Starry, Starry Night

--A simple game of chess

Our crusade was such madness 
that only a real idealist could have thought it up
--The Seventh Seal (1957)
___________________

Ranger will draw connections among three fights: Lang Vei (Vietnam, Feb. '68), Mogadishu - Black Hawk Down (Oct. '93) and the Battle of Kamdesh at Command Outpost Keating in Afghanistan (Oct. 2009).

The key devolution over 40+ years is that the U.S. is no longer fighting enemy armies but simple assemblies of enemy fighters variously described as militias, militants, insurgents, etc., and while U.S. forces are arrayed to fight battles, they instead get roughly handled by simple street thugs ... people for whom soldierly behavior does not apply.

So, why do we fight for hills, towns and terrains which are disposable and not of worth to anyone except those squatting on that particular grid square, and then pull up stakes and leave? Have the principles of war lost their relevance? This is the Day of the Jackal; you lie down with dogs, you get fleas. Has Clausewitz had his day? If so, what will direct and constrain our present and future conflicts?

From his personal discussions with battle survivor (Lt.) Paul Longgrear, the Battle of Lang Vei was the death of the United States Special Forces A-Camps, which were small and remote fighting camps with mission augmentation. The fall of Lang Vei showed that the US Army could not hold a camp if the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) was determined to expend the operational assets to destroy their objective.

If the  NVA could do this at LV with USMC assets a 105 Howitzer distance away, then any SF fighting camp in VN was a potential death trap. The LV Battle was a knock-down fight between two determined armies; after LV and Tet '68, the outcome of the American war in Vietnam was sealed.

And yet, despite that death knell the U.S. continues 40 years on to emplace its soldiers in indefensible outposts which suffer the same dire fate.

Like LV, the Mogadishu battle [Black Hawk Down - "BHD'] was conducted by the finest Special Operations Forces (SOF) -- the 75th Ranger Battalion assets teamed up with SOF Delta operatives. The difference in the BHD scenario was that the enemy was an unorganized opponent lacking a detailed Table of Organization and Equipment (TO& E) and order of battle; in short, they functioned as militias lacking state apparatus. They probably lacked mission objectives beyond killing soldiers and controlling the countryside and cities by armed violence.

But BHD demonstrated that militias with platoon-level weapons (including RPG2 and 7's) could engage and kill prime US war fighting assets IF the militias were willing to take the casualties. It was estimated in BHD that the U.S. killed 1,000+ militia fighters, yet the U.S. mission was ultimately frustrated and abandoned. Somalia is still the same sewer 20 years on.

The book and the movie were an awe-inspiring view of a world-class infantry, but insurgents and militias world-wide re-learned that they can fight any army to standstill if willing to take the casualties. The lessons taken from the '79 Russo-Afghan war have been re-imagined in Iraq and Afghanistan, 2001 onward.

The Battle at Kamdesh in '09 for which SSG Clinton Romesha earned the Medal of Honor earlier this year occurred 20 miles away from a similar failure the previous year in the Battle of Wanat. While the U.S. soldiers supposedly killed 100 enemy militants, that is immaterial since the 4th Division no longer occupies any terrain in the mountain ranges of Afghanistan.

An old Counterinsurgency (COIN) metric goes, if we are killing 10:1 of ours, then we are being successful. It is doubtful the U.S. met that metric in LV and it assuredly did not in BHD. And in Kamdesh, with a kill ratio of 8:100 ... ? Did we win?

The New York Times reported the Americans following Kamdesh "declared the outpost closed and departed — so quickly that they did not carry out all of their stored ammunition. The outpost’s depot was promptly looted by the insurgents and bombed by American planes in an effort to destroy the lethal munitions left behind" ("Strategic Plans Spawn Bitter End for Lonely Outpost.")

COP Keating was not a win, and they left like Lee slinking out of Gettysburg in July 1863. The difference was that instead of withdrawing under an enemy army's pressure, they faced a rag-tag group of militia fighters who may have been simple bandits or warlord fighters. Though not a Waterloo or Liepzig, it was a total failure nonetheless.

If U.S. forces were to kill 100:1, they would still be losing in a Low-intensity conflict (LIC) or COIN environment.  We no longer talk of LIC, instead pretending that we fight battles, but LIC is the order of the day, and reality demands that understanding. However, that understanding would threaten to upend the profitable military complex as we know it.

Ranger's unit in RVN, Studies and Observations Group (SOG), is reported to have had a kill ratio of 150:1, but we still lost control of the Ho Chi Minh Trail since we never controlled the key terrain on the ground. An army can hold ground, but that is not equal to controlling the ground.

In the last 43 years, the U.S. Army has lost the ability to control the ground. It may have conquered Kabul and Baghdad, but it never controlled the ground, nor the hearts and minds of the locals. This is the fallow result of phony wars.

