Good News Day

--Died for Nothing,
 Andy Singer
 

I heard the news today, oh, boy,
The English army had just won the war 
--A Day in the Life, The Beatles 

Come on, baby
Jump up
Jump back
Well, now, I think you've got the knack 
--LocoMotion, Little Eva 

Here war is simple like a monument:
A telephone is speaking to a man;
Flags on a map assert that troops were sent;
A boy brings milk in bowls. There is a plan 
--Here War is Simple, W. H. Auden

______________________

The Big News a few days ago was that United States Delta troops had captured an ISIS chemical weapons expert who specialized in the manufacture and use of mustard gas, a "Chemical Ali" for our times.

Yet despite the Good News of Good Guys triumphing over Evil, here we are 14 years into the Middle East war project and not one millimeter closer to an endgame. The capture and killing of an individual is meaningless effort, signifying motion with no progress.

But Perhaps Good News is relative -- what is good for the talking heads and Hollywood filmmakers and contractors is not good for us taxpayers in the homeland.

As RangerAgainstWar has said from the inception of the Phony War on Terror (PWOT ©): there is nothing for the U.S. to win, and all is effort with no benefit. Our soldiers are not fighting for our freedom (though they may be fighting for the freedom of the war profiteers to profit.)

Iraq and Iran will never be bastions of liberal democracy; meanwhile, freedoms in the U.S. wane daily. So what is the soldier's mission? 

We were sold The Surge and The (fill-in-the-blank) Spring as worthy soldierly goals. Yet historically, surges and springs come to no good end. Stalingrad, Kursk, the German efforts at The Bulge, the Prague Spring. Sounds good, but they had no staying power.

The Surge was a media event, the Sunni Awakening and the Sons of Iraq being bribed to pretend to fight for U.S. goals when in reality it was Sunni fighters consolidating and reorganizing for their next effort . . . with the help of U.S. weapons and training. Add a spoonful of sugar and the result?

That's right -- ISIS. And the conclusion: all of the troops killed, wounded and mentally unbalanced by these wars were used for no good thing. What do they see when they look into the mirror now?

For a war to be just, the sum of the good must exceed the evil, suffering and death required to achieve it. What good has been achieved since the U.S. invasion in 2002?

Ronald Reagan's question holds: "Are you better off than you were four years ago?" 14 years ago?

The War on Terror isn't tough on terrorism, it's tough on the everyday working American. We are spending our treasure on no Good Thing.

Sergeant Kyle J. White's Medal of Honor

--Congressional Medal of Honor

 Don't ever march home the same way.
Take a different route so you won't be ambushed 
--Roger's Standing Orders 

 Then I'm going to Hell,
and I'm taking the renaissance with me 
--Hit of the Search Party,
 Every Time I Die

Lies written in ink can never disguise
facts written in blood
--Lu Xun
_____________________

Today, Ranger will discuss the 2007 action for which Sgt. Kyle J. White was recently presented the Medal of Honor (MOH) on 13 May 2014:

On 9 November 2007, an element of the United States Army descended into what was known as "Ambush Alley" outside of the Afghan village of Aranas, meeting their own ambush; five soldiers and a Marine were killed in their turn of the screw. What is truly tragic is that the unit traversed a known danger area without a proper support plan.

An old combat axiom warns against following roads or trails, or crossing danger areas without proper application of what should be unit standard operating procedure (SOP). The failure of Sgt. Kyle's unit originated in higher headquarters, far from that fated day in Ambush Alley. Battalion (Bn) level is where the Operations Orders originate for sqauds, platoons and companies of the Bn. (in this case, the 2/503rd/173rd Airborne.)

It would be instructive to see the Regimental Operation's Order, but of course these are classified for OPSEC purposes, never-minding that the OPSEC was seven years ago. So Ranger's analysis will be based upon the official record, and his experience as an Infantry small unit leader.

In danger areas (like Ambush Alley), several steps can be taken to minimize the risk of traversing the ground prior to engagement:

• Traveling overwatch

• Having friendly units covering the far ends of the danger area while bounding through the area

• Having far and flank security (in this fight, flank security was not an option)

• Having pre-planned artillery concentrations along the route of march ready to fire on-call. (Alternately, launch harassing and interdicting fire (H & I) along the route while the troops move through)

• Use a nighttime movement through the danger area (an undesirable solution)

• Have an alternate route

• Have a helo lift to move the troops on the patrol. Gunships should be on-station

These are preplanning considerations that should have been considered before issuing an OPORD or patrol order for an action. According to the Army's History Channel-esque fabuloso website transcript of Sgt. White's action, none of these precautions were employed. (note: it does, however, appear that the enemy had an overwatch element.)

It is unrealistic to criticize anyone on the patrol for the oversights. The patrol leader was only a 1st Lieutenant, and they lack the knowledge to ask these questions or make these plans. That is the role of senior commanders and staff planners.

The official report online indicates only some overwatch elements, but this was clearly ineffective. An old Army adage says, "You must give medals or Courts Martial for dereliction of duty"; medals are preferred as the most expedient course of action.

Clearly, it is not Sgt. White who was derelict. As mentioned previously, the fault lies in higher HQ. Sgt. White's actions were reactive rather than proactive, and therein lies his valor. The enemy held the initiative, to include when to break contact. The enemy's planning and execution trumped ours.

Because Sgt. White's leaders failed to provide proper preplanning and support, Sgt. White's element was out-soldiered on that day. He lacked the tools that are in the inventory, and should have been immediately on-call.

Where was the Regiment or Bn. intelligence officer in this fight? Was the patrol provided fresh satellite photos of the battle space? Did agents indicate any hostiles in the area of operation (AO)? Were drones available to cover the unit's movement? 

The breakdown at Ambush Alley was at the Bn level command and staff functions. Sgt. White's MOH citation states that he "provided information and updates to friendly forces, allowing precision airstrikes to stifle the enemy's attack ..." At this point there were five U.S. KIA on the field and it is doubtful that the enemy would wait for supporting fires of any sort to arrive before the ambush element had left the kill zone. Enemy units know the sweet spot in which they can operate before being subjected to U.S. firepower.

