A Sign of Hope, II

We don’t submit to terror.
We make the terror 
--House of Cards

The sailors and pilots
The soldiers and the law
The pay offs and the rip offs
And the things nobody saw 
--The Smuggler's Blues, 
Glenn Frey
 _______________________

As a follow-on to the previous piece on Medal of Honor (MOH) recipient Clinton Romesha, Ranger asks, "Why such a paucity of MOH's to living recipients from the wars of the last 13 years?"

In comparison, the United States awarded 20 MOH's to living recipients for the small 1890 engagement the Army called "The Battle of Wounded Knee" (or, "The Massacre of Wounded Knee"), more than have been awarded in the entire War on Terror.

Why have more awards not been issued to non-elite type units? They, too, carried this war on their backs. Since so many Reserve and National Guard units have also fought to the legal standard, why have they gone unrecognized?

The MOH is a symbolic award that serves to ennoble and revitalize the institution. Without such recognition, the fighting and dying seems paltry and trite. Does the National Command Authority understand this military nuance?

The institution needs these medal recipients, yet they are saluting smartly and route-stepping into history. That many of the living recipients of this highest service recognition have chosen to leave the active service is a curious phenomenon, considering the institutional deification that is traditionally accorded these recipients.

But that is a topic for its own study and one would have to dialog with these men to understand their decision. Ranger imagines that their turning away is an indictment and rejection of the stated goals of the wars.

Does anyone else wonder why?

Making Hay

Beyond ideas of wrongdoing and rightdoing,
there is a field.  I'll meet you there.
When the soul lies down in that grass,
the world is too full to talk about.
Ideas, language, even the phrase each other 
doesn't make any sense 
--The Field, Rumi (trans. Coleman Barks) 

How does it feel to feel what I had to learn
Baby, don't say you're sorry
'cause I'm just not concerned 
--Tell It to the Rain, 
The Four Seasons
____________________

Ranger has 20 acres of fertilized grass that he swaps to local cattleman in return for their cutting it and keeping the pasture productive -- the best of bartering.

Recent rains caused the grass crop to prosper, but there were concerns that there would be a sunshine period to harvest the hay. Jumping on a brief window, two trucks, five men 3 trailers one tractor, bailer and thresher showed up and the men worked three nights processing the hay (a chore which they tackled after their day jobs.) That's America, and it always has been.

But on the final night the skies broke open, wetting the hay, meaning mold and mildew will ruin the bales. There was no tarpaulin to protect the hay, and the overhang of my outbuilding was not enough to cover them. A minor tragedy at ten, there will be no news at eleven.

In this comedy of errors Ranger saw a microcosm of modern day existence in the U.S.A. All the work and effort was negated for the want of tarps. The hay ended up like our efforts in the Phony War on Terror (PWOT ©); there was not enough to close the deal. Look at the actions of the latest Medal of Honor recipients, CPL William Carpenter and Sergeant Kyle White.

They had everything that a soldier needed to engage in combat, but they couldn't get the hay out of the field. They were shot up and rattled, and produced nothing for the benefit of anyone. They may as well have been out in the field without a tarp.

Men were killed and wounded, and command outposts (COPs) were abandoned, as ever, after all the needless violence. Even if they had won a decisive unit level victory, there was no hay hauled away. {The same goes for the previous actions of MOH recipients Carter, Romesha, and Swenson.}

Whether in a far-flung COP or my field, all the effort is meaningless unless the sun can shine on our efforts. Nothing can change the rain, the sky or the earth. Life is about fighting for the right reasons, which are always life-enhancing.

The bales of hay are expendable, but our soldiers should not be, even if we pretend and perpetrate the fiction that they were mowed down for a purpose.

Defensible Terrain

 --Paresh Nath, UAE 

Does our ruin benefit the earth?
Does it help the grass to grow, the sun to shine?
Is this darkness in you, too?
Have you passed through this night?  
--The Thin Red Line (1998)

 There were many lessons from COP Keating.
One of them is that our troops should never, ever,
be put in a position
where they have to defend the indefensible 
--President Obama, bestowing the MOH
on SSG Romesha
_______

{Today's piece is an outgrowth of the commentary to Ranger's recent piece @ sister site MilPub ("True Colors").  The wide-ranging discussion by the largely military community there was kicked off by the topic, Command Outposts (COPs) in Afghanistan. He felt he should attempt to integrate their collective cache of knowledge on 50 years of institutional military experience from an Infantryman's perspective.}

Per President Obama's statement above, defending the indefensible is a no-go, so why do it?