The latest wars prove the inability of the U.S. Army to destroy and force U.S. will on insurgencies and militia-inspired insurgencies. They are continuations of LV and BHD on another chessboard. What should we have learned?

Time is not on our side.

[cross-posted @ milpub]

Lang Vei, Revisited

--Paul Longgrear being evacuated to Khe Sanh Airbase,
7 Feb 1968
________________

February 6 was the 42 anniversary of the Battle of Lang Vei fought by members of the 5th Special Forces Group in the Republic of Vietnam.

Ranger's associate Paul Longgrear is the last surviving officer from that battle, but Paul and Ranger have divergent views on the validity of current actions of the U.S. Army. Ranger alone will analogize this action to several from the current wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Ranger emphasizes that nothing he says is a criticism of any Special Forces soldier or their leadership. They fought beyond human comprehension; the Corps and Theatre Commanders are left holding the bag on this one.

The questions I have about Lang Vei are the same I have about Waygul or Wanat or Roberts Ridge, today:

• Was the mission realistic? Achievable?

• Were assets properly allocated to the SF?

• Was Lang Vei key terrain and essential to defend?

• Were Corps assets properly allocated to weight the effort?

These questions haunt the military mind, and are not confined to this lonely and desperate fight for survival. In all of these scenarios, U.S. forces are thrown onto a piece of terrain and told their mission is essential, and that they will attack and secure the locale, or they will defend the terrain, but the rationale for doing so is never clearly thought out.

The soldiers fighting are at the bottom of the food chain. The Corps Commander is the person that bears all responsibility, closely followed by the Theatre Commander. Ranger doubts that the Corps concept even functions in Afghanistan.

The chain of command appears to be Theatre directly down to Platoon Leader, with little thought given to the concept of the operation. To a large extent, Afghanistan resembles the Vietnam War in that too much responsibility is shouldered by Platoon Leaders.

At Lang Vei, the defense was not weighted to achieve the mission. If the defense was important, then adequate Corps artillery assets should have been allocated on a direct support basis, or as general support (GS) or even GS reinforcing. In addition, an Artillery Liaison or Fire Direction Coordinator should have been dedicated to the defensive effort.

Instead, these functions fell to Captain Willoughby, the Camp Commander. They should not have, He should have been leading the camp's defenses, not coordinating supporting defensive fire.

For some inexplicable reason, this was not done.

Ranger was never Mike Force or A Team, but stands in awe of their professionalism and dedication. However, this admiration is always mixed with dismay at the misuse of these assets by Theatre and Corps Commanders and planners. Longgrear's Mike Force was expected to hold terrain that a USMC line battalion would have found difficult to achieve.

These fights devolved to young Lieutenants and Captains. My impression is that all actions above Captain-level were disjointed and reactive in nature. There were no in-place Corps scenarios to reinforce or evacuate Lang Vei in an organized military manner. All reactions above camp level seemed ad hoc.

Lang Vei, Waygul, Wanat and Roberts Ridge share many characteristics. The U.S. engaged forces were given unrealistic and unattainable missions lacking adequate resources. The fights could not be reinforced in a timely manner and the weight of the events fell upon LT's and CPT's. Units were committed piecemeal and placed in positions which the enemy could defeat in detail, with impunity. None were formulas for success.

Lang Vei was a classic battle, and though what we have seen in Afghanistan is not of the same scale, the concept is the same. The unanswered questions pertain to sustainability, reinforcement, reserves, mutual support and weighting the assets of the assigned units emplaced in positions making them vulnerable targets for enemy exploitation.

Then, as now.

Follow-on:

Since writing this piece, Ranger has come across a vital chapter in the book Last Stand at Khe Sanh (2014) by Gregg Jones which expounds upon the Battle for Lang Vei. This book provides a valuable addition to the student of the Lang Vei fight - jh.

 

Wanat, Revisited, Pt. II

And all the morons
And all the stooges with their coins
They're the ones who make the rules
It's not a game - its just a rout
--I Want My Money Back, Meatloaf

The greatest perils to democracy arise
from the fanaticism of moral idealists
who are not conscious of the corruption of self-interest
--Reinhold Neibuhr
__________________

Wanat, Pt II:

"[T]hree minutes after the attack began, the first target for indirect fire support was given to the fire direction center, and within < ? > the first of 96 rounds of 155 mm artillery was fired in support of VPB Wanat."

155's are too much for danger close type fire missions. 105's would have been more acceptable, as would have been 81/60 mortars. Danger close 155 rounds are shaky stuff! In addition, as previously noted, an OP should fall back automatically after they have given early warning of attack.

