It Takes a Village

I regard the death and mangling
of a couple thousand men
as a small affair, a kind of morning dash --
and it may be well that we become so hardened
--General William Tecumseh Sherman

War on the cheap
is always a rotten policy
--William Rees-Mogg
___________________

More thoughts on Dakota Meyer's Medal of Honor scenario:

The back story is a subtle slap in the Army's face. It is repeatedly stressed that the fire support was denied by the Army, and 10th Mountain officers were relieved after this incident. This is the reverse of the Battle at Lang Vei in Vietnam in which the Marines failed to provide fire and artillery support to the Special Forces under siege. Instead after that battle, Marine Commander Colonel Lowndes was rewarded for his grave inaction and received the Navy Cross; he was never reprimanded.

Simple questions regarding the personnel at the fight:

1. Why was United States Marine Corps 05 in the fight? How did he fit in the command structure?
2. If there were 140 friendlies, then how did they all get to the Objective Rally Point (ORP)? Did they use a tour bus? What did their approach march look like? How long did they occupy the ORP?
3. If there were 140, then why was a reserve element not designated?
4. How many vehicles were at the ORP?

The fact that Meyers found the four U.S. dead and the ANA member in a bunch indicates that the U.S. members were desperate -- soldiers are trained to maintain distance and proper dispersion in training and combat. Bunching up indicates instinct is overriding training, a desperate position.

Huddled dead are indicative of every historical U.S. military defeat. The image of Myles Keogh at Little Big Horn and his clustered dead at the ravine come to mind. The groups may be larger or smaller, but it feels like we are walking a Mobius strip of repetitive disasters.

The fact that the bodies were stripped of all their equipment indicates the hostiles completely dominated and controlled the battle space. Not only did they dominate the field by placing effective fire on the friendlies, they had the freedom to maneuver and move with obvious impunity. This is a gross invalidation of the entire goodwill mission.

We were selling goodwill, but they were not buying. Instead, they copped at least $100,000 worth of U.S. combat paraphernalia. How can any commander intellectualize having ordered such a mission? The facts indicate that perhaps this war is just another unmanageable boondoggle of no military merit.

This was designated a "goodwill mission" to rebuild/repair the local mosque (McClatchey). This is a perplexing military mission. Does having the military rebuild a mosque violate separation of church and state? Does the U.S. military or government build or repair churches in the U.S.?

Does it make sense to combat "Islamic Extremism" in a Phony War on Terror (PWOT ©) while encouraging fundamentalism via actions such as mosque repair? Why fight them and then encourage their religious beliefs? This looks a lot like creating another Islamic fundamentalist state at U.S. taxpayer's expense. If so, why?

Since the enemy fighters were not on board with the "goodwill" of the mission, we should ask militarily, societally and as a course of national policy why it is a U.S. policy to kill people in the confines of isolated villages and valleys far from any Walmart, and to try and portray the action as one of goodwill?

An Army that fights people on their home turf under the flimsy guise of goodwill is performing an exercise in futility, expending lives for naught. Is destroying a village to save it a goodwill mission? Do the locals see it that way? Goodwill is not something carried on the backs of 140 heavily-armed and dangerous soldiers.

The kids in this valley probably did not receive any USMC Toys for Tots this Christmas.

Goodwill Hunting, II

--Self conqueror wall mural taken by reader
"Enrico" in Thailand

"My good fool," said a learned bystander,

"Your operations are mad."

"You are too candid," cried the candid man,

And when his stick left the head of the learned bystander

It was two sticks

--War is Kind and Other Lines,

Stephen Crane

Action

I got so much to give

I want to give it

I want to get some, too

--I Love the Nightlife,

Alicia Bridges

__________________

Pt. II -- Goodwill Hunting:

So is it any wonder the ostensible goodwill mission turned into a slugfest? The surprise is that the Command did not worst case plan this escapade, and the troops paid the price.

Do we care that the citation was embellished, or that five brave and good Americans died that day for a Goodwill Mission? Is Goodwill Hunting a new mission for a Rifle Platoon or Company? Following are a few rhetorical observations:

McClatchey reports in Dancing Goat II: "The Americans and an Afghan soldier were later found in a trench to which they had retreated." Retreated is not the correct term for what First Lt. Michael E. Johnson, Gunnery Sergeant Edwin W. Johnson, Petty Officer 3rd Class James R. Layton (medic) and Staff Sergeant Aaron M. Kenefick did that day. Retreating indicates an attempt to evacuate the battle area after having cashed it in.

