Wanat, Revisited, Pt. II
And all the morons
And all the stooges with their coins
They're the ones who make the rules
It's not a game - its just a rout
--I Want My Money Back, Meatloaf
The greatest perils to democracy arise
from the fanaticism of moral idealists
who are not conscious of the corruption of self-interest
--Reinhold Neibuhr
__________________
Wanat, Pt II:
155's are too much for danger close type fire missions. 105's would have been more acceptable, as would have been 81/60 mortars. Danger close 155 rounds are shaky stuff! In addition, as previously noted, an OP should fall back automatically after they have given early warning of attack.
Why would any combat leader place a house less than 50 meters from a defensive perimeter? This is tactically unsound policy that provides a likely avenue of approach for attacking units.
"PV2 < ? > and SPC < ? > and others repeatedly ran across the VPB under fire to resupply the fighting positions with ammunition." Only one M2-50 cal is mentioned, but why not more firepower put in the perimeter? Also, why was extra ammo not stored in the fighting positions? In addition, were there any alternate fighting positions designed and prepared?
"All were injured or killed by enemy fire within the first fifteen to twenty minutes of fighting." Again, was this a blocking position or an OP? OP's are not fighting positions.
Why were anti-disturbance devices not used on the claymores (push-pull detonated explosives)? With the attackers are safely ensconced 20 meters from the perimeter, one must question the tactical planning that went into this incident. Personnel beyond the O-3 level know better than this, or at least they should.
This entire fight is contradictory in nature. If the mission was to bring the people under the wing of the government then it was a miserable failure, since the village was destroyed. The same old story -- they were destroyed in order to protect them.
What an amazing warning order. Be prepared to remain or relocate! That covers all the bases and is some fine tactical guidance.
The 60 mm mortars and attached on site Medic are not mentioned in the AAR. Both would have enhanced the defense of the VPB. Since there was a Medic in the CO QRF, Ranger will assume there was not one present at the fight.
"A formal risk assessment was conducted before the location was occupied." The AAR does not indicate or clearly state if any of this information was disseminated to Company or Platoon level.
"Based upon the fact that the enemy normally conducts probing attacks prior to conducting an all out large scale attack, it was logical to think that an attack of 20 AAF would be a probing attack."
What the AAR calls "logical" is stereotypical thinking, of the sort probably found in the AAR of the Little Big Horn battle. What is called logical led to the deaths of nine fine young men.
"The first MEDEVAC arrived at 0125z (0555L), one hour and thirty-five minuites into the fight." No comment.
Under "Recommendations concerning improvements, if any, to coalition force techniques, tactics and procedures": "We must hold the population accountable if they are to [ever] benefit."
Who is "we", and how do the people benefit? The US Army cannot hold the Afghan population accountable. We may kill the hell out of them, but only the Afghanistan government can hold their population accountable.
Wanat seems like an uncalled for action and fight, which could lead to no possible benefit for anybody. Platoons do not fight strategic battles, nor should they be placed in unsupportable and untenable situations. The bravery of these soldiers was wasted.
Historical perspective: At the battle of Lang Vei in Vietnam, the camp was commanded by CPT Willoughby and the Mike Force by 1LT Longgrear. In addition, LTC Shungel and MAJ Hoadley arrived on scene to exert experienced leadership and to influence the outcome of the battle.
Why was such activity not evident at Wanat?
Addendum: Below is some informed commentary received by Ranger on the battle --
And all the stooges with their coins
They're the ones who make the rules
It's not a game - its just a rout
--I Want My Money Back, Meatloaf
The greatest perils to democracy arise
from the fanaticism of moral idealists
who are not conscious of the corruption of self-interest
--Reinhold Neibuhr
__________________
Wanat, Pt II:
"[T]hree minutes after the attack began, the first target for indirect fire support was given to the fire direction center, and within < ? > the first of 96 rounds of 155 mm artillery was fired in support of VPB Wanat."
155's are too much for danger close type fire missions. 105's would have been more acceptable, as would have been 81/60 mortars. Danger close 155 rounds are shaky stuff! In addition, as previously noted, an OP should fall back automatically after they have given early warning of attack.
"The defenders engaged the AAF from opposite sides of the Hesco and received fire from above . . . house less than 50 meters away."
Why would any combat leader place a house less than 50 meters from a defensive perimeter? This is tactically unsound policy that provides a likely avenue of approach for attacking units.
