Lang Vei, Revisited

--Paul Longgrear being evacuated to Khe Sanh Airbase,
7 Feb 1968
________________

February 6 was the 42 anniversary of the Battle of Lang Vei fought by members of the 5th Special Forces Group in the Republic of Vietnam.

Ranger's associate Paul Longgrear is the last surviving officer from that battle, but Paul and Ranger have divergent views on the validity of current actions of the U.S. Army. Ranger alone will analogize this action to several from the current wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Ranger emphasizes that nothing he says is a criticism of any Special Forces soldier or their leadership. They fought beyond human comprehension; the Corps and Theatre Commanders are left holding the bag on this one.

The questions I have about Lang Vei are the same I have about Waygul or Wanat or Roberts Ridge, today:

• Was the mission realistic? Achievable?

• Were assets properly allocated to the SF?

• Was Lang Vei key terrain and essential to defend?

• Were Corps assets properly allocated to weight the effort?

These questions haunt the military mind, and are not confined to this lonely and desperate fight for survival. In all of these scenarios, U.S. forces are thrown onto a piece of terrain and told their mission is essential, and that they will attack and secure the locale, or they will defend the terrain, but the rationale for doing so is never clearly thought out.

The soldiers fighting are at the bottom of the food chain. The Corps Commander is the person that bears all responsibility, closely followed by the Theatre Commander. Ranger doubts that the Corps concept even functions in Afghanistan.

The chain of command appears to be Theatre directly down to Platoon Leader, with little thought given to the concept of the operation. To a large extent, Afghanistan resembles the Vietnam War in that too much responsibility is shouldered by Platoon Leaders.

At Lang Vei, the defense was not weighted to achieve the mission. If the defense was important, then adequate Corps artillery assets should have been allocated on a direct support basis, or as general support (GS) or even GS reinforcing. In addition, an Artillery Liaison or Fire Direction Coordinator should have been dedicated to the defensive effort.

Instead, these functions fell to Captain Willoughby, the Camp Commander. They should not have, He should have been leading the camp's defenses, not coordinating supporting defensive fire.

For some inexplicable reason, this was not done.

Ranger was never Mike Force or A Team, but stands in awe of their professionalism and dedication. However, this admiration is always mixed with dismay at the misuse of these assets by Theatre and Corps Commanders and planners. Longgrear's Mike Force was expected to hold terrain that a USMC line battalion would have found difficult to achieve.

These fights devolved to young Lieutenants and Captains. My impression is that all actions above Captain-level were disjointed and reactive in nature. There were no in-place Corps scenarios to reinforce or evacuate Lang Vei in an organized military manner. All reactions above camp level seemed ad hoc.

Lang Vei, Waygul, Wanat and Roberts Ridge share many characteristics. The U.S. engaged forces were given unrealistic and unattainable missions lacking adequate resources. The fights could not be reinforced in a timely manner and the weight of the events fell upon LT's and CPT's. Units were committed piecemeal and placed in positions which the enemy could defeat in detail, with impunity. None were formulas for success.

Lang Vei was a classic battle, and though what we have seen in Afghanistan is not of the same scale, the concept is the same. The unanswered questions pertain to sustainability, reinforcement, reserves, mutual support and weighting the assets of the assigned units emplaced in positions making them vulnerable targets for enemy exploitation.

Then, as now.

Follow-on:

Since writing this piece, Ranger has come across a vital chapter in the book Last Stand at Khe Sanh (2014) by Gregg Jones which expounds upon the Battle for Lang Vei. This book provides a valuable addition to the student of the Lang Vei fight - jh.

 

Dak To, Redux

There's nothing you can do that can't be done
Nothing you can know that isn't known
Nothing you can see that isn't shown
--All You Need is Love, The Beatles

One who sets the entire army in motion
to chase an advantage will not attain it
--Sun Tzu
_______________

David Ignatius proudly said in this Sunday's WaPo, this is an "Army that Learns."

"Rather than sulking about the Iraq mess, commanders made necessary changes. The Army developed a new doctrine for fighting a counterinsurgency . . ." On the same day, nine soldiers were killed and fifteen wounded in Afghanistan.

"This study illustrates what's most admirable about the Army. It has maintained a tradition of intellectual rigor and self-criticism. That's nurtured in the Army's unique program of midcareer education. It's not an accident but part of that Army tradition that the current commander in Iraq, Gen. David Petraeus, took a doctorate in international relations at Princeton, or that the former Centcom commander, Gen. John Abizaid, had a stint as commandant of West Point."

