Boys are Back in Town

GWB was technically truthful. Iraq will be a strong ally
in the war on terror -- just not necessarily our ally
--The Longer the War, the Larger the Lies, Frank Rich

Guess who just got back today?
Those wild-eyed boys that had been away
Haven't changed, haven't much to say
--The Boys are Back in Town, Thin Lizzy

________

There has been much talk in recent weeks of disbanding the Iraqi police altogether, so fraught with corruption is that force.

And amid another police culture many claim is rife with corruption, the Afghan police are also dealing with the changing threat posed by the Taliban (Afghan Forces Suffer Setbacks as Taliban Adapt).

"Over the past six weeks, the Taliban have driven government forces out of roughly half of a strategic area in southern Afghanistan that U.S. and NATO officials declared a success story last fall in their campaign to clear out insurgents and make way for development programs, Afghan officials say.

"A year after Canadian and U.S. forces drove hundreds of Taliban fighters from the area, the Panjwai and Zhare districts southwest of Kandahar, the rebels are back and have adopted new tactics. Carrying out guerrilla attacks after NATO troops partly withdrew in July, they overran isolated police posts and are now operating in areas where they can mount attacks on Kandahar, the south's largest city."

The media is finally labeling the Taliban as guerrilla, versus terrorist. But they failed to note that these attacks on the local police are actually training missions before the Taliban gain the proficiency to engage Afghan Army and NATO units. They will train versus police and army units, and then the engage NATO elements. This is textbook insurgent evolution. Further, the attacks allow the Taliban to loot weapons, munitions and commo gear, all graciously provided for by U.S. taxpayers.

"NATO and Afghan army soldiers can push the Taliban out of rural areas, but the Afghan police are too weak to hold the territory after they withdraw. At the same time, the Taliban are unable to take large towns . . ."

The Taliban does not need to take the large towns to control the country. They have boxed the government forces into the large towns.

"At least 2,500 to 3,000 people have died in insurgency-related violence so far this year, a quarter of them civilians, according to the U.N. tally, a 20 percent increase over 2006.

"NATO and U.S. casualty rates are up by about 20 percent this year, to 161, according to Iraq Casualty Count, a Web site that tracks deaths in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Afghan police continue to be devastated by Taliban bombings and guerrilla strikes, with 379 killed so far this year, compared with 257 for all of last year."

By killing farmers and coercing the population, the Taliban is creating an effective indigenous infrastructure outside the control of the government and NATO forces. Placing Taliban personnel within the social structure is a preparation of the battlefield for future military operations, adding a depth that cannot be neutralized via purely military means.

An anticipated Taliban spring offensive never materialized, "and Western officials say that raids by NATO and U.S. Special Operations forces have killed dozens of senior and midlevel Taliban commanders this year."

But Taliban operations need not materialize to be effective, as the simple threat of possible operations ties down NATO and Afghan assets. Killing senior and midlevel assets is meaningless since the organization is nurturing new leaders throughout its operational cycle.

When the army and foreign troops withdraw, they leave lightly armed Afghan police forces unable to hold rural areas. "Corruption is rampant among the police, and some units have exaggerated casualty rates or abandoned checkpoints."

That the government has to withdraw troops shows they have only sporadic control of the countryside. In effect, they control the perimeters out to 400 meters -- the effective range of the M-4 carbine. This inability to control the country is a recipe for disaster in the CI mode. If you don't control the countryside, then it is not your country -- merely contested ground.

When Canadian and Afghan forces began withdrawing from four checkpoints and two small bases in Panjwai in early July, leaving two Afghan police posts in Panjwai largely unprotected, the Taliban attacked the posts simultaneously. "For several hours, the police held them off and called for help from Canadian forces but none arrived. Sixteen policemen were killed."

The simultaneity of the attacks shows sophistication, tactical proficiency and confidence. The key point here is that NATO forces can hold the countryside forever, but that doesn't make it an Afghan state. Only Afghans can create an Afghanistan.

When 16 police are killed, then 16 kits are transferred to the Taliban. More importantly, the Taliban have gained a small training coup and gained an aura of authority among the local citizenry. While they may be forced later to withdraw, that is neither a defeat for them, nor a victory for the government. It is simply the ebb and flow of CI combat.

The Canadian forces were correct not to rush in response to the distress call from the overrun police stations and a secondary ambush, as the time frame was indicative of Taliban initiative.

Gearing friendly response to the enemy's tempo is a recipe for disaster. The Taliban probably wanted NATO troops more than the police, but when the Canadians failed to materialize, they killed 16 cops and called it a successful day. Either way they scored a victory, as they showed government troops to be ineffective.

The Canadians report they have retaken the checkpoints, but checkpoints in that environment are meaningless anyway, as the Taliban will simply bypass them. This not like directing traffic at the Champs-Élysées. Channeling Sam Kinison once again, it's a desert, folks.

Panjwai police chief Bismillah Jan has 64 policemen and five vehicles now, "to defend the district from several hundred Taliban fighters. He said that his men could make forays into Taliban areas but that could not hold terrain."

The police should be there to perform law and order functions; they are not warfighters. Possibly they make forays to visit their cousins and uncles in the Taliban.

It was noted that "[l]ast year, [the Taliban] had their own trenches and their own places. Now, they are very close to the houses and families. Their tactics changed."

But this is not a new tactic. It is as old as the Vietcong on the Republic of Vietnam, and then some. It is called "grabbing the belt" --you hug your opponent, thereby neutralizing his long-range fires. This configures the fight as a one-on-one infantry squabble, a paradigm in which the insurgent always wins.

The article also notes the August kidnapping of a mayor, who was released when his family paid ransom. Separating the criminals from the insurgents in that environment is an impossible task. Hostage-taking for ransom is a classic insurgent/terrorist activity which grows and sustains the insurgent groups. It shows the ineffectiveness of the government and the group's control over the population.

The noteworthy points here are that the Taliban is being recognized as an indigenous group of insurgents by the media, rather than their formerly incorrect designation as terrorists, and that the activities of the Taliban fit classic CI methodology and evolution.

Our technologies may evolve, but there is nothing new under the sun.