Instead, these men were employing the cover that was available. They were in contact with a superior force and they were falling back under enemy pressure. They did not turn their backs, and this describes their deaths more accurately than calling it a retreat. They died in military order.

Ditto the paper's description of the MOH "winners". The medal of Honor is not won, it is conferred; they are "recipients". The implication of the word winner emanates from a sport culture divided into winners and losers, but the battlefield is not such a game. It could be said that even when one "wins", one has lost on some profound level.

But these are small points. The real point is that we have a President and a USMC Commandant that do not ask the correct questions. Both focus on the actions at the objective to the detriment and exclusion of questions that should be and need to be discussed. Those questions concern command actions which should have been considered before the unit was task organized and launched.

Casting aspersions upon Meyer's actions obscures the fact that good men died needlessly because of poor planning, which leads inevitable to faulty execution. The negative superlatives must fall upon the chain of command to include a Commander in Chief who continues such a senseless war.

The USMC was determined to produce a live MOH recipient and institutionally set out to do so. Controversy resulted, and an MOH recipient who left the Corps as soon as he could put on his hat.

We will close with a comment by then-Lance Cpl. Meyer:

"When somebody calls me a hero, I almost feel sick to my stomach. I'm getting recognized for what I did, but this medal is not about me. It's about the men and women serving right now, and those who will be serving afterward. They're the true heroes" (Man of Honor).

Afghanistan Medals of Honor

If this is what being a hero feels like,
you can have it
--Cpl. Dakota Meyer, Medal of Honor recipient
_____________________

The Murphy, Meyer and Miller Medals of Honor all share certain hallmarks:

• The enemy was overwhelming

• There were no Quick Reaction Forces (QRF's) ready to launch

• The hostile fighters had intimate knowledge of the battle space and had prepared the battlefield. The U.S. troops were behind the power curve before the first round went downrange.

• The concept of Cover, Concealment, Key Terrain and Avenues of Approach were ignored.

• Escape routes were non-existent

• Fire support was questionable

• Medical support was negligible

• Witness statements appeared self-serving and conflicting

• The pace of the fights were dictated by the hostile forces and they maintained the initiative throughout

• If the missions had been successful, what would the exploitation phase have looked like? None appeared evident

These are some basic observations. Ranger stands behind his original battle analyses [links HERE, HERE, HERE, HERE and HERE.] (Per previous Afghan War MOH recipients, SFC Paul Smith's MOH was awarded in a correct action; SSG, Salvatore Giunta's MOH did not meet the bar in a sane world in Ranger's opinion, and should have been a Silver Star, instead.)

Since the Unit Commander established an Objective Rally Point (ORP), this indicates Meyer's action was a planned attack or raid. (This was not a meeting engagement -- a combat action that occurs when a moving force, not necessarily deployed for battle, engages an enemy at an unexpected time and place -- as the hostiles were expected to be on-target.)

An ORP is the last covered and concealed, easily identified terrain feature out of the range of enemy direct fire weapons. The ORP is where the assault element moves out to the line of departure, which is the kick-off point of the attack.

Though this was a planned attack and not a meeting engagement (as both sides were arrayed to fight) it was conducted by the U.S. as if it were not planned. No follow-on forces were available for employment once the enemy was fixed and engaged.

A deliberate attack, such as this one, differs from a hasty attack in that the attackers (U.S.) should have thoroughly prepared the battlespace, to include photo and satellite imagery and agent reports. Active patrolling is usually part of the preparations.

Planned or hasty attacks and meeting engagements are anticipated and are expected to further the Commander's scheme of maneuver. The unit should always be prepared to continue on order, or to be relieved by an element that will exploit any initial success. From materials available, it appears that all U.S. fights look a lot like meeting engagements; this is bad on many levels, but especially because it denies the U.S. elements their combat multipliers.

There was no indirect fire available to seal off enemy avenues of approach and to deny them assembly areas or to block their escape routes. This appears to have been one-sided slugfest weighted to the enemy's advantage.

