PAKMAN

That, passing strange, and wondrous true,
Himself at last believed it too
--The Ghost, Charles Churchill

War is one of the scourges with which
it has pleased God to afflict men
-- Cardinal Richelieu

Fresh confidence the specialist takes,
From every hair-brain'd proselyte he makes
--The Progress of Error, William Cowper
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Fellow military blogger Andrew Exum ("Abu Muquwama") often provides incisive commentary, but this week, his aspiring military analyst-for-hire was showing.

Ranger understands guys like Exum, Nagl and Kilcullen. They were educated and rewarded as soldiers, and saw the money floating around the COIN boardrooms, and they want their cut. They live in a diffuse world, and all they know is soldiering, as practiced by the U.S. military.

Charts, briefings, power points, staff studies, and they mistake all of that for reality. But just because it is in an OPLAN does not translate into reality. Military proponents live in a make-believe world where words substitute for reality. It is the Coney Island of the Mind.

As always with military analysts, there was a bulleted list of things the U.S. had to do in order to pull the nuts out of the fire. Let me be clear: Exum, Kilcullen and Nagl, are good and smart men, but they and others like them make their living off advising the Department of Defense on Counterinsurgency tactics. Unlike unpaid Rangers on the flank, they are selling a product based upon fear, with liberal doses of terrorism thrown in.

As consultants, they get paid regardless of consequences; soldiers are wounded, disabled or killed trying to execute their scenarios, but everyone gets paid only if the war continues.

Two bullets with which I disagree:

• The U.S. must eliminate corruption in Afghanistan

• The U.S. must increase the security of the Afghan people (even if this results in increased U.S. casualties.)

My disconnect is immediate: For one to discuss the application of COIN, one must accept the legitimacy of efforts in the region, which Ranger does not. The analysts tell us how, but never why.

Even if the allies were to be wildly successful in Iraq and Afghanistan, this will contribute nothing positive to the daily life of the average U.S. citizen. Will those countries ever be real allies, or simply a drag on our resources?

It is a classic case of national cognitive dissonance: Our policy embraces the slim positives and continues to throw money at insoluble and meaningless (to the U.S.) problems. AFPAK and Iraq will never make us safer, nor will they ever win the love and respect of the regional populations.

The key questions should be, "What are we trying to achieve, and why?" Gen. Stanley McChrystal, new U.S. Commander in Afghanistan, said this week, "The thing I believe in most is understanding what you're trying to do, and the effects of what you do." That is only half os the equation. The question which should take precedence is, "Why?"

Furthermore, these questions must be evaluated from a disinterested posture, different from the emotion-laden stance which landed us here.

The problem with bullet point one is that it presumes a noble ground, which does not exist. The entire U.S. Phony War on Terror (PWOT ©) is steeped in corruption, from both the side of the U.S. military and the contractors. Contractors now owe the government $2.8 Billion. Promotions, careers and consulting fees ride on the wars' continuance.

On the Afghan side, their government is composed of little more than pimps who care little about democracy (They're not even pimps, as they usually provide the services they promise). The Afghan's concern with the concept is, how it will allow them to turn a buck. The Afghan government provides squat to the strategic environment.

Afghan was a failed state under the Soviets and the Taliban, and continues to be one under U.S. tutelage. The U.S. Army is not a missionary force. If the U.S. attacks the corruption inherent in the Afghan government, this reveals us to be the puppet masters versus the Jeffersonian democrats we claim to be.

The Afghan government will never be other than corrupt because the U.S. siring policy was corrupt. Corruption begets corruption. Corruption is the only motivator U.S. COIN policy has to offer any current COIN environment since true nationalists would eschew U.S. dominance.

As for bullet point two: Whose country is this? Only the Afghan police and Army can secure the safety of the Afghan people. If this cannot be achieved, then the U.S. is chasing its tail.

Security cannot be externally imposed upon any country, let alone a failed state. There comes a time for realism to bite us on the ass, when we must realize that Somalia, Afghanistan, the Waziristan areas will always be failed states because there is no imperative or precedent for a viable government. A nation in which most everybody carries an AK-47 will not be pacified or democratized by forming additional armed groups and calling them "Armies" or "Police." L'etat c'est Moi.

The security of Somalia, AFPAK, etc. is not the DoD's responsibility.

A note to the SECDEF: This is a free consult.