Haq the Hack, II

The children born of thee are sword and fire,
Red ruin, and the breaking up of law
--Idylls of the King, Alfred Tennyson
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[cont. of 12 Jan 12 post] --

The very best operatives will be selected only after severe scrutiny and a filtration process. "confidential sources" -- as referred to in the AFP piece -- need not apply. The U.S. is playing into the terrorist's game plan when expending resources chasing men like Irfun Ul Haq, who is precisely a buffoon.

A candidate must commit a capital crime before being admitted to the inner sanctum, and it is there where the U.S. should direct its resources. This is important because U.S. agents or "confidential sources" are not legally permitted to commit a capital crime like murder in order to be infiltrate any group. The big guys are not Boy Scouts; they operate like the Mafia or many other criminal gangs. A "made" guy will seldom turn against the organization if he values his family ties.

Al Qaeda assets also add true religious fervor to their qualifications. The operatives who carried out the Twin Tower attacks were most certainly not recruited by a "confidential source".

If terrorism is a hydra-headed monster, then attacking the little snake heads is an exercise in futility, another version of whack-a-mole Try infiltrating a group in Waziristan with a confidential source and see what happens. Our policies of netting the little guys are based in appearances vs. effectiveness; we aim the spear tip at inappropriate targets.

Misunderstanding the threat and its capabilities, our leaders ascribe a military paradigm to a reality that exceeds that simplistic view. The military threat is the "far threat", which poses a threat to the governments of Afghanistan and Iraq; it is NOT a danger to U.S. internal security.

The real threat to the U.S. is the operational assets that may or may not have official cover, or at least the compliance, of our erstwhile allies. The 9-11-01 conspirators are the yardstick for this threat: They were not military and they are not readily replaceable.

It takes years to develop a deep threat asset, and simply attaining a training camp will not suffice; it is merely the first step in the filtration of future assets. Military training teaches only military skills, and no such skills were used on 9-11. This is a simple observation, but one usually overlooked.

Our policies are simplistic eye candy, movement with negligible progress. A major pursuit before these petty dragnets of smugglers of imaginary personnel should be ascertaining the latest conformation of al Qaeda, along with its emerging leaders and assets. Months before leaving the CIA, director Leon Panetta said that al Qaeda had no more than 200 assets worldwide, but the statement did not evaluate their operational abilities.

NEXT: Historical context