Why do we engage in combat, both offensively and defensively? The question applies to a rifle squad as well as a theatre Army. Whether fighting a counterinsurgency (COIN) or unconventional or guerrilla wars (UW/GW), why do we fight? Do we just fight to kill, or is there a military logic beyond the killing?

We put our soldiers into combat for one purpose: to facilitate future operations which will lead to a militarily achievable purpose that reflects a political reality. We do not fight for  hopes or dreams, but for observable and verifiable achievements.

Why do we defend COPs -- small battle stations set on the frontier of a battle area? What should Commander's planning and guidance indicate before we even occupy the ground?

Obviously, any occupied terrain should be defensible. There must be mutual support to include logistics, personnel and supporting fires of all consideration. Historically, adjacent units provide direct fire to mutually support a friendly unit in distress. Defense is either hasty or planned, mobile or static. It is generally thought that static defense is to be avoided (think Bataan, Corregidor and Wake Island.)

So for a COP to be effective, it needs defensible terrain with adequate resources; wishful thinking does not count. Then it needs depth to the battle space, which implies a connection among all of the involved units. Reserve units historically are positioned within supporting distance, with reliable avenues of approach. This also allows engaged units to fall back to the reserve position if the situation deteriorates (or upon receipt of such orders.)

Strangely, all reported Afghan COP battles have lacked this feature. The soldiers in these COP battles could not withdraw to a friendly position on defensible terrain.

Soldiers should not be fighting for non-quantifiable metrics such as the love of the Afghan people for their government, for instance. Ranger cares that our soldiers fight and die, if necessary, for a purpose beyond the ratings bump of a saccharine news byte.

The United States can hang four Medals of Honor (MOH) from four COP fights around the necks of four extremely heroic soldiers, but that does not alter the nature of the fight. What did our good and true and loyal soldiers die for out on those hillsides? Will Afghanistan ever be a beacon of democracy? Do we even care?

Beyond that, to risk a Thin Red Line-like reverie ...

How did the Taliban become an enemy of the U.S.? Why is it our business to kill them? Are the people of Afghanistan our enemies or our friends? Further, what of other countries whose business we have  been getting into -- Libya, Egypt, Tunisia, Syria and Iraq? Can the forces of arms achieve anything beyond the imposition of death? As the character of Capt. James 'Bugger' Staros thinks in "The The Thin Red Line", The tough part is, uh... Not knowing if you're doing any good. That's the hard part.

Now, a soldier on a COP does not ask these questions, but we as citizens should and must before sending the first soldier down range. It is to our eternal shame if we do not.

[cross-posted @ milpub.]

There is No Finish Line

--There is no finish line
--could be the tagline for the Phony War on Terror 

That's what these soldiers were asked to do:
Defend the indefensible
--President Obama at SSG Romesha's Medal of Honor ceremony

Everybody's gotta learn sometime
Everybody's gotta learn sometime
Everybody's gotta learn sometime 
--Everybody's Gotta Learn Sometime, Beck

I had a brother at Khe Sahn
Fighting off the Viet Cong
They're still there, he's all gone 
--Born in the U.S.A., Bruce Springsteen
_______________________

[This is Pt. II of Defending the Indefensible -- Romesha Medal of Honor]

Fighting and dying for indefensible terrain is the perfect metaphor for the war on terror. The President's utterance reveals the military's policy to be corrupt as a Bernie Madoff scam.

Ranger is discomfited because he remembers when soldiers trained to fight wars in order to win them, a goal not achieved in his lifetime. The spirit of the Army is the offense.  On Day One we learn that we have one function in life -- to take the battle to the enemy. This is far different thing than sending them across the world and slapping them into defensive positions. Wars are not won by defensive action.

