My War

--h/t Deryle

"Quit smiling. What are you smiling for?
This is an arrest." This is your mug shot,
not your prom photo. I was smiling from happiness;
my government will not disappear me
--Peace Demonstration
Maxine Hong Kingston

Those who cannot remember the past
are condemned to repeat it
--George Santayana

Lt. Stanley McChrystal enters an army in the late 70's
that is broken, riddled with drugs and race problems.
The soldiers aren't very good:
a collection of drunks, dirtbags,
junkies and scammers.
--The Operators, Michael Hastings (171)
___________________

Ranger has noticed a dismissive attitude toward the United States Army that fought in Vietnam, particularly at the Bad Boy lad's sites. He is not sure the reason for the snitty attitudes, but it seems like the lads doth protest too much. Their attitude ranges from supercilious to dismissive, implying that the U.S. experience in Vietnam is passe, and today's ranks are far superior in technology, doctrine, etc.

This arrogance of dismissing the recent past as Old School and no longer relevant is short-sighted and dangerous. Wars are not fought ex nihilo, and that certainly holds for today's supposed efforts at Counterinsurgency (COIN) and Counterterrorism (CT).

Today's military can focus on Low-Intensity Conflict (LIC) and pretend that it is a real war, when it is actually (fill in the blank.) In fact, today's Army has slack that we did not have in the 1960's and 70's, despite the rhetoric of how the last decade's stress has been so professionally addressed.

The U.S. fought a war in the Republic of Vietnam while also being deployed to address the Warsaw Pact. My service in Vietnam was preceded by a line Infantry assignment facing this threat on the German border -- these were real threats. Today, the U.S. faces no such opponent.

As for combat ability, today's Army (USMC) has not fought any battles against hardcore enemy Battalions, Regiments or Divisions. The RVN battles against enemy units with organic artillery and severe unit discipline are legend. Enemy supply columns actually rolled down the Ho Chi Minh Trail like rush hour traffic in downtown Baghdad. The enemy had the "division slice" of support for their operations, to include timely and accurate intelligence on U.S. intentions and capabilities.

The enemy in Vietnam had the will, the capability and the intent to prepare the battlefield at higher echelons, something unheard of in the Phony War on Terror (PWOT ©). The threat faced in Vietnam was real and vicious ... what equivalent did we see after the fall of Baghdad or the months following the invasion of Afghanistan? The Taliban has no Regimental or above combat capabilities.

Per U.S. forces, we had one echelon above Corps, meaning we had a real Theatre Army scenario, to include a Theatre Army Commander with Corps supporting. This means not only did we have Theatre - Corps - Division assets, but we also had the on-call abilities of the RVN forces including all of the usual suspects: Artillery, Aviation, Combat Support and Combat Service Support. We operated as an Army, not as door-kicking combat Brigades sans higher assets.

So what's the reason for the dismissive attitude toward my Army as being anything less than professional? Where is the evidence that any draftee fought less professionally than did the forces in the PWOT? From whence this lack of fraternity?

The troops in the Vietnam War were largely draftees and they earned their battle streamers with the same valor as did troops in all previous U.S. wars. What battles in Afghanistan or Iraq demonstrated the level of violence experienced by the Infantry units in the Vietnam War?

Further, there is a logical fallacy built into the argument of the Old Army detractors who say the 60's and 70's Army was "amateurish". If that is so, then we must accept that the Warsaw Pact was neutralized by a bunch of quacks. The next illogical step is to believe that today's professional volunteer force is totally responsible for the defeat of al Qaeda, despite the fact that less than 200 al Qaeda operatives exist worldwide (per former Central Intelligence Agency Director Leon Panetta.)

Framing the argument qua the Andrew Exum crowd, a crowd of amateurs defended the U.S. against Warsaw Pact with thousands of tanks, artillery pieces and millions of soldiers, while we are now ably protected against a laughable threat by the New Warriors.

Taking their argument to its logical ends, one must also believe the military leadership during the 60's was also incompetent, though carrying experience from two wars before assuming leadership in Vietnam. Contrast that with the present day Professional Army which sports a dearth of combat experience at the highest levels. The depth of experience was greater in Ranger's time frame than it is today, contrary to the hype.

And this is why we need poppy eradication programs in Afghanistan (though the Bushmills tap will always flow.)

