Terrible, but Not so Enfant, Part Deux

Is there a place for the hopeless sinner,
Who has hurt all mankind just to save his own beliefs?
--One Love, Bob Marley

Marley poses a good question, and for GWB's sake, we hope it'll be alright. However, as I do not have the benefit of the spliff which Mr. Marley probably did when writing these inspired lyrics, I cannot "feel alright" about the whole thing. Over morning coffee, not in a canteen cup, I considered a recent posting--Enfant Terribles. My infantry brain went about deconstructing and extending the ideas, and this is the result:

The combat arms of the Army are death-dealing machines, their only function, to utilize fire and maneuver to defeat an enemy on the battlefield. To a limited extent, this combat power can be modified and utilized to counter resistance movements that are unconventional or guerilla in nature. When this modification occurs, U.S. soldiers start wearing Green Berets and are referred to as Special Operations Forces (SOF). Unlike conventional combat units, the SOF generally has four missions:

• Unconventional Warfare (UW)
• Guerilla Warfare (GW)
• Intelligence
• Direct Action (DA)

Somewhere, Psychological Operations are thrown into the mix.

Those are the differences from regular Infantry, save for Mission Four (DA), when they are functioning exactly the same as every other combat soldier in the U.S. forces. Direct action consists of closing with and destroying the enemy. Generally, it is my impression that DA has become the main mission of SOF in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Going "toe-to-toe" with hostile forces negates the "combat multiplier" effect of these elite units. A regular Army private can do the same thing in a more cost-effective manner. The loss of an Infantry PFC is not equivalent to the loss of an E-7 SOF asset. Please realize that I am not speaking on any essential, moral level here; it is a cold statement of invested training value. SOF assets should not be the soldiers of choice in individual deadly combat.

But beyond this incorrect employment of combat assets, my larger concern is that Iraq and Afghanistan embody complex sociological, psychological, religious, economic and political issues, with armed resistance and religious militias also on the scene, which no amount of U.S. force application will resolve.

Unfortunately, a sizeable percentage of Americans think the answer in Iraq is throwing a preponderance of Army and Marine power in there to smash the hell out of everybody and everything. Kill them all and let God sort 'em out. Sounds tough on wannabe T-shirts, but it's a disastrous policy on the ground. While I'm not opposed to legitimate use of military violence, legitimacy is not on our side in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The combat forces of the U.S. military are similar to a predator missile, in that both forms of violence are applied correctly only after the intelligence cycle has determined which legitimate target to engage. Combat units have intelligence shops (S2) designed to deal with enemy order of battle and other intelligence pertinent to ground combat. However, these S2's are not tuned to resistance movements and insurgencies/UW/GW.

The intel utilized by U.S. forces in Afghanistan and Iraq is usually provided by the host nation, which may or may not be providing accurate intelligence. The U.S. military should not utilize foreign intel to justify support of Shia dominance in Iraq. Fighting Sunnis is not the solution to this conundrum.

In effect, the U.S. military is now functioning as a strike arm of the Shia majority. Destroying Sunni towns will not address the core issues. You don't deflect and neutralize a threat via combat power; if you use it, it must be as a part a coordinated civilian/military program. This collaborative team effort is necessary to model the desired outcome.

Optimally, you use your enemy's power against him to immobilize or attrit his force, as in the Japanese martial arts of Jujitsu or Aikido. The goal is a blending, versus a clashing. I'm not suggesting we borrow another move from the Tom Cruise playbook (The Last Samurai), but getting back to my intial statement, the combat arms of the Army are death-dealing machines, a mission incommensurate with mediation or peace-keeping.

There are no historical examples of successfully defeating resistance movements solely with overwhelming destruction dealt by combat forces. Combat power minus diplomatic or political justification is murder.