"PV2 < ? > and SPC < ? > and others repeatedly ran across the VPB under fire to resupply the fighting positions with ammunition." Only one M2-50 cal is mentioned, but why not more firepower put in the perimeter? Also, why was extra ammo not stored in the fighting positions? In addition, were there any alternate fighting positions designed and prepared?
"All were injured or killed by enemy fire within the first fifteen to twenty minutes of fighting." Again, was this a blocking position or an OP? OP's are not fighting positions.
"SGT < ? > and SPC < ? > attempted to fire several claymore mines against the AAF to the north but they had been disabled or turned around to face the OP by AAF."
"The AAF fighters in the hotel and bazaar area engaged from the second floor windows at a distance of approximately 20 meters. SGT < ? > then called over the radio that Top Side needed help."
Why were anti-disturbance devices not used on the claymores (push-pull detonated explosives)? With the attackers are safely ensconced 20 meters from the perimeter, one must question the tactical planning that went into this incident. Personnel beyond the O-3 level know better than this, or at least they should.
". . . their 30 mm cannons "danger close" to friendly forces on the ground, including multiple gun runs though the bazaar, but there is no eveidence of casualties due to friendly fire."
This entire fight is contradictory in nature. If the mission was to bring the people under the wing of the government then it was a miserable failure, since the village was destroyed. The same old story -- they were destroyed in order to protect them.
"The leadership on the ground at wanat was given an order on 14 July 2008 at 1700z (2130L) to prepare for either remaining at Wanat or relocating the forces."
What an amazing warning order. Be prepared to remain or relocate! That covers all the bases and is some fine tactical guidance.
The 60 mm mortars and attached on site Medic are not mentioned in the AAR. Both would have enhanced the defense of the VPB. Since there was a Medic in the CO QRF, Ranger will assume there was not one present at the fight.
"There were between 21 and 52 AAF killed in the attack. . . . One of the recoverd AAF bodies was identified as an Arab man in traditional Afghan clothing over a set of woodland camouflage military fatigues."How was his "Arab nationality" determined?
"A formal risk assessment was conducted before the location was occupied." The AAR does not indicate or clearly state if any of this information was disseminated to Company or Platoon level.
"Based upon the fact that the enemy normally conducts probing attacks prior to conducting an all out large scale attack, it was logical to think that an attack of 20 AAF would be a probing attack."
What the AAR calls "logical" is stereotypical thinking, of the sort probably found in the AAR of the Little Big Horn battle. What is called logical led to the deaths of nine fine young men.
"The first MEDEVAC arrived at 0125z (0555L), one hour and thirty-five minuites into the fight." No comment.
Under "Recommendations concerning improvements, if any, to coalition force techniques, tactics and procedures": "We must hold the population accountable if they are to [ever] benefit."
Who is "we", and how do the people benefit? The US Army cannot hold the Afghan population accountable. We may kill the hell out of them, but only the Afghanistan government can hold their population accountable.
Wanat seems like an uncalled for action and fight, which could lead to no possible benefit for anybody. Platoons do not fight strategic battles, nor should they be placed in unsupportable and untenable situations. The bravery of these soldiers was wasted.
Historical perspective: At the battle of Lang Vei in Vietnam, the camp was commanded by CPT Willoughby and the Mike Force by 1LT Longgrear. In addition, LTC Shungel and MAJ Hoadley arrived on scene to exert experienced leadership and to influence the outcome of the battle.
Why was such activity not evident at Wanat?
Addendum: Below is some informed commentary received by Ranger on the battle --
http://www.armytimes.com/news/2009/04/army_silverstar_box_041209w/
http://www.armytimes.com/news/2009/04/army_silverstars_041209w/
45 Americans in the battle if I read this right.
9 KIA. 27 WIA.
11 Silver stars (two went to the two officers. In all 3 were posthumous meaning 8 went to survivors)
17 BSM-V
25 ACM
Total 53 metals for 45 Americans.
Reading the information, I suspect there were no listening posts because the unit knew the attack was coming and because the elders had warned them of an attack and had evacuated their families.
I note in the AAR it says that the claymores around the OP were disabled or turned around. Do you suppose they fired the claymores on themselves?
AAR implies no civilian casualties in the village which is odd given the ordnance dropped.
