Revisiting Wanat

____________________

The WaPo reports today on the Army's revision of the battle of Wanat (Army edits its history of the deadly battle of Wanat). Top officers were absolved of responsibility, foisting the failure off onto the Platoon level.

Gen. Campbell "concluded that the deaths were not the direct result of the officer's mistakes," but if not that, what did cause the deaths? Mistakes = death in combat.

The Army doctrinal formula is, "officers are responsible for everything that is done of fails to be done."

"The Army's final history of the Wanat battle largely echoes Campbell's conclusions, citing the role of 'uncertainty [as] a factor inseparable from any military operation.'

"In its conclusions, the study maintains that U.S. commanders had a weak grasp of the area's complicated politics, causing them to underestimate the hostility to a U.S. presence in Wanat."

Understanding the political situation is not relevant; an Army plans for worst-case scenarios, and soldiers are not politicians. Uncertainty is not the same as poor mission planning. Uncertainties should be addressed in the assumptions section before the Operations Order is finalized.

Poor planning caused these deaths and the failure rests at Battalion and Brigade which were derelict in this action, not at Company or Platoon level. The Commanders may have misunderstood the hostility of the locals, implying Battalion and Brigade leaders were doing best-case estimates rather than worst-case, the more appropriate combat stance.

Did the Chain of Command lack Predator feeds and satellite photos of the position for use by higher headquarters? If the assets needed to fulfill this mission were not allocated, this cannot be the result of a Platoon leader's failure. Asset allocation is a Battalion Commander function.

The responsibility for placement of the Observation Post (OP) should not be placed upon a Lieutenant. This is why the Army has Company Commanders and higher. The fight is fixed in time and space and the facts are constant. What changes are institutional efforts to justify derelict Battalion, Brigade and Company command actions.

Wanat is important because it is a microcosm of the corrupt macrocosm, which is a corrupt phony war.


[cross-posted @ milpub]

Designated Loser

These days I'm feeling all right
'Cept I can't tell my courage from my desperation
--Local Hero, Bruce Springsteen

Well, I stand up next to a mountain
And I chop it down with the edge of my hand
--Voodoo Chile, Jimi Hendrix

When you go up on the mountain top
And you look out across the sea
And you know there's another place perhaps
A young man can be
--It Ain't Easy, Three Dog Night

A man hanging on the ropes in a helpless state,
with his toes off the ground, shall be considered down
--Marquess of Queensbury Rules
____________

A continuation of "Dak To, Redux," following news that "U.S. and Afghan troops have abandoned a remote outpost in eastern Afghanistan where militants killed nine American soldiers this week (U.S. Troops Pull out of Afghan Base After Attack.)"

Dak To turns out to be the perfect analogy to this unnamed action, for after the battle for the hills around Dak To the famous Army Airborne Infantry regiments pulled up stakes and moved to greener pastures. This, after expending good lives on both sides on meaningless real estate.

In past wars terrain was purchased with blood, but every fight led one inch closer to victory, unlike then and now. At least at Dak To the paras gave as good as they got, which is the best that can be said for the valor and dedication of these wonderful U.S. soldiers.

But why did nine soldiers die on a worthless piece of terrain in a worthless country in a worthless phony war? It just doesn't add up in any rational tally.

"Sunday's attack by some 200 militants armed with machine guns, rocket-propelled grenades and mortars was the deadliest for the U.S. military in Afghanistan in three years. Rebels fought their way into the newly established base, wounding another 15 Americans and suffering heavy casualties of their own, before the defenders and warplanes could drive them back.

"Some 50 officers were headed to the area to try to regain control, said Ghoolam Farouq, a senior provincial police official."

So the anti-coalition forces kick the U.S. Army out of the area and we are to believe 50 Afghan cops are going to successfully walk that beat. Let's get real. This is not a fantasy Survivor episode -- this is actual death.

"The assault underlined how Islamic militants appear to be gaining strength nearly eight years after the ouster of the Taliban, and the difficulties facing foreign and Afghan forces trying to defeat them."

False. It has nothing to do with their gaining strength; they never lost it. They merely husbanded their strength. It IS however a clear indication that U.S. forces do not know how, when, where or why they are fighting, and that our actions violate the very basics of infantry combat, minus COIN considerations.

The basics have gone missing -- mutual support, escape routes, and most importantly, the assessment of significance of any combat action in the COIN environment. Ranger will bet the farm that the village of Wanat was actively supporting the militants. Those villagers that weren't were doing so passively.

As an aside, it is interesting that the anti-coalition forces are called "militants," but our soldiers are called "soldiers." Aren't they the same thing?

"NATO said the post, which lies amid precipitous mountains close to the Pakistan border, had been vacated, but insisted that international and Afghan troops will 'retain a strong presence in that area with patrolling and other means.'"

Translation: We will hand out a bunch of Purple Hearts and Silver Stars and call it a victory. That is, after we have turned tail and run. Nobody asks: Why did we occupy that terrain in the first place? Why did our soldiers die? Did a Division, Brigade or Battalion commander need his ticket punched?

In the Civil War and the Napoleonic tradition the Army that vacated the battlefield was designated the loser. At Gettysburg, Lee left the field to the Union forces, ergo the North is viewed as the victor. By that yardstick, the U.S. is a loser, and 23 Purple Hearts richer. This is enough to break a heart. In memory of battles past, I nominate this action be called "Heartbreak Ridge."

This strikes Ranger as playing soldiers rather than warfighting. And a soldier is a terrible thing to waste.