Guerrillas in the Midst
What we got here is... failure to communicate
--Road prison Captain, Cool Hand Luke (1967)
We are here to help the Vietnamese, because inside every gook
there is an American trying to get out.
It's a hardball world, son. We've gotta keep our heads
until this peace craze blows over
--Pogue Colonel, Full Metal Jacket (1987)
___________
But more troubling than this shunting off of responsibility to those lower down in the chain of command is what is this event implies--the impossibility of any working relationship between U.S. command and Iraqis, both unaffiliated civilians and their government. As a case study of the U.S. Iraqi occupation, the Haditha incident suggests this situation is dire.
It is the blase and paranoiac nature of USMC division commander Major General Huck's comments which is most distressing. They suggest a disaffection borne of disappointment and lack of any positive situational reinforcement. The only thing that matters is survival, and a sort of self-justified stance of quashing anything that suggests defiance toward an already defeated unit.
The Marines and the U.S.military in general have a real perception problem when placed in the kitty litter box that is Afghanistan and Iraq. MG Huck said in a statement given at Camp Lejeune, nearly five months after the incident at Haditha, ''They may have been guys pulling the trigger, for all I know.''
Time magazine reporter Tim McGirk broke the story
The problem in Haditha is a microcosm of the larger problem experienced by U.S. troops elsewhere in Iraq. The equation is simple: The mayor is thought to be an insurgent, and the Marines are there to kill insurgents; the mayor represents the people, therefore, the people must be insurgents.
In an untenable contradiction, the Marines were in Haditha to protect the local population from the local population. If they refuse to be protected, then kill them, as they are the enemy, too.
The New York Times reported, ''Recently unclassified documents suggest that senior officers viewed the killings of 24 Iraqi civilians in Haditha in late 2005 as a potential public relations problem that could fuel insurgent propaganda against the American military, leading investigators to question whether the officers’ immediate response had been intentionally misleading.'' (''Propaganda Fear Cited in Account fo Iraqi Killings.'')
This kind of cherry story for the bad guys is what you get when you are not sure whether you are there to kill or cure. To cover up your vacillation regarding whether you've done a good or a bad thing, you lie. Kick a little dirt on them, and pretend they are left over from Saddam's days.
Regarding the possible outcome of Capt. Stone's hearing to determine whether he will stand trial at a court martial, John D. Hutson, former Navy judge advocate general said,
''Intangible considerations can also influence military lawyers in deciding whether to recommend charges when wrongdoing is more ambiguous. 'If you know the guy and he’s done well and he’s never done anything dishonest before you might give him the benefit of the doubt.''
I'm sure that the benefit of a doubt should be offered to young officers after a massacre. Every officer should be allowed a free pass for one practice massacre. That's part of military protocol, right?
But the key point which is rarely discussed is that the military's attitude reflects that fact that everyone from E1 to at least 08 is totally demoralized. They are feeling hopeless that their military skills are not solving the problems, so they are resorting to mindless violence, a la My Lai in Vietnam.
MG Huck--who dismissed the Time reporter inquiries ''because [he] saw him as a naïve conduit for the mayor of Haditha''--reflects this desperation is his inability to entertain the possibility that the killed civilians were unaffiliated with the insurgency. It reflects a weary attrition of the soul.
Not only are they demoralized, but they don't even know it, and this sublimation shows itself as violence which is easily shrugged off by a warrior culture.
The demoralization allows massacres, torture, detentions and all accompanying ugly facets of this Phony War on Terror.
Labels: marine haditha killings
posted by rangeragainstwar at 12:12 AM
2 Comments:
The most revealing thing about Haditha from my point of view was the cover story.
According to their cover story, they were attacked by a bunch of insurgents. The insurgents took cover in a building that housed civilians so the American troops pinned them down in the building and called in an air strike. The civilians, according to this account, were therefore "collateral damage" and the troops had done nothing wrong.
Of course this story is patently a lie since the civilians had bullet holes in their heads not shrapnel wounds. But why on earth should this get the troops off the hook? I thought we were supposed to be be there to protect civilians not strafe them.
Yet this is the story the troops at Haditha gave to show that they had acted PROPERLY.
From what I understand, such a practice is completely against our own military doctrine on how to fight an insurgency. So who's running the show over there?
the comet,
And more to the point, we need to figure out who is running the show over here. Because some day, we're going to have to leave that mess and deal with our own problems.
Military answer: generally, the U.S. Army is trained to accept 35% collateral damage of civilians in combat in built-up areas. Historically, if a commander felt that this number would be exceeded, permission was req. from higher HQ.
Consider that when realizing that we had nuclear weapons at division level. In short, it is not healthy for civilians to be around the U.S. Army in combat.
Haditha was a USMC op,and the initial error in this incident was the failing of the CO to file an after action report detailing the incident, as the civilians deaths exceeded the acceptable formula, which is 3:1 kill ratio.
Ranger's position is this will continue to happen as the troops become more frustrated with their inability to control the situation. My sympathy lies with the soldiers, and I understand their actions.
The only solution is to get them out of there. The hardest thing for a commander to do is to get his troops to cease shooting once engaged. This leads to the sort of incident we're discussing.
The problem is the military is operating as if Iraq is a normal combat scenario, when really, it is a civil war and/or an insurgency. Therefore the levels of violence should not be pumped up, as they would be on the battlefield.
Post a Comment
<< Home