I wonder if there were sworn statements taken from the two marines training the afghan soldiers. They would be the only Americans not in the 173rd direct chain of command.
Labels: afghanistan, Lang Vei, wanat
posted by Lisa at 9:16 AM
28 Comments:
at dong ap bai the commander of the base, the commander of the SEALs, shit, even a couple of corpsmen when they had been relieved of their medical duties by walking wounded and the chaplain had rifles on the line.
before the last assault (which was only broken by air power showing up after three days, and day 3 of tet made them just in fucking time, not late or slow to react) the marine CO gave a quick rundown of our plan of defense. it was an ever constricting perimeter where the few remaining ammunition stores were laid up. the "plan," other than to go completely bugfuck on any enemy we could see were to exercise maximum fire discipline to conserve what ammo remained, fire until out, fall back to the next supply, finally, after the "last ditch" to rally at "the alamo."
his parting words before we took our positions were "i wouldn't dream of asking any more of you. you've already done far more than anyone could expect. i imagine that you'll continue to rise to the demands of the situation. if i don't see you after this fight, i'll see you in hell with the other great soldiers."
unfortunately, lt. col. murchison usmc, did not survive. he was an exemplary soldier. his superb leadership, his ability to anticipate battle conditions and respond correctly, his ever present example of courage and skill saved lives and helped us to hold an untenable position. if, when we do meet in hell, he wants to lead a raiding party on purgatory or heaven, i will break my vow to never again volunteer for nothing just for a chance to fight by his side once again.
i don't think i would like to be around these guys on a peace time base next to a national park in hunting season. their lack of anticipation of probable attacks shows either the arrogance of empire or flat out stupidity. either one is unacceptable in the field. they did not properly exploit what few advantages they had, much less try to compensate for the obvious weaknesses in armament and position.
seven years into this fight and our troops are still making rookie mistakes. shameful. they deserve better.
It's good to have your commentary to remind me that even in the extremes of war, there is a right way to do things. MB is right. Our troops deserve better.
On the Claymores, and there turning of them: There is no institutional memory, ergo Grunts will relearn lessons, conflict after conflict, Ad Infinitum, Ad Nauseam.
There ought to be a more modern way to handle the claymore issue. Iridescent paint was one way for the defender to see the backs of them, but so could the sappers, once they crawled past them.
They should have some sort of IR source on the back of these, that could be picked up/monitored from a device by persons in the fighting position.
Also, for the sake of redundance, claymores should be bi-wired in a fixed pos defense. bury the second lead to the final redoubt, Cp, whatever. that way, if several positions are overun prior to their firing their claymores, you can do a mass firing in a situation where you need the FPF.
It can be done with ease with a 24v low wattage transformer thingy.
Hill 180 (outside of Phu Bai) was a radio relay point for the Trai Bac Station Listeners. Grunts guarded the hill's fighting positions in which were located these boxes with toggle switches to fire claymores and set off half buried 55 gal. drums filled with (napalm or diesel compound???? - shit rolls downhill and so would this stuff, the hill being steep).
I and a dozen other folks spent about ten days with a US Army MAT team, at I think was PK17, just down the holler on route 1 from Quang Tri. They had the same setup for their command post. Their fort was impressive as far as mine fields, wire obstacles, US CP defense (don't know about the Marvin District Chief's House). As an added bonus, all of the Marvin 50 and 30 cal. gun emplacements had C4 packages buried underneath them, In the case one or more of them Chieu-Hoi'ed on the spot, or if the emplacement were captured, and the guns turned inward. All of this was controlled by a series of low voltage boxes with toggle switches, controlled, natch, by the devious American devils; they even had a similar answer for anyone trying to open the main gate from the inside during a contre-temps.
The MICC will not furnish this stuff for the grunts, because the technology is not big ticket enough. This is why we are still fielding a variation on the same sad, under powered rifle (Mattel) in use over 40 years. As for the star wearing clowns, they could care less.
How's that go? Seems like I had to memorize this and then was expected to live by it:
"All soldiers are entitled to outstanding leadership, I will provide that leadership."
There's also something about being tactically proficient. Apparently someone fucked that up. I was never in a situation in Iraq that an infantry rifle platoon couldn't handle (even though sometimes we only had a squad) but even though we didn't "expect" attacks in certain areas we always had plans that took both the most likely and most dangerous enemy actions into account.
sarcasm
Let's just hand out a bunch of medals and everything will be OK. Because if you get a medal, it was all worth it.
