Political Mathematics

He told me,
Red means run, son,
numbers add up to nothin'
--Powderfinger, Neil Young

We are in a tragedy
--Lt. Gen. James Gavin (1967)
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"(T)he size of the force we deploy has little effect on the rate of attrition of enemy forces." The determining factor was not battlefield superiority, which usually went to the Americans, but the choice of battles. In a vast majority of cases, the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese controlled whether they would stand and fight. And when they did, according to the study, it was usually because they had initiated the battle.

. . .even though the U.S. forces had vastly superior kill ratios on the battlefield, the enemy, at almost any time, could limit losses -- and frustrate Westmoreland's attrition strategy -- by simply refusing to stand and fight.

--They Marched into Sunlight, Maraniss (p.219)
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"They Marched into Sunlight" is David Maraniss's sobering account of the Battle of Ong Thanh in Vietnam, 1967. But more sobering than the sad facts of that engagement is the sad fact that the mistakes of 1967 are the same ones the U.S. Army is making 40 years later.

In a nutshell, the Viet Cong forces facing the 1st Division in October '67 outsoldiered their U.S. counterparts and due to a ground commander's tactical blunders, two U.S. Companies were decimated. Among the errors:

• Technology hindered U.S. battlefield tactics and efficiency because the U.S. forces placed undue reliance on air strikes, which in this battle did not give U.S. forces an advantage.

• Poor tactical air planning. In fact, tac air may have given enemy forces a window of opportunity to maneuver and exploit their initial initiative. Air, artillery and heloes did not tip the scale.

• Company and Battalion mortars were not employed in this fight, although they were set up and registered and within supporting ranges.

• Weapons malfunctions played a company-level role. M-16's, M-60's and M-79's actually had battlefield shutdowns which were instrumental in this unit's destruction. No follow-up investigations were conducted, except concerning the M-16 and its ammunition problems.

• Faulty intel. Sending an Infantry Battalion Minus versus an NVA Regiment. Poor Fire Support Plan and coordination of fires.

• No attached assets; no aerial rocket artillery laid on.

• Poor Fire Support Plan and coordination of fires.

• No reserve forces in position.

• Weapons obviously not test-fired prior to mission.

• No automatic emergency resupply evident.

• No Medevac support on call.

• No LAWs available to the Infantry.

• No unity of command; poor prior planning; no concept of operation or logical commander's guidance.

• Units not mutually supporting.

• Units were depleted and not combat ready.

Is this all blood on the risers, only of interest to old-timers and history buffs? Not when the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq are also reporting malfunction M-249's, over-reliance on tactical air, and ditto everything else listed above.

41 years later and we are still dealing cards from the bottom of the same deck.