SITREP, I

--Hogwarts Coat of Arms,
the new "E Pluribus Unum"?

Clowns to the left of me, jokers to the right,
Here I am, stuck in the middle with you
--Stuck in the Middle With You, 
Stealer's Wheel

Hope is a good breakfast but a bad supper
--William Rawley

It's a beautiful mornin'
I think I'll go outside a while,
And just smile.
--Beautiful morning,
The Rascals
______________________

America is like Disney World's Magic Kingdom. We have left Frontierland and Liberty Square, now residing squarely in Fantasyland. We live as though Harry Potter is real. We receive our tutelage at Hogworts (aka The Media News).

We believe in entertainment and alternate realities; we are saturated in it. In fact, we are so estranged from the daily requirements of life that we -- to include our leaders -- cannot define what our national health should look like. Much like "the leadership" stood agog before the dipping barometer in advance of 2005's devastating Category 5 storm Katrina, we see the wreckage ... we CREATE the wreckage ... yet the lack the ability to pull up the brakes, or to take another track.

Leaders which are primarily self-serving lack the ability to lead others. Our national policies are largely self-destructive, despite the inclusion of words like "care" and "defense". The rubes in the despised flyover states considered good by the these politicians only for the fodder of their party vote and photo ops have shown that they know the gig is up.

The day of the true Statesman is gone. The People now know that neither the Right nor the Left will improve their lots or protect them from their too-often dismal lives. "Hope" is the provenance of them that has, or at least, those that have access to mentors and tutelage, goods not often seen in the downward cycling hinterlands or the decayed inner cities.

Like almost all revolutions, we forged a nation in fire and blood. Liberal thought and action was played out on the field of battle.

Revolutions are not conservative events; the U.S. Revolution was no exception. All that is great about our nation sprang from liberal concepts. Sadly, for too many today, to be a liberal is an exclusionary thing.

Hypocritically, liberalism has become perverted to denote a creed sanctioning all behaviors, while concomitantly ostracizing those deemed not "liberal" enough. We have betrayed the great competition of ideas we once had between the Madisons and the Jeffersonians.

We use tinny words like "progressive" to describe thought and action which should rightly be called "liberal" but which we know is a term which has passed its "use by" date.

Politics has become an ego project. One is either enveloped in the "aren't we cool" fold of rube-baiting, or one is a rube. (Pick your side of the fence, and you will be facing the Other.)

There is a third group, however, and its members disdain the absurd theatre. It is remotely possible that our salvation may be there.

The military realm should be logical and linear, but that is not serving us well today, for the events that we call war are neither logical nor linear. The old paradigms do not plug into the new chaos.

Since our assumptions are illogical, our tactics and strategies cannot succeed. As said previously (Symbolic Targets), we fail because we insist on calling counter-terrorism "warfare". Nothing done militarily since 2003 has been warfare.

What is HAS been is the use of military might in an attempted suppression of an idea. Ideas are not defeated with either drones or foot soldiers.

Wars are opposing nation-states pitting their armies against one another with realistic military and political goals as their drivers.  Wars are based upon objective facts.


next: SITREP II

Amps in Their Panties

A lady removing her scanties,
Heard them crackle electrical chanties.
Said her beau, "Have no fear,
For the reason is clear:
You simply have amps in your panties
--Limerick

There's the way things ought to be,

and the way things are

--Platoon (1986)

Trouble in transit, got through the roadblock,

we blended with the crowd

We got computer, we're tapping phone lines,

I know that ain't allowed

--Life During Wartime,

Talking Heads

__________________

This is about the new-and-improved underwear bomb (not) and a brief analysis thereof. Intelligence is the focus, but first, some history.

The major deficiency of U.S. policy and operations since World War II has been intelligence; WWII could be viewed as a failure of strategic intelligence. The intel breakdown in pre-World War II scenarios was not in the collection cycle but in the policy application phase.

It is safe to say that President Franklin Delano Roosevelt and his Secretary of State Cordell Hull interpreted intelligence to reflect outcomes that were aligned with their goals. In short, the intel was a tool to be bent to their will, much the same as we saw with President G. W. Bush's actions in 2002.

WWII intelligence was largely a U.S. product with input from the British, Dutch and other major players. Historically, however, we realize that the input from other nations was often self-serving, designed to play U.S. policy-makers.

Korean War intel was largely a military product that was sufficient at the Division and Corps Level but broke down at Theatre. This was because the command structure (=MacArthur) totally misread the battlefield reports as they did not fit into his conception of the field forces reality. The problem was not external. The military collected, interpreted and disseminated the product in a correct manner, however, it was largely ignored.