"The defenders engaged the AAF from opposite sides of the Hesco and received fire from above . . . house less than 50 meters away."

Why would any combat leader place a house less than 50 meters from a defensive perimeter? This is tactically unsound policy that provides a likely avenue of approach for attacking units.

"PV2 < ? > and SPC < ? > and others repeatedly ran across the VPB under fire to resupply the fighting positions with ammunition." Only one M2-50 cal is mentioned, but why not more firepower put in the perimeter? Also, why was extra ammo not stored in the fighting positions? In addition, were there any alternate fighting positions designed and prepared?

"All were injured or killed by enemy fire within the first fifteen to twenty minutes of fighting." Again, was this a blocking position or an OP? OP's are not fighting positions.

"SGT < ? > and SPC < ? > attempted to fire several claymore mines against the AAF to the north but they had been disabled or turned around to face the OP by AAF."

"The AAF fighters in the hotel and bazaar area engaged from the second floor windows at a distance of approximately 20 meters. SGT < ? > then called over the radio that Top Side needed help."

Why were anti-disturbance devices not used on the claymores (push-pull detonated explosives)? With the attackers are safely ensconced 20 meters from the perimeter, one must question the tactical planning that went into this incident. Personnel beyond the O-3 level know better than this, or at least they should.

". . . their 30 mm cannons "danger close" to friendly forces on the ground, including multiple gun runs though the bazaar, but there is no eveidence of casualties due to friendly fire."

This entire fight is contradictory in nature. If the mission was to bring the people under the wing of the government then it was a miserable failure, since the village was destroyed. The same old story -- they were destroyed in order to protect them.

"The leadership on the ground at wanat was given an order on 14 July 2008 at 1700z (2130L) to prepare for either remaining at Wanat or relocating the forces."

What an amazing warning order. Be prepared to remain or relocate! That covers all the bases and is some fine tactical guidance.

The 60 mm mortars and attached on site Medic are not mentioned in the AAR. Both would have enhanced the defense of the VPB. Since there was a Medic in the CO QRF, Ranger will assume there was not one present at the fight.

"There were between 21 and 52 AAF killed in the attack. . . . One of the recoverd AAF bodies was identified as an Arab man in traditional Afghan clothing over a set of woodland camouflage military fatigues."

How was his "Arab nationality" determined?

"A formal risk assessment was conducted before the location was occupied." The AAR does not indicate or clearly state if any of this information was disseminated to Company or Platoon level.

"Based upon the fact that the enemy normally conducts probing attacks prior to conducting an all out large scale attack, it was logical to think that an attack of 20 AAF would be a probing attack."

What the AAR calls "logical" is stereotypical thinking, of the sort probably found in the AAR of the Little Big Horn battle. What is called logical led to the deaths of nine fine young men.

"The first MEDEVAC arrived at 0125z (0555L), one hour and thirty-five minuites into the fight." No comment.

Under "Recommendations concerning improvements, if any, to coalition force techniques, tactics and procedures": "We must hold the population accountable if they are to [ever] benefit."

Who is "we", and how do the people benefit? The US Army cannot hold the Afghan population accountable. We may kill the hell out of them, but only the Afghanistan government can hold their population accountable.

Wanat seems like an uncalled for action and fight, which could lead to no possible benefit for anybody. Platoons do not fight strategic battles, nor should they be placed in unsupportable and untenable situations. The bravery of these soldiers was wasted.

Historical perspective: At the battle of Lang Vei in Vietnam, the camp was commanded by CPT Willoughby and the Mike Force by 1LT Longgrear. In addition, LTC Shungel and MAJ Hoadley arrived on scene to exert experienced leadership and to influence the outcome of the battle.

Why was such activity not evident at Wanat?

Addendum: Below is some informed commentary received by Ranger on the battle --

http://www.armytimes.com/news/2009/04/army_silverstar_box_041209w/

http://www.armytimes.com/news/2009/04/army_silverstars_041209w/

45 Americans in the battle if I read this right.

9 KIA. 27 WIA.

11 Silver stars (two went to the two officers. In all 3 were posthumous meaning 8 went to survivors)

17 BSM-V

25 ACM

Total 53 metals for 45 Americans.

Reading the information, I suspect there were no listening posts because the unit knew the attack was coming and because the elders had warned them of an attack and had evacuated their families.

I note in the AAR it says that the claymores around the OP were disabled or turned around. Do you suppose they fired the claymores on themselves?

AAR implies no civilian casualties in the village which is odd given the ordnance dropped.

I wonder if there were sworn statements taken from the two marines training the afghan soldiers. They would be the only Americans not in the 173^rd direct chain of command.