/sarcasm
I think it's complacency, pure and simple. If you are in a machine shop and you take off your safety glasses a hundred times to look at your part, you forget that on the 101st time you might have a piece of metal fly into your eye. If you do two tours of Afghani-Land as a PFC/SPC or 2LT/1LT, and don't face a concerted attack except IEDs or snipers, you aren't going to take the proper steps when you go back for Round 3 as a SSG or CPT.
However, in hindsight, I think that there were a lot of times where my unit was just lucky that nobody attacked us at certain times, because our leadership was making terrible decisions.
It really sucks to be a Joe. Hell, it really sucks to be a team leader, because then not only do you get the stupid ass order, you have to explain it to someone else.
they were probably using 55gal drums of "foogas." different units had different recipes, but the basics involved diesel, laundry soap, styrofoam if you could get it (for that extra sexy jelly/sticky effect) and an accelerant.
accelerants are critical in mixing stuff to go BOOM. without them releasing extra oxygen molecules the stuff snuffs itself out rather than blow up.
my favorite accelerant was easily available from the medical folks. it was a big part of field snakebite kits.
i have heard that the art of foogas has been revived in afghanistan. it's nice to see that some of our hard earned lessons have survived.
Rez Dog,
War is the base line use of logic.
Everything is simple and basic- that's the only reason that Rangers can understand it. The problem is that we ignore the basics.
Eddy,
We as sop always put a dog leg in our wiring for claymores and it was easy as pie to put standard issue anti-disturbance devices wired to them. It doesn't take much volts to set off a military cap but the resistance in the line requires large sources
of power easily found under the hood of a mil vehicle.
jim
MB,
We really need to put a disclaimer on your info.
THE USE OF FOOGAS IS DANGEROUS TO THE USER AS WELL AS THE INTENDED TARGET.The readers,if in theater, should stick to(no pun)issue items UNLESS they are trained up to the standards that you attained. Making this stuff is not to be undertaken lightly(again,no pun)I repeat to the troops out there-DO NOT ATTEMPT THIS WITHOUT ADULT SUPERVISION.
MB, we want these troops to live to be old fools like us.
jim
MB,
A after thought; taping a willie pete to the front of a claymore will light up someones life. It also illums a kill zone. This is a good substitute for your technique and it's safer for non demo types.
SOG 10's also put powdered CS in canisters in front of claymores when the were running for their lives. This nuetralized the tracking dogs set on their trail. These were detonated with time pencils.
jim
To All,
Yes, falling back to the Alamo is approved technique of fighting in phase lines and is easy to control with visual techniques. But my disconnect is that this did not happen at Wanat , nor did it appear that they had an E&E plan. Usually at the Alamo the groups will split up and execute escape plans. See the story of Lang Vei and the German cauldron battles of the 2nd war.
In classic ground combat it's a great comfort and morale booster for defenders to have secondary positions pre-designated and equipped as described by MB. It shows the troops that you know and you're not gonna sacrifice them. This is what makes combat leadership a art. Research Gen. Heinrici on the Vistula front fighting 20/30 to 1 odds.
And to Grant- all soldiers were born to die but their lives should never be expended frivolously or incompetantly.
jim
Jim:
I never heard about E&E plans in the regular grunts. I had to go to SERE school to learn about that. Methinks it is still only taught to high speed, low drag types.
I'm honestly very surprised that the Taliban is even able to mount these kinds of attacks after this amount of time. I can't imagine Hadji taking on my unit in Iraq and being able to field enough fire- and manpower to inflict those kinds of casualties on an infantry platoon that was entrenched in a defensive position, even if they had done a poor job of setting up.
They used to go to IEDs and suicide bombs because they couldn't beat us on our terms... And now they can. I hope these lessons are taken to heart among commanders, but they probably won't be.
This should be a black eye for somebody, but instead it's a feather in his cap.
Grant:
Please don't construe my comments as churlish, or inconsiderate, but I do believe you need to get more acquainted with the concept of critical thinking in these types of military subjects.
you say:
"I'm honestly very surprised that the Taliban is even able to mount these kinds of attacks after this amount of time."
They are improving, but since the US position was in the lowest part of a bowl, the enemy has eyes on, plunging fires, and a higher village from which to fire from; they were not short on advantages. Need I bring up the unreasonable ROE's vis-a-vis Positive ID?