This shows failure may happen at many points along the intel cycle, from gathering through application, and the failure may be one of incorrect input (intentional or not), or one of human bias. [Ranger has discussed Human Intelligence (HUMINT) versus Signal Intelligence (SIGINT) in the past, and one is not preferable to the other, nor may one exist successfully independent of the other. However, bias is always problematic.]

In Vietnam, the U.S. in country depended largely upon reports that were generated by the South Vietnamese government, data that was often faulty and self-serving. Unfortunately, this fact was largely ignored since an ally is always believed to be honest and trustworthy. As a result, projects like Phoenix were based upon faulty and misleading intel provided by a foreign power.

In the 1980's, when U.S. doctrine attempted to assimilate the experience of Vietnam, it failed to recognize this key deficiency in the Low Intensity Conflict (LIC) and Counterterrorism (CT) arenas since the only intel available was often foreign-based and produced.

Which brings us to 2012, and questionable intel is still chewing on our shorts. I will use the case of the second underwear bomber as a template for the problem, beginning with the facts, ending with an analysis. Put on your thinking caps.

Tomorrow: Amps in Their Panties II

My War

--h/t Deryle

"Quit smiling. What are you smiling for?
This is an arrest." This is your mug shot,
not your prom photo. I was smiling from happiness;
my government will not disappear me
--Peace Demonstration
Maxine Hong Kingston

Those who cannot remember the past
are condemned to repeat it
--George Santayana

Lt. Stanley McChrystal enters an army in the late 70's
that is broken, riddled with drugs and race problems.
The soldiers aren't very good:
a collection of drunks, dirtbags,
junkies and scammers.
--The Operators, Michael Hastings (171)
___________________

Ranger has noticed a dismissive attitude toward the United States Army that fought in Vietnam, particularly at the Bad Boy lad's sites. He is not sure the reason for the snitty attitudes, but it seems like the lads doth protest too much. Their attitude ranges from supercilious to dismissive, implying that the U.S. experience in Vietnam is passe, and today's ranks are far superior in technology, doctrine, etc.

This arrogance of dismissing the recent past as Old School and no longer relevant is short-sighted and dangerous. Wars are not fought ex nihilo, and that certainly holds for today's supposed efforts at Counterinsurgency (COIN) and Counterterrorism (CT).

Today's military can focus on Low-Intensity Conflict (LIC) and pretend that it is a real war, when it is actually (fill in the blank.) In fact, today's Army has slack that we did not have in the 1960's and 70's, despite the rhetoric of how the last decade's stress has been so professionally addressed.

The U.S. fought a war in the Republic of Vietnam while also being deployed to address the Warsaw Pact. My service in Vietnam was preceded by a line Infantry assignment facing this threat on the German border -- these were real threats. Today, the U.S. faces no such opponent.

As for combat ability, today's Army (USMC) has not fought any battles against hardcore enemy Battalions, Regiments or Divisions. The RVN battles against enemy units with organic artillery and severe unit discipline are legend. Enemy supply columns actually rolled down the Ho Chi Minh Trail like rush hour traffic in downtown Baghdad. The enemy had the "division slice" of support for their operations, to include timely and accurate intelligence on U.S. intentions and capabilities.

The enemy in Vietnam had the will, the capability and the intent to prepare the battlefield at higher echelons, something unheard of in the Phony War on Terror (PWOT ©). The threat faced in Vietnam was real and vicious ... what equivalent did we see after the fall of Baghdad or the months following the invasion of Afghanistan? The Taliban has no Regimental or above combat capabilities.

Per U.S. forces, we had one echelon above Corps, meaning we had a real Theatre Army scenario, to include a Theatre Army Commander with Corps supporting. This means not only did we have Theatre - Corps - Division assets, but we also had the on-call abilities of the RVN forces including all of the usual suspects: Artillery, Aviation, Combat Support and Combat Service Support. We operated as an Army, not as door-kicking combat Brigades sans higher assets.

So what's the reason for the dismissive attitude toward my Army as being anything less than professional? Where is the evidence that any draftee fought less professionally than did the forces in the PWOT? From whence this lack of fraternity?

The troops in the Vietnam War were largely draftees and they earned their battle streamers with the same valor as did troops in all previous U.S. wars. What battles in Afghanistan or Iraq demonstrated the level of violence experienced by the Infantry units in the Vietnam War?

