Term Limits

We do not keep the outward form of order,
Where there is deep disorder in the mind
--Merchant of Venice, I, ii, Shakespeare
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Counter Terrorism is today's watchword, the Alpha and the Omega of all things Terrorism. We have even consecrated two endless wars to the concept . . . but is this logical?

Terrorism is a limited threat to our national security, but it has become a detractor, distracting from the real survival issues facing the United States. While Counterterrorism (CT) is a sound concept, it is only one-half of a balanced protective posture. Everything that is done to address terrorism is NOT Counterterrorism.

Counterterrorism encompasses all of the active measures emplaced to neutralize a terrorist threat. This includes assault teams and active operations directly aimed at operational terrorist assets. These programs may be tactical or strategic, and their effectiveness is limited by our definition of the programs.

CT used to be only one side of the coin (COIN); Terrorism Counteraction (TC/A) was the balance to the equation. TC/A used to be Department of Defense policy before everything morphed into CT, a conflation which misconstrues the nature of the threat. We have now created a farrago of guerrilla war (GW), unconventional war (UW) and civil disobedience, calling the unholy trinity TERRORISM, which is not always factual.

An example would be an IED in theatre, which is usually described as a terrorist incident if occurring in Afghanistan, Iraq or any OCONUS location occupied by U.S. troops. In reality, the IED is a UW/GW event misrepresented as terrorism; while the detonation caused terror, it was not terrorism.

TC/A is the pro-active aspect of a program aimed at countering terrorism. It is aimed at lessening the likelihood of a terror group initiating actions against an entity, whether that be an Army base, a state or a nation. TC/A assumes that we are on friendly terrain and control the territiry we physically occupy.

In a UW/GW environment TC/A is applicable but more difficult to evaluate and execute. TC/A is program-oriented and simple, enlisting things such as roadblocks, random patrolling, vehicle stops and checks, I.D. checks, population and resource control (PRC) and all other programs that were historically adapted to Internal Defense and Development (IDAD). The screenings at airports are akin to roadblocks on the approaches to Saigon.

TC/A are preventative measures aimed at breaking up or hindering the movement and success of terror groups. When these same programs are used in theatre they are classic PRC. The point is, not everything in the playbook is CT. We ignore the panoply of TC/A measures to our detriment, for the expected results of a strict CT approach are rather meager.

When we fail to articulate or clearly define the problem, how can we expect anything of value from the expenditures of our effort and resources? Our emphasis is is on "kinetic" direct action and CT at the expense of the less sexy TC/A. Such an imbalanced approach is based upon counteracting free-floating anxiety and fear, versus realistic, long-term appraisals. We should re-emphasize randomness and realistic evaluation of threat levels.

The CT program does not succeed in its current incarnation because it is neither complementary nor synergistic.