The men who fought and died that day are very special soldiers and men. Sgt. White was honorable and valorous, and deserved his MOH. But our soldiers are not sacrificial lambs. They deserved better leadership than they received.

Further thoughts: why did it take almost seven years for Sergeant White to receive his award? In addition, why are there only nine living recipients of the MOH from the wars formerly known as the War on Terror? Why is there a cluster of MOH's coming out of the 503rd Infantry-- do they have a corner on the MOH market?

There is nothing to celebrate from the actions on 9 November 2007 in Nuristan Province.

[cross-posted @ milpub.]

Bunker Buster

The flash from a distant camera
Reconnecting thoughts and actions
Fragments of our missing dream 
--Distant Camera, Neil Young
_____________________

Today's entry is an analysis of a bunker of the 1/502/25, a slice of life in today's United States Army. [The bunker was caught incidentally in a photo of the recently returned U.S. Army soldier, Bowe Bergdahl, rt. of photo.]

As background, think of all the wonderful photos of World War II, German, Japanese and U.S. fighting positions: there are always grenades laid out for final defenses. There are no grenades in this photo.

Why is the Light Machine Gun (LMG) not protected from the elements (or at least, the $1,500 sight)?

As for the gun, it is too high of a silhouette, forcing the gunner to expose his body to enemy suppressive fire. The gun needs to be dug into a lower firing platform. The ammunition is open to trash, dirt and the elements, and the gun does not have the belt in the feed tray. This means the gun is not ready to fire.

A military axiom says that Machine Guns are employed in pairs, to provide interlocking fires through coordinated defense. The lay of the land in the photo would seem to make this impossible. Does this fighting position have room for an assistant gunner/loader to service the gun? Does the position have a rear egress and entrance? Must the soldiers enter the bunker from the enemy side?

Now see the roof of the structure: it is weak, unsupported and would not provide any appreciable protection from either direct or indirect fire. An enemy assault could chop this bunker into smithereens with direct rifle fire. An RPG would spell disaster. The bunker's supports are 2 x 4 white pine, like you'd buy at a a home supply store. (Ranger hopes the Army got the military discount.)

Ignoring the troops' casual and non-technical demeanor, we will not ignore the mortar to the left rear seen between the three troops (with hands in their pockets.) The gun is clearly not dug in, meaning that it could not be serviced if this position were attacked. (We have noted this deficiency in several past Afghan battle analysis here at RAW.)

Further: why would a mortar be placed directly on a firing line of a defensive position? This is just wrong, and violates the logical placement of the weapon, which should be protected from direct fire.

If the situation were dire, move the gun forward (in what would be a tactical leadership call), but dig it in and have connective trenches so that friendly movement could ensue, crawling if need be under enemy fire.

Last comment: what were these troops defending, anyway?

Smiley's People

 Well the Ukraine girls really knock me out
They leave the West behind
And Moscow girls make me sing and shout
That Georgia's always on m-m-my mind 
--Back in the USSR,
The Beatles 

 There will be no war, but in the pursuit
of principle no stone will be left standing 
--Absolute Friends, John le Carre
___________________

Subtitle: Designated Hitters

It is said that President Obama doesn't smile much, that he has the sang froid of an attorney-academic. But we will see him as "Smiley" for just this post.

The press has been having their day with the recently-released Prisoner of War U.S. Army SGT Bowe Bergdahl. Some call him a traitor; other say he nuts. The more charitably-minded say it is right that the five supposed Taliban prisoner at Guantanamo Bay be traded for his release, while others claim those released will go right back to being carbuncles on the back of Democracy.

Funny we call Bergdahl a former P.O.W., yet the five men traded for his release were not designated P.O.W.'s; at best, they were called "detainees". When the U.S. was gunning for war, the Taliban leaders (once and current leaders in Afghan's government) were "terrorists". Assuredly, al Qaeda types may be terrorists, but Taliban membership requires meeting a far different bar than does al Qaeda.

But our topic today is not the terminology applied to the incarcerated, or the legitimate leadership of Afghanistan. The topic concerns the intention behind the choice of these five Gitmo detainees.

Rather than seeing the released prisoners all through the narrow glass of radical ideological caricature, what if one or more of them is now something different after 12 years in captivity? What if, after 12 years of mind-breaking incarceration, one or more of these Taliban have been turned?

What if, possibly -- and just that -- one or more is now an agent for the Central Intelligence Agency, and enjoys the best of legend and cover? These men are the real deal, and if they've been turned, that could be one reason for the trade (after Bergdahl's five years in captivity.)

You can tell Ranger if you think he has read one too many le Carre novels.

Taliban's Got Spokesmen

Ain't no sound but the sound of his feet,
Machine gun ready to go
Are you ready, hey are you ready for this?
Are you hanging on the edge of your seat? 
--Another One Bites the Dust, 
Queen

 So when you hear it thunder
Don't run under a tree
There'll be pennies from Heaven
For you and me 
--Pennies From Heaven, 
Bing Crosby
 __________________

When another one bites the dust, the happy-yippy media cues up applause. So when the United States vaporized Pakistani Taliban head honcho Hakimullah Mehsud last November, the audience's neon sign lit up predictably.

But the Pakistan Taliban -- like all such groups -- self-generates, and every slot can be filled by another, one-each.  As we at RAW have written before (when "taking out" the No. Two's was big deal), if the 7th "No. Two" is taken out there will be an 8th.

The media crowed that the latest leader is the hardest of the hard, Mullah Fazlullah. Feh -- just another day at the office, but there is meaning here for U.S. taxpayers.

Fazlullah is reported to be supported by Afghan intelligence, noteworthy since Afghan intel is a creature of 12 years of support provided to Afghan National Forces. Afghan intel is supporting Pakistan Taliban in order to punish Pakistan for supporting the Afghan Taliban. (Sounds like a line from a Gilbert and Sullivan Opera.)  So U.S. monies are now supporting the Taliban, which is in turn trying to destabilize Pakistani interests.