MOH recipient Meyers was featured in the Dec. Maxim magazine (which hired him in September as their Military consultant), however, the following soldier's questions remain unanswered in that interview:

• What was the mission?

• Why did the attackers channelize and attack a larger, dug-in force without artillery or air support?

• Where was the assault elements reserve force?

• Why was the ORP not secured more solidly?

• Did the divergent assault elements have a habitual relationship, or was it an ad hoc, slap-dash pickup team?

• Why did the unit lack organic mortars?

• Why were there no registered artillery concentrations?

• The state of training for the Afghan Nation Army members (ANA's) was deficient per Meyer. Why would any unit employ questionable combat assets?

• Why were there last minute additions to and deletions from the team?

• What was the medical evac policy and SOP for this unit?

• [On Iwo Jim, the Marines would do a deliberate assault on fortified caves with two medical corpsmen per platoon, and this was still insufficient. Also at Iwo, there was a company and battalion aid station somewhere immediately to the rear to assist in medical evacuation and treatment. In Cpl. Meyer's action, there appears to be only one corpsman and he was killed forward.]
  

This is a condemnation of the staff planning and indicates a weakness in the overall troop leading procedures. Did the commander employ backward planning steps? It looks doubtful. Communication from higher to low and low-to-high appears spotty. At best, there was a commo link that did not provide appropriate fire support.

This was a down-and-dirty analysis. The next entry will address the details of the action.

Further on SSG Miller's Medal of Honor

To every thing there is a season,
and a time to every purpose under the heaven
--Ecclesiastes 3:1

Man's most valuable trait is
a judicious sense of what not to believe
--Euripides
_____________________

Further thoughts on SSG Millers Medal of Honor action:

The Special Operations Forces (SOF) MOH's of Lt. Murphy and SSG Miller are similar in that neither team had a realistic chance of fulfilling their mission. Bravado and bluster aside, a mission must be realistically planned and executed, and most importantly, must have a reasonable chance of being successful with assets available and forces engaged.

In Murphy's scenario the team was compromised and forced to fight for their survival. In Miller's scenario the team was sent on a mission with no familiarity training with the ANA forces, lacking translators and solid intelligence. The hunters became the prey; the mission should never have been launched.

Both ODA and ANA small unit elements were sent into contact with a company-sized enemy force; this was a failure of intelligence functions. They either knew this fact or not, and either indicts negligent staff functioning. The ODA Commander should have required firm intelligence prior to kick off. Both scenarios indicate a lack of professionalism at the command level.

In Miller it is apparent that the friendly elements were never decisively engaged, nor did enemy forces have effective fires placed upon them. While the Afghan Army element was pinned down and lost forward momentum, they could freely move to the rear by whatever route they chose. They, in fact, did so.

During this phase the ODA, possessing vehicles with mounted weapons which provided a modicum protection, were never used for tactical. They had freedom of maneuver to the rear but they did not prudently pull back into hasty defensive positions. The simulated video of the action indicates this was a possibility. The question becomes, why didn't they break contact, which would have been the prudent course of action?

It lacks military sense to expect a small element to attack a larger entrenched enemy possessing the high ground. One wonders if the ODA Commander had control of the point element at any time during this engagement. One further wonders why the Patrol Leader was not with the engaged element of his patrol (normal combat leadership.)

Further, are the present SOF forces trained to be overly aggressive, and do only aggressive personnel pass selection to these units. There is a time to attack and a time to defend, and that is what doctrine, training and experience dictate to a leader when engaged in deadly close combat.

As young Infantry officers we were repeatedly indoctrinated to distinguish between effective and ineffective fire, and to temper our actions accordingly. A soldier is not expected to assault overwhelming odds when an escape route is available and no other units will be adversely affected by their actions. Perhaps this is the difference between soldiering and warriorhood.

In Miller's scenario, a fine loyal and dedicated soldier died to what military purpose? Even if all the enemy were killed in this fight we still see evidence that ANA forces were inadequate to the task. Additionally, this terrain could not be held indefinitely, so what was the point of the exercise?

