Wanat, Revisited -- Pt. I
Oliver's army is here to stay
Oliver's army are on their way
And I would rather be anywhere else
Than here today
--Oliver's Army, Elvis Costello
A nation with an inordinate degree
of political power is doubly tempted
to exceed the bounds of historical possibilities
--Reinhold Neibuhr
________________
This is commentary on the fight at Wanat, Afghanistan, 13 July 2008, based on the After Action Report (AAR). Tom Ricks offered his breakdown in "A Battle Gone Wrong" here. (The Operations Order would have been helpful, but was not available.) Ranger is offering his take as a courtesy to an associate. Further comments are welcome.
"The freedom of movement experienced by the AAF [Anti-Afghan Forces] in Waygul District would not be possible without the passive and active support of the local population and the weakness of the government." This acknowledges that the threat is actually the Afghan people. How does one address such a reality with combat arms power?
This was the closest thing to a mission statement for the engaged US forces. But how is "connecting the people with the local government" facilitated by building a vehicle control base (VPB) in their midst? It is not logically necessary that a VPB or Combat Outpost will win the locals over to the government. US combat presence ≠ loyalty to the government.
But there is/was no effective government presence. Since the village was destroyed in the fighting, it is doubtful that the dispossed Afghan nationals have developed any loyalty for for the U.S. military or the Afghan government.
"The new base would initially consist of a VPB that would be expanded into a combat outpost, when the coditions were set." The conditions are undefined and unlisted. Without defintion, how can one determine when the conditions are met?
Why would a TOW team be attached? A TOW is an Anti-Tank Guided Missile (ATGM). It's only function could be to destroy local homes since the Taliban lacks armored vehicles. Since the Wanat defenders had 50 cals., these ATGM's were simply eye candy.
Why only 29 paratroopers? Was there a medic on site? Unclear from the AAR.
Was there an Escape and Evade plan in place? What was the fall back position if the VPB were overrun? Where is the worst-case planning, the contingency plans?
". . . Wanat sits in the central Waygul Valley, one of the steepest valleys in eastern Afghanistan. It sits at approximately 4,000 feet with mountains towering to 8.600 feet . . ." The number of villagers is never noted, nor is the fact of friendlies or civilian casualties.
"They took shifts working, resting and pulling guard duty in gun turrets of their up-armored HMMWV's." No where in the AAR does it indicate that the defenders did any actual active patrolling outside their perimeter.
The 24 attached Afghans would have been ideal for this purpose (or are Afghan soldiers not received as friends by Afghan citizens?) The key point is that all military units at all levels in the defense conduct active patrolling to enhance local security.
An OP is not a fighting position. It appears that OP Top Side was actually a blocking position. An OP gives warning of attack and falls back to the main defensive position. An OP does not fight -- it provides early warning.
". . . all paratroopers were awake, wearing their personal protective equipment (PPE), and securing their positions for stand-to at 2330z (0400L). A smaller element led by 1 LT Brostrom was preparing to conduct a patrol of the area at 0000z (0430L) JUL 2008. Simultaneously, a different element of ANA and Marine embedded training team (ETTs) was preparing to leave to scout the location for a new ANA OP."
Why was this ignored until after the position was established? The OPs/LPs should be integral to any defensive planning.
Were there Forward Observer's (FO's) present? The AAR indicates that 60 mm mortars were present but only 120's are discussed as being employed. The minimum 120 range would preclude effective use of these indirect fire assets. The 60's would have been much more effective and have provided flexible fire support. It is also easier to move the tubes while under enemy pressure.
It is standard policy to eliminate all crew served weapons in the intial burst of fire. Did the defenders attempt to tactically deceive any potential attackers?
Why were there no concentrations or pre-planned fires laid-on prior to the attack? After all, it was obvious that a fight was in the making.
When one is defending it is called defensive fires; when attacking, suppressive. The battle tempo is usually controlled by the attackers, as seen here. The defenders were fighting like cornered rats, behavior not conducive to controlling the tempo of combat.