Get that? Simply put, the Taliban flourishes in theatre with the support of U.S. tax dollars. -- the same guys who used to be the bad dudes. (What, no applause?)

The Pakistani Taliban's spokesman, Shahidullah Shahid, has recently announced a month-long ceasefire of the affiliated groups (theTehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan, or "TTP") aimed at reviving stalled peace talks with the Pakistani government, and to coerce them into accepting conservative religious sharia law. So even the Taliban is ingratiating itself into governmental tactics by offering to stop breaking the law in order to twist the arm of the reigning rulers to do what it wants. The statement released by spokesman Shahid said the groups should "restrain themselves from all kinds of [fun] jihadist activities," like killing polio team workers.

However, the New York Times reports, "The announcement of the truce came just hours after two bombings killed 13 people and wounded 10 in an attack on a polio vaccination team in the northwestern Khyber region." We at RAW do not think it is because they are anti-vaxxers who got word on Jenny McCarthy's anti-mercury-in-vaccines crusade.

But beyond the local Taliban wars, does it even matter that U.S. policy destroyed Saddam or Qaddafi? Where is the progress in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Egypt and Syria? Are the new regimes better than those deposed with U.S. tax dollars? Were those tax dollars well-spent?

An old military axiom is to never mistake motion for progress nor to move laterally under effective enemy fire, yet that comprises the entirety of the Phony War On Terror (PWOT ©). Afghan President Karzai recently called the war for what it was, an exercise for 'Western interest', and gave his version of The Romantics' "Goodbye to You" in a recent WaPo interview:

"To the American people, give them my best wishes and my gratitude. To the U.S. government, give them my anger, my extreme anger."

So, whence the progress for the hapless taxpayer, who was told he would become a safer Plebe if the Taliban could be combated?

Keeping the Peace

 --Peaceable Kingdom, Edward Hicks 
 Do those eyes look at peace? 

Ain't it funny how you feel
when you're finding out it's real
 -- Sugar Mountain, Neil Young

 Blessed are the peacemakers:
for they shall be called the children of God 
--KJV, Matthew 5:9 

Ev'rybody's talking about 
Revolution, evolution, masturbation,
flagellation, regulation, integrations,
meditations, United Nations,
Congratulations. 
All we are saying is give peace a chance 
--Give Peace a Chance, John Lennon

___________________

One of RangerAgainstWar's gripes is the misuse of words in the Phony War on Terror (PWOT  ©). Take the term, "Peacekeeping".

In  the book Blind into Baghdad: America's War in Iraq, James Fallows quotes Army War College scholar and Afghanistan War veteran Larry Goodson thusly:

"When the security situation in Afghanistan was collapsing, we might have come much more quickly to the peacekeeping and "nation-building" strategy we're beginning to employ now (125)"

Aside from the fact that strategy -- a word which implies a thought-out and concerted effort to achieve a desired goal -- is NOT a word which describes the United States' PWOT efforts, let us look instead at the term "Peacekeeping", a term often misunderstood and misused, often in an effort to justify a military presence.

Who doesn't want peace? Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) is an admirable yet elusive concept usually pertaining to efforts to lessen violence and chaos in failed states or in Low-intensity conflict situations. PKO can be a long-term or short-term solution to a problem, if not a resolution of the situation. The three United Nations' guidelines for PKO's are:

1) The consent of all parties
2) Impartiality
3) Non-use of force, except in self-defense and the defense of the mandate

Think of the efficacy of peacekeeping while considering some recent PKOs:


1) The British effort in Northern Ireland --

Was this PKO? Were the British impartial since they were supporting the Royal Ulster Constabulary? The reason for the violence was the Irish Republican Army's desire to rid Northern Ireland of the British presence.

2) Beirut, 1983 --

Was this U.S. operation a PKO? Were the U.S. forces impartial? Did both sides in the violence accept the legitimacy of the U.S. unilateral effort? Since the Marines were bombed in their barracks and HQ, it would seem not, so this was not a PKO.

3) The NATO effort in Kosovo --

Were the NATO forces impartial? No, since NATO warplanes were bombing one side of the equation, so another "no".

4) U.S. in Afghanistan --

Was the U.S. impartial? Did the anti-government coalition accept our presence? Did the U.S. have legitimacy?


A PKO that met UN guidelines but was ineffective was what we call the Rwandan Genocide. While the PKOs were impartial and accepted by both parties, still the genocide continued apace. So simply following UN guidelines may not be an adequate yardstick to measure a successful PKO.

An exception to the general failure of PKOs would be the Sinai PKO separating the Egyptian and the Israelis, keeping peace between former enemies. The peacekeepers are impartial and are there at the behest of both parties. The peace has been maintained.

For a PKO to succeed, both the peacekeepers and the opposing parties must be dealing from the top of the deck, and this is usually not the case in the usual scenarios, unfortunately.

So, is there such a thing as Peacekeeping? "Peacekeeping" is not the same thing as "Peace Making". Peacekeeping is a bit bromidic and euphemistic. One is not so much "keeping the peace" but holding the boxers apart until they can join in the fray once again. PKO's are doomed to fail, until the day honest brokers step up to the table and resolve their differences otherwise. Diogenes is still out there with his lamp ...

Being as we inheritors of the primate legacy, we do not look for rational, non-fighting solutions anytime soon. Perhaps, as with the schoolyard bully, the fight should be allowed, and until someone appears who can trounce him, the most brutish wins they day.

[cross-posted @ milpub.]

CPT William Swenson

MOH recipient Capt. William Swenson

________________

Purple Heart magazine featured recent Medal of Honor winner Captain William Swenson in their Jan/Feb (2014) issue ... currently unemployed Capt. Swenson, according to the piece.

And though Mr. Swenson has requested a return to active duty, to-date there has been no action on his personnel request. Capt. Swenson left the Army after nine years Active Duty; he is the only living officer of the Phony War on Terror (PWOT ©).