Dak To, Redux

There's nothing you can do that can't be done
Nothing you can know that isn't known
Nothing you can see that isn't shown
--All You Need is Love, The Beatles

One who sets the entire army in motion
to chase an advantage will not attain it
--Sun Tzu
_______________

David Ignatius proudly said in this Sunday's WaPo, this is an "Army that Learns."

"Rather than sulking about the Iraq mess, commanders made necessary changes. The Army developed a new doctrine for fighting a counterinsurgency . . ." On the same day, nine soldiers were killed and fifteen wounded in Afghanistan.

"This study illustrates what's most admirable about the Army. It has maintained a tradition of intellectual rigor and self-criticism. That's nurtured in the Army's unique program of midcareer education. It's not an accident but part of that Army tradition that the current commander in Iraq, Gen. David Petraeus, took a doctorate in international relations at Princeton, or that the former Centcom commander, Gen. John Abizaid, had a stint as commandant of West Point."

Not to be iconoclastic just for the hell of it, but would someone tell Ranger how Petraeus's doctorate or Abizaid's stint as commandant of West Point helped the nine soldiers killed or fifteen wounded this Sunday in Afghanistan? Ignatius may believe there is a learning curve, but the facts do not bear this out.

All the doctorates in the world will not change the fact that military leaders are just that. If the U.S. government needs doctorates in International Relations, let them employ them at the State Department. Army commanders fight our enemies and strategically employ our armed forces.

Invasions and COIN are not social events -- they are killing and destroying actions. We never admit that; it does not fly in polite society, so we call it "nation building." But the whole shooting match is based on destructive combat power.

Just like the Food Stamp Office is renamed "Department of Children and Families," because who could be against a kid or a family? And food stamps themselves are now a "Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP)." In a SNAP, a wrap -- no more needy poor people. We are winning the rhetorical battle, at least.

"A multi-pronged militant assault on a small, remote U.S. base close to the Pakistan border killed nine American soldiers and wounded 15 Sunday in the deadliest attack on U.S. forces in Afghanistan in three years, officials said.

"The attack on the American troops began around 4:30 a.m. and lasted throughout the day. Militants fired machine guns, rocket-propelled grenades and mortars from homes and a mosque in the village of Wanat in the mountainous northeastern province of Kunar, NATO's International Security Assistance Force said in a statement (Nine Soldiers Killed in Afghanistan.)"

Here's a news flash: the battle killing nine in Afghanistan is the same battle that killed 19 in Murray's Medal of Honor action, and the Battle of Roberts Ridge.

These are battles of desperate, isolated units that lack mutually supporting elements and lack sufficient firepower to overcome the enemy. Add the following tragic element: Even though desperately fought, the outcomes did not, could not and would not affect the outcome of any strategic importance.

Whether U.S. arms were successful is totally immaterial. These are meaningless battles that have only one consequence: U.S. soldiers die for nothing, and are wounded for more of the same. Unless one wanted to take a particularly grim approach and say to give the hospital mega-industry more clientele.

Anybody attending Ranger, Special Forces or Infantry school in the 1960's knows that 0430 BMNT is the most dangerous time of day. This is when the enemy assaults isolated units stuck out on the periphery. Put a tasty morsel out there and the anti-coalition forces are gonna eat their shorts. I reckon they don't teach that to Doctors of International Relations because the word has not filtered down to troop level yet.

It is pointless to place small units in battle positions that cannot be rapidly relieved or covered by indirect massive volumes of protective artillery. If you don't believe this, ask the survivors of this battle their thoughts on the subject.

No one will ask because it is the accepted conventional wisdom to place outlying units acting as LP's/OP's, which is correct in a conventional war because these elements are always covered by fire. However, this U.S. element obviously did not come under higher protective shield.

Why would any commander stick a unit in a poorly defended arena? It did not work at Dak To, Dak Pek, Dak Seang, Lang Vei, Roberts Ridge or with any other isolated unit. The dead soldiers of these actions would cry from their grave to know the same needless sacrifices are being made today, sacrifices that will never lead to anything remotely associated with a military success.

Units must be mutually supporting with quick reinforcements available. Helicopters cannot efficiently achieve this and approaching by road march is not a viable option due to the ambush-like nature of the Afghan roads. What's the solution? Too bad Westmoreland's dead; maybe he'd have a clue, even without a PhD.

Hint: Military action is similar to political action -- it can only achieve the achievable.

Ranger entered Infantry Officer Basic Course in 1968 during the height of the Vietnam war and what tactical studies did we have from RVN? Exactly none! We only had classes on Search and Destroy. Does today's Officer Advanced Course , CGSC or War College examine the tactics of the NVA at Dak To or the anti-coalition forces in Afghanistan?

The tactics being used today vs. U.S. forces are the same as those used against the Russians, so what is the problem? All we have to do is get their historical reports.

Then read 'em and weep.