Not to be iconoclastic just for the hell of it, but would someone tell Ranger how Petraeus's doctorate or Abizaid's stint as commandant of West Point helped the nine soldiers killed or fifteen wounded this Sunday in Afghanistan? Ignatius may believe there is a learning curve, but the facts do not bear this out.

All the doctorates in the world will not change the fact that military leaders are just that. If the U.S. government needs doctorates in International Relations, let them employ them at the State Department. Army commanders fight our enemies and strategically employ our armed forces.

Invasions and COIN are not social events -- they are killing and destroying actions. We never admit that; it does not fly in polite society, so we call it "nation building." But the whole shooting match is based on destructive combat power.

Just like the Food Stamp Office is renamed "Department of Children and Families," because who could be against a kid or a family? And food stamps themselves are now a "Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP)." In a SNAP, a wrap -- no more needy poor people. We are winning the rhetorical battle, at least.

"A multi-pronged militant assault on a small, remote U.S. base close to the Pakistan border killed nine American soldiers and wounded 15 Sunday in the deadliest attack on U.S. forces in Afghanistan in three years, officials said.

"The attack on the American troops began around 4:30 a.m. and lasted throughout the day. Militants fired machine guns, rocket-propelled grenades and mortars from homes and a mosque in the village of Wanat in the mountainous northeastern province of Kunar, NATO's International Security Assistance Force said in a statement (Nine Soldiers Killed in Afghanistan.)"

Here's a news flash: the battle killing nine in Afghanistan is the same battle that killed 19 in Murray's Medal of Honor action, and the Battle of Roberts Ridge.

These are battles of desperate, isolated units that lack mutually supporting elements and lack sufficient firepower to overcome the enemy. Add the following tragic element: Even though desperately fought, the outcomes did not, could not and would not affect the outcome of any strategic importance.

Whether U.S. arms were successful is totally immaterial. These are meaningless battles that have only one consequence: U.S. soldiers die for nothing, and are wounded for more of the same. Unless one wanted to take a particularly grim approach and say to give the hospital mega-industry more clientele.

Anybody attending Ranger, Special Forces or Infantry school in the 1960's knows that 0430 BMNT is the most dangerous time of day. This is when the enemy assaults isolated units stuck out on the periphery. Put a tasty morsel out there and the anti-coalition forces are gonna eat their shorts. I reckon they don't teach that to Doctors of International Relations because the word has not filtered down to troop level yet.

It is pointless to place small units in battle positions that cannot be rapidly relieved or covered by indirect massive volumes of protective artillery. If you don't believe this, ask the survivors of this battle their thoughts on the subject.

No one will ask because it is the accepted conventional wisdom to place outlying units acting as LP's/OP's, which is correct in a conventional war because these elements are always covered by fire. However, this U.S. element obviously did not come under higher protective shield.

Why would any commander stick a unit in a poorly defended arena? It did not work at Dak To, Dak Pek, Dak Seang, Lang Vei, Roberts Ridge or with any other isolated unit. The dead soldiers of these actions would cry from their grave to know the same needless sacrifices are being made today, sacrifices that will never lead to anything remotely associated with a military success.

Units must be mutually supporting with quick reinforcements available. Helicopters cannot efficiently achieve this and approaching by road march is not a viable option due to the ambush-like nature of the Afghan roads. What's the solution? Too bad Westmoreland's dead; maybe he'd have a clue, even without a PhD.

Hint: Military action is similar to political action -- it can only achieve the achievable.

Ranger entered Infantry Officer Basic Course in 1968 during the height of the Vietnam war and what tactical studies did we have from RVN? Exactly none! We only had classes on Search and Destroy. Does today's Officer Advanced Course , CGSC or War College examine the tactics of the NVA at Dak To or the anti-coalition forces in Afghanistan?

The tactics being used today vs. U.S. forces are the same as those used against the Russians, so what is the problem? All we have to do is get their historical reports.

Then read 'em and weep.

Roberts Ridge

The wastefulness in excess explosives seen in a recent picture (Dick & Dynamite), and a recent meeting I had with the father of Sgt. Bradley Crose--one of the first three Rangers killed in the Shah-i-Kot battle--brought to mind a small section of the book Roberts Ridge, about the battle on Takur Ghar mountain.