While this is no denigration of SSG Miller's actions, there are questions that should be asked beyond the simple waving of the colors. The U.S. cannot continue to assign missions that lack tactical value and serve no strategic purpose. Simple knock-down, drag-out fights are not military science but rather, mindless wastes of lives.


Postscript:

Ranger does not like to politicize the death of any soldier, but how do insurgents against a corrupt Afghan government equate to enemies of the United States? How does their occupation of their tribal lands adversely affect our freedoms or safety?

Even if the enemy were hard core Arab al-Qaeda fighters the value of this fight is questionable. Killing armed insurgents does not make America one iota safer and surely does nothing to stabilize the created myth that is the Afghan nation.

The Vietnam War was my only experience and this colors my critique. My unit had large numbers of casualties and great bravery and heroism was the order of the day. Yet none of this led to military success. No political success was discernible, either -- How does this differ from Iraq or Afghanistan?

Meanwhile, good soldiers fight and die for what? There must be meaning beyond the violence; this was not clear in 1970-71 and is still elusive on today's battlefields.

This discussion on SSG Miller's MOH discussed the hows, but perhaps the more important and difficult question is, why?

SSG Miller MOH, Pt. 3

Pavel Sidorenko (Estonia)

SSG Miller MOH Pt 3:
Things Don't Line Up
_________________

As the battle reaches its conclusion, inconsistencies and questions stack up:

"Throughout the engagement, the insurgent fire around Staff Sgt. Miller was so intense that his fellow team members could not see him due to the dust, debris, and RPG and small arms fire impacting around him. During the ensuing 25-minute battle, Staff Sgt. Miller was mortally wounded by a second gunshot to his upper torso under his left arm. Despite suffering a second and fatal wound, Staff Sgt. Miller remained steadfast and continued his selfless acts of heroism. He provided essential disposition and location reports of insurgent actions and he relentlessly fired his SAW until he expended all of his ammunition and threw his final hand grenade."

If there was no visual contact between the ODA element and SSG Miller, how can we be assured that he was not killed by friendly fire? The ANAs carry the same weapons as the enemy. This would not be the first time that friendly data as been twisted to fit the official narrative. Though speculative, it is a valid question. The situation is anomalous and defies logical infantry evaluation.

"At the first opportunity, members of Staff Sgt. Miller’s team bound up to his position to render aid and recover him. Enemy reinforcements overwhelmed the recovery team with direct fire causing the team to seek cover. During the recovery attempt, the enemy’s precision was clearly evident as team members sustained multiple hits from small arms fire to their body armor and equipment."

This still was not effective enemy fire. If it were, the team would have suffered KIA's. SSG Miller was the lone casualty.

"Approximately an hour and 45 minutes later, a quick reaction force arrived, which allowed the ODA to lead a patrol back into the valley to recover Staff Sgt. Miller. As a testament of the enemy’s tenacity, the quick reaction force sent to assist with recovery operations sustained additional casualties from intense direct RPG and small arms fire. Because of the enemy’s dominance of the terrain and potential for loss of additional lives, the patrol was forced to use its second CCP and two MEDVACs."

When it takes a QRF 1 hour 45 minutes to respond to a call for help, there is a remarkable criticism here. A QRF should be dedicated, combat-ready with transportation on-station. Why the delay? Why was the engaged unit so far from mutual support?

Was the planning and execution of this mission realistic and grounded in basic rules of ground combat? Units should not be thrown out piecemeal to be chewed up by concentrated enemy elements. Why didn't intel know about these enemy dispositions? Where were the visual or photo recons of the route? Was this operation a shot in the dark, or planned and considered in a professional and soldierly manner? Did the ODA Commander have control of the maneuver element? Why would the untested, unknown ANA forces be sent into such reported fire? Why would a Special Forces element? Tactics imply something other than suicidal action.

"Post-battle intelligence reports indicate that in excess of 140 insurgents participated in the ambush, more than 40 were killed and over 60 were wounded. Staff Sgt. Miller is credited with killing more than 16 and wounding over 30 insurgents. His valor under fire from a numerically superior force, complete selflessness and disregard for his own life, combined with his unmatched ability to accurately identify and engage insurgent positions, allowed his patrol to move to the safety of covered positions."

