Zulu, Redux

Lieutenant John Chard: The army doesn't like more than one disaster in a day.
Bromhead: Looks bad in the newspapers and upsets civilians at their breakfast.
--Zulu (1964)

Up and down the City Road,
In and out of the Eagle,
That's the way the money goes.
Pop! goes the weasel.
--All Around the Mulberry Bush, Mother Goose
___________________

The American soldier is a magnificent thing to observe, and they seldom shine as brightly as they do when facing harsh realities. Think of Valley Forge, Bataan Death March, Chosin Reservoir and Khe Sanh. Now the battle for Tarmiyah is the newest episode.

This is why the U.S. Army carries battle streamers on our colors. The troops are beyond reproach, but our policy's are wasting this bravery and dedication in a sand box that ignores the realities of the situation.

We seem to be going round and round the mulberry bush, encountering and re-encountering the same adversaries who are merely following the rules of guerrilla warfare. As we are following the rules of a failed occupying power vs. that insurrection. Everything is going to plan, except we're on the losing team in this game.

This is commentary on a Wall Street Journal feature on the U.S. base in Tarmiyah ("At Lonely Iraq Outpost, GI's Stay as Hope Fades.")

Some opening quotes:

"If the Americans spend longer than 10 minutes in one place, a sniper will track them down and begin shooting."

"Even the local police chief who oversees the area that includes Tarmiyah refuses to set foot in the town.

"As U.S. and Iraqi troops have surged into Baghdad in a quest to bring stability there, enemy fighters have moved into the surrounding towns. U.S. commanders in these areas lack the manpower to defeat insurgents or protect the locals. On most days there are fewer than 50 U.S. troops in Tarmiyah, a city of about 30,000, many of them angry and disenfranchised Sunnis. Their goal is to keep the enemy off-balance, with periodic raids. It's the best they can hope for under the new U.S. "surge strategy," which some U.S. officers in Iraq say does little more than chase insurgents from one part of the country to another."

The concept of keeping the enemy off-balance is absolutely meaningless if this is not exploited through main or secondary attacks in other areas. Keeping an enemy off-balance has no tactical or strategic meaning. It is a waste of effort and life; who cares is the enemy is off-balance if this does not lead to a victory of some sort?

At first, Tarmiyah was seen as something of a success story.

"In spring 2006. . .U.S. and Iraqi troops surrounded the city with razor wire, set up the patrol base in the city, and began a $16 million campaign to rebuild the city's schools, clinics and sewer system." $16 million to rebuild a city where the inhabitants hate the U.S. troops equally as they do the Shias. U.S. tax dollars well-spent.

"And in December, the 150-man Tarmiyah police force, which shared the patrol base with American troops, drew their weapons, saying they were going out on a patrol, and never returned."

And of course, if the Iraqi forces won't or can't do the job, then the U.S. command expends U.S. lives securing dirt that even the Iraqis deem worthless.

However,

"Last summer Tarmiyah began to fall apart. A battalion of about 300 to 400 Iraqi army soldiers that had been based in the city was transferred to Baghdad to support the new U.S.-Iraqi effort to stabilize the capital. At the same time, some 6,000 to 10,000 angry Sunnis, driven from their homes in Baghdad by Shiite militia forces, began streaming into this largely Sunni city. Sunni insurgents, affiliated with al Qaeda in Iraq, joined them."

It was the old switcheroo. Those in in Baghdad could claim success in driving out the bad guys, who then made their way to the 50 or so troops guarding Tarmiyah. Gentrification always has repercussions.

Then February 17, 2007, a truck laden with 1,000 tons of explosives smashed through the front gate of the patrol base.

"In mid-February a massive truck bomb sheared off the front of the soldiers' base in Tarmiyah, sending concrete and glass flying through the air like daggers. The soldiers at the small outpost spent the next four hours fighting for their lives against a force of 70 to 80 insurgents."

A sort of Zulu ensued, with the less injured men returned to duty following the initial blast. The defensive perimeter is too close in. Troops "fighting for their lives" is not the way that operations are classically orchestrated. GWB should spend a week with these troops in a far-flung outpost that is flapping in the breeze.

"At the command post a 20-year-old soldier was working feverishly to get the base's radios, which had been knocked out by the blast, running so the soldiers could call for help. A piece of glass was sticking out of his ear.

"Finally around 8:15 a.m. the soldiers got a hand-held radio working and rushed it to the roof. With the radio the troops could direct the Apache attack helicopters circling overhead to enemy positions."

Around 11 a.m., fresh troops from nearby Camp Taji began arriving, and the wounded were removed to Camp Taji.

The terrain cannot be secured and it is criminal to place troops on positions that cannot have inner and outer layers of security. All battle positions should have an area to apply awesome death and firepower upon enemy assault elements. In Infantry terms, this is called "Final Protective Fires." In effect, the adversary must assault through a wall of steel and death.

That isn't happening because U.S. troops are being placed in non-defensible terrain. The assault is already on the troops before they are aware that they are decisively engaged.

In addition, in our wonderful new battlefield, why isn't land-line hard wired communication being laid for these beleaguered forces? When on the defense, wire is always the best means of commo.

The U.S. Army must return to basics. Forget satellite commo in close quarters combat in urban areas.

"None of the soldiers in Tarmiyah talk about winning anymore. 'Is what we lost worth it? Not even a little bit,' says Staff Sgt. Chad Stallings. But like many of those badly wounded in the blast, he has returned to the base."

"An Iraqi battalion made up of about 300 to 400 soldiers is expected to arrive in Tarmiyah later this summer to help with security. Until then, the goal is to just hang on and, as much as possible, keep the enemy from completely taking over."

Let's hope the Iraqi soldiers hang around longer than the police force did.