Hedge Hogs
Today's Wall Street Journal advises the embedding of platoons into into 140 Iraqi army battalions and critical police stations as a way to "jump start the Iraqi military." Numerous faulty assumptions erode the credibility of the proposal that the platoons so embedded would serve as force multipliers.
The term "force multiplier" is a misnomer if we're talking about the combined arms team as envisioned in the Army's air-land-battle concept of the 1970's and 80's. With integrated fire support, the concept of force multiplier doesn't really apply. How can you amplify beyond the already integrated fire support, to include artillery and air support? If you want to use U.S. advisers as force multipliers, simply use forward observers and air liason officers to orchestrate fires.
The scenario put forth by the Journal envisions these multipliers as providing "moral reassurance"--something akin to cheerleaders who rouse spirit among the believers to go and fight the good fight. But this is to ignore the realities of the combat environment, wherein the only thing that matters is firepower brought at the crisis moment and unit cohesion. The term force multiplier implies that violence is being implemented and leveraged against an enemy, and combat power is brought to bear to destroy or capture this enemy. The force multiplier refers to the symphony of resources enlisted to bring a preponderance of assets to to bear to subdue the enemy attack.
However, before this can even be accomplished, the enemy must first be identified and fixed. Therefore, find, fix and destroy is the rule. If you can't fix 'em, then all the firepower in the world is useless. Herein lies the problem in Iraq and Afghanistan--the guerilla will evaporate before you can fix and destroy them; that is the nature of unconventional warfare. No guerilla or unconditional warfare force will allow itself to be fixed unless they choose to give battle, and then a wise commander would be well-advised to carefully assess the situation.
The article uses the Marine Corps Combined Action Platoon (CAP) program in Vietnam as an example of the effective embedding of combat advisers, which might cut "the overall U.S. troop requirement...nearly in half during the coming year." The CAPs were civic action platoons which lived with the people, who were accepting of their presence. Their primary mission was not combat; they were out to win hearts and minds. There's no doubt the CAP program was effective in VN, but only because the Marines had organic artillery and airpower to support units under attack. What firepower can the advisers bring down if the troops are not there to back them? Pon pons won't do much good.
In Iraq, will the envsioned adviser cadre retreat to a safety zone at night? if so, they aren't advisers in that sense.
The history of the Vietnam War is replete with times and places that VC/NVA forces saw fit to fight toe-to-toe with U.S. and RVN forces. Those are the fights most veterans choose to forget because the enemy prepared the battlefield before U.S. forces entered the fight. A fine present-day example is the Hezbollah bunker and tunnel systems in Lebanon. They were interconnected to provided escape routes and protection from blasts.
I was an adviser to the Vietnamese Special Forces in 1970. The earliest American approach to the Vietnam War was the Military Advisory Corps (MACV) concept of advisers. The concept of being embedded was not in vogue at that time. Usually, shrapnel was the thing that became embedded. Certainly not the media, and not advisers, either.
My counterpart, a Captain, had 13 1/2 years in the VN army. The VN Camp Commander and Major had each fought in the French Indochina War, each with 25 years military service. The Commander fought for the French, and the Major fought for the Vietnamese communists, before changing sides. At that time, I had been in the U.S. Army 21 months. All three of the VN soldiers in question--a Lieutenant Colonel, Major and Captain--called me, a lowly 1st Lieutenant, "sir". It was a joke that I would be advising such men.
An adviser does not have command authority; an adviser advises. While this does not seem like a news flash, the WSJ article implies that the advised are enjoined to abide by suggestions given. This is not so; the Iraqi commanders on the ground are not compelled to follow orders from an adviser.
In the Vietnam War, most advisers viewed themselves as conductors, vis-a-vis the engineer who was driving the train. Iraq will be no different. Likewise, Iraqi soldiers rightfully can ignore adviser guidance.
So where is the forward movement in implementing a plan to shift assets to embedded advisory positions? This shifting of assets is simply a dog and pony show that signifies nothing. I question why the Iraqi's (those U.S. sycophants) even need advisers when those who are attacking U.S. soldiers seem to be doing a heck of a job without any advisory support. Really, they're bringing it on, truth be known.
