RANGER AGAINST WAR: Dak To, Redux <

Tuesday, July 15, 2008

Dak To, Redux

There's nothing you can do that can't be done
Nothing you can know that isn't known

Nothing you can see that isn't shown

--All You Need is Love
, The Beatles

One who sets the entire army in motion
to chase an advantage will not attain it

--Sun Tzu

_______________

David Ignatius proudly said in this Sunday's WaPo, this is an "Army that Learns."

"Rather than sulking about the Iraq mess, commanders made necessary changes. The Army developed a new doctrine for fighting a counterinsurgency . . ." On the same day, nine soldiers were killed and fifteen wounded in Afghanistan.


"This study illustrates what's most admirable about the Army. It has maintained a tradition of intellectual rigor and self-criticism. That's nurtured in the Army's unique program of midcareer education. It's not an accident but part of that Army tradition that the current commander in Iraq, Gen.
David Petraeus, took a doctorate in international relations at Princeton, or that the former Centcom commander, Gen. John Abizaid, had a stint as commandant of West Point."

Not to be iconoclastic just for the hell of it, but would someone tell Ranger how Petraeus's doctorate or Abizaid's stint as commandant of West Point helped the nine soldiers killed or fifteen wounded this Sunday in Afghanistan? Ignatius may believe there is a learning curve, but the facts do not bear this out.

All the doctorates in the world will not change the fact that military leaders are just that. If the U.S. government needs doctorates in International Relations, let them employ them at the State Department. Army commanders fight our enemies and strategically employ our armed forces.


Invasions and COIN are not social events -- they are killing and destroying actions. We never admit that; it does not fly in polite society, so we call it
"nation building." But the whole shooting match is based on destructive combat power.

Just like the Food Stamp Office is renamed "Department of Children and Families," because who could be against a kid or a family? And food stamps themselves are now a "Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP)." In a SNAP, a wrap -- no more needy poor people. We are winning the rhetorical battle, at least.


"A multi-pronged militant assault on a small, remote U.S. base close to the Pakistan border killed nine American soldiers and wounded 15 Sunday in the deadliest attack on U.S. forces in Afghanistan in three years, officials said.

"The attack on the American troops began around 4:30 a.m. and lasted throughout the day. Militants fired machine guns, rocket-propelled grenades and mortars from homes and a mosque in the village of Wanat in the mountainous northeastern province of Kunar, NATO's International Security Assistance Force said in a statemen
t (Nine Soldiers Killed in Afghanistan.)"

Here's a news flash: the battle killing nine in Afghanistan is the same battle that killed 19 in Murray's Medal of Honor action, and the Battle of Roberts Ridge.

These are battles of desperate, isolated units that lack mutually supporting elements and lack sufficient firepower to overcome the enemy. Add the following tragic element: Even though desperately fought, the outcomes did not, could not and would not affect the outcome of any strategic importance.

Whether U.S. arms were successful is totally immaterial. These are meaningless battles that have only one consequence: U.S. soldiers die for nothing, and are wounded for more of the same.
Unless one wanted to take a particularly grim approach and say to give the hospital mega-industry more clientele.

Anybody attending Ranger, Special Forces or Infantry school in the 1960's knows that 0430 BMNT is the most dangerous time of day. This is when the enemy assaults isolated units stuck out on the periphery. Put a tasty morsel out there and the anti-coalition forces are gonna eat their shorts.
I reckon they don't teach that to Doctors of International Relations because the word has not filtered down to troop level yet.

It is pointless to place small units in battle positions that cannot be rapidly relieved or covered by indirect massive volumes of protective artillery.
If you don't believe this, ask the survivors of this battle their thoughts on the subject.

No one will ask because it is the accepted conventional wisdom to place outlying units acting as LP's/OP's, which is correct in a conventional war because these elements are always covered by fire. However, this U.S. element obviously did not come under higher protective shield.

Why would any commander stick a unit in a poorly defended arena? It did not work at Dak To, Dak Pek, Dak Seang, Lang Vei, Roberts Ridge or with any other isolated unit. The dead soldiers of these actions would cry from their grave to know the same needless sacrifices are being made today, sacrifices that will never lead to anything remotely associated with a military success.

Units must be mutually supporting with quick reinforcements available. Helicopters cannot efficiently achieve this and approaching by road march is not a viable option due to the ambush-like nature of the Afghan roads. What's the solution? Too bad Westmoreland's dead; maybe he'd have a clue, even without a PhD.

Hint: Military action is similar to political action -- it can only achieve the achievable.

Ranger entered Infantry Officer Basic Course in 1968 during the height of the Vietnam war and what tactical studies did we have from RVN? Exactly none! We only had classes on Search and Destroy. Does today's Officer Advanced Course , CGSC or War College examine the tactics of the NVA at Dak To or the anti-coalition forces in Afghanistan?

The tactics being used today vs. U.S. forces are the same as those used against the Russians, so what is the problem? All we have to do is get their historical reports.

Then read 'em and weep.

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10 Comments:

Blogger Ghost Dansing said...