As mentioned in "Defending the Indefensible" pt. I, the Army defends to buy time for reorganization and reconstitution, and to prepare to go on the offensive.  Until Counterinsurgency theory, everything was based on the attack to destroy the enemy or his will to fight. Now we call defending terrain indefinitely a "win", and occupy command outposts designed for no military purpose other than to have an option available for troop postings

While the defense of COP Keating in Kamdesh, Nuristan Province, was planned, it was not properly coordinated. In classic theatre-level ground combat there are a few rules for the defense: defense is planned or hasty; co-oordinated; mutually-supported; in -depth and strong enough to hold or attrit an enemy. At Keating, there were 52 soldiers but no reserve forces present that could have been utilized to influence the fight.

The defense was not in-depth as the soldiers had no secondary line of defense, nor could they fall back when pressed to nearby friendly units or alternate preplanned fighting positions. COP Keating was just like Wanat and Waygul: the only options were to fight to the death, or to surrender. These soldiers were decisively engaged before the first round went downrange.

Historically Infantry and Cavalry defenses are synergistic, interlocked and support one another by fire, whether direct or indirect, a fact which seems to elude United States Army planners in the PWOT© . Simply put, no commander should put a defensive position anywhere unless there is mutual support, secondary positions with adequate escape routes.  Also, there should be friendlies to act as reserve forces in a timely manner. The Quick Reaction Forces (QRFs) which arrived thirteen hours after the fight began does not qualify.

Why does the U.S. see fit to place soldiers in indefensible outposts?  Did these fights lead to a transition to offensive operations? Why does an Army defend a piece of terrain for no purpose? Why does the U.S. Army continue to do a job the Afghan Army should be doing? The U.S. military did the same thing in Iraq and Afghanistan as it did in the Republic of Vietnam (the 1st spectacular failure for the U.S. of COIN policy) -- we fought for terrain that did not affect the outcome of the war.

It is clear we can  attack and destroy the infrastructure and governments of places like Afghanistan and Iraq with less than a theatre-sized Army, but it is further clear that winning the invasion and regime change do not equal victory. Destroying a regime does not equate with creating a meaningful peace.


The failure of mighty U.S. Army in a site like Kamdesh gives lie to the idea that the U.S. is the sole Superpower in the world. Power comes in many guises.

An aside: It is interesting to note that three of the four living Medal of Honor recipients from Afghanistan chose to leave active duty. This is odd considering the status that an MOH winner has in the armed forces, which is basically holding a sort of godhood. Could this be a comment on the perception of the war on terror by those who have fought it?

Asymmetrical Awards

___________________

The military loves buzzwords like asymmetrical warfare, but often fails to examine the words beyond their simplest, most useful meaning.

If our wars are asymmetrical, then are our soldier's heroism and awards also become asymmetrical? Can asymmetrical warfare produce symmetrical valor and asymmetrical awards for this valor (i.e., medals)? Unlike Napoleon, the U.S. Army does not travel on its stomach but rather upon its awards and decorations. While we do not win many wars lately, but the awards sure do look good.

The Phony War on Terror (PWOT ©) is so insubstantial, unquantifiable and insignificant that the suffering and valor of the fights -- though real -- seem diminutive and illusory compared to symmetrical war standards. While our soldiers are exemplary, the so-called wars and battles are devoid of any meaning beyond the violence.

The awarding of medals for valor rests upon the assumption that the violence has a legitimate purpose. Medals try to reassure us that combat is not the same as a drive-by shooting or a barroom brawl. Our medals add dignity to an undignified endeavor, but one which it is presumably undertaken in order to reestablish some more positive order to society. All combat soldiers understand the undignified part of the equation; the only possible salvation is the idea that there is a larger purpose to the brutality.

A brief trip through past award winners gives an idea of what is being suggested:

Lew Millet led a company-sized bayonet assault against a dug-in and fortified Chinese main line of resistance. Contrast this against Staff Sergeant Robert Miller's death struggle; the substance is lacking (with no disrespect to Miller.)

Contrast Lt. Murray's Medal of Honor (MOH) to Gene Ashley's at the Battle of Lang Vei, or Franklin Miller's in Studies and Observations Group (SOG). Think of Crandall's MOH at LZ X-Ray, or Commando Kelley at Anzio. Think of Sergeant York. Think of the magnitude of these past battles.

