Got Ya Covered
We'll be over, we're coming over,
And we won't come back till it's over
Over there
--Over There, George M. Cohan
Before beginning a Hunt, it is wise to ask someone
what you are looking for before you begin looking for it
--Winnie the Pooh
Next thing you know
they'll be televising the whole thing
--The Trouble with Harry (1955)
_________
This ad gives a market scene populated with your Generic Muslim Persons. It is the sort of fear-mongering which goes on in both the civilian and the military arenas. (This one is aimed at giving the Air Force something to do, since money grows on trees today.)
It poses the sinister message, "How do you fight an enemy who hides among the innocent?" Well, first you define "enemy," then "innocent". He or she may be a guerrilla in their midst, but not ours. So what if Harry-the-would-be-suicide-bomber is in the tableau? The drone cannot see into people's minds to ascertain intent. What is the drone to do? They all look like Harry, after all.
In the U.S., the implied enemy -- the Muslim fundamentalist terrorist -- cannot hide very well. He is not coming over the border at Laredo to get a job illegally picking tomatoes.
There are 1.2 billion Islamic people in the world. Will there be a drone for each? Maybe just 1%; perhaps 10? What do the actuaries say will make us safe? What if we just pulled a Freddie Prinze ("It's not my job, man"?) We need to get a reality check.
If they are over there, why not leave them? If they are agitating over there, they are not fighting us here, right? It's just a wild and crazy thought.
The latest effort of the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) to scare/assuage the U.S. Public is with airport bomb scanners (Airport Bomb Scans Move into Busy Terminals.) Aimed at detecting people wearing bomb vests, aviation-security consultant Rich Roth said an airport attack "is what everybody's afraid of, and it's a valid fear."
Further points to consider:
Seven years into the Phony War on Terror (PWOT©) , and we have yet to understand our designated enemy.
It poses the sinister message, "How do you fight an enemy who hides among the innocent?" Well, first you define "enemy," then "innocent". He or she may be a guerrilla in their midst, but not ours. So what if Harry-the-would-be-suicide-bomber is in the tableau? The drone cannot see into people's minds to ascertain intent. What is the drone to do? They all look like Harry, after all.
In the U.S., the implied enemy -- the Muslim fundamentalist terrorist -- cannot hide very well. He is not coming over the border at Laredo to get a job illegally picking tomatoes.
There are 1.2 billion Islamic people in the world. Will there be a drone for each? Maybe just 1%; perhaps 10? What do the actuaries say will make us safe? What if we just pulled a Freddie Prinze ("It's not my job, man"?) We need to get a reality check.
If they are over there, why not leave them? If they are agitating over there, they are not fighting us here, right? It's just a wild and crazy thought.
The latest effort of the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) to scare/assuage the U.S. Public is with airport bomb scanners (Airport Bomb Scans Move into Busy Terminals.) Aimed at detecting people wearing bomb vests, aviation-security consultant Rich Roth said an airport attack "is what everybody's afraid of, and it's a valid fear."
These $210,000 machines which work at a 30-foot range are of little real-world value, because when any bomb gets within 30 feet of a protected point, it is too late. Security should be in layers with bombs secluded at the outer security zones. Police would be absolute fools to approach a positive-alert suspect. That is how one becomes a memory.
"It works this way: A scanner is mounted on a tripod at a busy part of an airport terminal, pointing at people 30 feet away. The $210,000 machine, which looks like a spotlight, reads the energy emitted from a human body. It looks for "cold" spots where dense objects -- such as bombs -- block energy."
"A passenger wearing a body brace under a shirt might set off the alarm, said Wally Miller, QinetiQ's head of transportation security.
Further points to consider:
- There have been no credible threats or actual suicide bomber scenarios aimed at U.S. airports. There has never been a suicide bomber attack versus a U.S. airport.
- Terrorism is a symbolic use of violence to reach an audience beyond the immediate victim(s). For terrorism to be effective the operations of terrorist groups must be increasingly dynamic and newsworthy.
Only the Japanese Red Army Attack on Lod Airport approached the parameters of a suicide type attack. Airport attacks are retro and ineffective because they will not produce dynamic results for any group.
- This machine can be easily bypassed (by simply avoiding the scanners.) In addition, the machine requires an operator, one probably paid minimum-type wages.
- The machine can be neutralized in a number of ways (diversion comes to mind.)
- A bomb need not be a suicide-type with a vest. A bomb can be in a valise, guitar, suitcase, etc. The scanner can only differentiate vested bombers, rendering it virtually useless. It addresses a threat that is not credible, one which is minimal at best but most likely, nonexistent.
Seven years into the Phony War on Terror (PWOT©) , and we have yet to understand our designated enemy.
Labels: airport scanners, phony war on terror, PWOT, pwot paranoia, terrorist propaganda