Why does the U.S. always seem to support the side that needs advisers to prop them up? Maybe sometime we'd be well-advised to back the fighters. In RVN, the Vietnamese flag was red with yellow stripes. The common quip was, if they're not Red, then they're yellow. The North Vietnamese army did a swell job without recourse to our eminent advisers.
It has long been my contention that the Iraqi situation will never be resolved via combat power, force multiplied or no. Everybody seems to acknowledge this fact, but U.S. policy still favors recourse to arcane juggling and permutations of the military option. Using insane tactics in an insane situation does not imply a healthy scenario, nor one that we're commanding. It just means that we are joining the fray on their terms. After 3 1/2 years, it is sadly evident that destroying cities in the name of democratization is insanity.
In a mind blowing statement, The Journal asserts, "The Iraqi Army has to take on the militias and the police units who side with them." I am left wondering: If the Iraqi army attacks the Iraqi police, which adviser will get priority for fire support? The police should not be fighting their population; they are a law and order function. The army should be for external threats, not civilian oppression. If this happens, we've merely replaced one oppressive army with another.
But what a great win-win scenario for the U.S.: since we arm, finance and train both the army and the police, whoever wins is our boy. I believe in economic parlance, that is called hedging your bets.
The term "force multiplier" is a misnomer if we're talking about the combined arms team as envisioned in the Army's air-land-battle concept of the 1970's and 80's. With integrated fire support, the concept of force multiplier doesn't really apply. How can you amplify beyond the already integrated fire support, to include artillery and air support? If you want to use U.S. advisers as force multipliers, simply use forward observers and air liason officers to orchestrate fires.
The scenario put forth by the Journal envisions these multipliers as providing "moral reassurance"--something akin to cheerleaders who rouse spirit among the believers to go and fight the good fight. But this is to ignore the realities of the combat environment, wherein the only thing that matters is firepower brought at the crisis moment and unit cohesion. The term force multiplier implies that violence is being implemented and leveraged against an enemy, and combat power is brought to bear to destroy or capture this enemy. The force multiplier refers to the symphony of resources enlisted to bring a preponderance of assets to to bear to subdue the enemy attack.
However, before this can even be accomplished, the enemy must first be identified and fixed. Therefore, find, fix and destroy is the rule. If you can't fix 'em, then all the firepower in the world is useless. Herein lies the problem in Iraq and Afghanistan--the guerilla will evaporate before you can fix and destroy them; that is the nature of unconventional warfare. No guerilla or unconditional warfare force will allow itself to be fixed unless they choose to give battle, and then a wise commander would be well-advised to carefully assess the situation.
The article uses the Marine Corps Combined Action Platoon (CAP) program in Vietnam as an example of the effective embedding of combat advisers, which might cut "the overall U.S. troop requirement...nearly in half during the coming year." The CAPs were civic action platoons which lived with the people, who were accepting of their presence. Their primary mission was not combat; they were out to win hearts and minds. There's no doubt the CAP program was effective in VN, but only because the Marines had organic artillery and airpower to support units under attack. What firepower can the advisers bring down if the troops are not there to back them? Pon pons won't do much good.
In Iraq, will the envsioned adviser cadre retreat to a safety zone at night? if so, they aren't advisers in that sense.
The history of the Vietnam War is replete with times and places that VC/NVA forces saw fit to fight toe-to-toe with U.S. and RVN forces. Those are the fights most veterans choose to forget because the enemy prepared the battlefield before U.S. forces entered the fight. A fine present-day example is the Hezbollah bunker and tunnel systems in Lebanon. They were interconnected to provided escape routes and protection from blasts.
I was an adviser to the Vietnamese Special Forces in 1970. The earliest American approach to the Vietnam War was the Military Advisory Corps (MACV) concept of advisers. The concept of being embedded was not in vogue at that time. Usually, shrapnel was the thing that became embedded. Certainly not the media, and not advisers, either.
My counterpart, a Captain, had 13 1/2 years in the VN army. The VN Camp Commander and Major had each fought in the French Indochina War, each with 25 years military service. The Commander fought for the French, and the Major fought for the Vietnamese communists, before changing sides. At that time, I had been in the U.S. Army 21 months. All three of the VN soldiers in question--a Lieutenant Colonel, Major and Captain--called me, a lowly 1st Lieutenant, "sir". It was a joke that I would be advising such men.
