2 1/2 Wars

Captain: "You gonna get used to wearin'

them chains after a while, Luke.
Don't you never stop listenin' to them clinking.
'Cause they gonna remind you of
what I been saying. For your own good."

Luke: "Wish you'd stop bein' so good to me, cap'n."

Boss: "Sorry, Luke. I'm just doing my job.
You gotta appreciate that."

Luke: "Nah - calling it your job don't make it right, Boss."
--Cool Hand Luke (1967)
____________________

Reading books on Iwo Jima and the Cuban Missile Crisis recently resurrected in my memory the U.S. defense policy concept of "2 1/2 Wars". The policy started in 1941 and seems to remain intact, though it doesn't get much play these days.

During World War II the U.S. had a two-oceans Navy with corresponding Pacific and European Theatres. That Two-War concept morphed into the somewhat surreal "2 1/2 War" policy. The 1960's Department of Defense based its planning and force development upon this concept, which was forced by the crisis of war; it remained driving policy well into the fall of the USSR in 1991.

The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan continue the idea since we maintain force postures in Korea and Europe, implying that the U.S. can fight in any of these theatres simultaneously. We can nibble on Iran, too, with the idea of adding another war once one ramps down, with five carrier groups waiting out at sea.

The U.S. fought the Korean War while it had a large European presence prepared to fight the Warsaw Pact with a two-Navy force patrolling the world. The same was true during the Vietnam War. Both wars required a strong strategic reserve as well as forces forward fighting these proxy "brush fire" wars.

Today we fail to verbalize this tremendous continual drain on our resources, instead accepting it as a required national status quo. However, while there was a time when this policy may have been necessary, that time is no longer.

Some one should tell the President, the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State.

Irrational Numbers

Fear of serious injury alone cannot justify
oppression of free speech and assembly.
Men feared witches and burnt women.
It is the function of speech to free men
from the bondage of irrational fears
--Louis Brandeis

Here we go
Don't go away mad
I don't want you to stay
--Don't Go Away Mad (Just Go Away),
Motley Crue

When a man with .45 meets a man with a rifle,
you said, the man with a pistol's a dead man.
Let's see if that's true.
Go ahead, load up and shoot
--A Fistful of Dollars (1964)
___________________

Counterinsurgency (CI) theory is based upon unverifiable numbers implying ratios for success.

The CI crowd says a successful ratio of counter-insurgent (CI) troops to targets is between 1:20 to 1:50, depending upon population density. It's all theory, but let's play the game.

There are 100,000 swinging dicks in the Afghan National Army, 97,000 police (or paramilitaries), 38,000 NATO troops and 99,000+ U.S. mercenaries and contract types bumbling around Afghanistan. This wall of personnel faces around 100 al Qaeda members left in Afghanistan, according to latest CIA estimates (Panetta: 50-100 al-Qaeda Remain in Afghanistan). The quality of these remnants is unknown.

It's Ranger's belief that most of the survivors are low-level types that couldn't properly cross the street at a school crossing with a school guard, let alone conduct a sophisticated attack of any kind on the U.S. Homeland. Remember: their AK-47's have a limited effective range of 460 meters.

Some will protest that we are not including the Taliban and the other suspects we lump under the rubric "insurgent". In fact, we never clearly define what constitutes an "insurgent", allowing a scatter gun approach to look like precision. However, al Qaeda is the threat to the U.S. -- the Taliban is merely their active and passive support, and all the other motley crew have their own bones to pick.

All told, the tally of all protective personnel versus al Qeada in Afghanistan is approximately 344,000:100, or 3,440 to 1, well exceeding the figures for success espoused by the COINISTA crowd. So to squelch these 100 al Qaeda personnel the U.S. is expending anywhere from $2 Billion per week to $12 Billion per month. Using the charitable figure of $8 Billion per month: That is 8 Thousand Million dollars. That is 18,400 pounds of $100 bills every month. ($1 Million = 22.3 lbs. of $100 bills.) Stop just a moment in your busy life and try to digest that fact. Breaking it down, the U.S. is paying a monthly tab of:

• $8,000,000,000 : 100, OR

• $80,000,000 : 1

That is $80 Million dollars expended upon tracking each al Qaeda member each month in Afghanistan. Now think about any other need in this nation -- all the service programs funded with niggardly sums which are constantly being shaved, yet the wars drag on without end.

Compare that to the $2,700/month earned by a 100% service compensible disabled veteran being compensated for injuries sustained while on active duty -- a long shot from $80 Million per month! Think about the 2012 U.S. Department of Veterans Administration budget of $132 Billion that is dedicated to the health and welfare of all surviving U.S. veterans from all wars. $132 Billion to cover the needs of ALL U.S. veterans, compared to ~$100 Billion per year chasing 100 ne'er-do-wells a world away. (The backlog of disability claims waiting to be processed by the Department of Veterans Affairs ballooned from 500,000 to 800,000 this year.)

As of 2009, there were 21.9 million veterans in the U.S. Using the DAV budget figure of $132 Billion, that = $6,000 per vet per year. Compare that to the $80 million spent monthly tracking down (but not necessarily finding) one al Qaeda member.

What do you think is the better use of your money?