"In a rare move, Swenson has asked to return to active duty. "We are currently reviewing his request and processing it within established policy," an Army spokesman, George Wright, told Purple Heart magazine."

Correct me if I'm wrong, but MOH recipients should be an exception to policy -- so why is an MOH recipient being treated so shabbily? The Army is a large institution and it's hard to believe they cannot find a place for a man like Swenson. If President Obama were acting as Commander-in-Chief he would directly order the Army Chief of Staff to create a special slot for this man.

MOH winners are akin to demigods in the Army. CPT Swenson was highly regarded by his men, capable and brave; none of this is in question. How could the Army not embrace him with open arms? Answer: he spoke the truth to power. He was correct, but he crossed the thin green line. Ranger knows what happens when you speak the truth (ref. his "Disillusionment" series.)

Swenson has already been shafted once by the Army. In the magazine's list of "Five Key Facts About Captain Swenson is, "#4. His path to the Medal of Honor was marked with Army politics":

"After the September 2009 battle, Swenson criticized senior Army officers in written reports, stating that they refused to send air and artillery support during the firefight, costing lives. The Army launched an investigation into Swenson's allegations. Eventually, the officers were reprimanded and their careers ended. As a result, Swenson's Medal of Honor nomination was "mysteriously deleted form [sic] the Army's awards tracking database. Speculation is that senior officers, perhaps friends of the reprimanded officers, were responsible. ..."

Ranger would like to congratulate Capt. Swenson. Having personally known and served with three MOH recipients, he can say Swenson stands as tall as all of them.

Whatever happens in this case we at RangerAgainstWar wish former Captain Swenson the best life has to offer.

There is No Finish Line

--There is no finish line
--could be the tagline for the Phony War on Terror 

That's what these soldiers were asked to do:
Defend the indefensible
--President Obama at SSG Romesha's Medal of Honor ceremony

Everybody's gotta learn sometime
Everybody's gotta learn sometime
Everybody's gotta learn sometime 
--Everybody's Gotta Learn Sometime, Beck

I had a brother at Khe Sahn
Fighting off the Viet Cong
They're still there, he's all gone 
--Born in the U.S.A., Bruce Springsteen
_______________________

[This is Pt. II of Defending the Indefensible -- Romesha Medal of Honor]

Fighting and dying for indefensible terrain is the perfect metaphor for the war on terror. The President's utterance reveals the military's policy to be corrupt as a Bernie Madoff scam.

Ranger is discomfited because he remembers when soldiers trained to fight wars in order to win them, a goal not achieved in his lifetime. The spirit of the Army is the offense.  On Day One we learn that we have one function in life -- to take the battle to the enemy. This is far different thing than sending them across the world and slapping them into defensive positions. Wars are not won by defensive action.

As mentioned in "Defending the Indefensible" pt. I, the Army defends to buy time for reorganization and reconstitution, and to prepare to go on the offensive.  Until Counterinsurgency theory, everything was based on the attack to destroy the enemy or his will to fight. Now we call defending terrain indefinitely a "win", and occupy command outposts designed for no military purpose other than to have an option available for troop postings

While the defense of COP Keating in Kamdesh, Nuristan Province, was planned, it was not properly coordinated. In classic theatre-level ground combat there are a few rules for the defense: defense is planned or hasty; co-oordinated; mutually-supported; in -depth and strong enough to hold or attrit an enemy. At Keating, there were 52 soldiers but no reserve forces present that could have been utilized to influence the fight.

The defense was not in-depth as the soldiers had no secondary line of defense, nor could they fall back when pressed to nearby friendly units or alternate preplanned fighting positions. COP Keating was just like Wanat and Waygul: the only options were to fight to the death, or to surrender. These soldiers were decisively engaged before the first round went downrange.

Historically Infantry and Cavalry defenses are synergistic, interlocked and support one another by fire, whether direct or indirect, a fact which seems to elude United States Army planners in the PWOT© . Simply put, no commander should put a defensive position anywhere unless there is mutual support, secondary positions with adequate escape routes.  Also, there should be friendlies to act as reserve forces in a timely manner. The Quick Reaction Forces (QRFs) which arrived thirteen hours after the fight began does not qualify.

Why does the U.S. see fit to place soldiers in indefensible outposts?  Did these fights lead to a transition to offensive operations? Why does an Army defend a piece of terrain for no purpose? Why does the U.S. Army continue to do a job the Afghan Army should be doing? The U.S. military did the same thing in Iraq and Afghanistan as it did in the Republic of Vietnam (the 1st spectacular failure for the U.S. of COIN policy) -- we fought for terrain that did not affect the outcome of the war.

It is clear we can  attack and destroy the infrastructure and governments of places like Afghanistan and Iraq with less than a theatre-sized Army, but it is further clear that winning the invasion and regime change do not equal victory. Destroying a regime does not equate with creating a meaningful peace.


The failure of mighty U.S. Army in a site like Kamdesh gives lie to the idea that the U.S. is the sole Superpower in the world. Power comes in many guises.

An aside: It is interesting to note that three of the four living Medal of Honor recipients from Afghanistan chose to leave active duty. This is odd considering the status that an MOH winner has in the armed forces, which is basically holding a sort of godhood. Could this be a comment on the perception of the war on terror by those who have fought it?

Defending the Indefensible -- Romesha Medal of Honor

--This won't be coming to a roadside in Afghanistan anytime soon 

The trouble with organizing a thing
is that pretty soon folks get to paying more attention
to the organization than to what they're organized for 
--Little Home on the Prairie, Laura Ingalls Wilder

You pop caught you smoking - and he said, "No way!"
That hypocrite - smokes two packs a day
Man, living at home is such a drag
Now your mom threw away your best porno mag (Bust it!) 
--Fight for Your Right to Party,
 The Beastie Boys 

Wherever there is injustice, you will find us.
Wherever there is suffering, we'll be there.
Wherever liberty is threatened, you will find...
The Three Amigos!
--The Three Amigos (1986)

_____________________

In warfare, defending the indefensible is sometimes required, and these actions serve a military function.