Tomorrow: Pt. II, Wanat, Revisited
Oliver's army are on their way
And I would rather be anywhere else
Than here today
--Oliver's Army, Elvis Costello
A nation with an inordinate degree
of political power is doubly tempted
to exceed the bounds of historical possibilities
--Reinhold Neibuhr
________________
This is commentary on the fight at Wanat, Afghanistan, 13 July 2008, based on the After Action Report (AAR). Tom Ricks offered his breakdown in "A Battle Gone Wrong" here. (The Operations Order would have been helpful, but was not available.) Ranger is offering his take as a courtesy to an associate. Further comments are welcome.
"The freedom of movement experienced by the AAF [Anti-Afghan Forces] in Waygul District would not be possible without the passive and active support of the local population and the weakness of the government." This acknowledges that the threat is actually the Afghan people. How does one address such a reality with combat arms power?
"The brigade and battalion leaders agreed that finding an alternate base to COP Bella in the Waygul district was necessary to improve the force protection for Chosen Company while still accomplishing its mission of connecting the people with the local government."
This was the closest thing to a mission statement for the engaged US forces. But how is "connecting the people with the local government" facilitated by building a vehicle control base (VPB) in their midst? It is not logically necessary that a VPB or Combat Outpost will win the locals over to the government. US combat presence ≠ loyalty to the government.
"The district level partnership is a successful model in Eastern Afghanistan. It increases security for the district governor, secures the area for infrastructure development, facilitates ANP training, and fosters an improved connection between the population and government while minimizing corruption at the local level. -- all of which were desirable to the local community in Wanat. ... Furthermore, moving near the district center would allow the CF and the local government to build a foundation from which to project good governance to the northern region of Wanat district."
But there is/was no effective government presence. Since the village was destroyed in the fighting, it is doubtful that the dispossed Afghan nationals have developed any loyalty for for the U.S. military or the Afghan government.
"The new base would initially consist of a VPB that would be expanded into a combat outpost, when the coditions were set." The conditions are undefined and unlisted. Without defintion, how can one determine when the conditions are met?
"The ISAF Force consisted of: five combat engineers from the 62d Engineer battalion; a three man TOW missile team from Destined Company; six mortar men from Chosen Company; and 29 paratroopers of 2d PLT, Chosen Company."
Why would a TOW team be attached? A TOW is an Anti-Tank Guided Missile (ATGM). It's only function could be to destroy local homes since the Taliban lacks armored vehicles. Since the Wanat defenders had 50 cals., these ATGM's were simply eye candy.
Why only 29 paratroopers? Was there a medic on site? Unclear from the AAR.
"A two-man Embedded Training Team (ETT) of Marines and 24 Afghan National Army Paratroopers also partnered with the Coalition Forces (CF) to establish the VPB, bringing the total manpower at Wanat to 72 troops."
Was there an Escape and Evade plan in place? What was the fall back position if the VPB were overrun? Where is the worst-case planning, the contingency plans?
". . . Wanat sits in the central Waygul Valley, one of the steepest valleys in eastern Afghanistan. It sits at approximately 4,000 feet with mountains towering to 8.600 feet . . ." The number of villagers is never noted, nor is the fact of friendlies or civilian casualties.
"They took shifts working, resting and pulling guard duty in gun turrets of their up-armored HMMWV's." No where in the AAR does it indicate that the defenders did any actual active patrolling outside their perimeter.
The 24 attached Afghans would have been ideal for this purpose (or are Afghan soldiers not received as friends by Afghan citizens?) The key point is that all military units at all levels in the defense conduct active patrolling to enhance local security.
"Above the VPB to the east, the paratroopers built on OP [Top Side] . . . which sat on slightly higher ground than most of the VPB at the base of a terraced spur which rose to the east. OP Top Side consisted of three levels with sandbags tied into existing rock walls to provide necessary protection from an attack."
An OP is not a fighting position. It appears that OP Top Side was actually a blocking position. An OP gives warning of attack and falls back to the main defensive position. An OP does not fight -- it provides early warning.
". . . all paratroopers were awake, wearing their personal protective equipment (PPE), and securing their positions for stand-to at 2330z (0400L). A smaller element led by 1 LT Brostrom was preparing to conduct a patrol of the area at 0000z (0430L) JUL 2008. Simultaneously, a different element of ANA and Marine embedded training team (ETTs) was preparing to leave to scout the location for a new ANA OP."
