Terms of Endearment

By all that you hold dear on this good earth,
I bid you stand, Men of the West!
--Aragorn's speech at the Black Gate
Lord of the Rings, J. R. R. Tolkien

Where you've fallen, you will stay.
In the whole universe this one
and only place is the sole place
which you have made your very own
--On the Wall of a KZ Lager,
Janos Pilinszky

Everything a lie. Everything you hear,
everything you see. So much to spew out.
They just keep coming, one after another.
You're in a box. A moving box
They want you dead, or in their lie
--A Thin Red Line (1998)
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When considering terrorism or the militarization of a society, the American Revolution is a good place to start.

Let us address terms so simple nobody knows what they mean, though they use them like common coin.

In the spectrum of conflict, what is terrorism – a term which should have been defined before basing a worldwide war upon it. What is a “conflict”? Is peacekeeping (PKO) an “act of war”? Is the latter a military or a political action? Both?

Is a revolution the same thing as a rebellion? Are rebels considered soldiers? Are revolutions wars? Are Civil Wars revolutions? Are revolutions guerrilla wars or unconventional wars? Can they be all three, and be so at the same time? Can a revolution be a conventional war?

Can Counterinsurgency be a conventional war? Does winning hearts and minds have any relevance to the battlefield? Do won hearts translate to positive action? Are hearts as fickle as minds?

If COIN is not a viable mode of warfare, then what is? Is COIN terrorism counteraction? Does a nation invade another in a presumptive strike to avoid a possibility of terrorism emanating from that source? Do such invasions affect hearts and minds negatively? Do invaders ever bring peace? Are invasion and peacekeeping polar opposites, or are they the same?

If COIN is not a valid theory, then what is? Are invasions sound preemptive policy? If COIN is not the prescription for terrorism, then what is? Are military options even viable? Are there any examples of successful military operations against terrorists on a national level? Are all armies based upon terror?

Is all military power terrorism? Is institutional (governmental) violence more legitimate than non-state use of terror?

Further, are police actions wars? Are they conflicts? Can both sides be right in a war? Are wars ever justified? If so, when? Is there “good” versus “bad” killing? Is assassination an act of war?

Do warriors conduct a legitimate form of violence? Are soldiers warriors? Are warriors covered by the Geneva Conventions? Are terrorists soldiers? Are partisans soldiers? Do partisans use terror as a tactic? Are Hellfire missiles a form of terror?

Are these questions answerable? Do we define these terms currently in a meaningful manner? Do our Army manuals address and reflect these questions? Do our leaders think in these terms?

If the American Revolution was legitimate, then why are not other revolutions? Why does the U.S. support some revolutions, start others via covert operations, and oppose others (sometimes doing all three concurrently)?

Why is a Civil War not right for Iraq and Afghanistan, but it was right for America? Why do we use sneak attacks after fighting a war, especially since we were “sneak-attacked” at Pearl Harbor? Is sneakiness o.k. for our Special Operations?

Are Black Operations legal? Why are they classified?

A few idle thoughts for your consideration.

Variations on a Theme

--Brian Shivers could play his ownself in the film

Give Ireland Back To The Irish
Don't Make Them Have To Take It Away
Give Ireland Back To The Irish
Make Ireland Irish Today
--Give Ireland Back to the Irish,
Paul McCartney and Wings

So hold on to your rifles boys and don't give up your dream
Of a Republic for the workin' class economic liberty
Then Jem yelled out "Oh Citizens this system is a curse
An English boss is a monster an Irish one even worse"
--James Connolly, Black 47

So you saved your shillings and your last six pence
Cause in God's name they built a barbed wire fence
Be glad you sailed for a better day
But don't forget there'll be hell to pay
--Rebels of the Sacred Heart,
Flogging Molly
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Brian Shivers was convicted two weeks ago of the murder of two soldiers during a Real IRA gun attack on Massereene Army base in Northern Ireland three years ago. The Guardian, The Telegraph, GlobalPost and MSNBC call him a "dissident"; Reuters calls him a "nationalist". Ten years after the events of 9.11.01, we still use the terms interchangeably, though they are not commensurate.

The answer as to Mr. Shivers' correct label depends upon which side of the fence you live. In 1975, an armed Irish Republican Army member killing an armed British soldier would have been declared simple terrorism, but everything is pumped up today. Terrorism mutates according to the needs of the political climate.

History lessons are in order: Ireland was the first British colony, and though we often view it as integral part of the British empire, not all the Irish see it that way. Technically, Ireland's colonial existence is in violation of the World War II Atlantic Charter that set the elimination of colonialism as a war goal. Britons are on board with this, except in the case of Ireland. (Yes, Ranger actually wore orange into an Irish pub on St. Patrick's Day, but he did not know why he was getting the evil eye, being a Slovak and all.)

In this sense, the IRA may be seen as a legitimate "separatist" movement, or an insurgency or guerrilla war. It could also be seen as an unconventional war since it fits within the parameters of all of those events. The IRA and the ETA are the only two Euroterror groups that share the distinction of having a possible validity behind their violence (as seen from their perspective.)

