Meeting Engagements

"Was it worth it? I am sure it was.
When we first came in here, the Iraqi people
seemed like they were happy to see us
--Sgt 1st Class Lon Bennish, 3-tour Iraqi veteran

Relying on luck, however,
does not constitute a policy
--Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice,
David Galula
_____________________

A basic rule of combat operations is not to move or place any unit anywhere unless it has mutual support -- visual, fire or both. The actions at Waygul and Miller, Murphy and now Meyer's Medals of Honor all violated that rule.

It is usual to have eye contact between units and that eyeball space is always covered by obstacles and fires, both direct and indirect. When visual contact is lost, so too, is the battle. Classic examples of this failure include Custer's Little Big Horn and The Battle of the Bulge, when units were too separated by distance to plug the gaps. Have we forgotten our hard-won ground combat sense?

Meeting engagements (or, "approach marches") are characterized by uncertainty and are difficult to manage UNLESS the friendly unit forward is part of a tactical movement with combat power in-depth, to include vertically. Space must be considered multi-dimensionally.

When and if we fight these engagements as a one-on-one fight, we are always going to be the designated loser because insurgents and guerrillas will not engage unless they have already prepared the battle area. Insurgents do not fight unless it is to their projected benefit -- the logistics of asymmetrical warfare dictate this theoretical given in unconventional and guerrilla warfare (UW/GW).

The fights we have read about in Afghanistan lack depth and do not qualify as battlefields. They are simply desperate men fighting for their lives, to no tactical advantage or gain.

The goal of all classic ground combat is to make contact (usually through a movement to make contact) and then fix and destroy or defeat the enemy through fire and maneuver. The War in Afghanistan is all fire, with no apparent successful maneuver.

Meeting engagements are always riskier and more difficult to manage than planned operations. The meeting engagement requires flexibility, maneuver and tactical proficiency in developing rapidly changing scenarios. In classic ground combat, major units -- such as Armored Cavalry and Reconnaissance units -- specialize in these types of actions. Both examples feature highly mobile forces with exceptional dedicated to the maneuver element.

Additionally, meeting engagements often result in fixing the enemy and then bypassing to attack deeper and more productive targets. Deep targets are always a priority, yet in Afghanistan we rarely see this type of action. This indicates that our operations lack depth and purpose beyond contact.

We will close by pointing out that Custer's fight was a meeting engagement. We know how that turned out.

Another fine mess.