Defensible Terrain

 --Paresh Nath, UAE 

Does our ruin benefit the earth?
Does it help the grass to grow, the sun to shine?
Is this darkness in you, too?
Have you passed through this night?  
--The Thin Red Line (1998)

 There were many lessons from COP Keating.
One of them is that our troops should never, ever,
be put in a position
where they have to defend the indefensible 
--President Obama, bestowing the MOH
on SSG Romesha
_______

{Today's piece is an outgrowth of the commentary to Ranger's recent piece @ sister site MilPub ("True Colors").  The wide-ranging discussion by the largely military community there was kicked off by the topic, Command Outposts (COPs) in Afghanistan. He felt he should attempt to integrate their collective cache of knowledge on 50 years of institutional military experience from an Infantryman's perspective.}

Per President Obama's statement above, defending the indefensible is a no-go, so why do it?

Why do we engage in combat, both offensively and defensively? The question applies to a rifle squad as well as a theatre Army. Whether fighting a counterinsurgency (COIN) or unconventional or guerrilla wars (UW/GW), why do we fight? Do we just fight to kill, or is there a military logic beyond the killing?

We put our soldiers into combat for one purpose: to facilitate future operations which will lead to a militarily achievable purpose that reflects a political reality. We do not fight for  hopes or dreams, but for observable and verifiable achievements.

Why do we defend COPs -- small battle stations set on the frontier of a battle area? What should Commander's planning and guidance indicate before we even occupy the ground?

Obviously, any occupied terrain should be defensible. There must be mutual support to include logistics, personnel and supporting fires of all consideration. Historically, adjacent units provide direct fire to mutually support a friendly unit in distress. Defense is either hasty or planned, mobile or static. It is generally thought that static defense is to be avoided (think Bataan, Corregidor and Wake Island.)

So for a COP to be effective, it needs defensible terrain with adequate resources; wishful thinking does not count. Then it needs depth to the battle space, which implies a connection among all of the involved units. Reserve units historically are positioned within supporting distance, with reliable avenues of approach. This also allows engaged units to fall back to the reserve position if the situation deteriorates (or upon receipt of such orders.)

Strangely, all reported Afghan COP battles have lacked this feature. The soldiers in these COP battles could not withdraw to a friendly position on defensible terrain.

Soldiers should not be fighting for non-quantifiable metrics such as the love of the Afghan people for their government, for instance. Ranger cares that our soldiers fight and die, if necessary, for a purpose beyond the ratings bump of a saccharine news byte.

The United States can hang four Medals of Honor (MOH) from four COP fights around the necks of four extremely heroic soldiers, but that does not alter the nature of the fight. What did our good and true and loyal soldiers die for out on those hillsides? Will Afghanistan ever be a beacon of democracy? Do we even care?

Beyond that, to risk a Thin Red Line-like reverie ...

How did the Taliban become an enemy of the U.S.? Why is it our business to kill them? Are the people of Afghanistan our enemies or our friends? Further, what of other countries whose business we have  been getting into -- Libya, Egypt, Tunisia, Syria and Iraq? Can the forces of arms achieve anything beyond the imposition of death? As the character of Capt. James 'Bugger' Staros thinks in "The The Thin Red Line", The tough part is, uh... Not knowing if you're doing any good. That's the hard part.

Now, a soldier on a COP does not ask these questions, but we as citizens should and must before sending the first soldier down range. It is to our eternal shame if we do not.

[cross-posted @ milpub.]

MOH #1: Paul R. Smith

Paul R. Smith
10/24/69-4/4/03

The bravest are surely those who have the clearest vision
of what is before them, glory and danger alike,
and yet notwithstanding, go out to meet it
--Thucydides
____________

This is one of a series of articles Ranger does not want to write. It concerns the four Medals of Honor awarded thus far in the Phony War on Terror, and the criminal negligence that allowed each scenario to unfold, resulting in the deaths of four valorous Americans. (We are not writing "PWOT" out of respect for these men.)

The four recipients were typical American military men who found themselves in exceptional circumstances requiring desperate acts of valor. The MOH should recognize valor above and beyond the call of duty. While each of these four medals recognize such actions, they also indicate a failure of leadership and ignorance of basic military precautions which led to the sacrifices of each of these recipients.

These four medals reflect poor leadership and tactics. The medals reflect the faithful and arduously brave performance of duty on behalf of the military members, but it was criminal negligence at best that placed our service members in such dubious tactical settings.

All four of these actions are woven of the same thread: loss of life that could have been avoided through judicious military planning. Surely soldiers die in combat, but death should not result from faulty planning and leadership. Extreme valor is no substitute for planning.

Today: Paul R. Smith, SFC, US Army action 4 April 03. It is subtitled: When Engineers Fight as Infantry.

From SFC Smith's citation:

"On that day, Sergeant First Class Smith was engaged in the construction of a prisoner of war holding area when his Task Force was violently attacked by a company-sized enemy force. Realizing the vulnerability of over 100 fellow soldiers, Sergeant First Class Smith quickly organized a hasty defense consisting of two platoons of soldiers, one Bradley Fighting Vehicle and three armored personnel carriers."

The U.S engineers had at least two platoons which should have been adequate to defend against a company-sized enemy force. That is, IF the U.S. troops had adequate preparation, proper security and had their weapons set in for defense.

Since they were building a Prisoner of War holding area, it is safe to assume this action should have been in a secure rear area, as the Geneva Conventions require POW's to be collected in safe areas free of enemy fire.

If this requirement were met, there should have been combat arms forces between the enemy and the engineers. But this was not the case as the attacking forces lacked depth and were loosely tied in to adjacent units.

In addition, the engineers should have been tied into the fire support net and should have had the ability to call mortar and artillery upon any attacking force. Again, obviously this was not the case.

Additionally, why if two U.S. platoons were engaged did it devolve upon an SFC to save the day? Where were the platoon-level officers?

Certainly Combat Engineers are required to fight to complete their assigned missions, but that doesn't mean they are replacements for infantry units. Without question, SFC Smith and assigned units fought like hell, but one must ask why an enemy unit can just pop up on a battlefield that should be a rear area.

Even forward enemy POW collection points should be out of small arms range.


Next: Jason Dunham