Further, there is a logical fallacy built into the argument of the Old Army detractors who say the 60's and 70's Army was "amateurish". If that is so, then we must accept that the Warsaw Pact was neutralized by a bunch of quacks. The next illogical step is to believe that today's professional volunteer force is totally responsible for the defeat of al Qaeda, despite the fact that less than 200 al Qaeda operatives exist worldwide (per former Central Intelligence Agency Director Leon Panetta.)

Framing the argument qua the Andrew Exum crowd, a crowd of amateurs defended the U.S. against Warsaw Pact with thousands of tanks, artillery pieces and millions of soldiers, while we are now ably protected against a laughable threat by the New Warriors.

Taking their argument to its logical ends, one must also believe the military leadership during the 60's was also incompetent, though carrying experience from two wars before assuming leadership in Vietnam. Contrast that with the present day Professional Army which sports a dearth of combat experience at the highest levels. The depth of experience was greater in Ranger's time frame than it is today, contrary to the hype.

And this is why we need poppy eradication programs in Afghanistan (though the Bushmills tap will always flow.)

Term Limits

We do not keep the outward form of order,
Where there is deep disorder in the mind
--Merchant of Venice, I, ii, Shakespeare
_____________________

Counter Terrorism is today's watchword, the Alpha and the Omega of all things Terrorism. We have even consecrated two endless wars to the concept . . . but is this logical?

Terrorism is a limited threat to our national security, but it has become a detractor, distracting from the real survival issues facing the United States. While Counterterrorism (CT) is a sound concept, it is only one-half of a balanced protective posture. Everything that is done to address terrorism is NOT Counterterrorism.

Counterterrorism encompasses all of the active measures emplaced to neutralize a terrorist threat. This includes assault teams and active operations directly aimed at operational terrorist assets. These programs may be tactical or strategic, and their effectiveness is limited by our definition of the programs.

CT used to be only one side of the coin (COIN); Terrorism Counteraction (TC/A) was the balance to the equation. TC/A used to be Department of Defense policy before everything morphed into CT, a conflation which misconstrues the nature of the threat. We have now created a farrago of guerrilla war (GW), unconventional war (UW) and civil disobedience, calling the unholy trinity TERRORISM, which is not always factual.

An example would be an IED in theatre, which is usually described as a terrorist incident if occurring in Afghanistan, Iraq or any OCONUS location occupied by U.S. troops. In reality, the IED is a UW/GW event misrepresented as terrorism; while the detonation caused terror, it was not terrorism.

TC/A is the pro-active aspect of a program aimed at countering terrorism. It is aimed at lessening the likelihood of a terror group initiating actions against an entity, whether that be an Army base, a state or a nation. TC/A assumes that we are on friendly terrain and control the territiry we physically occupy.

In a UW/GW environment TC/A is applicable but more difficult to evaluate and execute. TC/A is program-oriented and simple, enlisting things such as roadblocks, random patrolling, vehicle stops and checks, I.D. checks, population and resource control (PRC) and all other programs that were historically adapted to Internal Defense and Development (IDAD). The screenings at airports are akin to roadblocks on the approaches to Saigon.

TC/A are preventative measures aimed at breaking up or hindering the movement and success of terror groups. When these same programs are used in theatre they are classic PRC. The point is, not everything in the playbook is CT. We ignore the panoply of TC/A measures to our detriment, for the expected results of a strict CT approach are rather meager.

When we fail to articulate or clearly define the problem, how can we expect anything of value from the expenditures of our effort and resources? Our emphasis is is on "kinetic" direct action and CT at the expense of the less sexy TC/A. Such an imbalanced approach is based upon counteracting free-floating anxiety and fear, versus realistic, long-term appraisals. We should re-emphasize randomness and realistic evaluation of threat levels.

The CT program does not succeed in its current incarnation because it is neither complementary nor synergistic.

Disneyland

--American Soldier, Peray (Thailand)

Across the field you see the sky ripped open
See the rain through a gaping wound
Pounding on the women and children
Who run into the arms of America
--Bullet the Blue Sky, U2

We see things not as they are,
but as we are
--Anais Nin
_________________

Ranger muses on the nature of reality, whatever that is. Perhaps the questions should be, what is relevant versus irrelevant.

Veterans often said that the war in Vietnam was unreal: it's nowhere, man -- get me back to the world. Ranger said it was Disneyland for soldiers, and 3-tour VN vet and associate Frank Callahan, SFC (Army ASA), always called it "Oz." (Frank later committed suicide.)

To pampered Americans, that VN was unreal passes for truth. But Vietnam, like every other backwater nation we intrude upon, was very real. We cannot accept a reality different from yet equally as valid as our own perceptions. The reality of the world out there is impoverished.

