Strategic Partnership Agreement

"Relax," said the night man,
"We are programmed to receive,
You can check out anytime you like
... but you can never leave"
--Hotel California, The Eagles

“The Case for Preemptive War:
Taking the ‘Re-’ Out of Retaliation”
--Book by the fictional Institute for Continuing Conflict in
They Eat Puppies, Don't They, Christopher Buckley

How could I have loved someone
like the one I see in you?
I remember the good times baby now,
and the bad times too
--Goodbye to You, Scandal

She asked me to stay
and she told me to sit anywhere,
So I looked around and I noticed
there wasn't a chair
--Norwegian Wood (This Bird Has Flown),
The Beatles
_________________

President Obama and Islamic Republic of Afghanistan President Karzai had their own May Day celebration by signing the Enduring Strategic Partnership Agreement between the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and the United States of America (as opposed, presumably, to the "non-enduring, not-so-strategic" partnerships; of course, it is hard to have relationship sans good dialog, so maybe this really is something new.)

However, no matter how cheerily the new partnership begins, without the imprimatur of a super majority of the Senate, it lacks the weight of a treaty. We all should know that without the official piece of paper, a partnership is only so much pipe smoke, as partners may just roll up their goods in an Afghan rug or Bodhi bag and hie thee out of there at any moment.

This is not to say partners don't fail to honor the real deal (marriage/treaties) all the time. It's just more difficult, and with that impending effort, a little more consideration and circumspection between the partners is called upon. With a non-binding agreement Mssrs. Obama and Karzai are like the ill-fated live-in lovers, and a divorce or separation is imminent.

Without the advice and consent of the Senate, Mr. Obama and Mr. Karzai's partnership lacks even the heft of a Civil Union, and is therefore not worth the paper on which it is written. Where are the references to the imperative for a Senate vote? The lack of discussion suggests that the United States has something to gain from this "agreement" which makes Afghanistan into a "major non-NATO ally."

Which presents the question: How can the 3rd poorest and most corrupt nation in the world, with a Gross National Product of $16 billion, morph into a major ally? Exactly what does "security and defense cooperation"actually translate into in definable parameters? How did the security and defense of Afghanistan become a strategic objective of U.S.policy? Why would we even care?

It matters naught if the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan is securely defended since we invaded that country to defeat al Qaeda and to neutralize their threat to the American Homeland. The two concepts are not reliant on each other.

We should remember that President Nixon and Secretary of State Kissinger offered the South Vietnamese our pledge of support in 1970 and '71, then threw in the towel shortly thereafter. Surely the Afghan leadership has not forgotten that lesson, for all of Mr. Obama's convection to move "Forward!", and not be troubled by such things as prosecuting our own war criminals.

Surely Mr. Karzai also notes that John Yoo, torture memoist, cannot be prosecuted for his illegal work. Mr. Obama is behaving at home like the member of a partnership who must suck it up and give a pass for the bad behavior of his household members for the sake of peace in the house. It is not a very strong position.

Legal concepts are the basis of our Constitution, and words express these concepts. Mr. Obama is a Constitutional law specialist, so they say. The words, "Advise and consent" by the Senate express the needful basis of a binding treaty between partner countries. Anything shy of that bar is an unconstitutional exercise of Executive power.

Is Obama sampling Afghan poppy products when he signs such agreements?

Further on SSG Miller's Medal of Honor

To every thing there is a season,
and a time to every purpose under the heaven
--Ecclesiastes 3:1

Man's most valuable trait is
a judicious sense of what not to believe
--Euripides
_____________________

Further thoughts on SSG Millers Medal of Honor action:

The Special Operations Forces (SOF) MOH's of Lt. Murphy and SSG Miller are similar in that neither team had a realistic chance of fulfilling their mission. Bravado and bluster aside, a mission must be realistically planned and executed, and most importantly, must have a reasonable chance of being successful with assets available and forces engaged.

In Murphy's scenario the team was compromised and forced to fight for their survival. In Miller's scenario the team was sent on a mission with no familiarity training with the ANA forces, lacking translators and solid intelligence. The hunters became the prey; the mission should never have been launched.

Both ODA and ANA small unit elements were sent into contact with a company-sized enemy force; this was a failure of intelligence functions. They either knew this fact or not, and either indicts negligent staff functioning. The ODA Commander should have required firm intelligence prior to kick off. Both scenarios indicate a lack of professionalism at the command level.

In Miller it is apparent that the friendly elements were never decisively engaged, nor did enemy forces have effective fires placed upon them. While the Afghan Army element was pinned down and lost forward momentum, they could freely move to the rear by whatever route they chose. They, in fact, did so.

