Helter Skelter
Sgt. Archibald Cutter: You're mad!
Guru: Mad? Mad. Hannibal was mad, Caesar was mad,
and Napoleon surely was the maddest of the lot.
Ever since time began, they've called mad
all the great soldiers in this world. Mad?
We shall see what wisdom lies within my madness.
For this is but the spring that precedes the flood.
From here we roll on. From village to town.
From town to mighty city. Ever mounting, ever widening,
until at last my wave engulfs all India!
--Gunga Din (1939)
__________
Ranger has read and commented on Pat Tillman, Roberts Ridge, SSG Nein and Cpl. Sanford. My information was gleaned from open source material (After Action Reports available online.)
All of these actions share common threads:
[1] All were based on or resulted in hasty and ill-advised action. Only Nein's action indicated correct troop leading procedure prior to the action. Tillman's unit, the reaction forces at Roberts Ridge and Cpl. Sanford's unit were rushed for time and ignored basics of combat. These include leader's recon, establishing security elements and utilization of preplanned fires. None had an evident appropriate fall back contingency plan.
[2] All of these actions showed the heroism and dedication of our soldiers, even without proper staff planning and coordination.
[3] All of these actions show the lie that is evident in our Phony War on Terror (PWOT© ) in Afghanistan and Iraq. Yeah, we have a great new COIN program with a minty four-star guru, but units will be required at an instant's notice to divert and back up any Iraqi unit that is in a tight. Why?
The why is that the military is desperate to win, and to the military mind, killing people is the same as winning. Screw their hearts and minds -- blow their shit away!
What you have is a magnificently-equipped U.S Army running around willy-nilly looking for targets of opportunity. These hapless searches take place in the latest, most expensive blast-resistant vehicles money can buy. And of course, none of this expensive gear will produce a victory.
Using Cpl. Sanford's action as example, the Iraqi police are in a bad firefight to clear a house and call for help. If they are policemen, they should have backed out, contained the area and halted all movement in and out. The Iraqi Army should have been called for support, and anti-tank weapons could have been deployed to destroy them in place.
Since U.S. intelligence is so faulty the chain of command obviously prefers to throw assaults against houses full of insurgents and cross their fingers and hope for the best. When the best doesn't happen, cover it up with the heroism of the soldiers. Works every time.
These assaults are ill-advised, helter-skelter skirmishes, and overly costly to the tasked units. It is doubtful that the fighting, violence, death and destruction of any of these actions addressed the threat of al-Qaeda.
While the Chechen fighters at Roberts Ridge were hardcore al Qaeda assets, were they a strategic threat to America? Those jihadists wearing shower shoes in sub-zero temperatures were land-bound and fighting to expel the U.S. Army, as are most military assets that face U.S. troops.
Even if they were all al Qaeda linked, they are military arm and have no relationship to the sophistication of the western savvy 9-11 operatives. The threat of al-Qaeda is their infiltration-capable operatives. Their military arm cannot project any offensive action outside their sphere of influence. They may have the intent, but lack the capability. Which leads to the questions for us:
What you have is a magnificently-equipped U.S Army running around willy-nilly looking for targets of opportunity. These hapless searches take place in the latest, most expensive blast-resistant vehicles money can buy. And of course, none of this expensive gear will produce a victory.
Using Cpl. Sanford's action as example, the Iraqi police are in a bad firefight to clear a house and call for help. If they are policemen, they should have backed out, contained the area and halted all movement in and out. The Iraqi Army should have been called for support, and anti-tank weapons could have been deployed to destroy them in place.
Since U.S. intelligence is so faulty the chain of command obviously prefers to throw assaults against houses full of insurgents and cross their fingers and hope for the best. When the best doesn't happen, cover it up with the heroism of the soldiers. Works every time.
These assaults are ill-advised, helter-skelter skirmishes, and overly costly to the tasked units. It is doubtful that the fighting, violence, death and destruction of any of these actions addressed the threat of al-Qaeda.
While the Chechen fighters at Roberts Ridge were hardcore al Qaeda assets, were they a strategic threat to America? Those jihadists wearing shower shoes in sub-zero temperatures were land-bound and fighting to expel the U.S. Army, as are most military assets that face U.S. troops.
Even if they were all al Qaeda linked, they are military arm and have no relationship to the sophistication of the western savvy 9-11 operatives. The threat of al-Qaeda is their infiltration-capable operatives. Their military arm cannot project any offensive action outside their sphere of influence. They may have the intent, but lack the capability. Which leads to the questions for us:
- What are we fighting for?
- What are we fighting against?
- What can we win?
- When will we know if we've won?
- If we win, can we afford the cost?
Victory and War on Terror will never be uttered in the same sentence, save by fools like GWB & Co.
Labels: helter skelter approach in iraq and afghanistan, victory not compatible with war on terror (WOT)
posted by rangeragainstwar at 9:29 PM
6 Comments:
Stop speaking common sense and fall in line!
Excellent post...
elmo,
From squad to theatre command, both Afghanistan and Iraq are ad hoc missions with no realistic military objectives.
I don't know if this is common sense, or just basic military pragmatism, but both seem AWOL in our national planning.
Even Sesame Street could plan the thing better.
Happy Thanksgiving,
Jim
one of the things i hated most in vietnam was when we were simply told to go out into the boonies and (our term) farkle about smartly in the hopes of making contact or drawing fire. it was the obsession with body count (a meaningless statistic that harkens back to the civil war and grant's "terrible arithmetic of war") that brought that stuff about. it also flies squarely in the face of sound military philosophy. rather than being concerned with things like objectives, long term results, or anything else that would really matter they figure "kill 'em all, let god sort 'em out" which merely ensures that every single survivor of your last visit on down through their great-grandchildren will hate your murderous, brutal asses. it not only fails to accomplish any meaningful military objectives it ruins the chance of ever achieving them.
p.s. happy thanksgiving ranger house.
MB,
40 yrs. have come and gone, and we're back to square one.
Lisa's house wishes you a Happy Thanksgiving, as does Jim.
Towards the end of the VN war LRRP missions increased and their nature changed from avoiding contact to initiating contact. It went from small 6 man teams to heavy 12+ man teams. The logic, if it can be called that, was that as the war was winding down and becoming unpopular, small casualties were more acceptable than large ones. Generals in their comfort in the rear, put small groups of soldiers in peril at their whim in illconcieved operations with little thought for sound military planning.
Like you said, 40 yrs have come and gone and we're back to square one.
tw,
Yes, recon teams by definition are not equipped to fight, except to break contact. They are not hunters they are gatherers.
In MACVSOG this dual nature (recon/fight) was addressed by having Hatchet forces to exploit Recon findings. To the end 10's were strictly recon. Obviously, from your comments this was not your experience with US units.
If a team of any type has proper air and arty support, then they have a better chance of survival and success. From my readings this is not the case in Iraq, which has seemingly turned into small unit war without traditional firepower coverage.
jim
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