Assuredly Lt. Murray met the standard for the award, but the scenario lacked military logic. One must ask: Why are we expending valor for no recognizable purpose?

Compare recent MOH winner SSG Salvatore Giunta to Captain Donlon's award, the first of the U.S. Vietnam War. Think of SSG Basilone on Guadalcanal. If Basilone had caved, the perimeter of a Regiment would have been fractured. One man prevented the collapse of a front, while SSG Guinta saved two men. Again, SSG Giunta acted with courage and valor, but it is a flavorless meal leaving no sense of fulfillment.

Perhaps that is why SSG Giunta was angry upon being interviewed after receiving his award. Perhaps he understood the essential insignificance of the losses his unit incurred, for it is there where he put his emphasis -- on the loss, rather than the gain.

The award is real, but the circumstances are like wisps of pipe smoke in nature.

{SFC Smith's MOH is not mentioned because this was a force-on-force battle on a conventional battlefield, and was not asymmetrical warfare.}

The actions of all of the Medals of Honor from Iraq and Afghanistan pale to insignificance when viewed historically. This is not a criticism of our soldiers but rather of our political leadership which puts brave men in untenable circumstances. It should be noted: All of the awards in Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan did not add up (will not add up) to victory.

Valor is too precious to expend frivolously. It is apparent that our soldiers are now pawns and targets in incomprehensible and unjustifiable conflicts, and all the sound bytes and awards cannot justify the non-military complexion of the violence.

[RAW will occasionally re-post relevant entries which received no play during their original postings.
Asymmetrical Awards is a re-post of 12.7.10 entry.]

Goodwill Hunting, III

Do I dare
Disturb the universe?
In a minute there is time
For decisions and revisions
which a minute will reverse
--The Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock,
T.S. Eliot

I thought when I was a young man
That I would conquer the world with truth.
I thought I would lead an Army greater than
Alexander ever dreamed of,
not to conquer nations but to liberate mankind.
With truth. With the golden sound of the word.
But only a few of then heard.
Only a few of you understood
--How Green was My Valley (1941)

We are turning into a nation
of whimpering slaves to Fear—
fear of war, fear of poverty,
fear of random terrorism,
fear of getting down-sized
or fired because of the plunging economy,
fear of getting evicted for bad debts
or suddenly getting locked up in a military detention camp
on vague charges of being a terrorist sympathizer
--Hunter Thompson
___________________

Do we think beyond the buzz words and the emotional, feel-good rhetoric of false logic and weak-kneed patriotism? These are further thoughts on the bogus military mission of "goodwill".

It is as if we are trapped in the lyrics of a cheap country western song espousing uber-patriotic themes. We may be able to wrap ourselves in the flag and award magnificent medals for the expenditure of lives, but this does not justify the tableau.

Where in the Principles of War is that of Goodwill? Doesn't a forced U.S. entry into an Afghan valley simply reinforce their militancy and further disconnect them from our goals and the ephemeral hold of their make-believe government? This not about us, and their definition of Goodwill might sound a lot like the statement, "Stay our of my valley!"

The question seems, "How does one dare disturb this universe created by a warrior mentality (ours) that bumps head-on with another entrenched warrior society (theirs)?" It is clear that we can back off, but they have too much skin in the game to do so.

A clean, sterile award ceremony in the White House cannot relieve the stench of death surrounding our leaders. This stench belongs to them, and not men like Medal of Honor recipients Meyer, Miller or Murphy.

O Sole Mio

But she goes not abroad,
in search of monsters to destroy
She is the champion and vindicator
only of her own.
She is the well-wisher to
the freedom and independence of all
--John Quincy Adams

You can't do Right

Wrong,

and you can't do Wrong,

Right!

--seen in American Craft Magazine

(Dec/Jan 2012)

______________________

Terrorism is often called "War on the Cheap", and one must wonder if that is true of the Phony War on Terror (PWOT ©), also.

