Why I Write

But it wasn't because I didn't know enough
I just knew too much
Does that make me crazy?
Possibly
--Crazy, Gnarls Barkley
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[Motivated by Sgt. Rabb's post @ Milpub]:

I was a soldier once and now not-so-young, a fact which allows me to connect the dots from present to past. The logic of soldiering has been left deeply ingrained in my thoughts and actions.

Last night was suffused with memories of past screw-ups and negative events that I still cannot justify or accept as being correct. Today's events resurface them, and I am discomfited down to my Ranger lizard brain.

When I was a platoon leader, my assigned strength equaled the 37 men killed in the recent shoot-down of the Chinook in Afghanistan. My platoon was line infantry, not elite in any manner. We did, however, stress one military precept: Dispersion.

We never put all our eggs in one basket. We would never allow one military round to kill or wound more than was militarily acceptable. We maintained dispersion while eating and even in the chow line when we were operational. My tracks (M 106) were never bunched up to allow enemy counter battery to knock out more than one of our guns. Not being bunched up is Rule One of ground combat.

On or about 21/22 Jan 71 there was an action at B53 in the Republic of Vietnam in which another entire helicopter of highly-trained Special Forces and Special Operations Assets men were blown out of the sky. To this day it is my contention that these men were sacrificed because there was not a proper and judicious recon. Helo gunship fire suppression of the area was not employed and the men did not know what enemy they were facing nor their capabilities.

U.S. SOF assets are still making the same senseless mistakes that get good men killed for no measurable reason. What is the benefit of the cost?

Thirty soldiers died at the hands (we are told) of a lucky RPG gunner. But in Special Forces, we are taught there is no such thing as "luck" -- there is only the presence or absence of solid planning and execution. No unit should lose 37 people associated gear from one lucky RPG shot.

Such a loss is criminal negligence on the part of the operational planners and team leaders. No sensible soldier would put all his assets in one bunch, hoping luck would not turn ill; it does not work that way either in gang warfare or combat.

Ranger does not believe the shoot down of the Chinook was an RPG loss. Why does the media not posit the employment of a ground-to-air Redeye or Strella-type missile? If the U.S. uses technology, then why not the Afghanis? Why the fiction that their successes are due to sheer, dumb-ass luck? The Gods of War need not be Christian or Western.

What would it mean if they were as tactical as we?

Talk to the Hand

Every game has a distinctive fire-and-dodge action
that you will gradually master.
In Defender it is a fast two-finger action
on Fire and Thrust,
in Asteroids a spray action on Fire and Rotate.
In Space Invaders it is a continuous co-ordination
of Fire and retreat, Fire and retreat ...."
--Invasion of the Space Invaders, Martin Amis

We were as men who through a fen
Of filthy darkness grope:
We did not dare to breathe a prayer,
Or give our anguish scope:
Something was dead in each of us,
And what was dead was Hope
--The Ballad of Reading Gaol, Oscar Wilde

--I thought you spies knew everything.
--Only God knows everything.
He works for Mossad
--The Constant Gardner (2005)
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Max Boot in the L.A. Times argues that the U.S. not only stop al Qaeda, but also stop it from "regenerating itself as it has in the past" (Staying the Course in Afghanistan.) That means preventing the Taliban from returning to prominence and projecting power into Pakistan.

While the suggestion that the U.S. operate as constant gardener of evil weeds has a nice ring of closure, how can anyone or anything stop anyone or anything from regenerating itself? One can spray Ortho Weed Control, but sure as hell those weeds will be back in a few weeks, usually hardier than ever.

We do not control the future. We control only now, and that just barely. How can anyone say that we are trying to keep the Taliban from returning to prominence and projecting their power into Pakistan? This seems ass backwards since the problem with the Taliban began, matured and to date is the result of Pakistan's projection of power into Afghanistan rather than vice versa, as Max Boot and crew would assert.