You say:
"I can't imagine Hadji taking on my unit in Iraq and being able to field enough fire- and manpower to inflict those kinds of casualties on an infantry platoon that was entrenched in a defensive position,"
If you key your combat posture to the enemy that has been consistently underwhelming, what will you do when a new Iraqi Sheriff comes to town with some people that really know what they are doing, and have the resources to kick a US unit's ass?....you will be unpleasantly surprised.
I know you guys are road bound because of the motorized presence patrols, the convoys etc.. and most of your casualties come from IED/VBIED/EFP. However, it's good policy not to think the opponent is in a rut; because if you do, you are in a rut.
You say:
"even if they had done a poor job of setting up."
The TOC brass (wreaths of Albatrosses wearin' fools from the word GO), who came up with this fuck story of a pos, with its' attendant permanent OP, physically separated, from the rest of the POS, its under personnel resourced, under weaponized, under ammoe'd, under brain powered, idea, should be court martialed and shot, if there were in competence left in the Armed forces.
Having said that, in relation to your comment, an ancient proverb is apt for the defenders. "They had it coming." Not because of any religious reason, but because they were sloppy, lazy, dumb and thought the Wogs were dumber,
You say:
"They used to go to IEDs and suicide bombs because they couldn't beat us on our terms... And now they can."
Two things....there is no such thing as "on your terms," in War. They don't have Arclight....should we squat down and give them some? All is fair in Love and War. The suicide bombs and IED's are used because they provide returns, and there is no shortage of people willing to die in that manner, nor the resources for the explosives. Their Tactical improvement is a natural progression.
The genruls who run these conflicts will continue to get promoted, and when they retire, cash in big time with the MICC and the rest of Big time America. The Enlisted people???? what are they going to get? Is it fair? No, but it sure as fuck is true blue American.
roger your disclaimer/warning label on using foogas.
it is, by its very nature, tricky stuff.
willie pete on the front of a claymore is a great thing. especially at night. i was a big ass fan of the claymore. properly used it is one of the more effective tools of the trade.
and yes, the planned falling back was a brilliant piece of soldiering. the thing i noticed right off about it was that it enabled us to keep, or to quickly regain unit and force cohesiveness.
because the ammo was parcled out, because it was the trigger for falling back, we weren't getting ourselves divided and chopped to bits piecemeal. consistently constricting our perimeter also prevented us from being flanked at the berms and trenches.
to conlude with an elaboration on your foogas warning...
adult supervision was in extremely short supply in the RVN A.O. we made due with teenagers most of the time.
aside to grant:
since a great deal of us here come from special ops backgrounds we are constantly amazed at the longing for an enemy to "fight us on our terms."
before the iraq invasion there was an opfor leader at ord who took it straight at tommy franks' wonderboys. he never played their game. he rightly assumed that there would be a full ass "shokkinawe" barrage so he had his red team dug in tight and deep. he rightly figured that electronics countermeasures would be employed so he used bicycle/motorcycle couriers for coms.
even outnumbered 4 to 1 he kicked unholy ass. franks complained and the rules were rewritten so he could deploy with a victory in the game stage.
you can't expect anyone with half a rational brain to expect to tangle force on force with the u.s. it wouldn't be a fight, it would be an ass kicking. something i always tried to avoid.
i am absolutely impressed with the performance of the line troops. you guys give grunts a good name. i was only in one full on street fight in an urban environment and it sucked out loud. that you lads did that every day for multiple tours speaks volumes to your skill and courage.
Eddy,
E&E is a lowest level form of the breakout from the encirclement. If it were a linear front then it could be withdrawal under enemy pressure. Both of which are the hardest mil op to control. Higher units breakout , little units E&E. Examples;Reno at LBH/Custer battle, Gordon at Ft. Stedham , or should I say Lee at Petersburg. The Marines at Chosin.
Grant,
I discuss battles ONLY to show the futility of the PWOT. Your cmts are how oriented and I prefer to focus on why. WHY INDEED do we need to do any of this PWOT, it benefits us not, and apparently it did not benefit anyone at Wanat ,to include the indig that we're there to supposedly defend. Everybody got screwed in that goat fuck.
The key point is why.why? why? Good men like yourself were misused as misused could be.
jim
I see what you are getting at now. I was just a grunt and my mind moves to tactical thoughts when presented with them.