An adviser does not have command authority; an adviser advises. While this does not seem like a news flash, the WSJ article implies that the advised are enjoined to abide by suggestions given. This is not so; the Iraqi commanders on the ground are not compelled to follow orders from an adviser.
In the Vietnam War, most advisers viewed themselves as conductors, vis-a-vis the engineer who was driving the train. Iraq will be no different. Likewise, Iraqi soldiers rightfully can ignore adviser guidance.
So where is the forward movement in implementing a plan to shift assets to embedded advisory positions? This shifting of assets is simply a dog and pony show that signifies nothing. I question why the Iraqi's (those U.S. sycophants) even need advisers when those who are attacking U.S. soldiers seem to be doing a heck of a job without any advisory support. Really, they're bringing it on, truth be known.
Why does the U.S. always seem to support the side that needs advisers to prop them up? Maybe sometime we'd be well-advised to back the fighters. In RVN, the Vietnamese flag was red with yellow stripes. The common quip was, if they're not Red, then they're yellow. The North Vietnamese army did a swell job without recourse to our eminent advisers.
It has long been my contention that the Iraqi situation will never be resolved via combat power, force multiplied or no. Everybody seems to acknowledge this fact, but U.S. policy still favors recourse to arcane juggling and permutations of the military option. Using insane tactics in an insane situation does not imply a healthy scenario, nor one that we're commanding. It just means that we are joining the fray on their terms. After 3 1/2 years, it is sadly evident that destroying cities in the name of democratization is insanity.
In a mind blowing statement, The Journal asserts, "The Iraqi Army has to take on the militias and the police units who side with them." I am left wondering: If the Iraqi army attacks the Iraqi police, which adviser will get priority for fire support? The police should not be fighting their population; they are a law and order function. The army should be for external threats, not civilian oppression. If this happens, we've merely replaced one oppressive army with another.
But what a great win-win scenario for the U.S.: since we arm, finance and train both the army and the police, whoever wins is our boy. I believe in economic parlance, that is called hedging your bets.
posted by rangeragainstwar at 5:48 PM
13 Comments:
It wase clear from before the invasion that the US had no credible comprador class to rely in Iraq. The difference between Vietnam and Iraq is that our "allies" in Vietnam at least had 1) sociopolitical penetration into the basic structures of Vietnamese society (as hopelessly corrupt and doomed as it turned out to be, it was at least there) and 2) a comity of interests with the US elite funding their efforts.
Both of those were and remain lacking in Iraq. And, as Vietname demonstrated, you need alot more than that in order to get the country's population to accept your chosen political elites. Frankly, as a comitted anti-imperialist who maintains an interest in imperialist thought, I found, and still find, the Iraq War baffling far beyond the Vietnam War.
There was never a hope of achieving US political objectives through the overthrow of Saddam Hussein because there was no suitable comprador class through which the US could push its political objectives.
This was clear before the invasion, what happened in the White House that they couldn't see this?
I opposed the war of aggression regardless of its chance of success, but WTF?
Addendum: I forgot, there was a comprador class. They were known as the Ba`athists.
I doubt that, post-invasion, they would have served as a capable legitimate comprador class, but I didn't want to let that error slip.
Rojo,
I appreciate both of your comments. I never realized it, but I guess I'm also an anti-imperialist; I didn't realize this until you vocalized it. In RVN, I believe that was religious war also--Catholics vs. Buddhists. It was 3% of the pop. supported by the U.S., basically leaving the rest of the folks dangling, to be used as pawns. I say this as a Former Catholic.
Iraq, Afg. and VN share one basic attribute--we pick the ersatz leaders b/c they dress like us, speak English, and are willing to be bought off. Generally, it doesn't hurt if they have a collaborative CIA background, either.
Re. your Baathist observation: I seem to remember that after WWII, the U.S. occupations utilized Germans and Japanese personnel, who served Hitler and the Emperor during the war.
I don't believe that any sense could be made of Iraq and Afganistan, unless you determined where the money flows.
