Thin Red Line

We're living in a world that's blowing itself to hell as fast
as everybody can arrange it
--First Sgt. Edward Welsh, Thin Red Line (1998)

Attack! Attack!
of the peacekeepers attack!
Is it really you, NATO is here to protect
With Berlin type walls when they came to visit?
--Attack of the Peacekeepers, Jello Biafra

Why are the missiles called peace keepers
When they're aimed to kill
--Why? Tracy Chapman
__________

Eminent Middle Eastern scholar Bernard Lewis recently wrote a thoughtful piece in the Wall Street Journal, ''Was Osama Right?''

In it, he argues our problems in the Middle East stemmed from two Cold War object lessons: If you upset the Russians, punishment would be ''swift and dire,'' but if you moved against the Americans you would not only forgo punishment, you might even gain some reward from the ''usual anxious procession'' of apologists.

It takes a lot to follow Lewis, and my intention is only to amplify and extend some ideas pertaining to technicalities on the ground. As a quick historical gloss, he explains the Muslim perception of the struggle between Islam and Christendom for the ''opportunity to bring salvation to the rest of humankind.''

''This struggle against the West explains the widespread support in the Arab countries and in some other places first for the Third Reich and, after its collapse, for the Soviet Union. These were the main enemies of the West, and therefore natural allies.''

But by the 70's and 80's, the situation had changed:

''The more immediate, more dangerous enemy was the Soviet Union, already ruling a number of Muslim countries, and daily increasing its influence and presence in others. It was therefore natural to seek and accept American help. As Osama bin Laden explained, in this final phase of the millennial struggle, the world of the unbelievers was divided between two superpowers. The first task was to deal with the more deadly and more dangerous of the two, the Soviet Union. After that, dealing with the pampered and degenerate Americans would be easy.''

''We in the Western world see the defeat and collapse of the Soviet Union as a Western, more specifically an American, victory in the Cold War. For Osama bin Laden and his followers, it was a Muslim victory in a jihad, and, given the circumstances, this perception does not lack plausibility.''

Lewis describes the 1983 attacks on U.S. forces in Beirut and concurrent Soviet responses to kidnappings and other violence to their diplomats. I suggest that it is possible the kidnappers mistook the Russians for Americans.

It is further possible that the perpetrators had no reason to target the Soviets since they did not have a horse in the race. By this I mean, though U.S. forces were there as ''Peacekeepers,'' they actually took sides in this internecine warfare, in violation of the neutrality peacekeepers should exhibit. Hence, they became targets.

It is doubtful that they were simply targeted because they were Americans. They became targets only after they entered a horse in their race, unlike the Russians who were not siding amongst the opposing factions.

Mr. Lewis seems to insinuate that the U.S. now show strength through kidnapping and assassinations; if so, he is on the wrong track. This is what distinguishes the U.S. from the Soviet regime. The U.S. can not adopt lawlessness in order to combat lawlessness. It is a fetching idea, but it is ultimately impotent. And it is a day late and a dollar short. We need a cohesive approach which abides by the rule of law, and transcends partisan affiliations.

In Mogadishu, the same was true. The U.S. forces sided against Farrah Aidid and therefore entered the race. The same reaction came from the Somalians, leaving 19 U.S. servicemen dead. The U.S. deaths resulted from U.S. forces acting aggressively upon foreign soil.

The way to avoid these incidents is to not enter into unilateral U.S. peacekeeping missions, and to keep behavior while in multilateral missions within the auspices of U.N. mandates. The military is not arrayed for peacekeeping; we are organized for ground combat.

Reagan put the troops into Beirut, and Bush 41 put them into Somalia. The lesson is to keep your eyes on the Republicans. The Arabs are doing what is expected, which is living within their own borders.

The Thin Red Line should not have to serve as the world's Thin Blue Line.