Truth, Lies and Afghanistan

--President's Day, 2012

Garbage. All I've been thinking about
all week is garbage.
I mean, I just can't stop thinking about it
--Sex, Lies and Videotape (1989)

________________

The Armed Forces Journal ran a piece earlier this month by Lieutenant Colonel Daniel L. Davis, "Truth, Lies and Afghanistan: How Military Leaders Have Let Us Down." After two year-long tours in the country, Davis decided to write about how the reality he saw did not mesh with the spin.

While it is commendable that LTC Davis spoke his truth, Ranger will fish out the problematic details.

In his first graph, Davis speaks of "the enemy", but of whose enemy is speaking? Are the enemies of the Afghan government enemies of my country? Is the U.S. war fighting or doing counterinsurgency (COIN)? What is our mission? How did killing Taliban become a U.S. war policy?

Davis says he deployed hoping to find local governments and military "progressing toward self-sufficiency", but becoming self-sufficient is not an outcome of the application of military power; to the contrary. A nation has military power because it is self-sufficient. Mirroring U.S. policy, LTC Davis puts the cart before the horse.

Writes Davis:

I saw the incredible difficulties any military force would have to pacify even a single area of any of those provinces; I heard many stories of how insurgents controlled virtually every piece of land beyond eyeshot of a U.S. or International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) base.

How does "pacification" relate to the U.S. effort? What is pacification, and is it a part of nation-building? Have there been any precedents for successful military pacification programs central to a U.S. mission in a theatre scenario? Surely it is not as simple as occupying key terrain and killing all opposition forces.

Is it possible that the insurgents, the Taliban and the Afghan people are not aligned with U.S. goals? Davis saw "little or no evidence" of a government capable of providing even basic needs, and "[s]ome of the Afghan civilians I talked with said the people didn’t want to be connected to a predatory or incapable local government."

If true, then there is no government structure in Afghanistan -- only a poor simulacrum reliant totally on U.S. arms to subjugate the population. This is not a reason for the U.S. military to be killing people on a daily basis, and Davis suggests as much.

When speaking of the police, Davis asks a police captain if they send out harassing patrols, but harassing patrols and combat patrols are military functions, and should be separate from police authority. Police should not hunt people down for the purpose of killing them; they are law enforcement, not war fighters.

Of course, the police captain thought Cavalry LTC Davis's question nuts:

“No! We don’t go after them,” he said. “That would be dangerous!”

The captain made a sane response. Sticking him and his officers out in the middle of a lawless nowhere is nuts. How does it benefit anything if another firefight happens or not? If their government is a chimera, why would anyone expect the police to die for a fantasy? Afghan policemen are not Cav troopers; the latter get to go home after their tours.

A non-sequitur occurs in the piece: After describing the failings of the Afghan National Police (ANP), Davis says most U.S. officers told Davis "they had nothing but contempt for the Afghan troops in their area — and that was before the above incident occurred." Troops and police are different entities; while both are surely substandard, Davis only gives particulars on the ANP behavior.

He quotes a local official serving as a cultural adviser to a U.S. Commander who cites the example of a Taliban murder of an off-duty ANP member visiting family as showing that "[t]he people are not safe anywhere." However, the ANP member was a representative of the government and as such, he was a valid target for the opposition forces; that is how insurgents operate.

"Abysmal" is the word Davis uses to describe the "tactical" situation, but really, he is describing the social and political status quo, too. Perhaps since he is writing as a military man for a military journal, he was simply writing to his audience. But a change in tactics can only affect the military situation, leaving the other failures in place.

Davis sometimes gets bogged down in the how's, but addressing the why's will deliver a better truth. The war was based on lies and false assumptions, and truth can never flow from that font.

Davis concludes,

When it comes to deciding what matters are worth plunging our nation into war and which are not, our senior leaders owe it to the nation and to the uniformed members to be candid — graphically, if necessary — in telling them what’s at stake and how expensive potential success is likely to be. U.S. citizens and their elected representatives can decide if the risk to blood and treasure is worth it.

Likewise when having to decide whether to continue a war, alter its aims or to close off a campaign that cannot be won at an acceptable price, our senior leaders have an obligation to tell Congress and American people the unvarnished truth and let the people decide what course of action to choose. That is the very essence of civilian control of the military. The American people deserve better than what they’ve gotten from their senior uniformed leaders over the last number of years. Simply telling the truth would be a good start.

This is no slam on a mid-level 0-5 who is putting it on the line, but shouldn't we have had this discussion 10 years ago rather than last week, and shouldn't it be led by someone with more horsepower than an 0-5?



Addendum -- One of our faithful readers, GunsShowJoe, made the following incisive comment we'd like to share regarding Davis's piece and how we came to be here:

My take -- in this world appearance takes precedent over reality (with only very rare exception) even in situations involving the life and death of people and governments. We have most recently seen this in the cases of Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan. The old saw about killing the messenger if the news is bad comes to mind, so all the messengers make sure they deliver only good news and all the leaders pretend it is real!