As to why all of this has happened, I would imagine the answers are as unsatisfying as they are disturbing, but the ultimate reason in my mind is that government tends to fuck everything up. The system we have set up contains moral hazard in the extreme.
For example, Congress shirked all responsibility to check Bush's power, hoping that they could appear strong on defense, but as soon as it turned sour they attacked him. The Democrats had an incentive for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan to go badly, because it wins them seats (more power) and Republicans had an incentive to stay the course, because for some reason it's worse to admit you are wrong and fix it than it is to just keep being wrong.
I would still expect that a platoon of infantry, even in the wrong war, would not forget basic things like "Make sure you set up a claymore 'front towards enemy' and then take measures to ensure they stay that way".
Probably not really a discussion for this particular post, but that's what I think anyway.
Grant,
My cmts are not attacks -- we're all friends here. Simply statements that we need to ask the larger questions. Some of us have a harder style than others, but its all in the game [those unnamed were not fortunate enough to be airborne troops :)]
I'm with MB and all our readers- our troops at all levels have lived up to the spirit of past Armies.
I enjoy tactical questions and considerations and especially respect your cmts since you were in the AO. My observations are more historical and not here and now. Therefore, Grant, it is especially good for us to have you in the ranks. How you see things represents the truth for your generation. We need these cross generational viewpoints.
Drive on.
jim
As to why all of this has happened, I would imagine the answers are as unsatisfying as they are disturbing, but the ultimate reason in my mind is that government tends to fuck everything up.The system we have set up contains moral hazard in the extreme.For example, Congress shirked all responsibility to check Bush's power, hoping that they could appear strong on defense, but as soon as it turned sour they attacked him.The Democrats had an incentive for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan to go badly, because it wins them seats (more power) and Republicans had an incentive to stay the course, because for some reason it's worse to admit you are wrong and fix it than it is to just keep being wrong.
I've done some preliminary research and it seems to me that this was doomed to fail from the get go.
Firstly, apparently the politics between Karzai and the village chiefs was one of insult...apparently the chiefs wanted to chit chat, and Karzai left them waiting, without a face-to-face, and them summarily sent them away.
That's a huge failure.
Nothing sends the locals to the enemy than the gov ignoring them.
Secondly, ground intel reported hostiles in concentrated formations numbering 400, there is still problematic comm issues between who knew this, and who should have known this.
Lastly, the drop in.
Even though some locals informed the new arrivals that hostiles were in the area, command did not feel that the boys on the ground were the focus of attention.
As to why that was...reports don't say that I can find.
Lastly, my own pov.
Nothing says, "blow my shit away" than putting a fixed asset (base) right smack dab in the middle of indian country.
Apparently reliance on arty and air was the seal of faith for the designers of this mission.
But I am struck by the use of fixed bases in a time when the words manuever and mobile are often used.
When did that change?
There is a reason why castles went out of style way back when, why do we think they'll work now?
Anyway, this episode was a convergence of bad juju that could have been easily avoided if someone, somewhere along the line of idiocy we call the military officer corps said, "hells no!" to the designers of this mission.
Epic fail, and no one to blame but the officer staff.
P.S.: Forgive me for saying this, but the OJT of these officers is getting quite expensive, so is there someway we can sack these people and get some competent officers who have a shorter, and less costly learning curve?
Sheerahkhan,
At the battle of Khe San the locals offered to show the Marines where the NVA were holed up in caves. They were blown off and ignored. Instead of exploiting local intel the US cmd saw fit to expend gross amounts of bombs that largely killed lizards and monkeys; since the enemy was well under ground.
Sound familiar?
Fasteddiez,
From reading your cmts, I think you are witty, cool and brilliant. You probably won't be back to read this, but I wanted to recognize that you and the others fr. the old IntelDump are a rare and remarkable breed (Ael, sheerah, FDChief, Mike...)
It's a privilege to read you guys' thoughts.
Lisa:
Well FDC is a regular commenter and should have his own blog (but is probably too busy, what with working - young children, etc.) mike (small m) drops in once in a while (may I utter a thousand effendis, as I bow and scrape, for his support, whilst I crossed swords with the blackguard MSR). He is also a brother in a small MOS.