Ignatius is wildly optimistic..... dream on..... or awake

Tuesday, July 15, 2008 at 7:32:00 PM GMT-5  
Blogger The Minstrel Boy said...

the same tactics. small, irritating swipes and attacks. knock a few off, fade away.

yeah, sounds very familiar. it's great when the tactics and strategy are based on the losing end of the last several wars. the russians, us, the brits, the mongols, the greeks, the persians, so many folks have wandered into the afghan zone and been chewed up.

no wonder herodutus deemed it "the graveyard of empires."

a quick looksee in "the google" would have shown even a "c" student like bush what was in store for any invader. guys sporting graduate degrees should have been much more dililgence.

one of the things that continually stikes me is that our self proclaimed "ceo president" consistently refuses to perform "due diligence" before he sets his course. that's all stuff from econ 101, you'd think an MBA would know better.

when you're wounded and left
on afghanistan's plains
and the women come out
to cut up what remains
jest roll to your rifle
and blow out your brains
and go to your gawd like a soldier."


kipling

Tuesday, July 15, 2008 at 9:38:00 PM GMT-5  
Blogger FDChief said...

ISTM that somebody hung this poor platoon and its LT out hoping to lure in some Gs and got handed a stone ass-whipping because they suffered from the CRS Syndrome you mentioned, Ranger.

That said, my old CO, Ravin' Dave Mattes, would have had the ass off of any of his platoon leaders that couldn't dig in a platoon along the military crest of the most key hilltop in the AO under 18 inches of overhead cover, fields of fire interlocked, dead ground mined and covered, and MG, mortar and artillery FPFs shot in inside 24 hours. God help him if he didn't have his secondary positions dug by the second day and the supplementaries by Day 3.

From the news reports this outfit was hunkered down in some sort of fucked up sandbag-and-concertina Fort Zinderneuf in a hole overlooked by high ground in three directions waiting for the engineers to build them a fucking tree fort complete with Stalag 13 guard towers.

This isn't a "learning curve", this is flunking Infantry 101!!!

The sad part is that we will probably never know why this platoon was so ate up. Or who screwed them over so bad.

Tuesday, July 15, 2008 at 10:56:00 PM GMT-5  
Blogger rangeragainstwar said...

To all; i'm doing a followup on this. will prob post it tomorrow- this is based on further details and of course they are bullshit or more of the same.
As for Ignatius and his happy horseshit about Abizaid being Super. at WP -lets point out so was RE LEE and this didn't win his war AND so was Westmorelland (if memory serves) and that meant diddly squat to the 58000 or so up on the wall. May they all rest in peace. Amen. jim

Wednesday, July 16, 2008 at 10:08:00 AM GMT-5  
Anonymous Anonymous said...

There's also a post on this at Lightfighter Tactical Forum ... mostly sincere regrets and wishes to "kick ass," but, unfortunately, none of the historical perspective or analysis offered by Ranger and the previous posters here. I think you older, retired vets can educate the younger, active duty soldiers ... apparently, no one in their command has. GSM

Wednesday, July 16, 2008 at 4:25:00 PM GMT-5  
Anonymous Anonymous said...

Jim - GSM is GSJ with a typo.  GSJ

Wednesday, July 16, 2008 at 4:26:00 PM GMT-5  
Blogger rangeragainstwar said...

GSJ, i consider this blog to be an instuctional tool but unfortunately many mistake partisan policies as sound tactical planning.We as soldiers whether retired or active must look at all the aspects of this pwot and decide if it's worth the death of even 1 amie soldier- and if it is then sound tactics must be employed.
I oppose the PWOT on every level.
As for the younger soldiers -well lets hope they grow into crankly old soldiers. That's my wish for them. jim

Thursday, July 17, 2008 at 9:40:00 AM GMT-5  
Blogger FDChief said...

Ranger leans on one of my least favorite historical figures, "Marse" Robert Lee who, like his modern era counterparts Westy and Petraeus had all the tactical and grand tactical elements of genius and the strategic and geopolitical wisdom of Alfred E. Neuman.

Leave aside the fact that Lee never understood the impact on Napoleonic battlefield tactics of the rifled musket, the man should have been able to appreciate that the chances of a Southern victory on terms that would have been economically and politically acceptable to the South were negligible. At least after Gettysburg and Vicksburg he should have been able to see the endgame and started urging the Davis Administration to accept a conqueror's peace. At least it would have avoided Sherman's devastation of the Southeast that impoverished that region for a generation. At best, it might have avoided the nightmare of Reconstruction and Jim Crow that still trouble us today. Lee never had a "Make peace, you fools!" moment, any more than Magic Dave Petraeus seems to.

As the Wehrmacht discovered, if the fundamental geopolitical calculations are unsound, all the genius in the world cannot change the fact that 2+2=4.

Thursday, July 17, 2008 at 11:32:00 AM GMT-5  
Blogger rangeragainstwar said...

FDC,

your cmt about the Wehrmacht is right on in a number of ways. They never questioned the legalities of their aggressive wars and it bit them right on their German asses.

Pls don't say anything bad About RE LEE :)that'll get my southern readers upset. Actually i've discussed him more than once. i believe his greatest weakness was inability to exploit success; additionally, weakly stated mission orders and just plain being out of touch with what was actually happening as a result of the rebellion, as you point out (Yankee rabblerouser that you are.)

Other than that he was squared away. :) jim

Thursday, July 17, 2008 at 12:16:00 PM GMT-5  
Blogger rangeragainstwar said...

To all,
Somebody read this art. today and i came back over my essay and the comments.
I wrote several arts on this fight , and it still bothers me as a former small unit leader.
It's just too hard to swallow all this death, suffering and wounds-on both sides.
I can never resolve in my mind how these troops were emplaced and arrayed for deadly combat, which never brooks favor for weak planning considerations. Also my bottom line is that the PL/Ranger qualified should have pulled his perimeter in rather than trying to reinforce a OP/LP.
What do we teach our new young officers?
I'd like input.
jim

Monday, June 4, 2012 at 7:00:00 AM GMT-5  

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