Such were the losing World War II Battles of Corregidor, Wake Island, fought in order to buy time for taxed U.S. forces to evacuate, consolidate and fall back to defensible terrain; concomitantly, they served to attrit the Japanese forces.

However, the fights at Wanat, Waygul and now Kamdesh in the phony war on terror did not gain the military (or the nation) anything. After the fight at Kamdesh, Combat Outpost Keating was so rapidly evacuated that U.S. troops abandoned their ammunition (which the Afghan opposition forces later plundered.)

Intelligence failed at Battalion, Brigade, Division and echelons above corps. None appeared to have done predictive analysis of an impending attack, nor did they identify the threat or threat level. The unit can sometimes overcome this failure by vigorous patrolling, which is what you would expect from Cavalry troops, which are supposed to be offensive types geared to mobile rapid developing operations. The failure at COP Keating may be due in part to the fact that they were being used as static defense -- not their preferred mode of employment.

The day after the fight, NATO and U.S. command could not even identify the attackers of COP Keating, and the strength of enemy forces was variously reported as 300-500 men. The attackers were not a ghost army, yet details on this award-earning scenario are scant. Some reports suggest 100 enemy fighters were killed, but this strains credulity, even at the higher estimates of engaged forces. According to military experience, 100 KIA suggests 300-400 wounded enemy fighters, and there is no proof of this.

Reports suggest the HIG were the most likely attackers; the HIG were U.S. CIA-funded in the Russian War, suggesting the possibility that weapons bought with U.S. tax dollars in 1979 were used 30 some years later to kill U.S. Troopers. The HIG were largley Pashtun and hated the Tajiks and Hazara tribes which make up most of today's Afghan National Army (ANA).

The portions of the outpost perimeter that were quickly probed and penetrated were defended by the ANA. After six years of U.S. training they were unable to share the burden of defending Afghan terrain for an Afghan government and force structure, and for this failure U.S. soldiers died.

It sounds noble when SSG Romesha is quoted as saying, "It was our home, and they couldn't have it," but ultimately, we left and they did have it. FM-24 does not state this, but none of our Counterinsurgency wars (COIN) are "our country" -- that is not what COIN policy is about. We are fighting for their rights to party; that may not be the way we party, though, but that is the gig.

COIN is not about defending liberty, democracy or any other high-falutin' concept. The United States soldier kills and is killed for no apparent logical purpose, other than the right of the host nations to carry on in their accustomed manner, a manner not necessarily U.S.-friendly.

The people of Afghanistan, Iraq and Vietnam are the determining agents of change (or not) in their countries -- this is "self-determination". When 300-500 armed hostiles can badly handle 52 American Soldiers, it is evident that the situation in Nuristan Province, October '09, was beyond the control of U.S. forces.

Simply: What were U.S. troops expected to accomplish by sitting in an indefensible COP? Does anyone in Nuristan Province care that U.S. troops died for a faulty concept in a tactically faulty position? Does anyone in the U.S. care?

A Day Late

--Clinton L. Romesha

I’d rather have the Medal of Honor
than be president of the United States
--Harry S. Truman
______________________

[Note: RAW will run further comments on this action.]

Were it not for a story reprinted from MilitaryTimes.com in his Purple Heart Magazine (May/June 2013) reprinted from MilitaryTimes.com, Ranger would not have known of the fourth living Medal of Honor recipient who served in Afghanistan, Clinton L. Romesha. Romesha was presented with his medal at the White House 11 Feb 2013.

Press on Romesha's MOH was scant, typified by this brief NYT piece, possibly because Romesha declined Michelle Obama's invitation to attend her husband's State of the Union speech while in town for the award, denying the President an important photo op. Romesha's action deserves some Ranger commentary.

Staff Sergeant Romesha was the section leader of the 61st Cavalry Regiment, 4th Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division. During the action of 3 October 2009 in Nuristan Province, Afghanistan, this small unit fought for its life in a nasty little defensive fight reminiscent of those at Wanat and Waygul.

In all, U.S. troops were arrayed for combat in a defense position which was indefensible, to no apparent military purpose; the posts were abandoned soon after each fight.

Commander in Chief Obama said at SSG Romesha's MOH presentation that "A later investigation found that Command Outpost Keating was tactically indefensible". That's what these soldiers were asked to do: Defend the indefensible." If this assessment is correct, why was this not ascertained before eight U.S. soldiers were killed and 22 wounded, and why were the soldiers not extracted? The point of combat operations is that something be achieved as a result of the killing and violence; none of these fights met that bar.

Ranger is not questioning the indubitable valor of this engaged unit -- we are asking why COP Keating was hung out in the breeze, a tasty morsel for the Afghan opposition's picking? Hanging pretty medals from a brave soldier's neck does not erase the question.

In terms of U.S. response, the press rolls endless instant replays of the Benghazi Embassy murders and the Boston Marathon bombings, events in which eight U.S. citizens were killed. We are transfixed and mesmerized by these events, and yet hardly a whisper of the eight Americans killed in this 4th Infantry Division fight. No press and no indignation from the C in C down to the section leaders. Where are the congressional committee meetings searching to assign culpability for the failure?

Oddly, the Army reports four officers (0-3 through 06) received reprimands for the action, but the names or the nature of the reprimands are not stated; as the names are not given there is no way to verify the allegation. If there is culpability, the taxpayers have the right to know the names of the accused as we pay their salaries; this is democracy.

Or does democracy die incrementally in small little fights in insignificant valleys of inconsequential countries?

Why do we blithely accept the meaningless and sacrificial deaths of eight soldiers on some far-flung scrap of land which holds no value and gains us nothing? These soldiers did not die defending our country and Constitution. Their actions in Nuristan Province, Afghanistan, were not connected to the safety and security of our Homeland. The U.S. could kill every Taliban fighter in Afghanistan and that country will still never be a democratic member of the fraternity of nations.

