Mission Impossible

 --The bloom's off the rose 

 His stop-loss odyssey 
went Kabul, morphine, 
   Ramstein, Stateside, 
and back—round-robin   
desert wrestling,
tag out, tag in 
--Welcome Home, Troops! 
 Amit Majmudar

 Cause I gonna make you see 
There's nobody else here 
No one like me
 I'm special, so special
--Brass in Pocket,
The Pretenders

One step forward and two steps back
 Nobody gets too far like that
 One step forward and two steps back 
This kind of dance can never last 
--One Step Forward, 
The Desert Rose Band    
___________________

Let us do a check-in on the Phony War on Terror (PWOT ©) at lucky year 13, as President Obama sends more advisers to Syria in what looks very much like JFK's adviser gambit in the early years of the Vietnam War, the poster child counterinsurgency (COIN) failure.

First, a review: After the initial conventional invasion stage, the PWOT© became a COIN war, for lack of a better term. General Petraeus and his post-Vietnam thesis guided our participation, as if this time, we would really nation-build and win hearts and minds.

Hearts and minds, as if Vietnam could be redeemed and made into something of worth. COIN theory redux would modernize Galula, make what they tried to bury count, make it relevant for a new day.

But then the New COIN started looking like its own danse macbre. We forgot that it wasn't a war, and we were fighting the very people we came to democratize. COIN  really isn't a very good way for the U.S. to win a war, or to help a people.

You cannot both fight people and nation build concurrently. Probably, we still do not realize that it is possible to nation build and to fight insurgents, but the process must occur consecutively. It is impossible to fight, kill and destroy while also attempting to build; the concepts are mutually exclusive.

The luster fell away from the erstwhile Golden Boy, General Petraeus, and his vaunted COIN theory has been folded and put back under the trundle bed, like an old Mission Impossible VHS tape. So where does that leave hearts and minds and nation building, as the United States trudges on in the quagmire that is the Not-Arab Spring?

The mask of nation-building has fallen away, as the U.S. realizes that was merely pretense for our frenzied occupation of places in which the U.S. had no legitimate reason to be. "Asymmetrical warfare" has also died a protracted death on the trash heap of a failed policy.

The U.S. is currently yoked to a slug-fest that makes less sense than did the tarted-up, new-and-improved COIN of once-wonder boy, Vietnam vet-manque, Mr. Petraeus.

Plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose.

Pretty Dead Things

--ISIS and Iraq, 
Arend Van Dam

The image is re-presentation,
which is to say ultimately resurrection, and, as we know,
the intelligible is reputed antipathetic to lived experience

*   *   *

 The type of consciousness the photograph involves
is indeed truly unprecedented,
since it establishes not a consciousness
of the being-there of the thing…
but an awareness of its having-been-there.
What we have is a new space-time category:
spatial immediacy and temporal anteriority,
the photograph being an illogical conjunction
between the here-now and the there-then. 
--Rhetoric of the Image, Roland Barthes

  Expose thyself to feel what wretches feel,
That thou mayst shake the superflux to them,
And show the heavens more just 
--King Lear, Shakespeare  

Wars and elections are both too big and too small
to matter in the long run.
The daily work - that goes on, it adds up
 --Animal Dreams, 
Barbara Kingsolver
_______________________

ISIS is looking like a one-trick pony, with its latest journo beheading. But sometimes, one good move is all you need. The Afghan national game is Buzkashi, after all, in which a beheaded and be-hooved goat is dragged roughly around the field of play, so it seems playing with dead things can be fun.

The West continues its fascinated horror at these actions, committed even -- especially -- in the face of pathetic begging on behalf of the murdered and their families. Why pretend to care? When the rubber meets the road, the question for most is, "What of me and mine?" and IS is not threatening Kansas, after all.

This is reasonable, as we are neither giants nor martyrs. A martyr would leave his actual family in a lurch, in the name of pursuing the salvation of the universal Family -- the prerogative of very few.

In his book, War, Sebastian Junger mentions the chimpanzees who do not seek to aid their fellows in the face of a threat, but invariably run away from danger in order to save themselves. This self-preservation behavior comports with evolutionary biologist Richard Dawkins' theory of the "Selfish Gene", that lives on to fight another day.

For those peoples not burdened by a martyrish savior, the concept of being one's brother's keeper may not have much relevance in the race for survival. But what about those people who do understand the concept of service and martyrdom?

In China recently, members of a forbidden proto-Christian sect bludgeoned a 38-year-old woman to death in a McDonald's restaurant for refusing to give them her contact information. The more remarkable thing, however, is that the murder occurred before the watching eyes of others in the establishment, who were too busy documenting the event on their smartphones to intervene. For those who uploaded their photos to the cloud, it must have been a stellar "capture".

Similarly, the murderous members of the Islamic State (IS) members are mastering the art of social networking, being sure to publicize their gory work on the various platforms, disseminating their handiwork in real time.

A recent NYT piece ("Losing Our Touch") asks if we have entered an age of “excarnation,” where we focus on the body in increasingly disembodied ways "For if incarnation is the image become flesh, excarnation is flesh become image. Incarnation invests flesh; excarnation divests it." And what if, through reliance on the intermediary of the transmitted image, we do lose our sense of touch? Does that equate with losing our compassion?

What is the effect of instantaneous documentation on our tolerance reaction? Will witnessing and documenting preempt the impulse to act?

