Too Few MOH's

I don't want some mom whose son may have recently died
to see the commander-in-chief playing golf.
I feel I owe it to the families to be as --
to be in solidarity as best as I can with them.
--President Bush on his war sacrifice,
giving up golf (5/13/08)
_______________

It must be cold comfort to Mr. Walesa-Bush that all that remains is jogging and biking.

Why have there been only four Medals of Honor awarded in the present armed conflicts? Regardless of the justifiability of the wars, there is a requirement to honor the heroism of our military, both on an individual and institutional level.

The institution requires live MOH recipients to serve as living examples for the ranks to emulate. As example of disproportionality of awards during present conflicts, consider the minor U.S. action in Korea of 1871. While there were only light casualties in this little heralded campaign, there were 15 MOH's awarded.

In the Indian Campaigns from ~1865-1898 there were approximately 300 MOH's. As there were approximately 2,525 friendlies killed in action, that is a ratio of 300 medals : 2,525 casualties or about 1 : 8.4. In the GWOT the ratio is 4 : 4,500.

There should be more MOH's awarded now. The level of valor is there but it is going unrecognized by the national command leadership.

Why?

MOH #1: Paul R. Smith

Paul R. Smith
10/24/69-4/4/03

The bravest are surely those who have the clearest vision
of what is before them, glory and danger alike,
and yet notwithstanding, go out to meet it
--Thucydides
____________

This is one of a series of articles Ranger does not want to write. It concerns the four Medals of Honor awarded thus far in the Phony War on Terror, and the criminal negligence that allowed each scenario to unfold, resulting in the deaths of four valorous Americans. (We are not writing "PWOT" out of respect for these men.)

The four recipients were typical American military men who found themselves in exceptional circumstances requiring desperate acts of valor. The MOH should recognize valor above and beyond the call of duty. While each of these four medals recognize such actions, they also indicate a failure of leadership and ignorance of basic military precautions which led to the sacrifices of each of these recipients.

These four medals reflect poor leadership and tactics. The medals reflect the faithful and arduously brave performance of duty on behalf of the military members, but it was criminal negligence at best that placed our service members in such dubious tactical settings.

All four of these actions are woven of the same thread: loss of life that could have been avoided through judicious military planning. Surely soldiers die in combat, but death should not result from faulty planning and leadership. Extreme valor is no substitute for planning.

Today: Paul R. Smith, SFC, US Army action 4 April 03. It is subtitled: When Engineers Fight as Infantry.

From SFC Smith's citation:

"On that day, Sergeant First Class Smith was engaged in the construction of a prisoner of war holding area when his Task Force was violently attacked by a company-sized enemy force. Realizing the vulnerability of over 100 fellow soldiers, Sergeant First Class Smith quickly organized a hasty defense consisting of two platoons of soldiers, one Bradley Fighting Vehicle and three armored personnel carriers."

The U.S engineers had at least two platoons which should have been adequate to defend against a company-sized enemy force. That is, IF the U.S. troops had adequate preparation, proper security and had their weapons set in for defense.

Since they were building a Prisoner of War holding area, it is safe to assume this action should have been in a secure rear area, as the Geneva Conventions require POW's to be collected in safe areas free of enemy fire.

If this requirement were met, there should have been combat arms forces between the enemy and the engineers. But this was not the case as the attacking forces lacked depth and were loosely tied in to adjacent units.

In addition, the engineers should have been tied into the fire support net and should have had the ability to call mortar and artillery upon any attacking force. Again, obviously this was not the case.

Additionally, why if two U.S. platoons were engaged did it devolve upon an SFC to save the day? Where were the platoon-level officers?

Certainly Combat Engineers are required to fight to complete their assigned missions, but that doesn't mean they are replacements for infantry units. Without question, SFC Smith and assigned units fought like hell, but one must ask why an enemy unit can just pop up on a battlefield that should be a rear area.

Even forward enemy POW collection points should be out of small arms range.


Next: Jason Dunham