So whither the effort, death and destruction?

Harry of Khartoum, He's Not

 

The thumb is an evolutionary triumph.
Because of his thumbs, man can use tools;
because he can use tools he can extend his senses,
control his environment and increase in sophistication and power.
The thumb is the cornerstone of civilization! 
--Even Cowgirls Get the Blues, Tom Robbins 

thumb pushing down follower still deep in breech 
bolt sshhOCK! whacks thumb oh shit yes it hurts
and good-by to another unbeatable and legendary thumb 
--Gravity's Rainbow, Thomas Pynchon 

Blessed are they who expect nothing,
for they shall not be disappointed 
--The Trouble with Harry (1955)
______________________

Britain's Royal family has suffered a relentless comedown these last few decades.

Prince Harry, who's been deployed to Afghanistan for the past 20 weeks serving as a co-pilot and gunner in a heavily-armed Apache attack helicopter, said some boorish and foolish things in recent interviews released after his departure from country, proving the nut doesn't fall far from the tree.

When asked if he'd killed, Harry said, "Yeah, so, lots of people have" (Prince Harry's Killer Quotes.) So have thugs, Harry, and putting yourself in that category neither makes you cool nor exonerates you. 

The Prince showed exuberance when reflecting on his most excellent thumbs:

"It’s a joy for me because I’m one of those people who loves playing PlayStation and Xbox, so with my thumbs I like to think I’m probably quite useful" (The Taliban Says Prince Harry Is a Crazy 'Coward').

Playing tiddlywinks with Hadji is not exactly Gordon of Khartoum, and flying about in the armored Apache picking off "militants" is not exactly the Battle of Bosworth Field. An anonymous Taliban spokesman ventured to the AFP that Harry "has probably developed a mental problem" (Taliban responds to Prince .)

But Harry is just the latest incarnation of the supremely dysfunctional and feeble-minded house of Windsor (actually the German Saxe-Coburg and Gotha, and Hanover who renamed themselves "Windsor" as it sounds so cottage-like and British.) How can one expect more of the son of the exceedingly dull adulterer Prince Charles and his equally adulterous nursery assistant wife (daughter of an adulterous mother and a drunkard father who inherited his title in 1975)?  It's not a great root stock.

It would be nice if Royals and other titular leaders comported themselves with some dignity and politesse, and led the way by expressing true humility while conducting such actions, but we are in an age of false bravado.

Is Truth and Justice the American Way?

   Americans want their fascism soft-boiled.
Americans want gradualism.
They don't want a coup in the middle of the night.
They want to watch the leaves fall off
the tree of freedom one branch at a time 
--Media Fascism, Jon Rappoport

Even though the sewer pipelines
reach far into our houses with their tentacles,
they are carefully hidden from view
and we are happily ignorant of the invisible
Venice of shit underlying our
bathrooms, bedrooms, dance halls, and parliaments 
--The Unbearable Lightness of Being, 
Milan Kundera 

Are people bad code? 
--Person of Interest
____________________

Coming up behind a vehicle sporting Florida's "Operation Iraqi Freedom" license plate made Ranger queasy.  Florida's Governor Rick Scott has refused Medicaid funds for our state, so reviling is he of the poor urchins who have the bad luck to be poor in America ... but we have plates benefiting our foreign excursions. 

Apparently a license plate saying, "We support all citizens because we are a democracy" with vanity plate funds going into some general social coffers wouldn't be too cool.

Americans must be insane to accept and correlate aggressive, elective military invasions with the concept of freedom.  Wouldn't the more correct description of the escapade be, "Operation Iraqi Humiliation", or perhaps "Operation Iraqi Castration", or perhaps, "Domination?  Perhaps, "Operation 'He Tried to Kill My Dad!'"

The invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan had nothing to do with freedom, and yet we swallowed the lie hook, line and sinker.  The path to un-democracy is marked with religious impositions befitting an Augustinian City on the Hill: We may attack evil, because we are chaste.  Myth is more ennobling than reality; As Capt. Jean-Luc Picard says, "Make it so".

When did the United States begin replacing reality with myth?  Surely the original Revolution was an act of suspension of disbelief: "Taxation without representation" was false, and the rebels would surely have been hung as the brigands they were if not successful.  But victors write the history.

Have we ever told the truth? Perhaps, but the litany of untruth is long: The Philippines at the turn of the 20th century, The Banana Wars, The Dominican Republic or Cuba (1960)?  Was Grenada a practice run for Panama?  Was Panama a practice run for Iraq and Afghanistan?  Will those two wars be practice runs for Iran?

What about our domestic actions?  The government's violent response to violations at the Branch Davidian compound in Waco, Texas, shares similarities with the Iraqi operation.  The Branch Davidians may have been breaking the law by manufacturing firearms without a federal license. They may have been producing automatic versions of the M-16. But were their violations commensurate with the Waco Massacre, destroying their compound and killing 76 men, women and children?

An example of our extreme hypocrisy occurred recently when the U.S. blithely condemned Israel for its "disproportionate response" in its recent "Pillar of Defense" offense which killed 105 people, including many targeted terrorists, in an incursion to address years of bombings on their country; severe disproportionality is the name of our game.  We know that heavy-duty disproportional is the only way to fight and win, and we smugly engage in it because we have deemed ourselves "good", and the bombees "evil".

Bring out the big guns is the American way, and we do not even seem disturbed when the guns are turned against our own citizens, forgetting in those moments that we are supposed to be a democracy, which accords all citizens equal rights, regardless of how loony or destructive they may seem.

Because OUR destructiveness (murder) is in the name of good, and destruction behind the aegis of the U.S. government may not be questioned, lest one become a target themselves of suspicion.  You are with us, or agin' us.  Again, the American Way -- my country, right or wrong.  Only, in a converging world, such isolationism does not serve us well.

The Davidian comparison holds, because collateral damage is necessary when people are being held captive by bad guys.  You must break a few eggs to make an omelet. Only ... the Branch Davidians and the Iraqis did not choose to be "saved" by outside forces.  The deaths in Waco and Iraq were not  justifiable or proportional; they benefited no one and nothing.