Term Limits

We do not keep the outward form of order,
Where there is deep disorder in the mind
--Merchant of Venice, I, ii, Shakespeare
_____________________

Counter Terrorism is today's watchword, the Alpha and the Omega of all things Terrorism. We have even consecrated two endless wars to the concept . . . but is this logical?

Terrorism is a limited threat to our national security, but it has become a detractor, distracting from the real survival issues facing the United States. While Counterterrorism (CT) is a sound concept, it is only one-half of a balanced protective posture. Everything that is done to address terrorism is NOT Counterterrorism.

Counterterrorism encompasses all of the active measures emplaced to neutralize a terrorist threat. This includes assault teams and active operations directly aimed at operational terrorist assets. These programs may be tactical or strategic, and their effectiveness is limited by our definition of the programs.

CT used to be only one side of the coin (COIN); Terrorism Counteraction (TC/A) was the balance to the equation. TC/A used to be Department of Defense policy before everything morphed into CT, a conflation which misconstrues the nature of the threat. We have now created a farrago of guerrilla war (GW), unconventional war (UW) and civil disobedience, calling the unholy trinity TERRORISM, which is not always factual.

An example would be an IED in theatre, which is usually described as a terrorist incident if occurring in Afghanistan, Iraq or any OCONUS location occupied by U.S. troops. In reality, the IED is a UW/GW event misrepresented as terrorism; while the detonation caused terror, it was not terrorism.

TC/A is the pro-active aspect of a program aimed at countering terrorism. It is aimed at lessening the likelihood of a terror group initiating actions against an entity, whether that be an Army base, a state or a nation. TC/A assumes that we are on friendly terrain and control the territiry we physically occupy.

In a UW/GW environment TC/A is applicable but more difficult to evaluate and execute. TC/A is program-oriented and simple, enlisting things such as roadblocks, random patrolling, vehicle stops and checks, I.D. checks, population and resource control (PRC) and all other programs that were historically adapted to Internal Defense and Development (IDAD). The screenings at airports are akin to roadblocks on the approaches to Saigon.

TC/A are preventative measures aimed at breaking up or hindering the movement and success of terror groups. When these same programs are used in theatre they are classic PRC. The point is, not everything in the playbook is CT. We ignore the panoply of TC/A measures to our detriment, for the expected results of a strict CT approach are rather meager.

When we fail to articulate or clearly define the problem, how can we expect anything of value from the expenditures of our effort and resources? Our emphasis is is on "kinetic" direct action and CT at the expense of the less sexy TC/A. Such an imbalanced approach is based upon counteracting free-floating anxiety and fear, versus realistic, long-term appraisals. We should re-emphasize randomness and realistic evaluation of threat levels.

The CT program does not succeed in its current incarnation because it is neither complementary nor synergistic.

Disneyland

--American Soldier, Peray (Thailand)

Across the field you see the sky ripped open
See the rain through a gaping wound
Pounding on the women and children
Who run into the arms of America
--Bullet the Blue Sky, U2

We see things not as they are,
but as we are
--Anais Nin
_________________

Ranger muses on the nature of reality, whatever that is. Perhaps the questions should be, what is relevant versus irrelevant.

Veterans often said that the war in Vietnam was unreal: it's nowhere, man -- get me back to the world. Ranger said it was Disneyland for soldiers, and 3-tour VN vet and associate Frank Callahan, SFC (Army ASA), always called it "Oz." (Frank later committed suicide.)

To pampered Americans, that VN was unreal passes for truth. But Vietnam, like every other backwater nation we intrude upon, was very real. We cannot accept a reality different from yet equally as valid as our own perceptions. The reality of the world out there is impoverished.

Vietnam was very real, but we are too cocooned to see that world. We think voting is real, and it is meaningless. The people we are fighting are ruled by despots (we support), so their choices are meaningless.

The act of voting is meaningless when you are a peasant. When one is a peasant, it does not matter who is ruling the country. The reality of the poverty of half of our planet cannot be solved by bombing them and forcing them to vote.

We are a nation of warriors that are actually pampered mama's boys. Ranger was no different. We lack substance because we lack a basic level of humanity or compassion. If you doubt this, sit anywhere you choose and listen to the ambient conversations.

If it is correct that we do not understand the reality outside of our Desperate Housewives bubble, then Low Intensity Conflict [LIC], Cointerinsurgency [CI] and Counterterrorism [CT] will never be successful. They lack a viable substrate of understanding. We live in a Twilight Zone.

Ranger solicits input from younger soldiers: How do you view the world after your deployments, and what role do you see for the military in solving the problems you see?