However, the questions remain the same: How do we define terrorists, dissidents, insurgents and militants? What are their differences, and where do they overlap? Without correct terminology, how can they be appropriately dealt with? Our definitions are often vague and in accordance with political expediencies, but if something is legally vague, that usually equates to unconstitutionality.

An example of the expediency angle is a recent 60 Minutes episode featuring the Emir of Qatar which marveled over his game plan for improving life within his little sandbox. However, the Emir is also a big contributor to Hamas and Hizbollah; Hamas is recognized by the EU and many others as a terrorist organization, and the Council on Foreign Relations states the U.S. recognizes Hizbollah as terrorist, as well.

So why does the U.S. Department of Justice bust pathetic little pawns in the terror game while the big machers like the Emir continue to play their hand, untouched by U.S. sanctions? When Iran supports such groups the U.S. goes ballistic, yet the Emir openly provides material support to two Middle Eastern terrorist organizations. We step on the ants while the elephant sits in the middle of the room.

In addition to proper definition, we need to enact the proper responses. The British, French, Italian, Spanish and German governments neutered and countered domestic terror by applying the rule of law to the issue. There is nothing that a terror group can do that is not against the existing laws of all civilized societies (with the exception of propaganda and some financial aspects, but U.S. law covers these with "material support" and "conspiracy" charges.) Kidnapping, murder, extortion and bomb-making all violate national laws.

The terror threats faced by Europe in the 1970's and '80's are different than those faced by the U.S. today, but the concept remains the same. All terrorists are criminals, bottom line, and laws are on the books to deal with criminals.

Unless we treat them as such we will lose the war that we claim is against terrorism. When we ignore the reality of our legal system, we lose our legitimacy.

Defiance

The Bielski family and partisans

The people can be oppressed
by violent measures,
but they cannot be governed by them
--Leo Tolstoy, letter to Czar Nicholas II

Those who cannot remember the past
are condemned to repeat it
--George Santayana

Shall I tell you what the real evil is?
To cringe to the things that are called evils,
to surrender to them our freedom,
in defiance of which we ought to face any suffering
--Lucius Annaeus Seneca
________________

Defiance is a book (1993) and a movie (2008) based upon the lives of the Bielski partisans of World War II. The group was named after the organizers, a family of Polish Jews who rescued Jews from extermination and fought against the Nazi German occupiers and their collaborators in Poland. They saved approximately 1,200 Jewish lives.

The Bielski's story is but one of many amazing wartime stories of average people who endure while pitted against overwhelming odds, many of which are probably lost to history. Of the Bielski group, 70% were women, children, and the elderly; about 150 were shooters. The movie delivers a highly romanticized version of a dire existence, replete with the sensitive Nazi.

Ranger found the Bielski's behavior links with classic unconventional and guerrilla warfare, though their primary function was to ensure the survival of its Jewish members. His personal SF training was the result of the U.S. adopting UW/GW experience which evolved from the OSS in WW II, reflective of partisan and resistance warfare of WW II. This type of warfare was fought in all theatres in that war, and were aimed if not at destroying, then hamstringing the armies of occupation of the Axis forces.

Partisan units existed to harass, destroy and generally force the occupiers to dilute the combat power of their maneuver units by diverting them to fight the partisans. The titular use of the term is not exactly correct since the partisans existed to fight, where the Bielski unit existed primarily to save Jews; they fought only when forced to engage enemy forces.

The regular armies of the Allies provided trainers and support for Partisans which enabled the UW/GW forces to exist behind enemy lines. The Bielski unit received limited aid from the organized Soviet partisan units. Though minor, it is doubtful the Bielskis could have endured without it.

Another key point relevant to today's UW/GW scenarios is that the unit would not have survived without the active and passive support -- regardless of how meagre -- of the local population.

WW II is now 66 years old. Can such units still exist in future wars? Will Special Forces maintain their classic OSS/UW/GW orientation in future conflicts? Has Special Forces performed as UW/GW assets in the Phony War on Terror (PWOT ©) , or has their performance been a weak approximation of the OSS template?

The OSS types were originally organized to infiltrate enemy-occupied territory to link up with and train UW forces, then task-organizing them for actual combat operations. All UW/GW operations of significance in WW II complemented the Allied Armies' tactical plans.

Partisans were used to target specific objectives and were discouraged and disallowed from random and unfocused attacks upon the Axis forces. Although the UW/GW units were not strictly military organizations, they were compelled to operate in a military manner.

After WW II, the USSF was organized to operate with partisans and dissident groups in areas occupied by the Warsaw Pact forces. In the Republic of Vietnam, the Special Forces supported the government of Vietnam, while in Europe they opposed the governments of the Iron Curtain countries. This shows the SF -- like the sword in our unit patch -- is a double-edged weapon which will cut in both directions.

The question is, will SF retain its original function as an UW/GW force multiplier if the U.S. were to engage in a conventional ground war? Can organizations like the Bielski Partisans survive today's battlefield scenarios? Are partisan units a concept that is still within the realm of military logic?

A good story should provoke such thoughts on the relevance of its topic to the present day.