Why was this ignored until after the position was established? The OPs/LPs should be integral to any defensive planning.
". . . the indications that the enemy would attack at any time. He was in the process of coordinating a 120mm nortar fire mission and TOW missile engagement when the enemy intiated fire onto the VPB."
Were there Forward Observer's (FO's) present? The AAR indicates that 60 mm mortars were present but only 120's are discussed as being employed. The minimum 120 range would preclude effective use of these indirect fire assets. The 60's would have been much more effective and have provided flexible fire support. It is also easier to move the tubes while under enemy pressure.
"It was apparent that the AAF had identified the key crew served weapons systems and trageted them first. There was a burst of fire and an RPG fired into the mortar firing position (MFP), wounding SPC Abad."
It is standard policy to eliminate all crew served weapons in the intial burst of fire. Did the defenders attempt to tactically deceive any potential attackers?
"The main AAF support by fire position was around a house on high ground approximately 900 m to the SE. . . . The buildings and hillside to the north and east provided excellent positions for the enemy as well."
Why were there no concentrations or pre-planned fires laid-on prior to the attack? After all, it was obvious that a fight was in the making.
"Paratroopers in each fighting position at VPB Wanat controlled their fires, but ensured that all positions engaged enemy positions with an overwhelming level of suppressive fire in an attempt to gain control of the battle tempo."
When one is defending it is called defensive fires; when attacking, suppressive. The battle tempo is usually controlled by the attackers, as seen here. The defenders were fighting like cornered rats, behavior not conducive to controlling the tempo of combat.
Tomorrow: Pt. II, Wanat, Revisited
Labels: afghanistan, chosin company, wanat, waygul valley
posted by rangeragainstwar at 10:16 PM
13 Comments:
i am fearful of the day, dreading that it is coming soon when a company, platoon, or even battalion will go completely bugfuck the way the 327th did in quang ngai.
they figured out that the brass was only interested in body counts, that a burned ville, was a "secured" area.
for seven months they went absolutely apeshit. they were operating in free fire zones. two CID officers tried to bring folks to account. they were cashiered.
the ford adminstration came in and decided that "moving forward" and "healing the wounds" was more important than bringing murdering, raping, torturing, war criminals to account.
those same people who fostered insane atrocity, those same colonels who cut the leash on the 327th (who, at one point, were told by their lt. col, "you're the 327th, i want that on your body count") became general officers.
there was an apache half breed who was a corporal in the 327th. his name was sam. he drank himself to death. his battalion commander was a brigadier in the gulf war.
pretty soon, i expect we'll hear about free fire zones. some pissed off troops who've been on the line too fucking long will snap. just like my lai, just like song ve, just like que tran, things will be called "isolated incidents" or the work of "bad apples" who will be sent to the brig most ricky tick.
the torture at abu ghraib, gauntanamo, and bargram is most likely only the tip of a big ass iceberg.
believe me when i tell you, there ain't no moving on from that shit. people have to stand and speak of what they've done.
without a reckoning there will only be worse things. the coverup of my lai led directly to nearly a year of uninterrupted atrocity in the central highlands. while calley and his lads were going apeshit on civilians there was a major general right up above them monitoring the situation. he was never charged, never reprimanded, he retired as a lt. general. (maybe it was a "tombstone" third star, the navy did that shit all the time, give somebody a promotion right before they socked out. more retirement pay and bennies)
fuck, i'm tired.
I think Ranger does a fine job of analysing this. So i'm going to go a bit OT and ask what the hell is up with Chosen and Destined? What was wrong with Charlie and Delta? And is it just me or do Chosen and Destined have religious connotations?
See, Range, MB and Terrible? If a massacre happens like that the anti-US hate factor will increase EXPONENTIALLY. I'm a BIG fan of seeing generals get their due, but it wouldn't happen. Some right-wing country singer would sing about them, how they've "served their country". But I ask you all---how is the country being served by fomenting and endlessly conducting these racist, snake-handcuffing wars of attrition? Am I missing something??
it's strange you should bring up the renaming of units.
in the 1st/327 the self named "tigers" of the 101st.
the alpha, bravo and charlie companies were renamed
assasains
barbarians
cutthroats.
yeah. what's in a name?
terrible,
I have the same question- why the cutesy nomenclature.