How many decades, or centuries, should the U.S. allocate to giving the surge time to work? When did the U.S. begin championing its failures? The ill-fated Challenger mission made its way onto a license plate, as did the seriously dead Nascar hero Dale Earnhardt. Keeping people from joining groups which are their pleasure is a losing proposition -- why does the U.S. want to be a loser?

We could say, "Home by Christmas", but what year?

How Little Bighorn Looks like Afghanistan

Part of the Crazy Horse Memorial under construction
in the Black Hills of South Dakota, in Custer County

You can take an Afghan to Hell with kindness,
but never to heaven by force
--Afghan proverb

Tribe wars with tribe. Every man's hand
is against the other and all are against the stranger
... the state of continual tumult has produced
a habit of mind which holds life cheap
and embarks on war with careless levity
--Winston Churchill

Same old song
just a drop of water
in the endless sea
all we do
crumbles to the ground
though we refuse to see
--Dust in the Wind, Kansas
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Chief advocates viewing the Battle of Little Bighorn as another fight in the progression of events which began in 1492. This perspective helps in understanding the totality of the situation. Using that viewpoint, let us extend lessons from LBH into current scenarios in Afghanistan dealing with Counterinsurgency, unconventional/guerrilla war (UW/GW) and terrorism. This may seem a stretch, but saddle up . . .

The hostiles in both scenarios did not have a problem in the world until the outer world forcibly imposed progress upon them. The Afghans have much experience repulsing the outsiders, be they Greek, Persian, British, Russian, Paki, Indian, Chinese, American or even present-day Iranians.

Minus external forces, the Native Americans and the Afghanis would do fine, thanks, without the education or whatever the interlopers wish to impose. Both nations (or more precisely, confederation of nations) would be happy to continue killing each other before it became necessary to reach out and kill The Other. The only thing better than killing each other would be to kill invaders.

Following are some ways LBH can be compared to the Phony War on Terror (PWOT):


[1] "Fighting Season" -- both the Indians and the Afghans could only fight when they could support themselves operationally. Where the Afghans gather support external to the group, the Indians had to follow the cycle of nature. Both groups were sidelined by deadly winter weather, but of course, they continued to train, plan, maintain equipment, etc.

[2] Militarily, both the Afghan and Indian War campaigns had the same goals. The hostiles were given a Hobson's choice: Submit to government control or pick up the lance. There is no discernable middle ground.

[3] The Afghan fighters have a force structure similar to that of the Indians, one based upon tribal loyalties and realities. The groups are usually as strong as their leaders. Both groups possess limited ability and opportunity to isolate the battlefield, but both have the luxury and will to prepare the field before they willingly engage government forces. Both are fighting for their survival as discrete entities; neither care to subsumed into their own loosely confederated nation nor into a construction fashioned by the invaders.

[4] Both must apply the concept of Mass and Economy of Force. The LBH demonstrated Mass as the prevailing principle, where most fights in Afghanistan demonstrate the principle of Economy of Force. The U.S. Army must gain and maintain contact with these adversaries, while it is the opposition's job to break contact until it is advantageous for them to turn and face the enemy. This was shown at LBH, Waygul and Wanat.

[5] Government forces used indigenous members to neutralize the indig. The government elevated the indig that they chose either to leadership positions or as judas goats. At LBH they were called Scouts and in Afghanistan they are called the Afghan National Army.

[6] Intelligence is mitigated: In 1876 intel was negligible to non-existent regarding the Indian's intentions. In Afghanistan there is so much intel that analysis is hampered. The reliability and validity in both cases is always in doubt.

[7] Concealment: In the Indian Wars, there was no place for the Indians; in Afghanistan, the hostiles hide in plain sight and there is no place for U.S. forces to hide.

In conclusion, the best hope of prevailing in the Afghan leg of the PWOT would be to use a tactic that worked with the Indians: Give them tax-free cigarettes, legal gambling casinos and tell them they are free and autonomous. Facts be damned.