We say the U.S. is the lone Superpower, and that We Support the Troops, but sometimes things aren't as hoped for. In the Waygul battle, and in the three Medal of Honor scenarios (Murphy, Miller and Meyer), the troops received sketchy support -- conduct not meet for the world's sole Superpower.

Waygul (503rd) featured a U.S. Platoon with an inexperienced platoon leader, non-existent engineer support and an inadequate supply of water (Ranger bets the insurgents had adequate water sources). The Platoon could not be reinforced by road or air cover, to include drones -- a dodgy force protection posture, at best. Yet this did not spur anyone in the chain of command to review the mission statement.

The troops soldiered on until nine were Killed in Action and 16 Wounded in Action, causing one to question the logic of utilizing far-flung command outposts that lack proper support, mutual support or adequate logistical support. Is this how Superpowers support their troops in the face of the enemy? Ranger tabs and jump wings will not stop a bullet, contrary to popular belief.

There is a systemic infection across the spectrum of these actions, and this is a weakness in planning and execution. With Lt. Murphy we have three men killed and "one lone survivor", and award a MOH based upon one live witness. The other witnesses were on the other end of a radio link.

Staff Sergeant Miller's MOH was foreshadowed by Lt. Murphy's three years earlier, and was a precursor to Meyer's fight. RangerAgainstWar has discussed each of these engagements per available open-source material, but all leave uncomfortable, unanswered questions.

And the rest of the leading quotation is below. Our esteemed leaders might take some guidance from a not-so-distant luminary in America's intellectual and political arsenal:

She well knows that by once enlisting under other banners than her own, were they even the banners of foreign independence, she would involve herself beyond the power of extrication, in all the wars of interest and intrigue, of individual avarice, envy, and ambition, which assume the colors and usurp the standard of freedom.

--John Quincy Adams, On U.S. Foreign Policy (1821)

Goodwill Hunting, II

--Self conqueror wall mural taken by reader
"Enrico" in Thailand

"My good fool," said a learned bystander,

"Your operations are mad."

"You are too candid," cried the candid man,

And when his stick left the head of the learned bystander

It was two sticks

--War is Kind and Other Lines,

Stephen Crane

Action

I got so much to give

I want to give it

I want to get some, too

--I Love the Nightlife,

Alicia Bridges

__________________

Pt. II -- Goodwill Hunting:

So is it any wonder the ostensible goodwill mission turned into a slugfest? The surprise is that the Command did not worst case plan this escapade, and the troops paid the price.

Do we care that the citation was embellished, or that five brave and good Americans died that day for a Goodwill Mission? Is Goodwill Hunting a new mission for a Rifle Platoon or Company? Following are a few rhetorical observations:

McClatchey reports in Dancing Goat II: "The Americans and an Afghan soldier were later found in a trench to which they had retreated." Retreated is not the correct term for what First Lt. Michael E. Johnson, Gunnery Sergeant Edwin W. Johnson, Petty Officer 3rd Class James R. Layton (medic) and Staff Sergeant Aaron M. Kenefick did that day. Retreating indicates an attempt to evacuate the battle area after having cashed it in.

Instead, these men were employing the cover that was available. They were in contact with a superior force and they were falling back under enemy pressure. They did not turn their backs, and this describes their deaths more accurately than calling it a retreat. They died in military order.

Ditto the paper's description of the MOH "winners". The medal of Honor is not won, it is conferred; they are "recipients". The implication of the word winner emanates from a sport culture divided into winners and losers, but the battlefield is not such a game. It could be said that even when one "wins", one has lost on some profound level.

But these are small points. The real point is that we have a President and a USMC Commandant that do not ask the correct questions. Both focus on the actions at the objective to the detriment and exclusion of questions that should be and need to be discussed. Those questions concern command actions which should have been considered before the unit was task organized and launched.

Casting aspersions upon Meyer's actions obscures the fact that good men died needlessly because of poor planning, which leads inevitable to faulty execution. The negative superlatives must fall upon the chain of command to include a Commander in Chief who continues such a senseless war.

The USMC was determined to produce a live MOH recipient and institutionally set out to do so. Controversy resulted, and an MOH recipient who left the Corps as soon as he could put on his hat.