SSG Miller is credited with killing or wounding 46 fighters reportedly in superior fighting positions. Assuming that he carried 300 rounds for his SAW, this means he hit flesh 46 times out of 300 -- a 1:6 ratio. This is astounding accuracy from a squad auto weapon. Especially since the area was reportedly covered by explosions and dust that kept the team from maintaining visual contact.

"Staff Sgt. Miller’s selfless acts saved the lives of his seven of his ODA members and 15 Afghan soldiers. As a result of Staff Sgt. Miller’s heroic actions, the Gowardesh Insurgency was dealt a crippling blow, decimating insurgent forces involved in the battle, and shattering their morale and confidence. Staff Sgt. Miller’s actions exemplify the honored tradition of military heroism and reflect distinct credit upon himself, Special Operations Task Force–33, the Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force–Afghanistan, Special Operations Command Central, and the U.S. Army."

Summary: This was a classic meeting engagement in which friendly forces had every indication this would be an ambush site. A prudent Commander would have developed the situation and made a correct military decision not to conduct a hasty attack, as they unfortunately attempted.

The doctrinal course of action was clearly indicated: Fall back and conduct a planned attack with additional assets. Instead, this became a totally reactive, fragmented hasty reaction, leaving the initiative to the enemy. Due to the combat power of the hostiles, SSG Miller's one-man symbolic attack had no military significance. His U.S. comrades were not in the kill zone. We mourn his death, all the moreso for its needlessness.


Tomorrow: Closing thoughts

Partnering with the Unknown -- SSG Miller MOH, Pt. 2

Bullet in a sand storm
Looking for a place to land
Bullet in a sand storm
Full heart beats an empty one
In the deck they dealt to man
Use me while you can
--Use Me While You Can, Bruce Cockburn

SSG Miller Medal of Honor, Pt. 2:
____________________

When we left Part I, "the entire friendly force still has the freedom of maneuver, has not decisively engaged and maintains initiative, and the main enemy fighting positions had not yet been approached or engaged. At this point it is still a fight to establish and maintain contact."

Their next move contradicts military doctrine.

It is a strange decision to partner with an unknown friendly unit and enter intense combat without knowing the friendlies capabilities and proclivities. This ad hoc approach is NOT the way elite units operate. One cannot plan in-depth with an unknown quantity leading the point.

"During the movement, Staff Sgt. Miller continually reinforced proper patrolling techniques as well as repeatedly adjusted and corrected the ANA rate of speed. Realizing that the engagement area was located in the mouth of a small, extremely steep and narrow valley that created a natural choke point, Staff Sgt. Miller directed the ANA to disperse from a file into a modified wedge."

Why would anyone enter a choke point -- another word for "kill zone" -- when the high ground is obviously well-defended? Why not pull back and request the Quick Reaction Force (QRF) or conventional force to reinforce the effort? Simply put, twelve men do not an assault force make.

"This contact initiated a near-ambush from a company-sized group of insurgents. The insurgent forces fired on Staff Sgt. Miller’s patrol with multiple PKM machine guns, RPGs, and AK-47 assault rifles from distances of less than 25 meters.

"The patrol was completely vulnerable, in the kill zone and without cover in a complex ambush with insurgent fighting positions located to the front (East), the left (North), and the right (South)."

Why did the patrol enter into such a precipitous tactical environment? When does aggressive soldiering become foolhardy activity?

"It soon became evident that numerous insurgents occupied prepared, elevated and hardened fighting positions in the mountain rock with overhead cover along the North and South valley ridgeline. Insurgents on the valley floor to Staff Sgt. Miller’s direct front, left, and right were fighting in defilade and possessed ample cover and concealment necessary for the employment of overwhelming fires on the totally exposed patrol."

This is confusing as the enemy was in defilade. If they are in defilade, then aren't you also in defilade?

"In the face of devastating insurgent fire, the ANA located directly behind Staff Sgt. Miller broke formation and bound away downhill and out of the kill zone, leaving Staff Sgt. Miller alone and with no support in the open terrain."

If the fire was so devastating, why were no ANAs killed while pulling out of the area? Why would anybody occupy open terrain in the face of intense fire? Why not pull bakc and organize a hasty defensive position? Why not bring the SAW back into the main perimeter to provide direct defensive fire? Why not dismount the vehicular 7.62 machine guns and ground-mount them for defensive purposes?

