There is No Finish Line

--There is no finish line
--could be the tagline for the Phony War on Terror 

That's what these soldiers were asked to do:
Defend the indefensible
--President Obama at SSG Romesha's Medal of Honor ceremony

Everybody's gotta learn sometime
Everybody's gotta learn sometime
Everybody's gotta learn sometime 
--Everybody's Gotta Learn Sometime, Beck

I had a brother at Khe Sahn
Fighting off the Viet Cong
They're still there, he's all gone 
--Born in the U.S.A., Bruce Springsteen
_______________________

[This is Pt. II of Defending the Indefensible -- Romesha Medal of Honor]

Fighting and dying for indefensible terrain is the perfect metaphor for the war on terror. The President's utterance reveals the military's policy to be corrupt as a Bernie Madoff scam.

Ranger is discomfited because he remembers when soldiers trained to fight wars in order to win them, a goal not achieved in his lifetime. The spirit of the Army is the offense.  On Day One we learn that we have one function in life -- to take the battle to the enemy. This is far different thing than sending them across the world and slapping them into defensive positions. Wars are not won by defensive action.

As mentioned in "Defending the Indefensible" pt. I, the Army defends to buy time for reorganization and reconstitution, and to prepare to go on the offensive.  Until Counterinsurgency theory, everything was based on the attack to destroy the enemy or his will to fight. Now we call defending terrain indefinitely a "win", and occupy command outposts designed for no military purpose other than to have an option available for troop postings

While the defense of COP Keating in Kamdesh, Nuristan Province, was planned, it was not properly coordinated. In classic theatre-level ground combat there are a few rules for the defense: defense is planned or hasty; co-oordinated; mutually-supported; in -depth and strong enough to hold or attrit an enemy. At Keating, there were 52 soldiers but no reserve forces present that could have been utilized to influence the fight.

The defense was not in-depth as the soldiers had no secondary line of defense, nor could they fall back when pressed to nearby friendly units or alternate preplanned fighting positions. COP Keating was just like Wanat and Waygul: the only options were to fight to the death, or to surrender. These soldiers were decisively engaged before the first round went downrange.

Historically Infantry and Cavalry defenses are synergistic, interlocked and support one another by fire, whether direct or indirect, a fact which seems to elude United States Army planners in the PWOT© . Simply put, no commander should put a defensive position anywhere unless there is mutual support, secondary positions with adequate escape routes.  Also, there should be friendlies to act as reserve forces in a timely manner. The Quick Reaction Forces (QRFs) which arrived thirteen hours after the fight began does not qualify.

Why does the U.S. see fit to place soldiers in indefensible outposts?  Did these fights lead to a transition to offensive operations? Why does an Army defend a piece of terrain for no purpose? Why does the U.S. Army continue to do a job the Afghan Army should be doing? The U.S. military did the same thing in Iraq and Afghanistan as it did in the Republic of Vietnam (the 1st spectacular failure for the U.S. of COIN policy) -- we fought for terrain that did not affect the outcome of the war.

It is clear we can  attack and destroy the infrastructure and governments of places like Afghanistan and Iraq with less than a theatre-sized Army, but it is further clear that winning the invasion and regime change do not equal victory. Destroying a regime does not equate with creating a meaningful peace.


The failure of mighty U.S. Army in a site like Kamdesh gives lie to the idea that the U.S. is the sole Superpower in the world. Power comes in many guises.

An aside: It is interesting to note that three of the four living Medal of Honor recipients from Afghanistan chose to leave active duty. This is odd considering the status that an MOH winner has in the armed forces, which is basically holding a sort of godhood. Could this be a comment on the perception of the war on terror by those who have fought it?

Defending the Indefensible -- Romesha Medal of Honor

--This won't be coming to a roadside in Afghanistan anytime soon 

The trouble with organizing a thing
is that pretty soon folks get to paying more attention
to the organization than to what they're organized for 
--Little Home on the Prairie, Laura Ingalls Wilder

You pop caught you smoking - and he said, "No way!"
That hypocrite - smokes two packs a day
Man, living at home is such a drag
Now your mom threw away your best porno mag (Bust it!) 
--Fight for Your Right to Party,
 The Beastie Boys 

Wherever there is injustice, you will find us.
Wherever there is suffering, we'll be there.
Wherever liberty is threatened, you will find...
The Three Amigos!
--The Three Amigos (1986)

_____________________

In warfare, defending the indefensible is sometimes required, and these actions serve a military function.

Such were the losing World War II Battles of Corregidor, Wake Island, fought in order to buy time for taxed U.S. forces to evacuate, consolidate and fall back to defensible terrain; concomitantly, they served to attrit the Japanese forces.

However, the fights at Wanat, Waygul and now Kamdesh in the phony war on terror did not gain the military (or the nation) anything. After the fight at Kamdesh, Combat Outpost Keating was so rapidly evacuated that U.S. troops abandoned their ammunition (which the Afghan opposition forces later plundered.)

Intelligence failed at Battalion, Brigade, Division and echelons above corps. None appeared to have done predictive analysis of an impending attack, nor did they identify the threat or threat level. The unit can sometimes overcome this failure by vigorous patrolling, which is what you would expect from Cavalry troops, which are supposed to be offensive types geared to mobile rapid developing operations. The failure at COP Keating may be due in part to the fact that they were being used as static defense -- not their preferred mode of employment.

The day after the fight, NATO and U.S. command could not even identify the attackers of COP Keating, and the strength of enemy forces was variously reported as 300-500 men. The attackers were not a ghost army, yet details on this award-earning scenario are scant. Some reports suggest 100 enemy fighters were killed, but this strains credulity, even at the higher estimates of engaged forces. According to military experience, 100 KIA suggests 300-400 wounded enemy fighters, and there is no proof of this.

Reports suggest the HIG were the most likely attackers; the HIG were U.S. CIA-funded in the Russian War, suggesting the possibility that weapons bought with U.S. tax dollars in 1979 were used 30 some years later to kill U.S. Troopers. The HIG were largley Pashtun and hated the Tajiks and Hazara tribes which make up most of today's Afghan National Army (ANA).

The portions of the outpost perimeter that were quickly probed and penetrated were defended by the ANA. After six years of U.S. training they were unable to share the burden of defending Afghan terrain for an Afghan government and force structure, and for this failure U.S. soldiers died.

It sounds noble when SSG Romesha is quoted as saying, "It was our home, and they couldn't have it," but ultimately, we left and they did have it. FM-24 does not state this, but none of our Counterinsurgency wars (COIN) are "our country" -- that is not what COIN policy is about. We are fighting for their rights to party; that may not be the way we party, though, but that is the gig.

COIN is not about defending liberty, democracy or any other high-falutin' concept. The United States soldier kills and is killed for no apparent logical purpose, other than the right of the host nations to carry on in their accustomed manner, a manner not necessarily U.S.-friendly.

The people of Afghanistan, Iraq and Vietnam are the determining agents of change (or not) in their countries -- this is "self-determination". When 300-500 armed hostiles can badly handle 52 American Soldiers, it is evident that the situation in Nuristan Province, October '09, was beyond the control of U.S. forces.

Simply: What were U.S. troops expected to accomplish by sitting in an indefensible COP? Does anyone in Nuristan Province care that U.S. troops died for a faulty concept in a tactically faulty position? Does anyone in the U.S. care?