We will close with a comment by then-Lance Cpl. Meyer:

"When somebody calls me a hero, I almost feel sick to my stomach. I'm getting recognized for what I did, but this medal is not about me. It's about the men and women serving right now, and those who will be serving afterward. They're the true heroes" (Man of Honor).

Goodwill Hunting

Nobody does it better
Makes me feel sad for the rest
Nobody does it half as good as you
Baby, you're the best
--Nobody Does it Better,
Carly Simon

99% of us are in the top 1%
--Old quip on Officer Efficiency Reports
___________________

Hyperbole and superlatives have always been the military way.

Everything is "Outstanding" or "Excellent". We speak about "Can do", "Drive on" and "Hooah!" (or, OohRah, for the Marines), and we are surprised that Corporal Meyer's Medal of Honor citation narrative had exaggerations? This is no surprise to anyone who ever wore combat boots or carried a rifle.

Before driving on, let us get straight on Meyer: On his chest he wears a Navy Commendation with "V" device (valor). Like MOH recipient Staff Sergeant Miller before him, who had two Army Commendation medals with "V", Meyer had proven his valor and devotion to duty previous to his MOH encounter. Both men displayed the highest level of valor, and it is not their fault if their citations were inflated.

It is common to "gild the lily" in such reports, knowing that higher HQ's will usually downgrade an award IF it is not properly superlative in nature. This is an institutional bias and independent of the recipients.

With Meyer, as always the questions asked are the wrong ones. We should not question the valor of men like Murphy, Miller and Meyer, but rather ask, "Why were their actions were so desperate?" Why were they thrown into situations that required men to die needlessly for a questionable mission? Soldiers die, but their deaths should have meaning beyond shallow patriotism.

Going on open source material (sans Operations Order [OPORD] or After-Action Report [AAR]), the planned action is too sordid and questionable even before the first round is fired. The questions devolve to questions about the command responsibility of higher Headquarters.

McClatchey describes Meyer's action as a "savage gunfight in East Afghanistan" (14 Dec 11); in Meyer's Maxim interview (12 Dec 11), "Meyers and Chavez provide security at the Objective Rally Point (ORP) while the members . . . enter the Ganjgal village on foot."

Since this was an assigned mission and had an Objective Rally Point (ORP), we know that the team was executing an approach march to make contact, or to enter the village. We also know or trust that the team knew there would be contact at some level of engagement. It is safe to assume that their movement to contact was not an Easter egg hunt, and that they utilized appropriate Infantry tactics.

These tactics include point element, dispersion, over-watch, cover and concealment (as possible), team integrity and patrol HQ controlling the movement. This could not be an ambush -- as some have indicated -- because the unit knew that they were in a danger zone before the shooting began.

If you accept this, than what follows must be true based upon 220 years of U.S. Army patrolling skills which have translated into accepted Infantry rules and practice. There are no news flashes here; Rogers' Rules for Rangers outlined conduct for such situations, as did Carlson's Raiders of World War II USMC fame. Contrary to the line we are fed that fighting in Afghanistan and the Phony War on Terror (PWOT ©) is a new form of warfare, there is nothing new under the sun.

All actions are like an old M1 rifle and composed of three parts: The Front, The Middle and The Back. When pre-planning a mission we use backward planning steps and follow standard troop leading procedure. All of these actions should be in the OPORD and are SOP in most units. Here is the breakdown:

Front: Actions before mission
Middle: Actions during mission
Back: Actions after mission

Actions before include command responsibility for:

• Arranging fire support
• Weighting the action for success
• Medical and communication
• Actions of Adjacent or friendly units in supporting distance
• Quick Reaction Force (QRF) considerations
• Beans and Bullets (=all logistical functions)
• Air assets
• Photo and satellite imagery
• Agent reports
• Enemy order of battle. What should the patrol expect during the execution phase? What should the soldiers expect to await them?

Instead, failure occurred on several accounts. From the reports,

• Fire support was non-responsive and not pre-planned. Fire planning is not something done "on the fly". It is too late to pre-plan after decisive engagement; it is an oxymoron.
  

• Gunships were not pre-planned. Guns and fire support were an afterthought.