"To the front of Staff Sgt. Miller’s position one PKM machine gun and five AK47s were inflicting devastating hostile fire on the retreating ANA members and the remaining ODA patrol. Understanding the potential for catastrophe, Staff Sgt. Miller boldly charged the enemy and accurately engaged the entire force with his squad automatic weapon, thus eliminating the threat.

"With heavy fire from insurgent forces from all sides of his position engulfing him, Staff Sgt. Miller continued to engage at least four other insurgent positions, killing or wounding at least 10 insurgents."

This is remarkable since previously we saw that the enemy was in defilade.

"The darkness of the night and limited visibility made Staff Sgt. Miller’s weapon, also the most casualty producing, the greatest threat to the insurgent ambush. The highlighted muzzle flash and the distinct sound from his SAW instantly marked Staff Sgt. Miller as an easily identifiable target."

Why was the MK 19 not serviced and returned to action? Why were the vehicle MG's not utilized by the ODA to provide covering fire? Where was the on-call artillery?

"Staff Sgt. Miller’s cover fire was so accurate that it not only provided the necessary cover to save his team, it also suppressed the enemy to the right flank of the patrol, to the point where they could not reposition from that direction against the ODA for the duration of the engagement."

This belies the idea of the enemy being in defilade. Also, since they were in prepared positions they would have avenues of escape safe from direct fire. Artillery would have been most useful at this time. One man cannot keep an enemy company-sized force pinned down, especially when they occupied numerous prepared fighting positions.

"During his final charge forward, Staff Sgt. Miller threw two hand grenades into fighting positions, destroying the positions and killing or wounding an additional four insurgents. Only when Staff Sgt. Miller realized his fellow team members were out of immediate danger, and in positions to support him, did he attempt to move for cover."

Neither the ANA nor ODA elements entered the kill zone. Only Miller was forward and out of supporting fire range prior to his sustaining his mortal wound. This is not prudent soldiering. Where does valor split from ill-advised tactics? The teams were able to move, and Miller's fire was not supernatural.


Pt. III: Things Don't Line Up

SSG Robert Miller's Medal of Honor, Pt. 1

link to recreation of battle
_________________

This is an analysis of Staff Sergeant Robert Miller's Medal of Honor action 1.25.08. It is difficult to do a tactical analysis without access to After Action Reports and Operation Orders, but since these were not available the online "official narrative" was utilized.

"Staff Sgt. Robert J. Miller, U.S. Army, heroically distinguished himself by exceptionally valorous conduct in the face of the enemy of the U.S. while serving as the Weapons Sergeant, Special Forces Operational Detachment Alpha 3312, Special Operations Task Force–33, Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force–Afghanistan, Forward Operating Base Naray, Kunar Province, Afghanistan, in support of Operation Enduring Freedom.

"During the pre-dawn hours of Jan. 25, 2008, ODA 3312 conducted a combat reconnaissance patrol to Gowardesh, Afghanistan, to confirm or deny enemy activity and/or insurgents presence in the vicinity of Chen Khar in order to clear the valley of insurgent safe havens. ..."

The stated mission was to confirm or deny enemy activity. The mission would lead to clearing the valley of insurgent (= U.S. enemy) safe havens.

Was there an implied mission to close with the enemy, or was the goal merely to make contact to confirm their presence? Surely a 24-man patrol could not be expected to clear or hold a well-known strong point. Making contact can lead to several results, but meeting engagements such as this are especially sensitive as the enemy situation is unknown. A prudent Commander would not assault an unknown number of dug-in enemy who hold the high ground without properly defining the situation.

As the combined ODA and ANA convoy neared its objective, ODA 3312 was forced to halt twice to dismount and explode insurgent-emplaced boulders along its route. Staff Sgt. Miller and other members of ODA 3312 recognized this tactict as a potential precursor to an insurgent ambush and immediately heightened security. Recognizing the historical enemy tactic used to canalize and ambush Coalition forces, the detachment dismounted an overwatch element.

This is prudent, especially if the vehicular firepower was utilized as an overwatch feature. This would cover movement by firepower.