During this phase the ODA, possessing vehicles with mounted weapons which provided a modicum protection, were never used for tactical. They had freedom of maneuver to the rear but they did not prudently pull back into hasty defensive positions. The simulated video of the action indicates this was a possibility. The question becomes, why didn't they break contact, which would have been the prudent course of action?

It lacks military sense to expect a small element to attack a larger entrenched enemy possessing the high ground. One wonders if the ODA Commander had control of the point element at any time during this engagement. One further wonders why the Patrol Leader was not with the engaged element of his patrol (normal combat leadership.)

Further, are the present SOF forces trained to be overly aggressive, and do only aggressive personnel pass selection to these units. There is a time to attack and a time to defend, and that is what doctrine, training and experience dictate to a leader when engaged in deadly close combat.

As young Infantry officers we were repeatedly indoctrinated to distinguish between effective and ineffective fire, and to temper our actions accordingly. A soldier is not expected to assault overwhelming odds when an escape route is available and no other units will be adversely affected by their actions. Perhaps this is the difference between soldiering and warriorhood.

In Miller's scenario, a fine loyal and dedicated soldier died to what military purpose? Even if all the enemy were killed in this fight we still see evidence that ANA forces were inadequate to the task. Additionally, this terrain could not be held indefinitely, so what was the point of the exercise?

While this is no denigration of SSG Miller's actions, there are questions that should be asked beyond the simple waving of the colors. The U.S. cannot continue to assign missions that lack tactical value and serve no strategic purpose. Simple knock-down, drag-out fights are not military science but rather, mindless wastes of lives.


Postscript:

Ranger does not like to politicize the death of any soldier, but how do insurgents against a corrupt Afghan government equate to enemies of the United States? How does their occupation of their tribal lands adversely affect our freedoms or safety?

Even if the enemy were hard core Arab al-Qaeda fighters the value of this fight is questionable. Killing armed insurgents does not make America one iota safer and surely does nothing to stabilize the created myth that is the Afghan nation.

The Vietnam War was my only experience and this colors my critique. My unit had large numbers of casualties and great bravery and heroism was the order of the day. Yet none of this led to military success. No political success was discernible, either -- How does this differ from Iraq or Afghanistan?

Meanwhile, good soldiers fight and die for what? There must be meaning beyond the violence; this was not clear in 1970-71 and is still elusive on today's battlefields.

This discussion on SSG Miller's MOH discussed the hows, but perhaps the more important and difficult question is, why?

SSG Miller MOH, Pt. 3

Pavel Sidorenko (Estonia)

SSG Miller MOH Pt 3:
Things Don't Line Up
_________________

As the battle reaches its conclusion, inconsistencies and questions stack up:

"Throughout the engagement, the insurgent fire around Staff Sgt. Miller was so intense that his fellow team members could not see him due to the dust, debris, and RPG and small arms fire impacting around him. During the ensuing 25-minute battle, Staff Sgt. Miller was mortally wounded by a second gunshot to his upper torso under his left arm. Despite suffering a second and fatal wound, Staff Sgt. Miller remained steadfast and continued his selfless acts of heroism. He provided essential disposition and location reports of insurgent actions and he relentlessly fired his SAW until he expended all of his ammunition and threw his final hand grenade."

If there was no visual contact between the ODA element and SSG Miller, how can we be assured that he was not killed by friendly fire? The ANAs carry the same weapons as the enemy. This would not be the first time that friendly data as been twisted to fit the official narrative. Though speculative, it is a valid question. The situation is anomalous and defies logical infantry evaluation.

"At the first opportunity, members of Staff Sgt. Miller’s team bound up to his position to render aid and recover him. Enemy reinforcements overwhelmed the recovery team with direct fire causing the team to seek cover. During the recovery attempt, the enemy’s precision was clearly evident as team members sustained multiple hits from small arms fire to their body armor and equipment."

This still was not effective enemy fire. If it were, the team would have suffered KIA's. SSG Miller was the lone casualty.

"Approximately an hour and 45 minutes later, a quick reaction force arrived, which allowed the ODA to lead a patrol back into the valley to recover Staff Sgt. Miller. As a testament of the enemy’s tenacity, the quick reaction force sent to assist with recovery operations sustained additional casualties from intense direct RPG and small arms fire. Because of the enemy’s dominance of the terrain and potential for loss of additional lives, the patrol was forced to use its second CCP and two MEDVACs."

When it takes a QRF 1 hour 45 minutes to respond to a call for help, there is a remarkable criticism here. A QRF should be dedicated, combat-ready with transportation on-station. Why the delay? Why was the engaged unit so far from mutual support?