• Medical support was sketchy. Only one medic can be identified, and he was Killed in Action. Where is the best place to situate the medic -- with the assault element or at the ORP? Were the team members certified as Combat Lifesavers and if so, how could they perform this function if they were operating their rifles and required to fight for the life of the team?

• Was there a readily available escape route? Since the ORP was identified, why was there no provision for the team to fall back and assemble on the ORP? This, after all, is the function of this location.

• Did the U.S. troops, the Marines and the Afghan National Army (ANA) members have any operational planning or training operating as a joint force prior to this mission?
  

• What was the mission? What was this team to accomplish with the assets at hand? Was it realistic?

McClatchey states that the action "began as a goodwill mission by Afghan troops and American trainers", yet conspicuously absent were any civilian Afghan representatives. Further, how can a force of "About 20 Marines, 50 Army troops, 70 ANA soldiers and border police" possible be construed as a "goodwill mission"?

Imagine yourself an Afghan in a remote valley and 140 heavily-armed and dangerous men are approaching your village. Googling "Goodwill" will not fetch this image.


Tomorrow: Pt II, Goodwill Hunting

Dancing in the Dark

Stay on the streets of this town
and they'll be carving you up alright
They say you gotta stay hungry
hey baby I'm just about starving tonight
--Dancing in the Dark, Bruce Springsteen

Look, there is one statement that bothers me
more than anything else, and that's the idea
that when the troops are in combat
everybody has to shut up.
Imagine if we put troops in combat
with a faulty rifle, and that rifle was malfunctioning
and troops were dying as a result.
I can't think anyone would allow that to happen,
that would not speak up.

Well, what's the difference between a faulty plan
and strategy that's getting just as many troops killed?
--General Anthony Zinni (USMC, ret'd, former
CENTCOM Commander in Chief)

You are a fear prisoner.
Yes, you are a product of fear
--Donnie Darko (2001)
_____________________

Recent discussion of Waygul and the Medal of Honor actions in Afghanistan returned the lessons of a distant classroom to mind.

Once upon a time the Army had a doctrine that Captains fight battles, and Colonels and Generals get them there. They also arrange for the ash-and-trash items needed to fulfill the mission. Waygul and Murphy, Miller and Meyer's battles should have been fought by Captains committing their forces to destroy the enemy. All of the units did this to the best of human capacity, but that was not enough. Why?

This led me to ponder the history of the U.S. Civil War (since surely that is what the current wars will devolve into for their own respective peoples). Until Gettysburg, the Army of the Potomac was kicked around every battlefield by General Lee's Army of Northern Virginia. The Union Army was never out-fought or out-soldiered, but they were always out-Generaled, until Gettysburg.

Gettysburg was the first battle in which Union Generals actually generaled their Army and allowed the Captains and enlisted soldiers to fight the enemy on their own terms. The fights in Afghanistan are similar as our soldiers always fight properly, but the Colonels and Generals are not holding up their end.

The soldiers arrive at the battlefield, but they do not get a level playing field because the battlefield is never properly prepared: Items like fire support, medical evacuation, maneuver plans and follow-on forces and reserves are conspicuously missing. Pressure is not maintained on the enemy, and he is allowed to break contact after inflicting predictable casualties upon U.S. soldiers.

The U.S. Army in Afghanistan resembles Lee at Gettysburg without his cavalry screening his Army. Without this screen, Lee had no idea what forces he was facing until he developed the situation, which is what he did, at a disadvantage. U.S. forces in Afghanistan have that same feel of desperately trying to develop the situation, which must be the reason for the lopsided fights that we are seeing.

Meanwhile, what are the Colonels and Generals contributing to the effort? It is strange that the mighty U.S. forces are being out-generaled by folks fighting in shower shoes. This would not make Generals Lee or Meade very happy.

Like Lee at Gettysburg, the U.S. is fighting in the dark.

