Dak To, Redux

There's nothing you can do that can't be done
Nothing you can know that isn't known
Nothing you can see that isn't shown
--All You Need is Love, The Beatles

One who sets the entire army in motion
to chase an advantage will not attain it
--Sun Tzu
_______________

David Ignatius proudly said in this Sunday's WaPo, this is an "Army that Learns."

"Rather than sulking about the Iraq mess, commanders made necessary changes. The Army developed a new doctrine for fighting a counterinsurgency . . ." On the same day, nine soldiers were killed and fifteen wounded in Afghanistan.

"This study illustrates what's most admirable about the Army. It has maintained a tradition of intellectual rigor and self-criticism. That's nurtured in the Army's unique program of midcareer education. It's not an accident but part of that Army tradition that the current commander in Iraq, Gen. David Petraeus, took a doctorate in international relations at Princeton, or that the former Centcom commander, Gen. John Abizaid, had a stint as commandant of West Point."

Not to be iconoclastic just for the hell of it, but would someone tell Ranger how Petraeus's doctorate or Abizaid's stint as commandant of West Point helped the nine soldiers killed or fifteen wounded this Sunday in Afghanistan? Ignatius may believe there is a learning curve, but the facts do not bear this out.

All the doctorates in the world will not change the fact that military leaders are just that. If the U.S. government needs doctorates in International Relations, let them employ them at the State Department. Army commanders fight our enemies and strategically employ our armed forces.

Invasions and COIN are not social events -- they are killing and destroying actions. We never admit that; it does not fly in polite society, so we call it "nation building." But the whole shooting match is based on destructive combat power.

Just like the Food Stamp Office is renamed "Department of Children and Families," because who could be against a kid or a family? And food stamps themselves are now a "Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP)." In a SNAP, a wrap -- no more needy poor people. We are winning the rhetorical battle, at least.

"A multi-pronged militant assault on a small, remote U.S. base close to the Pakistan border killed nine American soldiers and wounded 15 Sunday in the deadliest attack on U.S. forces in Afghanistan in three years, officials said.

"The attack on the American troops began around 4:30 a.m. and lasted throughout the day. Militants fired machine guns, rocket-propelled grenades and mortars from homes and a mosque in the village of Wanat in the mountainous northeastern province of Kunar, NATO's International Security Assistance Force said in a statement (Nine Soldiers Killed in Afghanistan.)"

Here's a news flash: the battle killing nine in Afghanistan is the same battle that killed 19 in Murray's Medal of Honor action, and the Battle of Roberts Ridge.

These are battles of desperate, isolated units that lack mutually supporting elements and lack sufficient firepower to overcome the enemy. Add the following tragic element: Even though desperately fought, the outcomes did not, could not and would not affect the outcome of any strategic importance.

Whether U.S. arms were successful is totally immaterial. These are meaningless battles that have only one consequence: U.S. soldiers die for nothing, and are wounded for more of the same. Unless one wanted to take a particularly grim approach and say to give the hospital mega-industry more clientele.

Anybody attending Ranger, Special Forces or Infantry school in the 1960's knows that 0430 BMNT is the most dangerous time of day. This is when the enemy assaults isolated units stuck out on the periphery. Put a tasty morsel out there and the anti-coalition forces are gonna eat their shorts. I reckon they don't teach that to Doctors of International Relations because the word has not filtered down to troop level yet.

It is pointless to place small units in battle positions that cannot be rapidly relieved or covered by indirect massive volumes of protective artillery. If you don't believe this, ask the survivors of this battle their thoughts on the subject.

No one will ask because it is the accepted conventional wisdom to place outlying units acting as LP's/OP's, which is correct in a conventional war because these elements are always covered by fire. However, this U.S. element obviously did not come under higher protective shield.

Why would any commander stick a unit in a poorly defended arena? It did not work at Dak To, Dak Pek, Dak Seang, Lang Vei, Roberts Ridge or with any other isolated unit. The dead soldiers of these actions would cry from their grave to know the same needless sacrifices are being made today, sacrifices that will never lead to anything remotely associated with a military success.

Units must be mutually supporting with quick reinforcements available. Helicopters cannot efficiently achieve this and approaching by road march is not a viable option due to the ambush-like nature of the Afghan roads. What's the solution? Too bad Westmoreland's dead; maybe he'd have a clue, even without a PhD.

Hint: Military action is similar to political action -- it can only achieve the achievable.

Ranger entered Infantry Officer Basic Course in 1968 during the height of the Vietnam war and what tactical studies did we have from RVN? Exactly none! We only had classes on Search and Destroy. Does today's Officer Advanced Course , CGSC or War College examine the tactics of the NVA at Dak To or the anti-coalition forces in Afghanistan?

The tactics being used today vs. U.S. forces are the same as those used against the Russians, so what is the problem? All we have to do is get their historical reports.

Then read 'em and weep.