Lurch,
Thank you for your incisive comments, as always. Jim is not here for the next day or two, but I know he will appreciate what you have said. The technicalities are beyond my civilian brain,
Happy Holiday,
Lisa
Another point: In Vietnam, the South Vietnamese consisted of a fairly coherent army (as far as I know) where enemy-infiltration was at least not endemic. In Iraq, the shias are potentially liable to turn on embedded US troops in case of a conflict with the Mahdi army or Iran, or even along bloodlines. The danger of fragging seems very present in such a case.
Blitz,
I don't believe "potentially liable" is a strong enough statement (I dislike the term "embedded", but as it's the rage, I'll go with it.)
An advisor or any soldier is well-advised to have a personal exit strategy. In SF it's called an E & E (escape and evade) plan. I feel it's foolhardy to place our soldiers in places where they can't be exfiltrated if things go bad.
Fragging implies individual murder. I'm more worried about the systemic problem of Iraq unit loyalty. I believe we're on the same sheet.
Thanks for your well-thought out comment.
Lurch,
This was an OP-ED WSJ piece, and I should have noted it as such.
I believe it's a ,istake to place platoons or even U.S. companies with Iraqi units. A combat unit is similar to the Beatles and Rolling Stones in that they are synergistic. None of the foregoing could stand alone as great artists, and placing any one of them in a crummy band will not elevate the band.
The battalion is the smallest manuever unit in the Army; fragmenting units as advisors could be disastrous. Combat units are not trained as such. Also, all units at any level must "tie-in" to adjacent friendly units for synergistic utilization of fire assets.
Having said that, I must stress that the problem is not military, but rather, political. Firepower is not the solution. Peace through firepower is an oxymoron.
As for firepower comparisons, look at Mogadishu, VC, etc. Firepower is useless IF the adversary is willing to take the casualties and to carry on the guerilla campaign.
Even if we had unlimited air and artillery assets, it's foolhardy to employ these is skirmish-type entanglements.
As always, I believe we're in agreement on key issues, and I hate to bog down in details. I believe if we can trace the contractors that provided the purple ink for the great photo ops, then we'll figure out who's really benefitting from this war. I can't help but wonder what the real cost of that ink was to the American taxpayer.
Regards,
Jim
Just finished reading http://www.nybooks.com/articles/19720 about the process of the debaathification of the state and the demobbing of the Iraqi army. Amazing how this has been played. Just f&%¤ing amazing, beyond words. Bozo and Bongo does Iraq, with orders (like the demobbing-order) suddenly "appearing" in the chain of command without any clear source. Two paralell chains of command with diametrically opposite goals and shared power. A schizophrenic invasion is the best term that comes to mind. Its mindboggling, stupifying, surreal, like a bad Wagner-opera about the Bushian empire... Words fail me.
Blitz,
I've written on numerous occasions about the concept of the "country team." As a matter of policy, State Dept. Should be the lead agency when dealing with a foreign nation. Somehow State Dept. + foreign policy slide off my tongue very easily, but I have a severe problem with DoD determining what was typically State Dept. functions. This militarization of foreign policy was obviously permitted by the Decider in Chief.
Blitz,
I've written on numerous occasions about the concept of the "country team." As a matter of policy, State Dept. Should be the lead agency when dealing with a foreign nation. Somehow State Dept. + foreign policy slide off my tongue very easily, but I have a severe problem with DoD determining what was typically State Dept. functions. This militarization of foreign policy was obviously permitted by the Decider in Chief.
The problem, it seems from the article, is that they tried to do both at the same time, so that the initial plan of a quick in-and-out invasion got overhauled by the nation-building plan, leaving the ones on the ground to cope with new and undoable parameters of action. The demobilization of the Iraqi army is just an amazingly classic arm-chair general mistake. What on earth were they thinking?
I would propose waterboarding Rumsfeld until he describes in detail exactly his motivations and doings during this whole process...
Blitz,
Yes, it seems that the missions were stacked. The essence of a military mission is that it be achievable with the assets on hand.
I' not sure that anybody was thinking. This was an emotional response not based in reality.
I cannot second your waterboarding proposal, not even for Crummy Rummy. I do not espouse torture for any reason. But I also know that you were only joking.
I have several friends who think they were/are so religious they truly believed Jesus would come back as they entered Babylon, so they didnt need an exit-strategy ;-)
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