Instant Replay

What a small little man I am
I'm afraid of everything
From golden rules to airplanes
--Junior, John Mellencamp

Been flirtin' with disaster,
Y'all know what I mean.
And the way we run our lives,
It makes no sense to me
--Flirtin' With Disaster, Molly Hatchet
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The Army made public today the almost 700-page second volume of its study of the Iraq conflict, “On Point II: Transition to the New Campaign.” The study could also be subtitled, "Closing the Barn Door After the Horse is Out."

It reveals top American commander General Tommy R. Franks made several tactical errors following the fall of Baghdad. These issued from belief in the fiction that Iraq would fall into line and be a faithful ally to the U.S. In truth, the Iraq war will never bring any long-term strategic benefit to America.

There is something surreal about the Army's retrospective study of failures while in the midst of the failure. It is like watching a slo-mo replay of the crash, while the race is still on. However, it is not the first criticism of the conduct of the war.

Last year Army Lt. Col. Paul Yingling wrote A Failure in Generalship, criticizing American generals for failing to prepare a coherent plan to stabilize postwar Iraq. The RAND Corporation submitted a 2005 report to the Army ("Rebuilding Iraq") that "identified problems with virtually every government agency that played a role in planning the postwar phase (Occupation Plan for Iraq Faulted in Army History.)" But this is the first study put out by the Army itself, via its Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth.

Amazing is the fact that this study does not even question the validity of the mission or discuss the decision that effectively relegated the Department of State to a side show in post-invasion Iraq. The Department of Defense is not constituted to run countries -- this is a DoS function which was totally ignored. The Dod was playing outside of its ballpark.

This second volume of the report covers the 1 1/2 years following President Bush’s May 2003 pronouncement that major combat operations in Iraq were over. "It was a period when the Army took on unanticipated occupation duties." Military history is available for the reading -- how could the U.S. invade and NOT anticipate such duties? If you destroy a regime and break a country, someone has to provide security and fulfill functions of state. Colin Powell understood this.

Along with the faulty assumptions was inadequate training. "Lt. Col. Troy Perry, the operations officer of the First Battalion, 68th Armor Regiment, told Army historians that his unit trained extensively, but not for the sort of problems that it would encounter in setting up 'stability operations' for securing Iraq once Mr. Hussein’s government fell."

The security and stability of a nation should not devolve to a Battalion level operations officer. Combat arms battalions are not and should not be trained or equipped to act as local police.

These mistakes could have been ameliorated by including the DoS into the planning and execution of the Iraq invasion. Instead, we had a Secretary of State (Powell) complicitous in the phony run up to war, and later Secretary Condoleeza Rice who went MIA. (This statement is not made as an endorsement of illegal, preemptive aggressive wars, but merely as an observation of the shabby, desperate nature of the operation.)

L. Paul Bremer he of combat boot/suit fame replaced retired LT General Garner to run the most important occupation since that of post-WWII Japan and Germany. Imagine first a retired Lt. Gen. to run the most important occupation since that of post-WWII Japan and Germany.

Then Bremer who, as the chief civilian administrator in Iraq, disbanded the Iraqi Army and banned thousands of former Baath Party members from working for the government. The study ventures this act may have “created a pool of disaffected and unemployed Sunni Arabs” that the insurgency could draw on. Duh.

But you see, General Franks and Bremer were operating, “In line with the prewar planning and general euphoria at the rapid crumbling of the Saddam regime." "Franks continued to plan for a very limited role for U.S. ground forces in Iraq,” disbanding General McKiernan's land war command which had helped plan the invasion and the push to Baghdad, replacing him with General Ricardo Sanchez.

"A new headquarters would be established to command the military forces in Iraq and was to be led by Lt. Gen. Ricardo S. Sanchez. He had led the First Armored Division into Iraq before being promoted and picked to succeed General Wallace as the head of the Army’s V Corps, which was to serve as the nucleus of the newly established command."

Sanchez is a newly minted LTG who just left command of an Armored Division. What qualifications or experience level did Sanchez possess to run the occupation of an entire country? Why select a man whose highest experience level was that of commanding a combat division? If an LTG, then at least choose one with extensive Corps level command.

General Jack Keane, vice chief of staff of the Army was upset with the move, saying, “I think we did not put the best experienced headquarters that we had in charge of that operation.” He said is took six to eight months to ramp up the operation to "get some semblance of a headquarters together so Sanchez could at least begin to function effectively."

"General Keane told the historians that he raised his concerns at the time with Lt. Gen. John P. Abizaid, who had been picked to succeed General Franks as the head of Central Command. In the report he said he told Abizaid, "Jesus Christ, John, this is a recipe for disaster."

The same critique of Sanchez applies to Abizaid: why place a newly-minted 4-Star to succeed as CENTCOM Commander? This is such a key position that correct personnel management alone would dictate the assignment of a senior experienced 4-Star. A smart choice would have been a former NATO or other MACOM commander into theatre.

Throughout the entire occupation it seems that personnel selections were mandated by something other than sound personnel management considerations. Gen. William S. Wallace, who led the V Corps during the invasion and currently heads the Army’s Training and Doctrine Command, said military had the wrong assumptions and the wrong plan.

Summing up the episode, General Wallace told historians that the shift to a new headquarters involved a complicated transfer of responsibilities at a critical time.

“You can’t take a tactical headquarters and change it into an operational headquarters at the snap of your fingers,” he said. “It just doesn’t happen.”

Unfortunately the Iraq and Afghanistan debacles were run on such magical thinking.