Cop Out II

And if you're feeling cross and bitterish
Don't sit and whine
Think of banana split and licorice
And you'll feel fine
--Put on a Happy Face, By Bye Birdie

Why must I be surrounded by frickin' idiots?
--Dr. Evil, Austin Powers (1997)
__________

This is a follow on to yesterday's ''Cop Out.''

In the 1970's, Army protocol was that Captains fight the battles. Wars are won or lost at the company level. The caveat is that Colonels and Generals get the company to the right place at the right time to fight the right enemy.

Colonels and generals are also responsible for beans and bullets. This allows Captains to fight their units, but they do not function as independent units. They simply fight; the interrelationships are envisioned and implemented by ranks above them.

If the responsibility for this war has devolved to Lieutenants and Captains, then Colonels and Generals are not doing their jobs.

The situation in Iraq seems similar to that at Chosin Reservoir. Although the units at Chosin were division level, I believe the situation present some valid analogies to what is going on in Iraq at lower echelons.

Following are some likenesses, as I see it.

Enemy situation:

• The enemy can maintain the initiative
• There are unknown enemy elements operating. These units are of unknown strength.
• The enemy is willing to sustain casualties
• The enemy is motivated
• The population supports the resistance fighters with new recruitment, intelligence and resources
• The enemy can remain unidentified until the point of actual engagement, on both a personal unit level
• The resistance do not need sophisticated battle methods, as they can apply decisive combat power at a point and time of their own choosing
  

Friendly situation:

• Units are not tied together, and lack extensive fire planning and mutually supporting fires
• There are no friendlies to the right, left or rear. Troops are isolated in unsustainable positions
• The troops are overextended
• The commanders at Chosin did have control over all Combat Support and Combat Service Support Units. This is not true in Iraq, since contractors are independent of the military chain of command.
  
• The units believed that they could defeat the enemy through fire and maneuver. However, this is not true in either Chosin or Baghdad. Concentration of firepower and combat assets eventually stabilized the ChiCom threat; massive firepower will never solve the resistance/civil war in Iraq, though it may buy temporary local successes. Succeses which are abandoned the next day are not successes.
  
• The overall commander at Chosin thought that the had the initiative, although massive unidentified ChiCom formations were about to attack him in devastating strength. The same blindness hampers realistic threat assessment in Iraq. There may be unidentified enemy formations that are capable of extreme violence.
  

The U.S. does not have the initiative, nor do our commanders control the battlefield. U.S. policy is totally defensive and reactive.

Wars are won only through offensive operations, to include insurgencies or guerrilla wars.