Chimpanzees, smartphones and brutality ... do you see any nexus here?

Asymmetrical Warfare, II: How We Lost the War

 

--Iraqi Problems, Arend Van Dam

 He has knocked the pistol out of his hand
-- small room was there to strive,
"'Twas only by favor of mine," quoth he
 "ye rode so long alive:
There was not a rock for twenty mile,
there was not a clump of tree

*   *   *

So thou must eat the White Queen's meat, and all her foes are thine,

And thou must harry thy father's hold for the peace of the Border-line,

And thou must make a trooper tough and hack thy way to power--

Belike they will raise thee to Ressaldar when I am hanged in Peshawur

 --The Ballad of East and West, 

Rudyard Kipling

 

 What we want is more humane killers!

--How I Won the War (1967)

___________________

The First Gulf War and the invasion of Iraq in '03 share similarities in terms of their naive "“irrational exuberance” (thank you, Alan Greenspan.)

Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld said you fight the army you have, and the army we had was geared for land combat opposing Soviet Warsaw Pact adversaries.

Our soldiers wore uniforms with shoulder patches, unit patches, helmet patches, flags on their sleeves, fine rifles, sights and individual and unit equipment. Our air and artillery were unequaled, and we kicked ass and took names. We booted the Iraqis out of Kuwait, and later destroyed their army and political system.

In March of '03, the United States invaded in a theatre Army assault with prep fires and an air war that unleashed an impressive fury of World War II proportions, yet we did not win the war, at least not in any strategic sense, adding another one to Korea and Vietnam.

In contrast, the ISIS and ISIL forces are rag-tag, like the Viet Cong, Castro and Mao forces. They lack uniforms, use simple weapons, and their organizational items are captured or simply commandeered from civilians. It is easy to imagine Lawrence of Arabia leading such a rabble group.


ISIS/ISIL forces are successful because:

1) The Shia Iraqi forces lack legitimacy and a broad popular mandate, except for the Shi'ites who repress the Sunni minority. This is democracy as tool of oppression

2) ISIS/ISIL forces have popular support, both active and passive. 

3) ISIS/ISIL has safe haven and short lines of communication, with simple plans that are not phased or overly complicated.

4) The ISIS/ISIL forces are strictly following the principles of war [though not the Geneva Conventions (GC's)]

5) They live off the land, gaining momentum daily

6) They enjoy an unlimited pool of replacement fighters

7) They have combat-experienced leaders rather than executive-style corporate managers directing their operations. They do not mistake motion for progress

8) They have nothing to lose, and everything to gain

9) They are ideologically- and religiously-motivated

Though the ISIS attack is the opposite from that of the U.S. forces, it is moving with the same momentum that carried U.S. forces to Baghdad.

Their success shows that the rules of warfare have not changed in several thousand years. Reliance upon distractive theories like "asymmetrical warfare" is smokescreen to hide the fact that the U.S. war machine is struggling to find strategic significance in any of its current actions.

Assymetrical Warfare

 There are only murderers in this room!
This is the life we chose, the life we lead.
And there is only one guarantee:
none of us will see heaven 
--Road to Perdition (2002)

 Going forth with weeping,
sowing for the Master,
Though the loss sustained
our spirit often grieves 
--Bringing in the Sheaves, 
Knowles Shaw 

 What has been is what will be,
and what has been done is what will be done,
and there is nothing new under the sun
--Ecclesiastes 1:9
 __________________

The military pundits who bandy about terms like "asymmetrical warfare" and "4 G warfare" are entertaining but dead wrong.

The principles of war have not changed since the institutional study of war began, and the Phony War on Terror (PWOT ©) proves this.

The 14 June 2014 ISIS incursion into Iraq is yet more proof of "everything old is new again", and it shares a pedigree with many previous actions, including those of Quantrills' Raiders, Sherman's March to the Sea, Mao's China campaigns, the Viet Minh against the French, Castro in Cuba, and the National Liberation Front (NLF) fighting the U.S. and its Republic of Vietnam proxies.

A gloss:

--Quantrell was an irregular creating terror and killing for little of military value, sharing the behavior of al Qaeda prior to its push into Syria and Iraq.

--Sherman marched to the sea sans a logistical tail, living off the land while destroying Southern infrastructure, proving the inability of the Confederate States of America (CSA) to protect their deep territory. ISIS/ISIL are following this template, too.

--Mao transitioned from guerrilla and unconventional warfare to conventional, establishing the Red Chinese dynasty in the process. The NLF in Vietnam followed Mao's strategy, too.

The Sunnis are following a similar campaign. They are proving that power comes from the barrel of a rifle, but unlike the U.S., they know where and when to apply this power.

--The Viet Minh progressed through all stages of the spectrum of conflict, defeating the French in conventional warfare. Ditto Castro is Batista's Cuba.

All successful asymmetrical campaigns share similar strategies: they have popular support and interior lines of defense, and they enjoy a support base and safe haven outside of the battle zone. (Sherman is the exception in that he lacked popular support, though he did have an organized army.)

The U.S.'s combat in Iraq and Afghanistan has been therapeutic violence to placate America's need for vengeance, but vengeance is not a policy.

Vengeance is not a principle of war; it is a road to perdition.
_____________


Next: The beginnings of the PWOT and how we lost the war.