Wasn't it one of George W's minions who said, "We create the reality of and for the world" or words to that effect? Such men have perverted the truth for their own nefarious and hidden reasons...so that the entire world is now truly upside down and inside out.

Spot-on, GSJ. And that's why a truth that's allied with the facts matters. Otherwise, the truth will be "Twisted by knaves to make a trap for fools", as Kipling wrote.

Truth perversion is a high art for those practicing the discipline. People like Peter Van Buren (We Meant Well) and now LTC Davis generally don't fare so well up against the Institutions --Lisa

Overkill

(Spc. Justin French/Army) An Afghan National Policeman fires a rocket-propelled grenade during a live-fire exercise near Beshud, Nangarhar province, Afghanistan, on Feb. 13. The range is for U.S. forces to evaluate the ANP on their marksmanship skills

Of all the weapons in the vast soviet arsenal,
nothing was more profitable than
Avtomat Kalashnikova model of 1947.
More commonly known as the AK-47,
or Kalashnikov.
It's the world's most popular assault rifle.
A weapon all fighters love.
An elegantly simple 9 pound amalgamation
of forged steel and plywood.
It doesn't break, jam, or overheat.
It'll shoot whether it's covered in mud
or filled with sand.
It's so easy, even a child can use it;
and they do.

The Soviets put the gun on a coin.
Mozambique put it on their flag.
Since the end of the Cold War,
the Kalashnikov has become the Russian people's
greatest export.
After that comes vodka, caviar,
and suicidal novelists.
One thing is for sure,
no one was lining up to buy their cars.
--Lord of War (2005)
________________

[NOTE: Sign of the times -- We searched for the photo accompanying the 8.22.11 Army Times article, but the links for the Army Times title, "Weapon of Choice", were all for video games.]

Army Times recently ran a piece on the iconic RPG ("The Enemy's Weapon of Choice"), every terrorist's favorite weapon.

The picture accompanying the piece is captioned: "A U.S soldier coaches an Afghan National Police officer as he prepares to fire a rocket-propelled grenade launcher during a skills assessment mission on a range in Beshud, Afghanistan."

Now, being from Eastside Cleveland, Ranger knows from rough neighborhoods and both gang and police brutality. But when did RPG's become a police weapon? Is the RPG the Afghan Police equivalent of a Taser? Further, what qualifies a U.S. soldier to train a civilian police officer? A soldier's creed for weapon use is not exactly protect and serve, after all.

Training soldiers is typically a State Department function. Military Police are not civilian police, nor do they possess any skills associated with civilian police functioning, especially not in a country on the backside of nowhere.

RPG's are anti-tank weapons; aside from the character Hurley in Lost, they seem most inappropriate against the average civilian. Does the Taliban have armored vehicles requiring police destruction? Moreover, isn't tank killing a military vs. a police function?

Exactly whom does the Afghan police protect and serve? RPG's would seem to be the tool of tyrants forcing subjugation to and complicity with an unpopular regime.

Let's quit the sham that the Afghan Police and Army are forces of democratization. Both are simply extensions of war lord policies, just another level of violence imposed upon a war-weary nation. However, war-weary America is our concern, and our country should not be complicit in this dirty business.

Idea: Let us give everyone in Afghanistan an AK-47 and an RPG, freeing us to proceed to our next monumental fiasco. Bring it on!

Boys are Back in Town

GWB was technically truthful. Iraq will be a strong ally
in the war on terror -- just not necessarily our ally
--The Longer the War, the Larger the Lies, Frank Rich

Guess who just got back today?
Those wild-eyed boys that had been away
Haven't changed, haven't much to say
--The Boys are Back in Town, Thin Lizzy

________

There has been much talk in recent weeks of disbanding the Iraqi police altogether, so fraught with corruption is that force.

And amid another police culture many claim is rife with corruption, the Afghan police are also dealing with the changing threat posed by the Taliban (Afghan Forces Suffer Setbacks as Taliban Adapt).

"Over the past six weeks, the Taliban have driven government forces out of roughly half of a strategic area in southern Afghanistan that U.S. and NATO officials declared a success story last fall in their campaign to clear out insurgents and make way for development programs, Afghan officials say.

"A year after Canadian and U.S. forces drove hundreds of Taliban fighters from the area, the Panjwai and Zhare districts southwest of Kandahar, the rebels are back and have adopted new tactics. Carrying out guerrilla attacks after NATO troops partly withdrew in July, they overran isolated police posts and are now operating in areas where they can mount attacks on Kandahar, the south's largest city."

