Further on SSG Miller's Medal of Honor

To every thing there is a season,
and a time to every purpose under the heaven
--Ecclesiastes 3:1

Man's most valuable trait is
a judicious sense of what not to believe
--Euripides
_____________________

Further thoughts on SSG Millers Medal of Honor action:

The Special Operations Forces (SOF) MOH's of Lt. Murphy and SSG Miller are similar in that neither team had a realistic chance of fulfilling their mission. Bravado and bluster aside, a mission must be realistically planned and executed, and most importantly, must have a reasonable chance of being successful with assets available and forces engaged.

In Murphy's scenario the team was compromised and forced to fight for their survival. In Miller's scenario the team was sent on a mission with no familiarity training with the ANA forces, lacking translators and solid intelligence. The hunters became the prey; the mission should never have been launched.

Both ODA and ANA small unit elements were sent into contact with a company-sized enemy force; this was a failure of intelligence functions. They either knew this fact or not, and either indicts negligent staff functioning. The ODA Commander should have required firm intelligence prior to kick off. Both scenarios indicate a lack of professionalism at the command level.

In Miller it is apparent that the friendly elements were never decisively engaged, nor did enemy forces have effective fires placed upon them. While the Afghan Army element was pinned down and lost forward momentum, they could freely move to the rear by whatever route they chose. They, in fact, did so.

During this phase the ODA, possessing vehicles with mounted weapons which provided a modicum protection, were never used for tactical. They had freedom of maneuver to the rear but they did not prudently pull back into hasty defensive positions. The simulated video of the action indicates this was a possibility. The question becomes, why didn't they break contact, which would have been the prudent course of action?

It lacks military sense to expect a small element to attack a larger entrenched enemy possessing the high ground. One wonders if the ODA Commander had control of the point element at any time during this engagement. One further wonders why the Patrol Leader was not with the engaged element of his patrol (normal combat leadership.)

Further, are the present SOF forces trained to be overly aggressive, and do only aggressive personnel pass selection to these units. There is a time to attack and a time to defend, and that is what doctrine, training and experience dictate to a leader when engaged in deadly close combat.

As young Infantry officers we were repeatedly indoctrinated to distinguish between effective and ineffective fire, and to temper our actions accordingly. A soldier is not expected to assault overwhelming odds when an escape route is available and no other units will be adversely affected by their actions. Perhaps this is the difference between soldiering and warriorhood.

In Miller's scenario, a fine loyal and dedicated soldier died to what military purpose? Even if all the enemy were killed in this fight we still see evidence that ANA forces were inadequate to the task. Additionally, this terrain could not be held indefinitely, so what was the point of the exercise?

While this is no denigration of SSG Miller's actions, there are questions that should be asked beyond the simple waving of the colors. The U.S. cannot continue to assign missions that lack tactical value and serve no strategic purpose. Simple knock-down, drag-out fights are not military science but rather, mindless wastes of lives.


Postscript:

Ranger does not like to politicize the death of any soldier, but how do insurgents against a corrupt Afghan government equate to enemies of the United States? How does their occupation of their tribal lands adversely affect our freedoms or safety?

Even if the enemy were hard core Arab al-Qaeda fighters the value of this fight is questionable. Killing armed insurgents does not make America one iota safer and surely does nothing to stabilize the created myth that is the Afghan nation.

The Vietnam War was my only experience and this colors my critique. My unit had large numbers of casualties and great bravery and heroism was the order of the day. Yet none of this led to military success. No political success was discernible, either -- How does this differ from Iraq or Afghanistan?

Meanwhile, good soldiers fight and die for what? There must be meaning beyond the violence; this was not clear in 1970-71 and is still elusive on today's battlefields.

This discussion on SSG Miller's MOH discussed the hows, but perhaps the more important and difficult question is, why?