Knocking on Heaven's Door

--Iain Green, The Scotsman

Old Army joke:

Q: What's the difference between
the Army and the Boy Scouts?
A: The Boy Scouts have adult leadership

The lieutenant's battle was over
His bravery had little impact on the course of the fight.
He could not rescue the men on Topside,
and those who survived would have done so anyway
--Echoes from a Distant Battlefield,
Mark Bowdon

The worst is yet to come
--Arthur Schopenhauer
___________________

Before analyzing the action of latest Medal of Honor recipient, Dakota Meyer, it is important to place it in context of previous Afghanistan engagements. The U.S. has been fighting a war that looks instead like a series of meeting engagements. At its worst, this looks like blind men bumping into each other in the dark.

The brave yet futile actions of Lt. Brostrom in the gunfight at Waygul (503rd) keeps intruding in Ranger's thoughts because it typifies so much of the warfare being conducted over there.

All Afghan MOH scenarios were gunfights like Waygul -- meeting engagements that could have been developed into a real tactical issue, save they lacked an exploitation phase; they had a movement to contact and a contact phase, and then disintegrated. Battles should proceed well beyond this simplicity of action.

The action at Waygul typifies the Phony War on Terror (PWOT ©) Afghanistan campaigns, characterized as they are by hubris, accompanied by incompetence and tactical and strategic blundering. Though the soldiers fought bravely, their actions take us nowhere.

Military missions follow statements, which outline goals and methodology for success. They serve a larger purpose which is to win more than just the immediate skirmish. But in Afghanistan we have failed to develop most of these situations (engagements) by breaking contact, thereby violating every military rule for success. At least, that is what the recent Medal of Honor citations suggest.

In comparison, in World War II at Iwo Jima there were 27 MOH's in some of the deadliest ground combat U.S. forces have ever experienced. However, every one of these acts of bravery took the U.S. one step closer to victory in the Pacific. In the PWOT ©, we can't even define victory, but that does not stop us from expending our soldier's valor in search of that unquantifiable goal.

Adult leadership, be it from politicians or military leaders, should provide something other than the flimsiest of reasons for fighting, killing and dying based on the John Wayne pretext of "killing bag guys". The soldiers at Waygul and all the other gunfights did what U.S. soldiers always do, they fought as ordered. But where were the adult leaders? Unfortunately, the Army command structure does not ask this question, the answer to which would provide the key to analyzing any action and understanding its success or failure.

The platoon at Waygul was left flapping in the breeze, building a Command Outpost (COP) sans additional support. A platoon whose Company Commander was completing a 15-6 investigation statement rather than addressing the tactical concerns of a unit flung far forward in a dubious tactical environment.

The Commander was covering his ass doing paperwork, and he was doing so with the concurrence of the Battalion Commander. This is the Army. The Company Commander was prioritizing administrative over combat tasks, and therefore could not provide adult leadership. However, the Battalion Commander could have solved the problem by re-assigning the mission to a Company whose Commander was not otherwise occupied with administrative issues. Men die when priorities are skewed.

Key questions from the Wanat battle:

• Why even establish a COP flung forward without proper support? This is a kin to putting cannons on the Titanic to ward off icebergs.

• Did the Brigade Commander, Executive Officer (XO), S-2, S-3 or Command Sergeant Major (CSM) ever walk the terrain or do a map study? Was the feasibility of the venture war-gamed? Where were the adults?

• Ditto Battalion Commander, XO, S-2, S-3 and CSM.
  

• Where was the Company 1st Sergeant?

It is clear that the Platoon was sent on a mission that the Platoon leader was incapable of completing, and his effort was not weighted for success as the iceberg approached. All the adult leaders were elsewhere or otherwise occupied to do more than cast a passing glance at a platoon ground pounding on heaven's door.

If a U.S. Platoon as part of a Company in a Battalion as part of a Brigade in an Airborne unit cannot build a COP, then we must consider seriously what they can do! The same comment applies to the Murphy, Miller and Meyer MOH actions.

All the actions seen in these Afghan campaigns lead one to question the state of training of units and individuals, officers and enlisted men, alike. No amount of valor can trump a lack of technical and tactical expertise. The fights considered here are conspicuously lacking these features.

Waygul, the most discussed small unit action in the Afghan experience, provides a microcosm of the systemic failures eroding an entire Army's ability to fight a nebulous succession of engagements in the no man's land of a tribal society.

The bravery of our soldiers cannot counter these failures.


NEXT: Meeting Engagements

Wanat, Revisited -- Pt. I

Oliver's army is here to stay
Oliver's army are on their way
And I would rather be anywhere else
Than here today
--Oliver's Army, Elvis Costello

A nation with an inordinate degree
of political power is doubly tempted
to exceed the bounds of historical possibilities
--Reinhold Neibuhr
________________

This is commentary on the fight at Wanat, Afghanistan, 13 July 2008, based on the After Action Report (AAR). Tom Ricks offered his breakdown in "A Battle Gone Wrong" here. (The Operations Order would have been helpful, but was not available.) Ranger is offering his take as a courtesy to an associate. Further comments are welcome.

"The freedom of movement experienced by the AAF [Anti-Afghan Forces] in Waygul District would not be possible without the passive and active support of the local population and the weakness of the government." This acknowledges that the threat is actually the Afghan people. How does one address such a reality with combat arms power?

