A Dart to the Heart

Some folks you don't have to satirize,
you just quote 'em
--Tom Paxton

In a free and republican government,
you cannot restrain the voice of the multitude.
Every man will speak as he thinks
or more properly, without thinking.
--George Washington

A bullet to the heart
is worth two in the bush
--Ranger Hruska
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There is a doctrinal disconnect in the use of the basic rifle (M4) and squad and platoon level machine guns (MG).

The individual rifle has characteristics which limit its use in both the Phony War on Terror (PWOT ©) and conventional combat. The design limitations of our weapons are not being considered when training the troops, leading to unnecessary deaths for U.S. forces.

Recent Army experience shows that troops are experiencing stoppages and malfunctions in prolonged fighting scenarios -- the rifle overheats and/or fails to operate. The MG's also overheat and cease to be operational. The problems are due to weapons characteristics and/or training deficiencies.

Weapons characteristics: The U.S. systems are based upon war fighting considerations. The MG is designed to quick change the barrel in combat before it overheats, rendering the unit inoperational. The M240 and M249 have quick change barrels, so overheating and chamber welds should not happen, even in extended actions.

The above is true if the gunners/assistant gunners carry extra barrels and service the weapon, honoring the designation, "crew-served weapon". In addition, the ammunition must be kept clean, dry and protected from contamination.

The rifle will overheat if fired excessively in combat or range firings. Both individual and crew-served have extreme operational limits which can be ameliorated by training.

Training deficiencies: The U.S. Army is organized and equipped to fight theatre level scenarios. The PWOT is an unexpected scenario, and the Army simply applied a tactical tool to an insurgency environment. The Army is designed to fight other similarly arrayed forces, so our training emphasizes volume of fire and fire superiority. This is relevant in attack/defense environments on the conventional battlefield. Volume of fire is the key to winning, but not in counterinsurgency scenarios.

When platoons and companies operate independently against similar sized opposition forces not supported by normal national army assets, then we have problems. At Wanat, the defenders had a winning hand but they violated doctrine:

• They overheated their weapons
• They were defending non-defensible terrain
• They underutilized or improperly placed their organic mortar assets

All of these deficiencies could be overcome by leadership and training, but this presumes the leaders possess the requisite skills to impart to the troops.

Volume of fire and firing weapons at their maximum rate is not wise unless employing final protective fires (FPF). FPF is only used when it is clear that the final assault is being pressed. Firing weapons excessively at max is an invitation to disaster. Why did the MG's overheat? Were the barrels not changed in a timely manner?

Training should teach soldiers to fire at selected distant targets; simply putting out fire is not an effective infantry tactic. In the defense, each team member should fire selectively on semi-auto.
Easy to say, hard to do, but this is why we have professional soldiers paid to do hard jobs in hard environments.

Speaking as a former infantryman, it would be preferable to give the troops bolt-action rifles that shoot every time rather than full auto weapons that malfunction at critical times. This is not said frivolously. In a COIN environment this would be an acceptable modification consideration. Another modification would be to issue only semi-auto versions of the M4 to all troops in the COIN environment backed up by normal MG's and battalion level weapons.

If a U.S. Platoon or Company cannot defeat 3:1 when defending, then the Army needs some serious reconfiguring.