Was the planning and execution of this mission realistic and grounded in basic rules of ground combat? Units should not be thrown out piecemeal to be chewed up by concentrated enemy elements. Why didn't intel know about these enemy dispositions? Where were the visual or photo recons of the route? Was this operation a shot in the dark, or planned and considered in a professional and soldierly manner? Did the ODA Commander have control of the maneuver element? Why would the untested, unknown ANA forces be sent into such reported fire? Why would a Special Forces element? Tactics imply something other than suicidal action.

"Post-battle intelligence reports indicate that in excess of 140 insurgents participated in the ambush, more than 40 were killed and over 60 were wounded. Staff Sgt. Miller is credited with killing more than 16 and wounding over 30 insurgents. His valor under fire from a numerically superior force, complete selflessness and disregard for his own life, combined with his unmatched ability to accurately identify and engage insurgent positions, allowed his patrol to move to the safety of covered positions."

SSG Miller is credited with killing or wounding 46 fighters reportedly in superior fighting positions. Assuming that he carried 300 rounds for his SAW, this means he hit flesh 46 times out of 300 -- a 1:6 ratio. This is astounding accuracy from a squad auto weapon. Especially since the area was reportedly covered by explosions and dust that kept the team from maintaining visual contact.

"Staff Sgt. Miller’s selfless acts saved the lives of his seven of his ODA members and 15 Afghan soldiers. As a result of Staff Sgt. Miller’s heroic actions, the Gowardesh Insurgency was dealt a crippling blow, decimating insurgent forces involved in the battle, and shattering their morale and confidence. Staff Sgt. Miller’s actions exemplify the honored tradition of military heroism and reflect distinct credit upon himself, Special Operations Task Force–33, the Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force–Afghanistan, Special Operations Command Central, and the U.S. Army."

Summary: This was a classic meeting engagement in which friendly forces had every indication this would be an ambush site. A prudent Commander would have developed the situation and made a correct military decision not to conduct a hasty attack, as they unfortunately attempted.

The doctrinal course of action was clearly indicated: Fall back and conduct a planned attack with additional assets. Instead, this became a totally reactive, fragmented hasty reaction, leaving the initiative to the enemy. Due to the combat power of the hostiles, SSG Miller's one-man symbolic attack had no military significance. His U.S. comrades were not in the kill zone. We mourn his death, all the moreso for its needlessness.


Tomorrow: Closing thoughts

SSG Robert Miller's Medal of Honor, Pt. 1

link to recreation of battle
_________________

This is an analysis of Staff Sergeant Robert Miller's Medal of Honor action 1.25.08. It is difficult to do a tactical analysis without access to After Action Reports and Operation Orders, but since these were not available the online "official narrative" was utilized.

"Staff Sgt. Robert J. Miller, U.S. Army, heroically distinguished himself by exceptionally valorous conduct in the face of the enemy of the U.S. while serving as the Weapons Sergeant, Special Forces Operational Detachment Alpha 3312, Special Operations Task Force–33, Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force–Afghanistan, Forward Operating Base Naray, Kunar Province, Afghanistan, in support of Operation Enduring Freedom.

"During the pre-dawn hours of Jan. 25, 2008, ODA 3312 conducted a combat reconnaissance patrol to Gowardesh, Afghanistan, to confirm or deny enemy activity and/or insurgents presence in the vicinity of Chen Khar in order to clear the valley of insurgent safe havens. ..."

The stated mission was to confirm or deny enemy activity. The mission would lead to clearing the valley of insurgent (= U.S. enemy) safe havens.

Was there an implied mission to close with the enemy, or was the goal merely to make contact to confirm their presence? Surely a 24-man patrol could not be expected to clear or hold a well-known strong point. Making contact can lead to several results, but meeting engagements such as this are especially sensitive as the enemy situation is unknown. A prudent Commander would not assault an unknown number of dug-in enemy who hold the high ground without properly defining the situation.

As the combined ODA and ANA convoy neared its objective, ODA 3312 was forced to halt twice to dismount and explode insurgent-emplaced boulders along its route. Staff Sgt. Miller and other members of ODA 3312 recognized this tactict as a potential precursor to an insurgent ambush and immediately heightened security. Recognizing the historical enemy tactic used to canalize and ambush Coalition forces, the detachment dismounted an overwatch element.

This is prudent, especially if the vehicular firepower was utilized as an overwatch feature. This would cover movement by firepower.

"Staff Sgt. Miller led the overwatch elements as the threat of imminent danger increased. The rocky, snow-packed terrain, freezing temperatures and a fierce wind chill further exacerbated the ODA’s movement to the objective. The ODA’s only Pashto speaker, Staff Sgt. Miller took charge of the dismounted element and assembled partnered ANA forces to ensure they could move under cover."

