Nepotists and Contractors

Bankers, nepotists, contractors and talkies:
on four fingers one may count the leeches which have sucked a young and vigorous industry into paresis
--Dalton Trumbo

Trumbo was referring to corruption in Hollywood, but his statement holds just as well for our current administration. I am concerned that contracting for military support impedes our military operations by reducing the efficiency of the command structure.

The combat division is a self-contained organization for sustained ground combat. All divisions are considered to be manuever elements that possess what is commonly called the division slice of support. This slice is the combat service and combat-service support. These are the Jessica Lynches of the Army, if you will.

They drive trucks, repair vehicles, provide petroleum, oil and lubricants (POL), wash and repair clothes, run water and shower points, collect and dispose of dead bodies, retrieve discarded items from the battlefield, maintain weapons, and run mess facilities. They are generally not discussed, since they were traditionally at the unit level and organic to the units.

This is just a gross overview of combat support and combat service-support functions. The division, corps and theatre Armies have similar support to fulfill increased mission requirements of corps, and echelons above corps.

The trend of recent administrations has been to replace those division, corps and theatre support assets with contractors. I believe this is a politicial decision so that administrations can mislead the taxpayers as to the actual number of U.S. soldiers involved in an operation. The actual number of participants in an engagement is much larger that actual troop numbers, if you would include the contractors who are providing services that used to be provided by Army personnel.

I find it doubtful that contractors can provide the support network more efficiently or cheaper through contract bidding. Further, by contracting these services out, they are no longer subject to the tactical will of the commander.

In addition, contractors sometimes employ more indigenous personnel around U.S. forces. This does not facilitate operational security and, as such, should be discouraged.

While we did hire indigenous in Vietnam, those were not fast-moving tactical situations. Those were garrison situations, which facilitated the use of the indigenous population. In such circumstances, these personnel can be properly vetted. Without such oversight, indigenous employees are privy to troop movement, as their work schedule reflects our tactical schedules. The indigenous people in your mess hall may be loyal people, but they can be surveilled and compromised in many different ways.

It is a political lie that there are 150,000 soldiers in Iraq. There are untold numbers of military contractors that should be added to that figure, if the public were being told the rest of the story. (Where is Paul Harvey when we need him?)

Could you imagine military contractors at Bataan, Corregidor, D-Day, or the Battle of the Bulge? It just wouldn't work. Military contractors can never work in a traditional ground war because they're not responsive to the needs of the commander. And commanders should not be distracted by dealing with contractors, separately from their regular Army personnel.