Laughing Stock

I want a world where Frank junior and all the Frank juniors
can sit under a shady tree, breathe the air, swim in the ocean,
and go into a 7-11 without an interpreter
--The Naked Gun 2-1/2: The Smell of Fear (1991)

If we don't
(fill in the blank with your choice of suspended civil rights),
the terrorists have won
--The Right's best excuse for abdicating our rights

Can you fly this plane, and land it?
--Airplane! (1980)

Ranger Question of the Day [RQOD]:
If the T.S.A. did not exist,
what would the real unemployment rate be?
___________________

[R.I.P. Leslie Nielson. You only thought you were doing parody.]

Contrary to the ipsedixitism of airport supervisor Philip Burdette -- “I get paid to be paranoid" -- The Transportation Security Administration's job is NOT paranoia. It IS to follow reasoned and responsible, proactive measures to address a real threat in a judicious manner (T.S.A. Finds Itself on the Defensive.)

Airport security is a tactical measure, reflective of a larger strategic posture. All significant terror successes, or near successes, have been a result of strategic U.S. blunders. The intelligence community in the outer perimeter of defense was found lacking.

The events of 9-11-01 did not occur because of tactical negligence at airport terminals. The 9-11 operatives did not violate any existing protocols and boarded their flights legally. Instead, the failure occurred at the strategic level.

The crotch and shoe bombers paraded as successful infiltrators did NOT originate on U.S. flights, and their success was the failure of intelligence and not physical security. The weakness of the screening system is NOT poor security, but faulty intelligence and strategic threat analysis.

Screening domestic fliers is closing the barn door after the horse is out; it does not address any real threat. Airport security does not stand alone -- it is simply the last, visible layer of defense. If a threat is stupid enough to smuggle anything at this final checkpoint, then it is realistic to say that action is intentional to keep the U.S. response at an artificially high level.

If a device of any sort is discovered at a boarding gate, then this is not a success of security but rather a failure of strategic intel gathering and analysis. The T.S.A. can X-ray and grope to the pace of frenzied sexual predators, but that will not increase our security. Layers of security must be neutralized before the terrorists could penetrate any airport security. To date, there are no credible reports that the al-Qaeda threat has the assets to expend on such high-risk operations.

Paranoia is not a strategy, but the failure of one. It is diffuse fear of something that should not be feared. By extension, the Phony War on Terror (PWOT ©) is a fallow exercise in paranoia. If we honestly believe that our airports are being targeted, it is apparent that George W. Bush's PWOT is a dud. Every time we frisk a U.S. citizen in an airport we are admitting that, although we are still fighting them over there, we are not sure they ain't over here.

If we have perimeters in our airports, then we are fighting them over here (or at least, pretending we are.)

Got Ya Covered

We'll be over, we're coming over,
And we won't come back till it's over
Over there
--Over There, George M. Cohan

Before beginning a Hunt, it is wise to ask someone
what you are looking for before you begin looking for it
--Winnie the Pooh

Next thing you know
they'll be televising the whole thing
--The Trouble with Harry (1955)
_________

This ad gives a market scene populated with your Generic Muslim Persons. It is the sort of fear-mongering which goes on in both the civilian and the military arenas. (This one is aimed at giving the Air Force something to do, since money grows on trees today.)

It poses the sinister message, "How do you fight an enemy who hides among the innocent?" Well, first you define "enemy," then "innocent". He or she may be a guerrilla in their midst, but not ours. So what if Harry-the-would-be-suicide-bomber is in the tableau? The drone cannot see into people's minds to ascertain intent. What is the drone to do? They all look like Harry, after all.

In the U.S., the implied enemy -- the Muslim fundamentalist terrorist -- cannot hide very well. He is not coming over the border at Laredo to get a job illegally picking tomatoes.

There are 1.2 billion Islamic people in the world. Will there be a drone for each? Maybe just 1%; perhaps 10? What do the actuaries say will make us safe? What if we just pulled a Freddie Prinze ("It's not my job, man"?) We need to get a reality check.

If they are over there, why not leave them? If they are agitating over there, they are not fighting us here, right? It's just a wild and crazy thought.

The latest effort of the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) to scare/assuage the U.S. Public is with airport bomb scanners (Airport Bomb Scans Move into Busy Terminals.) Aimed at detecting people wearing bomb vests, aviation-security consultant Rich Roth said an airport attack "is what everybody's afraid of, and it's a valid fear."

"It works this way: A scanner is mounted on a tripod at a busy part of an airport terminal, pointing at people 30 feet away. The $210,000 machine, which looks like a spotlight, reads the energy emitted from a human body. It looks for "cold" spots where dense objects -- such as bombs -- block energy."

"A passenger wearing a body brace under a shirt might set off the alarm, said Wally Miller, QinetiQ's head of transportation security.

These $210,000 machines which work at a 30-foot range are of little real-world value, because when any bomb gets within 30 feet of a protected point, it is too late. Security should be in layers with bombs secluded at the outer security zones. Police would be absolute fools to approach a positive-alert suspect. That is how one becomes a memory.

Further points to consider:

• There have been no credible threats or actual suicide bomber scenarios aimed at U.S. airports. There has never been a suicide bomber attack versus a U.S. airport.

• Terrorism is a symbolic use of violence to reach an audience beyond the immediate victim(s). For terrorism to be effective the operations of terrorist groups must be increasingly dynamic and newsworthy.
  

Only the Japanese Red Army Attack on Lod Airport approached the parameters of a suicide type attack. Airport attacks are retro and ineffective because they will not produce dynamic results for any group.

• This machine can be easily bypassed (by simply avoiding the scanners.) In addition, the machine requires an operator, one probably paid minimum-type wages.

• The machine can be neutralized in a number of ways (diversion comes to mind.)

• A bomb need not be a suicide-type with a vest. A bomb can be in a valise, guitar, suitcase, etc. The scanner can only differentiate vested bombers, rendering it virtually useless. It addresses a threat that is not credible, one which is minimal at best but most likely, nonexistent.

Seven years into the Phony War on Terror (PWOT©) , and we have yet to understand our designated enemy.