Home Wreckers

LEATHERNECK, Helmand province, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan – Marines with Delta Company, 1st Tank Battalion, 1st Marine Division (Forward), fires the main cannon of an M1A1 Abrams tank during a range at Camp Leatherneck, Jan. 13, 2011. The Marines are the first tank unit to deploy to Afghanistan (Official US Marine Corps photo by Cpl. Ned Johnson)
__________________

"Former Vice President Dick Cheney says
he believes he'll have to make a decision on
whether to have a heart transplant ..."
--Cheney says he may have to have heart transplant

RAW comment: Doesn't it seem a bit late?
____________________

On the avenue, Fifth Avenue,
The photographers will snap us
And you'll find that you're in the rotogravure
--Easter Parade, Irving Berlin

Clank, clank
I'm a Tank
--Infantry barb

Something is always happening,
but when it happens, people don't always see it,
or understand it, or accept it
--Fallen (1998)

You ready to be fucked, man?
[W]e're gonna fuck you up
--The Big Lebowski (1998)
___________________

A belated commentary on the U.S.'s latest bad-boy entry into the Afghanistan melee: The company of M1 Abrams tanks rolling down an avenue near you, that is if you have the misfortune to be Taliban (U.S. Deploying Heavily Armored Battle Tanks for First Time in Afghna War.)

One must know that developed nations (a designation which still includes the U.S.) share combat doctrine that tanks fight tanks. Infantry supports the tanks. Tanks do deep objectives, religiously avoiding fighting in channelized environments like cities and built up areas.

No matter. Gushes the WaPo : "They can destroy a house more than a mile away"!

Wow -- that sure is great: A tactic to destroy slow-moving houses a mile away. Our ardor was a bit extinguished when contemplating the question: "Why destroy a house if it is a mile away?" Is the metric to win this war or the ability to fuck up houses in Afghanistan? When have hearts and minds ever been won by house-wrecking?

Do we have a clue how stupid and disconnected this violence has become? Will destroyed houses lead to victory or even democracy?

Revisiting Wanat

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The WaPo reports today on the Army's revision of the battle of Wanat (Army edits its history of the deadly battle of Wanat). Top officers were absolved of responsibility, foisting the failure off onto the Platoon level.

Gen. Campbell "concluded that the deaths were not the direct result of the officer's mistakes," but if not that, what did cause the deaths? Mistakes = death in combat.

The Army doctrinal formula is, "officers are responsible for everything that is done of fails to be done."

"The Army's final history of the Wanat battle largely echoes Campbell's conclusions, citing the role of 'uncertainty [as] a factor inseparable from any military operation.'

"In its conclusions, the study maintains that U.S. commanders had a weak grasp of the area's complicated politics, causing them to underestimate the hostility to a U.S. presence in Wanat."

Understanding the political situation is not relevant; an Army plans for worst-case scenarios, and soldiers are not politicians. Uncertainty is not the same as poor mission planning. Uncertainties should be addressed in the assumptions section before the Operations Order is finalized.

Poor planning caused these deaths and the failure rests at Battalion and Brigade which were derelict in this action, not at Company or Platoon level. The Commanders may have misunderstood the hostility of the locals, implying Battalion and Brigade leaders were doing best-case estimates rather than worst-case, the more appropriate combat stance.

Did the Chain of Command lack Predator feeds and satellite photos of the position for use by higher headquarters? If the assets needed to fulfill this mission were not allocated, this cannot be the result of a Platoon leader's failure. Asset allocation is a Battalion Commander function.

The responsibility for placement of the Observation Post (OP) should not be placed upon a Lieutenant. This is why the Army has Company Commanders and higher. The fight is fixed in time and space and the facts are constant. What changes are institutional efforts to justify derelict Battalion, Brigade and Company command actions.

Wanat is important because it is a microcosm of the corrupt macrocosm, which is a corrupt phony war.


[cross-posted @ milpub]