The point here is, our aggression and will to destroy starts here at home; it starts in the heart and mind of every one of us.  When our government kills our citizens in violation of well-established rules of conduct, illegal invasions are a stone's throw.

And we wonder how we can say "Iraqi Freedom" without a hiccup.

Looking Downrange

And though I wear a uniform
I was not born to fight 
--Last Year's Man, Leonard Cohen 
_____________________

[Sometimes a piece gets lost in the queue.  Today's post was a response to a Special Forces Valentine written last summer by Joe Pappalardo in Popular Mechanics (The Future of Special Ops).]

There is much contradiction in this piece, but that does not hamper the article's goal, which is to re-create Top Gun, 2012-style.  Hurt Locker and now Zero-Dark-Thirty shill director Bigelow is doing her part too in creating the mystique, our own Leni Riefenstahl as Naomi Wolf recently noted (RAW's Lisa said it first, but she didn't publish it, so it doesn't count.)

We must must remeber that the Ranger - SF dichotomy has become less distinct as SF's mission becomes more direct action (which was in the past the basic orientation of the regular combat arms branches.) The primary distinction between normal soldiers and the SOF was in their communication style: regular forces communicate with their own, whereas the SOF are trained to talk with a host nation's indigenous assets; this demarcation between conventional and non-conventional soldiers has been dissolving.

Special Forces and Rangers are both Light Infantry, so when and how did Light Infantry Special Operations become nation builders?  Where is the data showing that building foreign armies and police forces produces stable nations?  Army-building does not equate with nation-building: Strong armies and police do not ensure either democracy or stability. If our Special Forces are so special, why are they pulling guard duty like buck Privates in a leg unit? 

A team leader said, "We all have Type-A personalities on this team."  Type-A could just be another way of saying that attention deficit, hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) is the hallmark of the new SF; this is not necessarily a positive. A Ranger - SF - SOF selection process that selects for Type-A's indicates a break with the historical SF qualities of calm-thinking and logic.

--Not too phallic (fr. The Future of Special Ops)

How do soldiers teach a nation to take of themselves?  If these soldiers are "warrior-politicians", as a team leader is quoted as saying, then why are they not under State Department auspices?  The Department of Defense is not about politics, it is about killing people and breaking things; the SF skill set is more about breaking things than building things (which is why it is under the DoD aegis.)

The article does concede that "SOCOM has become the U.S. government's tool of choice for soft power projection ... by default":

"'Most of our resources, when it comes to these types of efforts, are placed in the Department of Defense,' says Rick Nelson, a senior fellow with the Center for Strategic and International Studies, who served with Joint Special Operations Command. 'The reality is that the State Department and USAID are not funded at appropriate levels.'"

A typical American bias is seen in the following:

"These "indirect-action" missions include training foreign troops and teaching locals how to establish responsible governments. The strategy also promotes economic development by building bazaars, encouraging farmers to grow extra food crops to sell, and constructing roads. No one makes video games based on indirect-action missions."

But -- what if the locals do not want any of these things? Laying things up for a rainy day fits in with our oft-preached (though seldom practiced) capitalistic ideology, but if you are nomadic, where are you gonna store your surplus?  It is not like there is a storage mall around the corner. (And heaven forfend Storage Wars break out.)

A team member is described tooling around in a "$470,000 mine-resistant, all-terrain vehicle" but by placing SF assets in fun off-road vehicles we have just reinvented the wheel.  Placing SF in such vehicles merely creates a new mechanized unit, albeit one that happens to wear SF - Ranger -Airborne tabs.

Why not use plain old Mechanized Infantry for this function (since this is what they do)? Putting SF  assets into an up-gunned vehicle that is naught but a modern chariot has nothing to do with nation-building.  It is simply a weapons platform, like an Apache helicopter with wheels -- whoopee, we have reinvented the Armor Branch.

The following concept escapes Ranger's comprehension:

"The attacks on Afghans who support the government in Kabul—and the United States—will only grow as 2014 approaches. The police units that spec ops teams train have been the targets of infiltration and murder. 'We talk to guys who are over there now,' Alpha says. 'We're expecting a hard fight.'"

How can SF teams train credible indigenous police forces when nobody on the SF teams has any civilian police force experience? Why do we pretend that Afghan police are anything other than paramilitary assets that have no police function other than that of supporting a corrupt and morally bankrupt puppet regime?  Why are our SF involved in such morally dubious activities?

So basically, the future of SF looks as confused as its recent past has been.  When will we ever learn?

General Betrayus

--We think he looks like Alfafa, 
though "Spanky" would be a better nickname

Tell me how this ends?
--David Petraeus

The power of example is very important
to people under stress
--General Sir John Hackett
_________________

[We at RangerAgainstWar find the scuttlebutt surrounding the General Petraeus incident interesting and provocative on many levels, and so will examine its implications over the next week.]

Today: Officers, not Gentlemen

Once upon a time there was a military academy called West Point, which held as its highest imperative their Honor Code, a road map for behavior suiting an officer and a gentleman, a man who would reflect the highest moral values of a brave new nation.

Many years later, after the United States failed to win its first two military actions in as many decades (Korea and Vietnam), there came a graduate who would endeavor to restore shine to his nation's military by being a part of  grand plan -- the redefinition of warfare, late-20th century-style.  This cadet, David Petraeus, would write his thesis explaining the new way of war for the United States (the Counterinsurgency) and he would go on to pen the titular FM 3-24 -- COIN -- which promised a new and winning outcome to foreign wars by applying the moral values of America to win far-flung hearts and minds of people less moral than we.

In its moral high dudgeon, the United States tromped off to find its success in the woman-demeaning Middle East, hoping to teach them to not stone women for adultery, for instance.  The now-General Petraeus staked his claim on the success of his doctrine and sought to redeem his country's esteem, but all the Brasso at his disposal could not remove the tarnish he himself would re-apply.

