Bennie and the Jets

However beautiful the strategy,
you should occasionally look at the results
--Winston Churchill

We could go kick down some doors together
stay out 'til morning sharp as knives
the new war will get you it will not protect you
--Paper Tiger, Spoon

And what was all that shit about Vietnam?
What the FUCK, has anything got to do with Vietnam?
--The Big Lebowski (1998)
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Ranger has sent us a dispatch from the road from an article in that most mainstream of MSM, the USA Today entitled (in a clever triple-entendre) "Impact of Airstrikes in Afghanistan Measured."

"Military commanders in Afghanistan reduced their reliance on airstrikes in 2008, records show, a change that experts say reflects the limitations of air power against a resilient insurgency."

"The limits of air power show why more ground troops are needed to provide security, said Dakota Wood, a military analyst at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments."

So. . . we need more troops to provide security. . . then we'll need more airpower to provide security for the troops. A nice mobius strip, shouldered by the American taxpayer.

"Commanders depend on airstrikes in Afghanistan more than in Iraq because jets can respond quickly to ambushed troops spread thinly across mountainous countryside. Afghanistan is larger than Iraq and has a higher population but about one-third the number of coalition forces. There are already 38,000 U.S. troops in Afghanistan."

The said protective cover sounds heartwarming, until one sees the facts.

First, if the troops are doing their job, they should not be ambushed. If they are, however, organic indirect firepower is the most responsive to the engaged units.

There are also Army aviation assets that should be readily available to engaged units. The combined arms teams, even sans Armor, are a synergistic tool capable of handling any Taliban threat. Army assets are responsible to the ground commander or the TF commander, and are a better tool than Air Force guided bombs.

"Lacking sufficient manpower to displace the Taliban and maintain control of these areas, the U.S. has had to employ airstrikes to inflict costs on the enemy."

Without boots on the ground or eyes on the target all airstrikes are futile efforts and the only effect is the cost of the ordnance. But it's all in a day's work for the taxpayer, natch (Thank you, sir -- may we have another?)

Gen. David McKiernan is quoted as saying the Taliban seeks to create backlash against coalition efforts there by using civilians as "shields," an urban myth in U.S. war lore. The Taliban is not using civilians as shields -- they are the civilians. As NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer said, "The basic problem in Afghanistan is not too much Taliban; it's too little good governance."

Even if the charge were true, don't bomb, strafe or fire up the civilian shield or the Taliban in question. Set up blocking positions and ambushes into and out of the Area of Operation.

"In January, USA TODAY reported that Afghan insurgents had learned to attack U.S. troops and scatter before they could be hit by airstrikes, a tactic that has limited the amount of bombs dropped."

It is ridiculous that the enemy can fade away before airstrikes arrive on station. If it is so important to kill these people, then use good old Army and Marine assigned assets. Any commander that sends out an element without indirect fire support is criminally negligent. Artillery is the Infantry's lifeline.

"Those warplanes also fly surveillance missions and will buzz enemy forces in "shows of force" that prompt insurgents to retreat from attacks..."

Ranger bets the Taliban would get a laugh out of that concept. The U.S. is romping and stomping all over their country, and we are trying to intimidate hardened fighters with free air shows? Well, it's good for an Air Medal.

It is Ranger's take that the Taliban or insurgents in Afghanistan operate at the platoon level, and possibly at understrength Company level. These forces will never equal the Regimental attacks on U.S. Special Forces camps in the Vietnam War.

The Taliban are small, localized organizations that have no semblance to main force Vietcong units that had crossed over to conventional forces. If there are large scale Afghan insurgent attacks, these will be in the larger towns.

A conventional U.S rifle platoon with attached assets and proper fire support should easily handle an insurgent company. The old rule of thumb for the defense was one defender to three attackers; in the offense, three attackers for each defender. These figures are based on fighting organized, sophisticated enemies (not people in shower shoes and sandals.)

If a U.S. rifle Company cannot fight an equal number of insurgents, then something is awfully wrong with today's Army. If the Afghans or the Iraqis would fight like the NVA, things might be touch and go. Every small unit leader should be able to fire plan, both offensively and defensively.

Forget the jets --use artillery!