Knocking on Heaven's Door

--Iain Green, The Scotsman

Old Army joke:

Q: What's the difference between
the Army and the Boy Scouts?
A: The Boy Scouts have adult leadership

The lieutenant's battle was over
His bravery had little impact on the course of the fight.
He could not rescue the men on Topside,
and those who survived would have done so anyway
--Echoes from a Distant Battlefield,
Mark Bowdon

The worst is yet to come
--Arthur Schopenhauer
___________________

Before analyzing the action of latest Medal of Honor recipient, Dakota Meyer, it is important to place it in context of previous Afghanistan engagements. The U.S. has been fighting a war that looks instead like a series of meeting engagements. At its worst, this looks like blind men bumping into each other in the dark.

The brave yet futile actions of Lt. Brostrom in the gunfight at Waygul (503rd) keeps intruding in Ranger's thoughts because it typifies so much of the warfare being conducted over there.

All Afghan MOH scenarios were gunfights like Waygul -- meeting engagements that could have been developed into a real tactical issue, save they lacked an exploitation phase; they had a movement to contact and a contact phase, and then disintegrated. Battles should proceed well beyond this simplicity of action.

The action at Waygul typifies the Phony War on Terror (PWOT ©) Afghanistan campaigns, characterized as they are by hubris, accompanied by incompetence and tactical and strategic blundering. Though the soldiers fought bravely, their actions take us nowhere.

Military missions follow statements, which outline goals and methodology for success. They serve a larger purpose which is to win more than just the immediate skirmish. But in Afghanistan we have failed to develop most of these situations (engagements) by breaking contact, thereby violating every military rule for success. At least, that is what the recent Medal of Honor citations suggest.

In comparison, in World War II at Iwo Jima there were 27 MOH's in some of the deadliest ground combat U.S. forces have ever experienced. However, every one of these acts of bravery took the U.S. one step closer to victory in the Pacific. In the PWOT ©, we can't even define victory, but that does not stop us from expending our soldier's valor in search of that unquantifiable goal.

Adult leadership, be it from politicians or military leaders, should provide something other than the flimsiest of reasons for fighting, killing and dying based on the John Wayne pretext of "killing bag guys". The soldiers at Waygul and all the other gunfights did what U.S. soldiers always do, they fought as ordered. But where were the adult leaders? Unfortunately, the Army command structure does not ask this question, the answer to which would provide the key to analyzing any action and understanding its success or failure.

The platoon at Waygul was left flapping in the breeze, building a Command Outpost (COP) sans additional support. A platoon whose Company Commander was completing a 15-6 investigation statement rather than addressing the tactical concerns of a unit flung far forward in a dubious tactical environment.

The Commander was covering his ass doing paperwork, and he was doing so with the concurrence of the Battalion Commander. This is the Army. The Company Commander was prioritizing administrative over combat tasks, and therefore could not provide adult leadership. However, the Battalion Commander could have solved the problem by re-assigning the mission to a Company whose Commander was not otherwise occupied with administrative issues. Men die when priorities are skewed.

Key questions from the Wanat battle:

• Why even establish a COP flung forward without proper support? This is a kin to putting cannons on the Titanic to ward off icebergs.

• Did the Brigade Commander, Executive Officer (XO), S-2, S-3 or Command Sergeant Major (CSM) ever walk the terrain or do a map study? Was the feasibility of the venture war-gamed? Where were the adults?

• Ditto Battalion Commander, XO, S-2, S-3 and CSM.
  

• Where was the Company 1st Sergeant?

It is clear that the Platoon was sent on a mission that the Platoon leader was incapable of completing, and his effort was not weighted for success as the iceberg approached. All the adult leaders were elsewhere or otherwise occupied to do more than cast a passing glance at a platoon ground pounding on heaven's door.

If a U.S. Platoon as part of a Company in a Battalion as part of a Brigade in an Airborne unit cannot build a COP, then we must consider seriously what they can do! The same comment applies to the Murphy, Miller and Meyer MOH actions.

All the actions seen in these Afghan campaigns lead one to question the state of training of units and individuals, officers and enlisted men, alike. No amount of valor can trump a lack of technical and tactical expertise. The fights considered here are conspicuously lacking these features.

Waygul, the most discussed small unit action in the Afghan experience, provides a microcosm of the systemic failures eroding an entire Army's ability to fight a nebulous succession of engagements in the no man's land of a tribal society.

The bravery of our soldiers cannot counter these failures.


NEXT: Meeting Engagements