Why was there no interpreter assigned to this mission? In addition, why were the partnered units not familiar with one another? Why was the lone soldier sent with the ANAs? Doesn't modern Special Forces maintain buddy teams? What Commander would send a soldier to an unknown unit without accompaniment by even a single friendly? Why would you send a Squad Automatic Weapon (SAW) without a cover?

"Once ODA 3312 arrived at the target compound, Staff Sgt. Miller led the ANA and established security around the ODA’s ground mobility vehicles. After security was established, the team confirmed through the employment of an unmanned aerial vehicle that 15 to 20 insurgents were congregating and occupying prepared fighting positions in the targeted compound.

"Maintaining his situational awareness, Staff Sgt. Miller immediately jumped into his vehicle’s turret and engaged the enemy with its mounted MK19 40mm automatic grenade launcher."

Key point: They had a drone above to provide accurate combat intelligence of enemy disposition, to include locations and strengths. Since the team was vehicular-mounted it is safe to assume that they had mobility and firepower, to include beaucoup ammunition to fight either attacking or defending. They were probably carrying at least two basic loads as they were expecting contact. This would have been more than sufficient as they had air and artillery support.

"As a result of his superior tactical skills, he positively marked the enemy while simultaneously describing the area to the JTAC. Without his expert marksmanship and accurate description of the area, the JTAC would not have been able to provide accurate grid locations for close air support."

Where were the reports from the drone? Why were the close air support elements not able to spot the enemy locations? This was not a one-man show -- there were JTAC and air assets operating, as they should.

"As noted by the team’s JTAC, Staff Sgt. Miller’s involvement in the employment of CAS was largely responsible for the accuracy of four 30mm strafe runs and the emplacement of three precision-guided GBU38 munitions on the objective. As a result of his efforts, two A-10 Warthogs and two F-15 Strike Eagles dealt lethal effects onto numerous enemy positions and disrupted their ability to maneuver."

Accepting this assertion, why do we even have a team JTAC? These assets are not blind and the target area was clear and visible.

Without even seeing the enemy it would be sufficient and desirable to put suppressive fire on the heights above the engaged team. This is what artillery support does. This scenario required overwhelming fire support in order to offer a reasonable expectation of mission completion. Why was there no Forward Observer/Artillery Liaison Officer assigned from the supporting artillery units -- policy in most ground combat scenarios. How accurate does a cluster bomb run have to be, anyway? If friendlies are pinned in the valleys, the cluster units go on the hillsides.

"As Staff Sgt. Miller continued to neutralize numerous insurgent positions, his MK19 sustained a catastrophic malfunction, which eliminated it for the duration of the battle. Without hesitation, Staff Sgt. Miller quickly transitioned from the MK19 to an M240B machine gun mounted on the rear of his vehicle and continued to effectively engage the enemy."

Why would the vehicle with the MK 19 be pulled into a defilade defensive position to be serviced, later to be brought back into operation? Any weapon can be cleared, and surely a defective gun was not carried on the mission; if so, this was inattention to detail. The vehicle and gunner were not pinned down or receiving effective enemy fire at this point, as manning the vehicular-mounted guns would not have been possible. That is the difference between effective and ineffective fire.

"Understanding the peril of the battle and the composition of his force, Staff Sgt. Miller moved from his firing position and began emplacing ANA soldiers in positions to provide overwatch, detect movement from the high ground, observe the rear of the patrol and provide security to the flank of the ground assault. His actions provided security for his team and enabled them to maintain their focus on enemy targets. Once ample security was established, Staff Sgt. Miller re-engaged the enemy."

What was the rest of the team doing during this action?

"Upon completion of the initial contact and CAS, the ODA commander directed a dismounted patrol to conduct battle damage assessment and a post-CAS strike assessment of the destroyed insurgent positions. Sensing the need to provide the ANA additional assistance, the ODA commander charged Staff Sgt. Miller with the responsibility to lead the partnered ANA force in an advisory role.

"With the proficiency of an already-proven combat leader, Staff Sgt. Miller briefed the ANA platoon leadership on the scheme of maneuver onto the objective in their native Pashto language. Staff Sgt. Miller established rapport and instilled confidence in the ANA platoon leadership and its soldiers despite being partnered with the ANA platoon only 30 minutes prior to the mission."

At this point the entire friendly force still has the freedom of maneuver, has not decisively engaged and maintains initiative, but the main enemy fighting positions had not yet been approached or engaged. At this point it is still a fight to establish and maintain contact.


NEXT: Partnering with unknowns