The media is finally labeling the Taliban as guerrilla, versus terrorist. But they failed to note that these attacks on the local police are actually training missions before the Taliban gain the proficiency to engage Afghan Army and NATO units. They will train versus police and army units, and then the engage NATO elements. This is textbook insurgent evolution. Further, the attacks allow the Taliban to loot weapons, munitions and commo gear, all graciously provided for by U.S. taxpayers.

"NATO and Afghan army soldiers can push the Taliban out of rural areas, but the Afghan police are too weak to hold the territory after they withdraw. At the same time, the Taliban are unable to take large towns . . ."

The Taliban does not need to take the large towns to control the country. They have boxed the government forces into the large towns.

"At least 2,500 to 3,000 people have died in insurgency-related violence so far this year, a quarter of them civilians, according to the U.N. tally, a 20 percent increase over 2006.

"NATO and U.S. casualty rates are up by about 20 percent this year, to 161, according to Iraq Casualty Count, a Web site that tracks deaths in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Afghan police continue to be devastated by Taliban bombings and guerrilla strikes, with 379 killed so far this year, compared with 257 for all of last year."

By killing farmers and coercing the population, the Taliban is creating an effective indigenous infrastructure outside the control of the government and NATO forces. Placing Taliban personnel within the social structure is a preparation of the battlefield for future military operations, adding a depth that cannot be neutralized via purely military means.

An anticipated Taliban spring offensive never materialized, "and Western officials say that raids by NATO and U.S. Special Operations forces have killed dozens of senior and midlevel Taliban commanders this year."

But Taliban operations need not materialize to be effective, as the simple threat of possible operations ties down NATO and Afghan assets. Killing senior and midlevel assets is meaningless since the organization is nurturing new leaders throughout its operational cycle.

When the army and foreign troops withdraw, they leave lightly armed Afghan police forces unable to hold rural areas. "Corruption is rampant among the police, and some units have exaggerated casualty rates or abandoned checkpoints."

That the government has to withdraw troops shows they have only sporadic control of the countryside. In effect, they control the perimeters out to 400 meters -- the effective range of the M-4 carbine. This inability to control the country is a recipe for disaster in the CI mode. If you don't control the countryside, then it is not your country -- merely contested ground.

When Canadian and Afghan forces began withdrawing from four checkpoints and two small bases in Panjwai in early July, leaving two Afghan police posts in Panjwai largely unprotected, the Taliban attacked the posts simultaneously. "For several hours, the police held them off and called for help from Canadian forces but none arrived. Sixteen policemen were killed."

The simultaneity of the attacks shows sophistication, tactical proficiency and confidence. The key point here is that NATO forces can hold the countryside forever, but that doesn't make it an Afghan state. Only Afghans can create an Afghanistan.

When 16 police are killed, then 16 kits are transferred to the Taliban. More importantly, the Taliban have gained a small training coup and gained an aura of authority among the local citizenry. While they may be forced later to withdraw, that is neither a defeat for them, nor a victory for the government. It is simply the ebb and flow of CI combat.

The Canadian forces were correct not to rush in response to the distress call from the overrun police stations and a secondary ambush, as the time frame was indicative of Taliban initiative.

Gearing friendly response to the enemy's tempo is a recipe for disaster. The Taliban probably wanted NATO troops more than the police, but when the Canadians failed to materialize, they killed 16 cops and called it a successful day. Either way they scored a victory, as they showed government troops to be ineffective.

The Canadians report they have retaken the checkpoints, but checkpoints in that environment are meaningless anyway, as the Taliban will simply bypass them. This not like directing traffic at the Champs-Élysées. Channeling Sam Kinison once again, it's a desert, folks.

Panjwai police chief Bismillah Jan has 64 policemen and five vehicles now, "to defend the district from several hundred Taliban fighters. He said that his men could make forays into Taliban areas but that could not hold terrain."

The police should be there to perform law and order functions; they are not warfighters. Possibly they make forays to visit their cousins and uncles in the Taliban.

It was noted that "[l]ast year, [the Taliban] had their own trenches and their own places. Now, they are very close to the houses and families. Their tactics changed."

But this is not a new tactic. It is as old as the Vietcong on the Republic of Vietnam, and then some. It is called "grabbing the belt" --you hug your opponent, thereby neutralizing his long-range fires. This configures the fight as a one-on-one infantry squabble, a paradigm in which the insurgent always wins.

The article also notes the August kidnapping of a mayor, who was released when his family paid ransom. Separating the criminals from the insurgents in that environment is an impossible task. Hostage-taking for ransom is a classic insurgent/terrorist activity which grows and sustains the insurgent groups. It shows the ineffectiveness of the government and the group's control over the population.

The noteworthy points here are that the Taliban is being recognized as an indigenous group of insurgents by the media, rather than their formerly incorrect designation as terrorists, and that the activities of the Taliban fit classic CI methodology and evolution.

Our technologies may evolve, but there is nothing new under the sun.