Jailhouse Rock

Before I built a wall I'd ask to know
What I was walling in or walling out,
And to whom I was like to give offense
--Mending Wall, Robert Frost

Only a fool or a fraud sentimentalizes
the merciless reality of war
--John McCain

Can't anybody here play this game?
--Casey Stengel
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A phased Taliban attack on the main prison in Southern Afghanistan Saturday sprung possibly upwards of 1,000 inmates, leading to our subtitle: COIN in Afghanistan, or How to Lose an Insurgency (4 Marines Die in Afghanistan; 870 inmates Escape.)

Why the subtitle? Let us start with the simple observation that facts are elusive in the Phony War on Terror (PWOT ©). How many Taliban escaped? The article begins with an unattributed "about 870," but reports the police chief of Kandahar Provine says 390, while the NATO spokesman says "around 1,100."

This is a simple prison operation and someone should know the number of escapees. If we can't tally up a prison population, how do we account for monetary expenditures? There must be accountability and accuracy in figures, otherwise how do you gauge progress? If we can not count former prisoners in an exact manner, can there be any hope of winning the war?

While Brigadier Gen. Carlos Branco admitted that the assault was a success, he said it does not have a strategic impact. "We should not draw any conclusion about the deterioration of the military operations in the area. We should not draw any conclusion about the strength of the Taliban."

Clearly, however, these Taliban fighters have a tactical acuity on par with U.S./NATO elements. They demonstrate planning and execution right out of the Ranger Handbook.

"The complex attack included a truck bombing at the main gate, a suicide bomber who struck a back wall and rockets fired from inside the prison courtyard, setting off a series of explosions that rattled Kandahar, the country's second biggest city."

This was a phased raid, a difficult operation for any military unit. It indicates rehearsals, intelligence, leaders reconnaissance, rally points and avenues of approach and escape were carefully evaluated prior to the successful execution phase of the operation. A Taliban spokesman said "militants had been planning the assault for two months."

Regardless of whether this operation was UW/GW/COIN/criminal or terrorist, why did intelligence functions miss the fact that this operation was afoot? There had to be turbulence, which would be an indicator. Because police are being used as soldiers, these indicators were not picked up and evaluated.

That these indicators were missed indicates the government does not have a firm grasp on "population and resource control" -- what used to be the basis of all operations in the UW/COIN scenario.

If the liberators of this prison were local or mobile, the local government should have been aware of their movements. The fact that the police, military and intelligence of Afghanistan's second largest city cannot discern the movement of the indigenous citizens is not a sign that Afghanistan is winning the insurgency.

Further, Mohammad Qasim Hashimzai, a deputy minister at the Justice Ministry, said "the [Sarposa] jail did not meet international minimum standards for a prison." The Kandahar facility was not built as a prison but had been modified into one, he said." So if the prison did not meet minimum standards, then why were prisoners being sent there?

This is not the first instance of substandard jail conditions revealed in this PWOT ©. Does democracy mean that nasty prison conditions are permissible in a Civil War/Insurgent War? The jailbreak also reveals Afghan government war crimes or crimes against humanity, all done in complicity with U.S. policy. This type of activity by government forces only raises the ante in this campaign.

Hashimzai said there are plans "to renovate all the prisons around the country." One can assume that once these prisons are built then democracy will really take off in Afghanistan. Good prisons = good citizens, a proven U.S. formula. But Americans need to ask if prisons and all that go with them are the best of the U.S. Is this the vision of the future?

On the same day, a bomb in the western Afghan province of Farah wounded one and killed four Marines "helping to train Afghanistan's fledgling police force, said U.S. spokesman Lt. Col. David Johnson."

Why are Marines training Afghan police? Unless these are law and order MP's, there is no legitimacy in this endeavor. Afghan police are not Marine recruits; the skill sets are not interchangeable.

"Marines from the 2nd Battalion, 7th Regiment based in Twentynine Palms, California, arrived in Afghanistan earlier this year and were sent to southern and western Afghanistan to train police."

Since 2/7 Marines are an Infantry unit, what values of police work can they impart? A police mission does not include "close with and destroy," despite those who would wish a move towards the militarization of police in the U.S. The Marines should be training Afghan Army elements, a task which would be commensurate with their skill set.

Police forces are not fighting units, although that is the role assigned to them by a faulty U.S. COIN policy. One can be either police, or one can be military; one can not be both (MP's do not count.)

Militarized police and overcrowded, inadequate prisons -- two parts of a recipe for disaster.