As for religeous overtones I cannot cmt since I'm not a church going Ranger. My Chaplains chit has expired.
I favor use of the old phonetic alfabet, it's universally understood.
jim
MB,
My memory is sketchy on Tiger /327 but I seem to remember this was a platoon size element that operated almost like a pathfinder unit. They'd start the shootup and normal units would then pile on.
We should remember that 20-25% of the VN were killed or wounded in their struggle for democracy. That is they were wacked by us at that level. xin loi.!
jim
jim
the "tiger force" did start out pretty righteous. they were formed while hackworth was the CO. their brief was lrrp's and recon. they were fucking good at it too. dedicated slinkers and spotters.
the folks in the central highlands were, for the most part, hostile to governments north and south. they wanted mainly to be left in peace to grow their rice. they were as hostile to VC and NVA as they were to any other outsiders. they looked at them as just one more group of outsiders coming to steal their rice.
when the CIA had their brilliant idea to employ "operation phoenix" groups like the tigers were ripe fruit for the picking. after all, since they were seasoned jungle and night fighters, capable of great mobility and stealth, why not include "surgical" removals of key personnel?
like most operations of its kind operation phoenix started off the fucking leash. it was, almost from the jumpoff, more of a tool for regional score settling and for land grabs and generalized lootings.
hackworth got himself into some sticky shit. there were all manner of rumours about him being in the field smoking dope with his troops and for corruptions minor and grave.
the thing that happened to the tigers next was a complete shame. like i said, they started out as good, solid troops. they bought into the darkness though.
in quang ngai the intel weenies had dropped a lot of chu hoi pamphlets advising folks to didi out most ricky tick. thing was the "secure" villes that they were supposed to head into weren't prepared for even a modest population. they were cesspools of disease and starvation. most of the highlanders had concepts of being tied with and part of the land that reminded me of the apache. the idea of leaving the crops untended and the graves of the ancestors uncared for was something unthinkable.
that was the main difference in the administration styles. in the same program in phu bai the navy and marines were doing immersions with the farmers. rather than move them into camps, we moved in with them.
after a couple weeks of leaflets the tigers moved in. they simply shot everything that moved. they had great body counts. thing was they were counting kids, women, and old folks in their stats. nobody back in the rear thought anything was amiss. they would report 25 VC killed, no weapons, no prisoners, no friendlies to relocate. also telling, no reports of medical treatment rendered to wounded VC.
for seven months right after tet the tigers ran amok. the entire area (about the size of rhode island and connecticut combined) was in an uproar. the VC contingents were rebelling against the NVA. all uniforms were something to be feared and attacked.
along with 1st marines recon we were sent in to try and bring some semblance of order and sense to the area but it was like the entire population had gone psycho along with the tigers, or maybe in response to them.
i'd have hated everybody in the fucking world myself.
the investigations by CID, NIS, and even a couple of tries by the FBI all proved fruitless.
even eyewitnesses and folks who had pictures of things like headless infants, american troops keeping jars of ears in vinegar, wearing ear and human teeth necklaces went wanting.
one of the CID officers who was cashiered did the unthinkable for a guy like him. when he was packing up his office he took 5 boxes of his interview transcripts and other evidence of the tiger's descent into terror. in 2004 it was published by a small wisconsin paper.
nobody was ever charged, ever arrested, or even had their careers ended.
I think this is what happens when you only have vague mission statements and op orders that aren't related in any way to what your strategic goals are.
That can't prevent all of these atrocities from happening, but combined with a system of holding people accountable it's certainly a start.
Ranger,
This is going to take some rereadings to get a feel for it as I begin breaking it down to the simplest formations.
I will more than likely have some...odd questions to ask later on.