Run, Forrest, Run

Paresh Nath (UAE)

Good. Bad. I'm the guy with the gun
--Army of Darkness (1992)

The race is not to the swift,
nor the battle to the strong
--Ecclesiastes, 9:11

Mama says they was magic shoes.
They could take me anywhere
--Forrest Gump (1994)
______________

By all MSM reports, General Stanley A. McChrystal is the Man With a Plan (instead of the hired assassin he actually is.)

Most press indicates the war in Afghanistan is reverting to Square One, and we will now kick ass and take names. No more of the screw up it has actually become. Been there, done that. General McChrystal will be the New Spartan Messiah, a savior ushering in that smell of victory.

The warm and fuzzy McChrystal stories invariably note that the General runs 10 miles before he begins each busy day, spreading democracy like Neufchatel on toast. (Not too thick, mind, or Afghanistan couldn't propagate the stifling Sharia snatch-and-catch marriage laws perpetuated by U.S. tax dollars.)

But why is the running even mentioned? We had a Joggin' President in Bush, and that didn't seem to help matters much. (As an aside, former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright was asked on NPR what she would title Bush's autobiography, to which she answered without a blink, "Exercise, Exercise, Exercise.")

Could Generals Washington, Knox, Scott, Lee, Grant, Pershing, Eisenhower, Patton, Creighton Abrams or Powell run even half a mile? When did jogging ability equate with the fitness of a Theatre Army level Commander?

Ranger wonders if any of the Taliban leaders ever jog, or can even run a mile. Even so, they can hump their gear and traverse their terrain as their wars with the Greeks, British, Russians and Americans clearly indicate.

General McChrystal can run like Forrest Gump, but that is not going to alter the outcome of the Phony War on Terror (PWOT ©) in Afghanistan. The Taliban leaders are going to persist a lot longer than Runnin' McChrystal. It is not the hare that wins the UW/GW war, but rather, the turtle.

Physicality is not the measure of how one wins wars. Advertising campaigns keep us thinking that the Army of One and the "General-Corporal" idea will keep us Army Strong. It was with General David Petraeus that the idea of physical fitness = success was first pressed upon us.

The Rangers and Special Forces may be able to march 40 miles with a ruck and full battle rattle, with minimum rest breaks. But the Vietcong were skinny little malnourished, malaria-ridden fighters, and they held their own.

Just ask Generals Washington, Sam Houston or Giap. Even Mao Zedong, to keep the spirit of Counterinsurgency thinking alive.

What's So Special?

A d0-gooder is an enslaver,
for they think they should go and save the world,
or amend situations to which they have no business [amending],
for the situations need to occur in order for
a working or a desire to be fulfilled,
and who are they to say what that is?
--Voyage to the New World, Ramtha

Ignorance is God's prison
--Emptiness, Rumi
________________

In his book Packing Inferno (courtesy friend tw), former Marine Tyler Boudreaux illustrates the folly of imposing "hearts and minds" theory at the hands of Infantry battalions. After a brief moment of falling back into a reverie on how Special Forces was and is the prime Counterinsurgency tool in the Army's kit, Ranger must agree with Boudreaux's assessment.

What makes the SF any sharper of a blade than that of the USMC, and how do their missions differ?

Historically, SF missions have been:

• Internal Defense and Development [IDAD], which has morphed into nation building and Provisional Reconstruction Teams [PRT's]

• Unconventional Warfare/Guerrilla Warfare [UW/GW]

• Strategic Intelligence and Reconnaissance

• Direct Action

While all fit into COIN, they have lost their strategic relevance. Even in the heady early days of the U.S. Afghan invasion, SF did not operate in the traditional UW/GW scenario of the Jedburgh mode. SF did not recruit, train or accompany the Northern Alliance when overthrowing the Taliban. They simply tagged along, presenting feel-good photo-ops. The Northern Alliance did not need anything in the form of training -- all they needed was beans and bullets. It is doubtful they even needed U.S. intel on the Taliban.

The Special Operations Forces haven't exactly formed "A" Camps, CIDG forces, Mobile Guerrilla Forces [Mike Forces], regional forces or any special projects of significance (if so, they are kept hidden.) In the days of super high-resolution, real-time photo intelligence, strategic recon seems OBE.

This leaves Direct Action [D.A.], the ground of all military combat elements, but the least effective employment of SF assets. SF is devolving into mini Ranger Battalions. What is being lost is the thing that distinguishes them -- the finesse and nuance, which earned them the well-deserved title, "Sneaky Petes".

D.A. is why God made Rangers and Marines. When SF and SEALS are used as assault infantry, then a fine tool is being misutilized. Conventional commanders simply don't know how to synergistically employ SF assets as force multipliers [Note: We are not talking SOF assets; we are talking SF and SEAL.]

Rangers, Force Recon Marines and Marines are classic Infantry assault troops of world-class quality. It is doubtful that any foreign military equals their level of expertise. But the point is, D.A. is not a hearts and minds moment. It is closing with and destroying a hostile force, which is not what COIN is all about, as Boudreaux points out. Killing the indig is not nation building.

The book challenges us to consider what actually makes the SF special. It certainly is not the beret, since everyone wears one these days.