"The brigade and battalion leaders agreed that finding an alternate base to COP Bella in the Waygul district was necessary to improve the force protection for Chosen Company while still accomplishing its mission of connecting the people with the local government."

This was the closest thing to a mission statement for the engaged US forces. But how is "connecting the people with the local government" facilitated by building a vehicle control base (VPB) in their midst? It is not logically necessary that a VPB or Combat Outpost will win the locals over to the government. US combat presence ≠ loyalty to the government.

"The district level partnership is a successful model in Eastern Afghanistan. It increases security for the district governor, secures the area for infrastructure development, facilitates ANP training, and fosters an improved connection between the population and government while minimizing corruption at the local level. -- all of which were desirable to the local community in Wanat. ... Furthermore, moving near the district center would allow the CF and the local government to build a foundation from which to project good governance to the northern region of Wanat district."

But there is/was no effective government presence. Since the village was destroyed in the fighting, it is doubtful that the dispossed Afghan nationals have developed any loyalty for for the U.S. military or the Afghan government.

"The new base would initially consist of a VPB that would be expanded into a combat outpost, when the coditions were set." The conditions are undefined and unlisted. Without defintion, how can one determine when the conditions are met?

"The ISAF Force consisted of: five combat engineers from the 62d Engineer battalion; a three man TOW missile team from Destined Company; six mortar men from Chosen Company; and 29 paratroopers of 2d PLT, Chosen Company."

Why would a TOW team be attached? A TOW is an Anti-Tank Guided Missile (ATGM). It's only function could be to destroy local homes since the Taliban lacks armored vehicles. Since the Wanat defenders had 50 cals., these ATGM's were simply eye candy.

Why only 29 paratroopers? Was there a medic on site? Unclear from the AAR.

"A two-man Embedded Training Team (ETT) of Marines and 24 Afghan National Army Paratroopers also partnered with the Coalition Forces (CF) to establish the VPB, bringing the total manpower at Wanat to 72 troops."

Was there an Escape and Evade plan in place? What was the fall back position if the VPB were overrun? Where is the worst-case planning, the contingency plans?

". . . Wanat sits in the central Waygul Valley, one of the steepest valleys in eastern Afghanistan. It sits at approximately 4,000 feet with mountains towering to 8.600 feet . . ." The number of villagers is never noted, nor is the fact of friendlies or civilian casualties.

"They took shifts working, resting and pulling guard duty in gun turrets of their up-armored HMMWV's." No where in the AAR does it indicate that the defenders did any actual active patrolling outside their perimeter.

The 24 attached Afghans would have been ideal for this purpose (or are Afghan soldiers not received as friends by Afghan citizens?) The key point is that all military units at all levels in the defense conduct active patrolling to enhance local security.

"Above the VPB to the east, the paratroopers built on OP [Top Side] . . . which sat on slightly higher ground than most of the VPB at the base of a terraced spur which rose to the east. OP Top Side consisted of three levels with sandbags tied into existing rock walls to provide necessary protection from an attack."

An OP is not a fighting position. It appears that OP Top Side was actually a blocking position. An OP gives warning of attack and falls back to the main defensive position. An OP does not fight -- it provides early warning.


". . . all paratroopers were awake, wearing their personal protective equipment (PPE), and securing their positions for stand-to at 2330z (0400L). A smaller element led by 1 LT Brostrom was preparing to conduct a patrol of the area at 0000z (0430L) JUL 2008. Simultaneously, a different element of ANA and Marine embedded training team (ETTs) was preparing to leave to scout the location for a new ANA OP."


Why was this ignored until after the position was established? The OPs/LPs should be integral to any defensive planning.

". . . the indications that the enemy would attack at any time. He was in the process of coordinating a 120mm nortar fire mission and TOW missile engagement when the enemy intiated fire onto the VPB."

Were there Forward Observer's (FO's) present? The AAR indicates that 60 mm mortars were present but only 120's are discussed as being employed. The minimum 120 range would preclude effective use of these indirect fire assets. The 60's would have been much more effective and have provided flexible fire support. It is also easier to move the tubes while under enemy pressure.

"It was apparent that the AAF had identified the key crew served weapons systems and trageted them first. There was a burst of fire and an RPG fired into the mortar firing position (MFP), wounding SPC Abad."

It is standard policy to eliminate all crew served weapons in the intial burst of fire. Did the defenders attempt to tactically deceive any potential attackers?

"The main AAF support by fire position was around a house on high ground approximately 900 m to the SE. . . . The buildings and hillside to the north and east provided excellent positions for the enemy as well."

Why were there no concentrations or pre-planned fires laid-on prior to the attack? After all, it was obvious that a fight was in the making.

"Paratroopers in each fighting position at VPB Wanat controlled their fires, but ensured that all positions engaged enemy positions with an overwhelming level of suppressive fire in an attempt to gain control of the battle tempo."

When one is defending it is called defensive fires; when attacking, suppressive. The battle tempo is usually controlled by the attackers, as seen here. The defenders were fighting like cornered rats, behavior not conducive to controlling the tempo of combat.

Tomorrow: Pt. II, Wanat, Revisited