Tactics 101
How I love my liberty
There are no strings on me
--I've Got No Strings,
Washington and Harline
All for a little bit of money. There’s more to life
than a little money, you know. Don’t you know that?
And here you are. And it’s a beautiful day
--Fargo (1996)
________________
Ranger is disdainful and indignant over both the offensive and defensive tactics used in this Phony War on Terror (PWOT ©). We thought it would be instructive to offer some basics in tactics and will focus on defensive tactics to compliment "Dak To" and "Designated Loser".
When you expect a Big Mac Attack, you must defend properly or you will be consumed. The indignation arises from the fact that the Army is fighting this war as amateurs when in fact our history provides a template of how we should fight.
Preparing for all fighting is similar to frying hamburger. There are clear steps which must be achieved on the way to producing the finished product, whether the workspace is McDonald's, GM or the battlefield. A successful battlefield product is not having soldiers killed needlessly.
The following comments will be pertinent to any hill being defended in the PWOT, from Platoon to Brigade level. Since our focus has been isolated outposts, most of the fights will be Platoon and Company level.
Planning considerations:
Regarding mission: since you are sitting on a hilltop (or any other terrain in the COIN environment), the defensive position will be planned (not hasty), will not be in-depth, should provide 360-degree security, and survivability in the position is predicated on fire support, via either air or artillery.
Since these positions are isolated, they must be task-organized and heavily weighted. That is, they should have a heavy augmentation of crew-served and M-203 weapons. Their medical support on-site should be augmented. A forward observer (F.O.) should be assigned to coordinate all defensive indirect fire. This allows the ground commander to devote his attention to directing the ground battle.
The F.O. and unit commander generally co-locate to insure contiuity of effort. Both are combat officers, so there is redundancy if that becomes necessary. Unit mortar F.O.'s may also be present, and air assets would be an integral part of this fire planning.
The fire support assets available at Platoon and Company level should be overwhelming to any attacking enemy formation. the history of the U.S. involvement in Korea indicates this necessity. LZ X-Ray in Vietnam demonstrated the indispensibility of artillery for the survival of isolated units. This is true regardless of whether the unit remains one night in that location or one year. Defensive fighting positions must be hardened and have overhead cover to defend the troops from friendly and enemy indirect fire.
Contingency planning must address worst-case scenarios and be prepared to relieve pressure on defending units, which can be achieved in a number of ways. It also must be determined if there are any friendly units in the area which can be called upon to relieve pressure if required. Logistically, can the position be provided with proper support, either via air or ground.
By this point in COIN operations in Afghanistan the capabilities and intents of local anti-coalition forces should be clearly understood and delineated. The recent attack at Wanat was not a jack-in-the-box event. It was a pre-planned attack which demonstrates proficiency of enemy tactics.
These basic planning considerations seem absent from the operations we read about in the daily news. There is simply no way 200 Taliban can overrun a weighted U.S. Platoon with proper fire support and fighting from prepared positions.
So when you read, "Nine Soldiers Killed and Fifteen Wounded," what is clear is that something is amiss. even before reading the after action report. Doubly true when dealing with elite units.
These battles indicate proper troop planning procedures are not being implemented.
There are no strings on me
--I've Got No Strings,
Washington and Harline
All for a little bit of money. There’s more to life
than a little money, you know. Don’t you know that?
And here you are. And it’s a beautiful day
--Fargo (1996)
________________
Ranger is disdainful and indignant over both the offensive and defensive tactics used in this Phony War on Terror (PWOT ©). We thought it would be instructive to offer some basics in tactics and will focus on defensive tactics to compliment "Dak To" and "Designated Loser".
When you expect a Big Mac Attack, you must defend properly or you will be consumed. The indignation arises from the fact that the Army is fighting this war as amateurs when in fact our history provides a template of how we should fight.
Preparing for all fighting is similar to frying hamburger. There are clear steps which must be achieved on the way to producing the finished product, whether the workspace is McDonald's, GM or the battlefield. A successful battlefield product is not having soldiers killed needlessly.
The following comments will be pertinent to any hill being defended in the PWOT, from Platoon to Brigade level. Since our focus has been isolated outposts, most of the fights will be Platoon and Company level.
Planning considerations:
- What is the mission, and contingency planning
- What is the friendly and enemy situation?
- Is there fire support
- Is there logistical support?
Regarding mission: since you are sitting on a hilltop (or any other terrain in the COIN environment), the defensive position will be planned (not hasty), will not be in-depth, should provide 360-degree security, and survivability in the position is predicated on fire support, via either air or artillery.
Since these positions are isolated, they must be task-organized and heavily weighted. That is, they should have a heavy augmentation of crew-served and M-203 weapons. Their medical support on-site should be augmented. A forward observer (F.O.) should be assigned to coordinate all defensive indirect fire. This allows the ground commander to devote his attention to directing the ground battle.
The F.O. and unit commander generally co-locate to insure contiuity of effort. Both are combat officers, so there is redundancy if that becomes necessary. Unit mortar F.O.'s may also be present, and air assets would be an integral part of this fire planning.
The fire support assets available at Platoon and Company level should be overwhelming to any attacking enemy formation. the history of the U.S. involvement in Korea indicates this necessity. LZ X-Ray in Vietnam demonstrated the indispensibility of artillery for the survival of isolated units. This is true regardless of whether the unit remains one night in that location or one year. Defensive fighting positions must be hardened and have overhead cover to defend the troops from friendly and enemy indirect fire.
Contingency planning must address worst-case scenarios and be prepared to relieve pressure on defending units, which can be achieved in a number of ways. It also must be determined if there are any friendly units in the area which can be called upon to relieve pressure if required. Logistically, can the position be provided with proper support, either via air or ground.
By this point in COIN operations in Afghanistan the capabilities and intents of local anti-coalition forces should be clearly understood and delineated. The recent attack at Wanat was not a jack-in-the-box event. It was a pre-planned attack which demonstrates proficiency of enemy tactics.
These basic planning considerations seem absent from the operations we read about in the daily news. There is simply no way 200 Taliban can overrun a weighted U.S. Platoon with proper fire support and fighting from prepared positions.
So when you read, "Nine Soldiers Killed and Fifteen Wounded," what is clear is that something is amiss. even before reading the after action report. Doubly true when dealing with elite units.
These battles indicate proper troop planning procedures are not being implemented.
Labels: consequences of phony war on terror, failure of wot, PWOT
posted by rangeragainstwar at 5:53 PM
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