Uphill Battle III: Synthesis

6 June 1944, Pointe du Hoc

He will win who knows when to fight
and when not to fight
(or, Choose your battles wisely)
--Art of War, Sun Tzu's 1st Rule for Victory
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Ranger has visions of tabs, not sugar plum fairies, this Christmas season.

Yesterday he had the pleasure of meeting a WW II 2nd Ranger Battalion Normandy invasion soldier, having noticed the Ranger plate on his car. The ensuing conversation started another free association, with thoughts slamming around concerning what it means to be a Ranger.

How can two Rangers separated by a generation meet and greet and accept one another as brothers in arms? The older Ranger even applauded the use of the Ranger tab in opposition to a phony war. Both the 2nd Ranger Bn. vet and Ranger were trained to fulfill direct action missions, to accomplish a tactical plan. This is a given and was the price of admission.

Yet Ranger lacks that same camaraderie with many of his younger Ranger fellows. They are too often quick to criticize an alternate view, marching in lock step behind the conservative political agenda. Will they ever realize the futility of killing to achieve peace?

How does one compare 6 June 1944 actions of the 2nd Ranger Bn. at Pointe du Hoc with those of the ODA of the 3rd Special Forces Group 6 April 2008 in Nuristan's Shok Valley?

The action of the 2nd Rangers in '44 was crucial to a successful landing and establishment of a beachhead. If they failed, then the mission could possibly fail. The entire beach had to be taken and held in depth. The 2nd Battalion accepted this, and paid the price in young blood to achieve a quantifiable mission, earning their motto -- Rangers Lead the Way.

Contrast that with the battles in the denied areas of Afghanistan. The "insurgents" held a remote safe haven way off the beaten path. The mission is to kill, capture, and/or generally spread death and mayhem, except it doesn't happen that way. What happens when the SF are kicked off the hill and the locals remain king of the hill? Does the action affect anything, either positively or negatively?

The goal of combat is not to kill and die, but to win. Preferably in a war with meaningful goals. The business of the U.S. Army is winning wars, not killing. The Union Army at Gettysburg was not there to kill rebels; it was there to engage in combat and to impose the Union will upon the Rebel Army and government. Killing was but a tool, not the reason for the battle.

The same was true at D-Day. The goal was the destruction and defeat of the Nazi war machine. Killing was a means to effect that end, and not the sole mover on the battlefield. Killing in battle can be done like a rapier rather than in sweeping Claymore strokes.

On that 10,000 ft. mountain range in Afghanistan the SF attacked a fortified mountain position. Even assuming they killed everyone in the defensive complex, how would this accomplish anything? The SF cannot kill everyone opposed to the Karzai government. Assuming the alternate view, with the defenders having killed every attacking government soldier and ally.

So what?

Killing and destruction, bravery and suffering will not change anything in the Phony War on Terror (PWOT ©) The entire operation is futile, on both sides of the fence.

The grueling and pivotal Point du Hoc action garnered two Distinguished Service Crosses and one Silver Star. How can a soldier reconcile the two events?

The tab on my uniform indicates conferred training and knowledge. These truths are no longer self evident, and what was taught as Army policy is now roundly ignored or blatantly violated. Reality has lost its relevance, and eyewash trumps a clear mission. This is not combat, it is insanity.

To cover this fact, we call this heroic and necessary.

Uphill Battle I

Do you feel sick when you read it?

Do you think that I can feel it faster?

--Uphill Battle, Saosin

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Special Forces troops can always be counted on to kick ass and take names when the chips are down. But reading about the 10 SF troops who received Silver Stars Friday, Ranger asks: Why were the chips on the table in the first place?

Are U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan to kill insurgents or terrorists? Are we nation building or war fighting? History shows that the two are incompatible missions. There is a protocol: First, win the war. Later, build the nation. Building a nation while blowing its citizens to hell is not conducive to victory -- whatever that is.

Afghanistan is largely composed of Taliban-types, and killing them does not further the development of the nation. Killing all of the insurgents in Afghanistan would depopulate the country.

If al-Qaeda is the threat, then fighting Afghan insurgents is a red herring and a waste of precious assets. Al Qaeda is not Taliban. Obviously there are linkages, but the exportable threat is the enemy of the US. The Taliban does not export their brand of violence.

Some questions regarding the awarded action [in two parts]:

After jumping out of helicopters at daybreak onto jagged, ice-covered rocks and into water at an altitude of 10,000 feet, the 12-man Special Forces team scrambled up the steep mountainside toward its target -- an insurgent stronghold in northeast Afghanistan (Ten Green Berets to Receive Silver Star for Afghan Battle.)

Why would a combat assault be launched at daybreak, when locals are active and starting their day? Why not utilize the advantage of a night attack, enabled by U.S. night vision technological supremacy? Alternately, why not illuminate the area with indirect fire and fly in?

"Our plan," Capt. Kyle M. Walton recalled in an interview, "was to fight downhill."

If the plan was to fight downhill, why didn’t they? Landing in depressions and stream beds indicates one is not on a hilltop. These troops made the same error as in the engagement at Roberts Ridge and in Lt. Murphy’s Medal of Honor scenario.

A team should land above the enemy and attack downhill. This has been an Army rule since air-assaults were first conceived. Attacking up hills in denied terrain is not conducive to long life and prosperity. Nobody of sound mind lands in a beaten zone and then tries to fight uphill to attack prepared defensive positions.

This type of direct action mission is best assigned to Rangers or regular Infantry types. SF assets are too valuable to waste in close ground combat. Private soldiers are most cost-effectively used in this scenario. Deliberately using SF assets as assault troops is downright criminal and wasteful of valuable assets, especially if a long endless war is the Commander's vision.

A harrowing, nearly seven-hour battle unfolded on that mountainside in Afghanistan's Nuristan province on April 6, as Walton, his team and a few dozen Afghan commandos they had trained took fire from all directions. Outnumbered, the Green Berets fought on even after half of them were wounded -- four critically -- and managed to subdue an estimated 150 to 200 insurgents, according to interviews with several team members and official citations.

This is interesting. When attacking a prepared defensive position the old rule of thumb was 3-4 attackers for each entrenched enemy. This rule assumed an artillery prep and force multipliers, to include adjacent units and adequate reserve forces with depth to the battlefield.

Ranger wonders what forces were available as ready reaction to reinforce or exploit any successes. If these were not on call and ready to jump off, then this whole scenario was a meaningless shoot 'em up.

So why was a 12-man SF unit with green indig troops attacking using an inverted formula? The SF attacking force was outnumbered and tactically compromised from the jump. 200 insurgents versus about 36 U.S-led troops.

Conclusion: SF/Rangers/Seals are not impervious to hot steel and it's obvious that staff planners still do not understand SOF asset capabilities. Further, the SF team commander should recognize a mission impossible when it is still in the planning phase. Nobody short of Superman can fight with 60 to 80 lbs on their back; especially at an elevation of 10,000 feet.

Today, Walton and nine of his teammates from Operational Detachment Alpha 3336 of the 3rd Special Forces Group will receive the Silver Star for their heroism in that battle -- the highest number of such awards given to the elite troops for a single engagement since the Vietnam War.

This reference requires Ranger to tip his hat to old friend Paul Longgrear, of Lang Vei fame, the Vietnam engagement often called The Night of the Silver Stars. Now historians will have to determine which battle was more devastating. The roles were reversed, however, as the NVA lost the toss and were attacking; SF/Longgrear defending.

Both scenarios required SF troops to attempt the impossible-this is not what military actions are about. If a team does not have a reasonable chance to fulfill the mission, it should not be attempted.

Tomorrow: Part 2