"Staff Sgt. Miller led the overwatch elements as the threat of imminent danger increased. The rocky, snow-packed terrain, freezing temperatures and a fierce wind chill further exacerbated the ODA’s movement to the objective. The ODA’s only Pashto speaker, Staff Sgt. Miller took charge of the dismounted element and assembled partnered ANA forces to ensure they could move under cover."

Why was there no interpreter assigned to this mission? In addition, why were the partnered units not familiar with one another? Why was the lone soldier sent with the ANAs? Doesn't modern Special Forces maintain buddy teams? What Commander would send a soldier to an unknown unit without accompaniment by even a single friendly? Why would you send a Squad Automatic Weapon (SAW) without a cover?

"Once ODA 3312 arrived at the target compound, Staff Sgt. Miller led the ANA and established security around the ODA’s ground mobility vehicles. After security was established, the team confirmed through the employment of an unmanned aerial vehicle that 15 to 20 insurgents were congregating and occupying prepared fighting positions in the targeted compound.

"Maintaining his situational awareness, Staff Sgt. Miller immediately jumped into his vehicle’s turret and engaged the enemy with its mounted MK19 40mm automatic grenade launcher."

Key point: They had a drone above to provide accurate combat intelligence of enemy disposition, to include locations and strengths. Since the team was vehicular-mounted it is safe to assume that they had mobility and firepower, to include beaucoup ammunition to fight either attacking or defending. They were probably carrying at least two basic loads as they were expecting contact. This would have been more than sufficient as they had air and artillery support.

"As a result of his superior tactical skills, he positively marked the enemy while simultaneously describing the area to the JTAC. Without his expert marksmanship and accurate description of the area, the JTAC would not have been able to provide accurate grid locations for close air support."

Where were the reports from the drone? Why were the close air support elements not able to spot the enemy locations? This was not a one-man show -- there were JTAC and air assets operating, as they should.

"As noted by the team’s JTAC, Staff Sgt. Miller’s involvement in the employment of CAS was largely responsible for the accuracy of four 30mm strafe runs and the emplacement of three precision-guided GBU38 munitions on the objective. As a result of his efforts, two A-10 Warthogs and two F-15 Strike Eagles dealt lethal effects onto numerous enemy positions and disrupted their ability to maneuver."

Accepting this assertion, why do we even have a team JTAC? These assets are not blind and the target area was clear and visible.

Without even seeing the enemy it would be sufficient and desirable to put suppressive fire on the heights above the engaged team. This is what artillery support does. This scenario required overwhelming fire support in order to offer a reasonable expectation of mission completion. Why was there no Forward Observer/Artillery Liaison Officer assigned from the supporting artillery units -- policy in most ground combat scenarios. How accurate does a cluster bomb run have to be, anyway? If friendlies are pinned in the valleys, the cluster units go on the hillsides.

"As Staff Sgt. Miller continued to neutralize numerous insurgent positions, his MK19 sustained a catastrophic malfunction, which eliminated it for the duration of the battle. Without hesitation, Staff Sgt. Miller quickly transitioned from the MK19 to an M240B machine gun mounted on the rear of his vehicle and continued to effectively engage the enemy."

Why would the vehicle with the MK 19 be pulled into a defilade defensive position to be serviced, later to be brought back into operation? Any weapon can be cleared, and surely a defective gun was not carried on the mission; if so, this was inattention to detail. The vehicle and gunner were not pinned down or receiving effective enemy fire at this point, as manning the vehicular-mounted guns would not have been possible. That is the difference between effective and ineffective fire.

"Understanding the peril of the battle and the composition of his force, Staff Sgt. Miller moved from his firing position and began emplacing ANA soldiers in positions to provide overwatch, detect movement from the high ground, observe the rear of the patrol and provide security to the flank of the ground assault. His actions provided security for his team and enabled them to maintain their focus on enemy targets. Once ample security was established, Staff Sgt. Miller re-engaged the enemy."

What was the rest of the team doing during this action?

"Upon completion of the initial contact and CAS, the ODA commander directed a dismounted patrol to conduct battle damage assessment and a post-CAS strike assessment of the destroyed insurgent positions. Sensing the need to provide the ANA additional assistance, the ODA commander charged Staff Sgt. Miller with the responsibility to lead the partnered ANA force in an advisory role.

