Operation Red Wings Failure

Marti was a fightin' man
Whose story should be told
He was a son of circumstance
He couldn't quite control
--Marti's Last Stand,
Enter the Haggis
____________

The soon to be published book Sawtelo Sar: The Untold Story of Operation Red Wings and Whalers, by Ed Darack, will discuss the "disinformation and missed-information" surrounding Red Wings, the operation for which Michael P. Murphy received his Medal of Honor (Michael P. Murphy MOH).

While we are glad Mr. Darack has written his book, why is there disinformation attached to any U.S. combat operation in the glorious War on Terror? Of his statement I have no doubt, but why does it devolve to an embedded independent stock photographer and adventure writer who was never in the military to expose these facts?

Included on the website promoting the book is a picture of Jason Kamiya, Commanding General of CJTF-76, so this operation was a Task Force, which generally translates as a combination of forces arrayed under a single commander to fulfill a specific mission. T.F.'s are usually of a short duration and are not habitual unit relationships.

As a small aside, the General is wearing an Expert Infantry Badge, so the task force was commanded by a MG without a Combat Infantry Badge.

"The objective of [Operation Red Wings] was to 'disrupt anti-coalition militia operations that could potentially affect the upcoming national elections,' Translation: the Marines along with local Afghan forces would interdict those responsible for the creation and employment of IEDs (improvised explosive devices, commonly referred to as 'roadside bombs'), mortar and rocket attacks, and ambushes that destabilized the remote Kunar Province."

To the best of my memory, T.F.'s are usually Battalion-sized efforts with attachments, i.e, artillery, aviation, armor or whatever is required to fulfill the mission. Therefore, a Battalion Commander should be the T.F. commander, and T.F.'s are usually named for the T.F. Commander.

One of the difficulties that should have been anticipated before the operation kicked off was that this was a CJTF, with inherent problems built-in. As example, the Iranian hostage fiasco during Desert One demonstrates the services still have problems working J-level operations. Bay of Pigs, Son Tay Raid, Grenada offer other examples.

Operations are difficult enough at the service level, and adding outside resources does not make things go more smoothly. When will the U.S. services learn this lesson?

The target for Murphy's SEAL team was a militia led by Ahmed Shah which was neither Taliban or al-Qaeda, though it probably had financial links to both. It was one of "approximately 22" distinct oppositional units operating in the region. Murphy's unit was ratted out by a goat herder.

Once again, U.S. military members are being used to suppress and/or kill non-Taliban, non-al-Qaeda personnel; how does this constitute a part of the War on Terror? Surely Ahmed Shah is a rough customer, but so what? How does this impact the welfare of the U.S.?

When there are 22 distinct anti-coalition militias (ACM) in the area, one must question the validity of elections in such a region. This indicates a civil war, which has nothing to do with the security of America. To throw American troops into the fray is like putting them in a bumper car in which they will be buffeted by any number of known and unknown hostiles. The cars may be different colors, but they all look alike.

The actions of these militias can not even be justified as terrorism as it is a classic guerrilla / unconventional warfare scenario. Why does the U.S. military kill people and conduct combat operations to prop up phony puppet governments that do not reflect the will of the people?

It is doubtful that Afghanistan will ever have a representative government even if the U.S. military were to kill every goat , chicken, dog and goat herder in the area. Some things are beyond the purview of combat power. Afghanistan was a failed state when the U.S. invaded; the production of choreographed elections does not alter that reality. Kabul will never be an Athenian democracy.

Battalion 2/3 decided to name its operations after hockey teams. Why do we believe that sports analogize to combat operations? The Phony War on Terror (PWOT ©) is not a sporting event, and there will be no winners, though there are cheerleaders, but they never were in harm's way.

The fact that Shah was shot and chased out of the region in a subsequent operation (Whalers) is as meaningless as warm spit. He is simply regrouping in another location for another day, and his units will return as soon as the Marines pack their rucks and split the scene.

Shah and his inheritors will still be there when the Marines are old and telling their war stories in a VFW post.