Term Limits

We do not keep the outward form of order,
Where there is deep disorder in the mind
--Merchant of Venice, I, ii, Shakespeare
_____________________

Counter Terrorism is today's watchword, the Alpha and the Omega of all things Terrorism. We have even consecrated two endless wars to the concept . . . but is this logical?

Terrorism is a limited threat to our national security, but it has become a detractor, distracting from the real survival issues facing the United States. While Counterterrorism (CT) is a sound concept, it is only one-half of a balanced protective posture. Everything that is done to address terrorism is NOT Counterterrorism.

Counterterrorism encompasses all of the active measures emplaced to neutralize a terrorist threat. This includes assault teams and active operations directly aimed at operational terrorist assets. These programs may be tactical or strategic, and their effectiveness is limited by our definition of the programs.

CT used to be only one side of the coin (COIN); Terrorism Counteraction (TC/A) was the balance to the equation. TC/A used to be Department of Defense policy before everything morphed into CT, a conflation which misconstrues the nature of the threat. We have now created a farrago of guerrilla war (GW), unconventional war (UW) and civil disobedience, calling the unholy trinity TERRORISM, which is not always factual.

An example would be an IED in theatre, which is usually described as a terrorist incident if occurring in Afghanistan, Iraq or any OCONUS location occupied by U.S. troops. In reality, the IED is a UW/GW event misrepresented as terrorism; while the detonation caused terror, it was not terrorism.

TC/A is the pro-active aspect of a program aimed at countering terrorism. It is aimed at lessening the likelihood of a terror group initiating actions against an entity, whether that be an Army base, a state or a nation. TC/A assumes that we are on friendly terrain and control the territiry we physically occupy.

In a UW/GW environment TC/A is applicable but more difficult to evaluate and execute. TC/A is program-oriented and simple, enlisting things such as roadblocks, random patrolling, vehicle stops and checks, I.D. checks, population and resource control (PRC) and all other programs that were historically adapted to Internal Defense and Development (IDAD). The screenings at airports are akin to roadblocks on the approaches to Saigon.

TC/A are preventative measures aimed at breaking up or hindering the movement and success of terror groups. When these same programs are used in theatre they are classic PRC. The point is, not everything in the playbook is CT. We ignore the panoply of TC/A measures to our detriment, for the expected results of a strict CT approach are rather meager.

When we fail to articulate or clearly define the problem, how can we expect anything of value from the expenditures of our effort and resources? Our emphasis is is on "kinetic" direct action and CT at the expense of the less sexy TC/A. Such an imbalanced approach is based upon counteracting free-floating anxiety and fear, versus realistic, long-term appraisals. We should re-emphasize randomness and realistic evaluation of threat levels.

The CT program does not succeed in its current incarnation because it is neither complementary nor synergistic.

What's So Special?

A d0-gooder is an enslaver,
for they think they should go and save the world,
or amend situations to which they have no business [amending],
for the situations need to occur in order for
a working or a desire to be fulfilled,
and who are they to say what that is?
--Voyage to the New World, Ramtha

Ignorance is God's prison
--Emptiness, Rumi
________________

In his book Packing Inferno (courtesy friend tw), former Marine Tyler Boudreaux illustrates the folly of imposing "hearts and minds" theory at the hands of Infantry battalions. After a brief moment of falling back into a reverie on how Special Forces was and is the prime Counterinsurgency tool in the Army's kit, Ranger must agree with Boudreaux's assessment.

What makes the SF any sharper of a blade than that of the USMC, and how do their missions differ?

Historically, SF missions have been:

• Internal Defense and Development [IDAD], which has morphed into nation building and Provisional Reconstruction Teams [PRT's]

• Unconventional Warfare/Guerrilla Warfare [UW/GW]

• Strategic Intelligence and Reconnaissance

• Direct Action

While all fit into COIN, they have lost their strategic relevance. Even in the heady early days of the U.S. Afghan invasion, SF did not operate in the traditional UW/GW scenario of the Jedburgh mode. SF did not recruit, train or accompany the Northern Alliance when overthrowing the Taliban. They simply tagged along, presenting feel-good photo-ops. The Northern Alliance did not need anything in the form of training -- all they needed was beans and bullets. It is doubtful they even needed U.S. intel on the Taliban.

The Special Operations Forces haven't exactly formed "A" Camps, CIDG forces, Mobile Guerrilla Forces [Mike Forces], regional forces or any special projects of significance (if so, they are kept hidden.) In the days of super high-resolution, real-time photo intelligence, strategic recon seems OBE.

This leaves Direct Action [D.A.], the ground of all military combat elements, but the least effective employment of SF assets. SF is devolving into mini Ranger Battalions. What is being lost is the thing that distinguishes them -- the finesse and nuance, which earned them the well-deserved title, "Sneaky Petes".

D.A. is why God made Rangers and Marines. When SF and SEALS are used as assault infantry, then a fine tool is being misutilized. Conventional commanders simply don't know how to synergistically employ SF assets as force multipliers [Note: We are not talking SOF assets; we are talking SF and SEAL.]

Rangers, Force Recon Marines and Marines are classic Infantry assault troops of world-class quality. It is doubtful that any foreign military equals their level of expertise. But the point is, D.A. is not a hearts and minds moment. It is closing with and destroying a hostile force, which is not what COIN is all about, as Boudreaux points out. Killing the indig is not nation building.

The book challenges us to consider what actually makes the SF special. It certainly is not the beret, since everyone wears one these days.