"With the proficiency of an already-proven combat leader, Staff Sgt. Miller briefed the ANA platoon leadership on the scheme of maneuver onto the objective in their native Pashto language. Staff Sgt. Miller established rapport and instilled confidence in the ANA platoon leadership and its soldiers despite being partnered with the ANA platoon only 30 minutes prior to the mission."

At this point the entire friendly force still has the freedom of maneuver, has not decisively engaged and maintains initiative, but the main enemy fighting positions had not yet been approached or engaged. At this point it is still a fight to establish and maintain contact.


NEXT: Partnering with unknowns

MOH #3: Michael P. Murphy

Michael P. Murphy
5/7/76-6/28/05

Show me a hero and I will write you a tragedy
--F. Scott Fitzgerald
_____________

The third MOH is Michael P. Murphy, Lieutenant, US Navy, SEAL, 28 June 05. Lt. Murphy is the lone MOH out of Afghanistan.

While leading a mission to locate a high-level anti-coalition militia leader, Lieutenant Murphy demonstrated extraordinary heroism in the face of grave danger in the vicinity of Asadabad, Konar Province, Afghanistan. On 28 June 2005, operating in an extremely rugged, enemy-controlled area, Lieutenant Murphy's team was discovered by anti-coalition militia sympathizers who revealed their position to Taliban fighters. As a result, between 30 and 40 enemy fighters besieged his four-member team.

The citation indicates the team was trying to locate "a high-level anti-coalition leader." A mouthful, but what does it mean? We are also told anti-coalition militia sympathizers revealed Murphy's team's position to the Taliban. What is going on here?

The team is looking for one leader who is not Taliban, and is ratted out by the locals to the Taliban. This is layers upon layers of junk.

The team has several key problems which should have been addressed prior to launch and should have been discussed before mission brief during isolation. Number One: What was the threat, and what were the levels of threat?

What military logic would have placed a 4-man reconnaissance team into a hostile environment where they were bound to be compromised? Recon teams are just that. They are not put on the ground to fight, and if they do fight they can only survive if they run and utilize pre-planned, on-call fire support and aviation assets.

Once they are decisively engaged, they are dead. The history of MACVSOG in the Republic of Vietnam clearly reveals this fact. All today's planners need do is read the after action reports. All of Murphy's team were killed, save for one.

Lieutenant Murphy valiantly led his men in engaging the large enemy force. The ensuing fierce firefight resulted in numerous enemy casualties, as well as the wounding of all four members of his team.

Engaging a larger enemy force in hostile denied areas with a small team is in itself a violation of recon tactics. A light recon team is not equipped to fight a protracted contact -- they only fight to break contact and be extricated. A recon team's only purpose is to gain intelligence to be exploited by future operations.

Murphy's unit was placed in a scenario which was a death sentence, and exceptional bravery does not mitigate that fact. Remember, this is a 4-man team.

Realizing the impossibility of communicating in the extreme terrain and in the face of almost certain death, he fought his way into an open terrain to gain a better position to transmit a call.

In the middle of a heated fight is not the time to realize that communication with higher is non-existent. A commo check should be the first thing the unit does when it hits the ground. If it has a negative contact, they should abort. Otherwise they are isolated, which is not good.

During mission planning, an aerial or ground radio-relay site should have been planned and on-station BEFORE the team launched. Anything less indicates poor leadership.

Lieutenant Murphy maintained his exposed position while he provided his location and requested immediate support for his team.

Why was immediate support not provided before the team became decisively engaged? Why was there no extraction available immediately? Why no air cover? Why no indirect fire support?

In fact, why are the team's emergency personal radios not being utilized? Is this an SOF operation or Loony Tunes? The final statement really disturbs Ranger:

In his final act of bravery, he continued to engage the enemy until he was mortally wounded, gallantly giving his life for his country and for the cause of freedom.

How can we say these brave men gave their lives for their country? They gave their lives for lack of timely support, and their heroism was the result of poor planning.

This is reminiscent of Roger's Ridge, which was a thrown-together haphazard operation resulting in needless loss of SOF assets without harming the enemy in any significant manner.


Next: Michael Monsoor