Couple of things jumped out at me from the ARR:
1. Defensive planning: it sounds like this patrol base was socketed way down in a hole. Why?
Why was the "house" that much of the mujs' fire came from not chosen as an OP/LP? It seems to have been pretty critical terrain - why not occupy it?
Why only one LP/OP? Not having a map hurts, because we can't judge whether this location provided 6400 mils of bservation, but the AAR implies it didn't, since the first reports of enemy movement came from the TOW team.
Why was the TOW still vehicle-mounted? It's harder than hell to prepare a vehicle position, and the vehicle itself is vulnerable as hell, as the AAR states - it was destroyed by RPG fire (and injured at least one GI when the TOW rounds cooked off.
What the hell was the story with the mortar position? It must have sucked huge pipe, since the mortar crew was driven ut by direct fire - I think that's why the 120's/155's were employed, Jim - the 60's were lost when the position was shot up.
And how come the ammo wasn't bunkered? Lots of secondary explosions - from TOW and mortar rounds. Not good.
2. Combat leadership
The defense - other than the site selection and perimiter construction - seems to have been sound enough; everybody kept shooting and the wire wasn't breached. Most of the casualties seem to have come from the fucking OP.
First of all, the AAR reads like an entire squad was on the OP.
WTF? You only have a platoon, and a short platoon at that, but you put an entire squad on OP? Where in Ranger School do they teach you that, L.T.?
The OP itself should have been abandoned as soon as the shooting atarted - it's "observation" function was done; they knew the bad guys were there. But instead of pulling the OP back inside the perimeter, the squad sits tight and gets wasted. And THEN the guys in the main defense start going up to the OP in little packets and get whacked - first the PL, then a bunch of guys just John Wayneing it. It doesn't sound like the CO really tries to coordinate any sort of fire-and-maneuver. The AAR reads like the groups just run out and get shot down. Crazy.
So, as usual, it comes down to piss-poor leadership. Poor sense of terrain. Failure to execute sensible immediate actions to contact. Lack of command and control.
But I'll bet the C Company CO got a Silver Star out of the deal.
Sad.
FDChief,
We'll post the number of awards for this action. It's by numbers and doesn't outline who rec'd what. Hope this will help.
All of your comments are extremely relevent. IMHO this thing was disjointed b/c it rec'd no command emphasis, it was just another day at the office until it became cya time.
The troops fought magnificently but as you point out it all seems disjointed and piecemeal and uncoordinated. The troops saved themselves in spite of the lack of detailed,realistic planning.
Forget dismounting the TOW, why was it even there? The 50 could eat up any target in that AO.
I'd be very happy to hear the 2 Marines take on this fight.
AS for your cmts on Ranger School the same could be said for, BNOC/anoc/iobc/oac/css3. Any NCO/Jr. Officer should sweat this stuff from their pores. It's all so basic and this is my concern. In most wars the house would've been flattened to provide fields of fire etc...But the reclama is that this is COIN and well it may be BUT 9 good men are dead and numerous have lifetime wounds to bear and to what purpose??.
And it doesw seem that these soldiers were manning a beaten zone and not a defesive position.
I wonder how the AAF turned the Claymores, were they not covered by fire?or observation?
jim
Based on what I saw during my tours, most small FOBs/firebases, etc. relied on HESCO barriers instead of properly prepared fighting positions and bunkers. Magineau line-ish, is the first thought that comes to mind.
Due to environmental regulations, not much digging is done on Stateside installations, so prepping a fighting position is a lost art.
In short, CRS syndrome is endemic.
JuniorAG: I hear you, but I also know that Ft. Leonard Wood has prepared special demo packages for doing quick cratering in rocky soils for fighting holes. The heavy weapons at least should have been dug in. The problem with the goddam HESCO barriers, IMO, is that they are still in the line of sight. It's hard as hell to get a good aiming point is something that only projects 18 inches above the ground. A whomping big-ass TOW vehicle or a HESCO circle?
Not so much.
Jim: I think the TOW vehicle was there because, frankly, the dumbass Army still doesn't have a good replacement for the recoilless rifle and the TOW is as close as it can get.
Grunts really need some sort of direct-fire pocket artillery, sort of the think that the RCR and the AT guns used to do.
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