As in Bowden's book Black Hawk Down, we are given the picture of Special Operations Forces caught up in hubris and poor planning.

This fight took place 4 March 2002 in Afghanistan, and lasted 17 hours. Rangers, SEALs, and Air Force SOF all fought in this engagement ,which took place at an altitude of 10,240 feet.

The SEALs were inserted on this key terrain to provide fire direction to interdict enemy movements during "Operation Anaconda". The insertion on the Landing Zone was done without a proper visual recon. A gunship indicated that nobody was near the LZ, and no U.S. personnel actually eyeballed the terrain prior to insertion.

Standard procedure is/should be to do a visual recon (VR) of the proposed LZ. Though an infrared scan indicated there were no fighters present, this proved inadequate as they were deeply dug in. It is yet another example of over-reliance on technology.

A good rule is, if there are bunkers present, do not land helicopters within their effective kill radius. It is so simple, even a retired Ranger understands it.

Next, a Quick Reaction Force of Rangers was sent to secure the LZ and to rescue the initial assault element.

The chosen LZ--Shah-i-kot--is key terrain and defensive ground for the Afghan fighters. The area served them against Alexander the Great (321 B.C.E.), British colonial troops (1840's) and against the U.S.S.R. in the 1980's. The Russians lost 250 soldiers in one day near this area.

Following are some excerpts and quick thoughts, as they arose, from the book. Following these are my perceptions:

"Defenders of the Shah-i-Kot had never tasted defeat. The tunnel and cave systems in this area are 165 years old."

"Over flights of intelligence-gathering warned of American interest, if not their intent."

As for the QRF, their mission changed after lift-off, and "with no time allowed to stop and conduct deliberate planning. . . Coordinating would have to be done on the fly."

"The ambush shocked the QRF and crew, but the enemy fighter's true shock must have been greater--that their enemy had sent a third plump target down the sights of their guns."

"The QRF was caught in an ambush in a sub-zero environment, and their air at an altitude at which no Ranger--indeed no U.S. troop--had fought before."

The M-134 mini-guns on both shot down helos would not work after being shot down. The guns required electricity to function.

"(But) true cooperation, they were finding, went only as far as unit loyalties, when the stakes were this high."

"No one commander had been given authority to issue orders to everybody else."

The enemy dead were seen to be wearing plastic shower shoes. "The minute you don't respect your adversary is the minute you are going to die.

The Ranger QRF leaders generally had to beg to get a medevac to their location.

The Special operations Forces Chinooks cost between $30 and $40 million each.

"Regardless of the virtues of the men, [Air Force pilot Lt. Col.] Milani said, "The mission was obviously not a success because MAKO 30 never got in. [Milani was tasked by JSOC Commander Gen. Dailey with chronologizing the event.] They became the focus instead of Anaconda. It was an unwanted distraction. Al-Qaeda soldiers--probably no more than 25-30 of them--died on or around the peak. The loss of seven Americans was not a fair trade. "

Rangers humble thoughts:


[1] The enemy fighters killed seven Americans shot at least $60 Million worth of helicopters out of the sky. What a tremendous loss of life and money for no gain. Afghanistan remains a situation of throwing good money after bad.

[2] The SOF in this fight were not included in the fire-planning of Operation Anaconda taking place in the valley areas. There was no dedicated direct or general Support Artillery, nor was there any designated General Supporting Reinforcing.

Simply put, the SOF fighters were to rely totally on Air Force weapons delivery, which is most precarious in close quarters combat. All Air Force munitions were delivered on a danger close scenario.

[3] The enemy fighters were definitely standing and fighting. These personnel were probably Chechens, and not native Afghans. These were hardened infantry-type soldiers. Note: Ranger did not and will not call them "terrorists."

[4] Loosely planned, on-the-fly operations cannot be successful against determined foes. Technology will not be a force multiplier without proper prior-planning. Sorties must be preplanned. Same for resupply and medical evacuation.


It is not the bravery and courage of the engaged U.S. soldiers which is called into question, for that met the gold standard. These military personnel were of the very same high calibre that is a longstanding tradition of the armed forces.

Rather, it is the operation itself. And extrapolating from that, the entire Afghan and Iraq project. It is never the common man, nor the soldier, at fault. rather, the powers that run these two entities.