True, he did not (literally) stone a woman, but his adulterous behavior is not consonant with the morals he and his fellows would purport to be exporting. He recognized this (as a CIA report threatened to go public), and correctly removed himself from public office.  It is unknown if the affair began while he was still ISAF Commander; if so Petraeus was derelict and guilty of battlefield cowardice by espousing one set of values with his words and defiling them by his actions. If so, he may be subject to military charges.  Knowing, however, there are different spanks for different ranks.

How can a hypocrite win anyone's heart or mind?  Is it a greater good to export adultery or to disapprove of its punishment?  Should not the man tasked with imposing our belief system upon a foreign land not at least implement the best of that heritage in his personal conduct? Is it any wonder the U.S. is seen as morally bankrupt hypocrites?  Maybe there is a corroding worm that lives within our vaunted freedoms.  Maybe man is destined everywhere to corrupt the good he would do.  How did an honor code become so fuzzy?

If we have no fixed moral compass, how can we expect FM 3-24 with its "panoply" of pretty words to export the thing we cannot manage ourselves?  Stoning a woman for adultery is one step beyond adultery only because we value each human life.  However, seen from a more traditional perspective, all transgressions that threaten to unseat the authority of one's culture and jurisprudence are equally offensive.  Our Ten Commandments are not listed in hierarchical order; killing and adultery are both theological crimes.

Further, on the nuts and bolts level, how was Gen. Petraeus's dalliance financed?  Did our tax dollars finance his "bad decision"?

Counterinsurgency and morality should be complimentary concepts. Why could a major COIN war not produce a Four Star 0-10 that could decisively affect the outcome of the effort? [Generals McKiernan and McChrystal were previously both relieved of duty.] Will it be the moral, tactical or strategic deficiencies which will prove the greatest detractor from U.S. COIN policy? Why is the U.S. Army incapable of producing 0-10's capable of theatre Army command?

General Petraeus has now reached the tail end of his teleological inquiry.

Across the River, III

--AP/Getty file photo, 10.6.12

I think we should remove ourselves
from Afghanistan as quickly as we can.
I just think we're killing the kids that don't need to die
--Congressman Bill Young (R - FL) 

The United States will always do the right thing --
when all other possibilities have been exhausted 
--Winston Churchill
 ________________

[Note, per Rep. Young's quotation: Some rare times a Floridian will get things right. Staff Sergeant Matt Sitton wrote his Rep. Bill Young June 2012 about the dire trajectory of military operations as he saw it in Afghanistan (The Soldiers Who Don't Need to Die); he concluded, "Thank you again for allowing soldiers to voice their opinion. If anything, please pray for us."  SSG Sitton was later killed in action, and Rep. Young decided to speak up.]

The above AP photo heading the news item on the most recent two Special Forces troops killed by insurgents in Afghanistan shows another danger area which is a trail or a dirt road.

The troops are bunched up and are a prime target; following normal lines of drift can get you killed.  There is not all around security and the troops are on their knees rather than dispersing and forming a hasty perimeter.  This is a potentially deadly mistake in patrolling technique, reflecting criminally poor training training and execution at squad level.

A shooter with a Dragon Soviet semi auto sniper rifle or (X)M21 system could render this team toast; ditto if the trail is rigged for explosion -- a Claymore or light machine gun would do the same.

This is strange behavior for Special Operations Soldiers; it is exactly the same as that exhibited by a recent group of young, drunk AIT Infantry soldiers on a balcony of a Columbus, Georgia motel.

Except, despite the bars on the businesses behind the motel, the AIT Soldiers were not in a war zone.

Worst Case Planning

"Relax," said the night man,
"We are programmed to receive,
You can check out anytime you like... 
but you can never leave" 
--Hotel California, The Eagles 

Think where man’s glory most begins and ends,
And say my glory was I had such friends 
--The Municipal Gallery Revisited, 
W. B. Yeats 

______________________

The recent murder of U.S. Libyan Ambassador Chris Stevens and three other diplomats along with the release of Mark Bissonnette's book No Easy Day prompt further thoughts:

The Special Forces Son Tay raid was an Act of War into a hostile nation to retrieve United States Prisoners of War.   It was a high-risk operation, just as was the SEAL team assassination party's incursion in Abbottabad, Pakistan to kill Osama bin Laden.  The difference is, Pakistan is an ostensible ally, and allies do not invade other allies; the idea is, a nation runs hostile operations in hostile countries.

If Son Tay had failed, the U.S. could accept that fact and the resultant loss of friendly lives, but what would a botched job have done to America in the case of the OBL raid? Could we have accepted a Black Hawk Down scenario, in which U.S. dead would be dragged through the streets of a friendly nation in hideous glee?

Would the U.S. have fought any Pakistani troops sent to establish Pakistan's control of their sovereign territory?  Did anyone wargame these questions?  Were the risks worth the payoff?  Was the killing of OBL worth taking these risks?

Since the inception of the Phony War on Terror (PWOT ©) the military logic of operations has consistently been composed of pie-in-the-sky planning and ignoring worst-case scenarios.  

What strategic value attended this operation?  If the intel was as good as Bissonnette's book suggests, why not just JDAM the target area?  If indeed killing was the object, why not simply put a precision target on the compound?

Maybe the fix was in, and the Pakistanis had been read into the scenario and had agreed to avoid and contact with U.S. troops, but this seems unlikely. If this were true, then they are a duplicitous bunch of opportunists sans straight-talk or straight-dealing. Whatever the situation, the operation lacked any semblance of military logic.

These thoughts pose further questions, "What is 'hostile'?"  Are Egypt, Libya, Yemen, Iraq and Afghanistan allies or even friendly, or are the hostile to the U.S.?  How does the U.S. treat enemies, and how, friends?  Can we even distinguish the difference these days?

It is hardly credible that Iraq and Afghanistan are friendly to the U.S.  It is readily believable that they will suck every dollar that we will throw their way, but they will never love or befriend us, and to believe so is delusional.

[cross-posted @ milpub]