Vietnam was very real, but we are too cocooned to see that world. We think voting is real, and it is meaningless. The people we are fighting are ruled by despots (we support), so their choices are meaningless.

The act of voting is meaningless when you are a peasant. When one is a peasant, it does not matter who is ruling the country. The reality of the poverty of half of our planet cannot be solved by bombing them and forcing them to vote.

We are a nation of warriors that are actually pampered mama's boys. Ranger was no different. We lack substance because we lack a basic level of humanity or compassion. If you doubt this, sit anywhere you choose and listen to the ambient conversations.

If it is correct that we do not understand the reality outside of our Desperate Housewives bubble, then Low Intensity Conflict [LIC], Cointerinsurgency [CI] and Counterterrorism [CT] will never be successful. They lack a viable substrate of understanding. We live in a Twilight Zone.

Ranger solicits input from younger soldiers: How do you view the world after your deployments, and what role do you see for the military in solving the problems you see?

Anti American Extremist Seeds

Do not go gentle into that good night,
Old age should burn and rave at close of day;
Rage, rage against the dying of the light
--Do Not Go Gentle Into the Good Night,
Dylan Thomas
________________

Reading Mangold's and Penycate's "The Tunnels of Cu Chi" (1985) is like deju vu all over again.

The parallels to today's wars in Iraq and Afghanistan are unmistakable and illustrative of a military organization lacking institutional memory and operational adaptability.

The following quotes on actions 40+ years old could just as readily be applied to the Phony War on Terror (PWOT ©) today:

"The Americans' concern for their dead and wounded remained a source of bewilderment and relief to the Communist soldiers. Anything that delayed the battle inevitably favored the weaker side and allowed reloading, regrouping and rethinking."

"The Americans came, as they always seemed to, shortly after eight in the morning."

"In fact, the explosions destroyed only some seventy feet of the tunnel complex, and the system was usable again within a few weeks."

"Everything he had learned about fighting seemed to have no relevance to what he had been doing today. . . . [W]hat did any of this have to do with an enemy you never saw alive, who existed in holes in the ground, and against whom only a man's brute strength and luck seemed to prevail?"

"Aircraft, bombs, artillery, and chemicals obliged the Viet Cong to live and fight underground."

"The tunnels evolved as the natural response of a poorly equipped and mainly local guerrilla army to mid-twentieth-century technological warfare.

"Professional soldiers, including the legendary Foreign Legion, had been defeated by an Asian guerrilla army -- a lesson for the future that few Americans heeded."

"However, the peasants did not in the main have to be terrorized into acquiescence by such tactics. The Viet Cong were themselves villagers, or their sons an daughters, and operated most of the time with the consent and assistance of the people among whom they lived."

"Guerrillas hold the military initiative; the Viet Cong could choose the time and place of battle." "For a guerrilla army, stalemate -- pinning down a larger force in its huge bases -- is equivalent to winning."

"But for the guerrillas there were often blood-debts to settle -- home villages bombed, relative killed, or arrested and tortured, by a government funded and armed by the U.S."

"Not only were they [the U.S.] easy targets for our snipers, but I realized the best way to kill them was with more booby traps."

"Throughout the war,booby traps were responsible for 11 % of all American deaths, and 17% of all wounds."

"The war occurred wherever opposing forces made contact."

"Large parts of South Vietnam could not be, and never were, secured."

"The Hamlet Evaluation System [HES] relied on suspect intelligence supplied by often corrupt ARVN local officials, who tended to portray the running of their areas of responsibility in the most flattering light."

"Twenty years earlier. Ho Chi Minh himself had warned the French, 'You can kill ten of my men for every one I kill of yours, but even at those odds, you will lose and I will win.'"

"Most of the Cu Chi district was under ARVN or American control by day, but the Viet Cong dominated it by night."

"Westmoreland remembered the advice given him in 1964 by [MacArthur]" To defeat the guerrilla, "you may have to resort to a scorched-earth policy."

"As usual in Vietnam, the brightest possible picture was painted in the after-action reports." "[T]he army's sweeping through an area for a short time, only to allow the Viet Cong to move back in and resume their activities [was futile]."

"Even before the ground war in Vietnam had begun to settle down into one of grinding attrition -- a strategy that is proof of a lack of strategy -- the Americans had already begun to rely heavily on their overwhelming superiority in weapons technology."

