For Lurch

As always, the respondents to this blog force this writer to clearly and concisely state his position. Specifically, our friend Lurch from Main and Central requested further discussions from Ranger on the subject of Lieutenant General Petraeus, and my suggestion that LTG Petraeus was not the correct person for the job of heading American forces in Iraq.

Out of the gate I must state the obvious, which is that the U.S. presence in Iraq is not legitimate. However, assuming the U.S. presence in Iraq will continue, the following thoughts are offered, not based on the new CI Bible, but rather, ideas gained from professional and personal education and experience.

The U.S. cannot fight the Battle of Hue (1968) in the streets of Baghdad. Placing a surge of U.S. combat assets will serve the function of bullet magnets. They will be engaged, and they will respond with overwhelming violence. Neither America nor Iraq can afford this waste. If one accepts the fiction that this is an insurgency, then a counter-insurgency strategy must be implemented.

LTG Petraeus is a conventional type of soldier. When his forces are attacked, they will respond. This is the ROE. One shot fired by an Iraqi of any stripe, and a neighborhood will disappear. LTG Petraeus will support the President's policy with no reservations. This is what soldiers do, but it will not result in peace and democracy in Iraq. It's very possible that the Iraqis do not even view that outcome as desirable.

American forces cannot be allowed to destroy Baghdad to save it. That scenario is counterproductive to any interests of America. As a conventional soldier, LTG Petraeus will respond accordingly. This is what Bush wants and expects, and this is also what will earn the LTG a promotion. But what is needed to get LTG Petraeus promoted is not what is required to stabilize Baghdad, which is ultimately not the purview of U.S. military power.

The only acceptable solution is the application of Special Forces unconventional warfare capabilities. A dedication of several Special Forces Groups to advise the Iraqi Army is the only viable solution, as the Iraqi Army is the only legitimate tool to affect a solution.

The Iraqi Army alone, or with U.S. Special Forces advisers, must be used to secure Baghdad. The U.S. Army successfully secured the hinterland in the Republic of Vietnam, but the Vietnamese government secured Saigon and the provincial capitals. This is correct and legitimate, and the same concept should be applied to Baghdad. The Iraqi government must control its own capital, or it is not a government, but a malignancy.

Unleashing the U.S. Army in Baghdad is overly aggressive and counterproductive. Further killing will be as useless as all the killing to date.

The U.S. Army cannot be the instrument to subdue the Sunni elements of Iraqi society. If the U.S. military subdues what is erroneously called a terrorist insurgent threat, then the rest of the Sunni Arab world will respond negatively, with the long-term interests of America severely injured.

If U.S. assets attack and fight Shia militias, this will push radical Shiite elements closer to Iranian hegemony, strengthening their cause by providing proof that America has long-term imperial interest in the area.

The U.S. surge in Baghdad may unite the Sunnis and Shiites for a temporary truce to address the U.S. presence. In the best case, both elements could fight independent, uncoordinated campaigns against the U.S. military. In the worst case, both sides would unite to deal with the U.S. and then solve their internal problems after the U.S. leaves the scene. Assuredly, the sectarian squabbles will continue as long as the U.S. is footing the bill.

And if Iraq ever becomes a democracy, does anybody believe they will be our friends?