Are you hip to Buggieboy, where Al the Aviator, and JD, from the old Phil Carter site, chose to continue the conversation. Not to call them old goats, but Al (I'm an Al too), and mike are way saltier than I. Let us not forget Publius, who still waxes poetically in the vain attempt to teach the COINDINISTA community a thing or three about Murrican History. The sad fact about the latter is "if you haven't lived it, you don't know dick....cuz the Gummint sure as shit ain't a gonna teach you about it.....they want your ass nice and disconnected.....Like This.
Fasteddiez,
Thank you for buggieboy (I did not know). FDChief has a blog at "Graphic Firing Table", evenly balanced between the family stuff and wicked military insight. (I think Al the Aviator shows up there, as has Charles Gittings.)
Publius. . . how could I forget to mention Publius?! He is not fond of me b/c I have teased about his golf shorts or some such at Abu M.'s site, but he clicks with the stolid Ranger. And they both hold women as an unknown and probably unfavorable quantity.
Lisa:
I messed up on FDC. What I meant to say was that others had suggested he try to get syndicated. That would have caused pressure on his present environment.
Fasteddiez,
Yes, Chief has a marvelous voice -- chivalrous and deeply informed, yet with unveiled disdain for flagrant excess and ignorance. I love it, but I am 1/2 click out of step with most of my fellows. . .
I was at the battle of wanat. To clear up alot of Questions you asked here are some answers instead of speculation. There were two medics on site. One Platoon medic and One X-SF medic that saved everyones asses including mine. The OP was in a Blocking position to a giant gully that was dead space and the enemy could use as an avenue of appr. There were 2 240 machine guns, 1 saw, 4 AT-4's, and Javalines at the OP position,(In Afghaninstan we use our OP's as a main fighting positions since they are usaully much higher than the FOB), along with an LRAS and one of our two FO's.Thats the reason there was no fall back position for the OP. If they took that they could take out the entire VPB. As far as an E&E plan for us, I've never heard of one. What the fuck are we going to do run back 13 miles to camp blessing and leave all of our fallen. Besides that we dont retreat.Continued... There were 2 .50 cals and 2 mrk-19 in a half circle inside the perimiter of the VPB. One of the .50 cals and one mrk-19 was completely disabled and guys were transfering ammo from one to another. Also they were taking the ammo of the wounded and redistributing it to the fighting. The reason there were no trips on the claymores cause we didnt have any. I was the one that was trying to fire them at the OP. But this was after 4 or 5 RPG's had struck my position and its very likely that these cut the wires. I gave that sworn statement and never said that I knew for a fact that they were disabled or turned around. All I know is that they didnt work and it was possible that they crawled up and turned them around. The 120mm is our weapon of choice over there and have used it numerous time in close fights. 60's just dont get the job done. And we have called in 155's danger close (within 300m) many times before. We had no 105's. Our 777's were johnny on the spot and had been all deployment. They had dropped more artillery than any other AO since Vietnam. We had been fully briefed on enemy activity and the mission had been scratched twice before for bombing runs that needed to be made on enemy positions. Bottom line is we went to a bad spot in the worst way. We were the only platoon sent cause everyone else was also in constant fights. Ya a few details changed and no one would have ever heard of wanat. Things get overlooked and joe pays for it.
ANON,
You and all who fought at WANAT have my respect and admiration but US soldiers should not be put in positions like the one you had to defend.
Falling back to alternate prepared positions is not retreating, it's the tactically correct thing to do in situations when the defense is overwhelmed. Whatever you do in AFGH , OPs are not fighting positions nor should they be. Using OCOKA is a leadership function and terrain should be utilized per doctrine-your PLAT was not forced to fight as arrayed but rather employed in a rather inadequate deliberate manner..IMHO. I'm not second guessing the Plat LDR but rather the BN CDR and S-3. The platoon performed to all time proven Airborne characteristics but valor will not trump superior fire power and a poorly designed defensive position.
As a former 4.2 Plat Ldr I have total confidence in the BN Mortars but they were employed too close to the enemy since they were in a beaten zone and seem from here in Florida to not have been adequately protected from RPG's. If properly employed the 60mm should be adequate to break up enemy concentrations and to suppress likely assembly areas and ORP's. I don't personally trust 155 but we're in the 21st century and your faith is your judgement call. I bow to your experience.
It saddens my tired old heart to read about fights like this. Thank you for writing, it's my honor to hear your story..
jim
anon,
I thank you, as well.
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