Bollixed Up

We seem not to realize the central fact
that each one of us is responsible
for what is going on in the world,
the terror, violence, wars.
--J. Krishnamurti
_______________

A 4/16 Wall Street Journal Op Ed lumped Counterinsurgency [COIN] and Counterterrorism [CT] into the same bundle. The writer used the terms interchangeably; unfortunately, they are they are anything but.

The writer said winning hearts and minds was a goal of CT. This is far from the truth.

Hearts and Minds is a bogus COIN construction that has no application in CT. The stated goal of COIN is to win the hearts and minds of the population, thereby denying recruitment and support from flowing from the people to the terrorists. (Really, we'll kill insurgents, nationalist movement members, guerrillas and anyone else in the line of fire.)

In contrast, the goal of CT is to destroy and obliterate terrorists. In the confused Phony War on Terror (PWOT ©), this mission is also applied to insurgents, militants, guerrillas and anti-government forces.

Since it is difficult to ascertain the actual CT mission today, the violence of suppressing these groups spreads to the population in general, which negatively impacts upon the more positive expressed intents of COIN.

COIN and CT are neither complementary nor equivalent concepts, and are in fact contradictory programs.

In any event, CT and COIN are both faulty bills of goods.

Deconstructing the Constructions

Surgeon General's Warnings, Richard E. Moore
_________

A recent editorial by former National Security staffers (A War the Pentagon Can't Win) shows some of the prevailing misunderstandings of the Iraq War. Ranger will debunk a few of them, as he sees it.

"Mr. Rumsfeld, who viewed special forces as the keystone of a transformed 21st-century American military, could not keep on track a mission that would have stunned Al Qaeda."

Stunning an adversary is meaningless in warfare, unless followed by a killing blow.

The writers cite successful counterterrorism operations, like the Israeli raids in Entebbe, Uganda; Tunis; and Beirut, Lebanon, in the 1970s and 1980s, and Germany's 1977 Mogadishu raid of 1977 freeing passengers on a plane hijacked by the Baader-Meinhof gang.

But the German example is comparing apples and oranges. The '77 raid was conducted by the police function GSG-9, since the hostage-takers were criminals, though it was conducted with military precision and tactics. The event is not comparable to hunting down Osama bin Laden, as it was a distinct event, and not a military action.

Note: The Federal republic of Germany never subverted democratic principles when dealing with terrorist threats. All police and intelligence functions operated with the purview of their constitution.

How ironic. The U.S. today has co-opted some of Germany's pre-democratic policies in regards to citizen surveillance and war conduct. Seeing as how Germany today has been forced as a nation to rectify their conduct and to strictly abide by the policies of a democratic constitution, there is hope yet the the new fascist state of America may get back on track.

Let us hope we can manage it before enduring such a come-down.

This is where the public gets misled, and why so many are still confused as to what constitutes a police/intelligence action against criminals (terrorists), and what constitutes a military action, one therefore requiring a correct military response.

"Senior officers. . . view special ops outside a war zone as something to be avoided at all cost."

Wars are not fought outside a war zone, using the military. Ex vi termini.

"The record of a small, vulnerable C.I.A. paramilitary force in Afghanistan in 2001 was more impressive. The group’s audacious reconnaissance work and direction of local warlords in action against the Taliban provided the most significant battlefield success of the post-9/11 period."

Of course, this is cited as a glorious moment for democracy since these local warlords are criminals and generally sympathetic to Iran. These same warlords are the present drug lords of Afghanistan. Now that's a great presto chango! And for our next trick. . .

"We have failed in Pakistan, and are failing in Iraq, to achieve a primary aim of our counterterrorism policy: preventing Al Qaeda from acquiring safe havens."

Why deny them safe haven? Keeping them in a geographically isolated mountainous distinct area is much better than their being in France, Spain or Saudi America.

"When the inevitable American drawdown occurs, we will need a way to keep the terrorists off balance in Iraq and to disrupt the conveyor belt that is already moving fighters to places like Lebanon, North Africa and Europe."

Keeping terrorists off-balance is a phony unsustainable policy that wastes U.S. assets. That's their job--to be wily. Good intelligence work that prevents them from entering the country is a much more realistic policy.

Ranger does agree with the writer's conclusion:

"With a small fraction of the resources that Pentagon has for special operations, the C.I.A. could develop the paramilitary capacity we profoundly need."

The CIA should possess this function only because Congress has oversight. Until the Department of Defense, SOF came under congressional oversight and until they stop operating unilaterally, then they are more of a danger to U.S. policy than they are a useful tool.

Rummy and Gates should never be given the option to launch SOF forces into any country without congressional approval. That is, unless it is a real war.

The Phony War on Terror (PWOT) is not.