Haq the Hack, III

As an occasional experience, the security measures
were fascinating, much more thorough
and intelligent than the cursory T.S.A. sweeps I’m used to
--Lost in Jerusalem, Matt Gross

Ooo and it's alright and it's comin' 'long
We got to get right back to where we started from
--Right Back Where We Started From,
Maxine Nightingale

And if you don't love me now
You will never love me again
I can still hear you saying
you would never break the chain
--The Chain, Fleetwood Mac

Just say move mountain, move mountain,
mountain get out of my way
--Move Mountain, The Rev. Clay Evans
and the Fellowship Choir
___________________

[cont. of Haq the Hack, II]

For a military-historical perspective, did destroying the VietCong - National Liberation Front (NLF) keep Vietnam from falling to the Communists? Did the U.S. destroy the Communist head of that hydra group? We failed to identify their leadership until after Saigon fell.

It may legally sufficient to imprison men like Ul Haq, but it lacks justification as a counter to the greater terrorist threat. Imprisoning dupes, crazies and wannabes indicates that after 10 years of fighting a Phony War on Terror (PWOT ©) we still misunderstand the actual threat.

More history is in order: Euroterrorism of the 70's and 80's was cross-fertilized and cooperation was extended across the board. Once the Soviet Union imploded, so, too, did the groups, because their external support evaporated overnight. To be effective groups must be isolated from their supporters -- quite a challenge for those groups operating in the often chaotic arena of the Arab world in which they swim readily amongst their supporters.

It was possible to reach a political understanding with the Irish Republican Army (IRA) by dealing with their political arm, Sinn Fein. However, al Qaeda lacks this dimension because they appear ideologically unwilling or incapable of reaching a political accommodation. They do not seek accommodation, so their goals appear murky, unlike those of terrorists in the past who presented a clear agenda.

So what are the implications? Does current U.S. policy make you any safer? Does it mean a bean to you IF the Taliban reaches an agreement with the government of Afghanistan? Does the
outcome in either Afghanistan or Iraq have any impact on our internal security?

These are the questions the President and the contenders for presidential nomination should address. Congress also assiduously avoids answering the question, thereby causing billions of dollars to be spent on meaningless security functions that do not increase our safety.

Maybe we need to get back to where we started from. This is best done by pitching your Soldier of Fortune magazine and ignoring Ollie North's nutterings on the topic. We are willing to take to the bank the worthlessness of convicting people caught in a sting operation trying to smuggle fictitious people.

The U.S. needs to focus on real threats. Fictional characters possess no threat value beyond increasing our own fear levels. If these three guys were the heavies the prosecutors allege them to be, why were they not given the full 15 year sentence allowable by law? Why -- because the judge saw the flimsiness of the case.

Ranger recommends John LeCarre's Little Drummer Girl as a fine fictional overview of the 1970's threat which remains relevant today. This series on the hapless Haq could have been subtitled, "Making Mountains out of Molehills", or "Using Mole Brains to Build Mountains".

These are mountains we do not need to move.

Haq the Hack, II

The children born of thee are sword and fire,
Red ruin, and the breaking up of law
--Idylls of the King, Alfred Tennyson
__________________

[cont. of 12 Jan 12 post] --

The very best operatives will be selected only after severe scrutiny and a filtration process. "confidential sources" -- as referred to in the AFP piece -- need not apply. The U.S. is playing into the terrorist's game plan when expending resources chasing men like Irfun Ul Haq, who is precisely a buffoon.

A candidate must commit a capital crime before being admitted to the inner sanctum, and it is there where the U.S. should direct its resources. This is important because U.S. agents or "confidential sources" are not legally permitted to commit a capital crime like murder in order to be infiltrate any group. The big guys are not Boy Scouts; they operate like the Mafia or many other criminal gangs. A "made" guy will seldom turn against the organization if he values his family ties.

Al Qaeda assets also add true religious fervor to their qualifications. The operatives who carried out the Twin Tower attacks were most certainly not recruited by a "confidential source".

If terrorism is a hydra-headed monster, then attacking the little snake heads is an exercise in futility, another version of whack-a-mole Try infiltrating a group in Waziristan with a confidential source and see what happens. Our policies of netting the little guys are based in appearances vs. effectiveness; we aim the spear tip at inappropriate targets.

Misunderstanding the threat and its capabilities, our leaders ascribe a military paradigm to a reality that exceeds that simplistic view. The military threat is the "far threat", which poses a threat to the governments of Afghanistan and Iraq; it is NOT a danger to U.S. internal security.

The real threat to the U.S. is the operational assets that may or may not have official cover, or at least the compliance, of our erstwhile allies. The 9-11-01 conspirators are the yardstick for this threat: They were not military and they are not readily replaceable.

It takes years to develop a deep threat asset, and simply attaining a training camp will not suffice; it is merely the first step in the filtration of future assets. Military training teaches only military skills, and no such skills were used on 9-11. This is a simple observation, but one usually overlooked.

Our policies are simplistic eye candy, movement with negligible progress. A major pursuit before these petty dragnets of smugglers of imaginary personnel should be ascertaining the latest conformation of al Qaeda, along with its emerging leaders and assets. Months before leaving the CIA, director Leon Panetta said that al Qaeda had no more than 200 assets worldwide, but the statement did not evaluate their operational abilities.

NEXT: Historical context