Principles of War

Don't throw the past away
You might need it some rainy day
Dreams can come true again
When everything old is new again
--Everything Old is New Again,
Peter Allen
_________________

Ranger submitted an entry to a contest held by the The U.S. Naval Institute's journal Proceedings several years back on the topic of warfare -- "Rethinking the Future Nature of Conflict". Needless to say, his neanderthal, non-4 GW thinking merited not so much as a nod.

But hearing Tyler Boudreau, former-Marine Captain and author of "Packing Inferno," address the topic of mission on National Public Radio this weekend got us thinking once again about mission and so-called New Nature of War. Simply: Everything is exactly the same as it was pre-9-11-01. No change. Nada.

The Constitution and the Rules of War are exactly as relevant and correct as they have always been. Clausewitz is alive and well. Even Sun-Tzu is still kicking! Asymmetrical warfare my ass. That's the way it has always been, just with new toys, now.

The Principles of War, as defined in the Army FM-3 Military Operations, were taught in 3rd-year ROTC class, so basic that all officers should be able to recite them in their sleep. Since our military leaders seem in a deep slumber, this is probably the only time they ponder the verity of these nine guiding principles. (If the reader doubts this, ask any officer to tick these off. Ranger will buy you a beer if you get a complete and correct answer.)

To a military man, these nine are more important than the 10 Commandments. They are:

• Mass
• Objective
• Offensive
• Surprise
• Economy of Force
• Maneuver
• Unity of Command
• Security
• Simplicity

The principles apply to classic military operations, of which counterinsurgency is anything but. We try to operate as COIN, yet apply conventional combat power to the situation in a most inappropriate manner. Following classic Clausewitzian philosophy, this will ensure that COIN will fail.

COIN is not warfare, and therein lies the rub. Classic combat operations insure the defeat of COIN theory and practice. Our political and military leaders have futilely been trying to fit COIN into a war formula, and trying to accommodate the war formula to fit COIN. The Principles of War are being ignored in the Phony War on Terror (PWOT ©), though we carry on as though at war.

We have lost our way. The only things being advanced are careers on the backs of the taxpayers and dead and wounded soldiers. All in a war that isn't a war, and a COIN experiment that isn't COIN.

If a Captain of USMC Infantry can see this, then why can't the Chiefs of Staff of the Services?

What's So Special?

A d0-gooder is an enslaver,
for they think they should go and save the world,
or amend situations to which they have no business [amending],
for the situations need to occur in order for
a working or a desire to be fulfilled,
and who are they to say what that is?
--Voyage to the New World, Ramtha

Ignorance is God's prison
--Emptiness, Rumi
________________

In his book Packing Inferno (courtesy friend tw), former Marine Tyler Boudreaux illustrates the folly of imposing "hearts and minds" theory at the hands of Infantry battalions. After a brief moment of falling back into a reverie on how Special Forces was and is the prime Counterinsurgency tool in the Army's kit, Ranger must agree with Boudreaux's assessment.

What makes the SF any sharper of a blade than that of the USMC, and how do their missions differ?

Historically, SF missions have been:

• Internal Defense and Development [IDAD], which has morphed into nation building and Provisional Reconstruction Teams [PRT's]

• Unconventional Warfare/Guerrilla Warfare [UW/GW]

• Strategic Intelligence and Reconnaissance

• Direct Action

While all fit into COIN, they have lost their strategic relevance. Even in the heady early days of the U.S. Afghan invasion, SF did not operate in the traditional UW/GW scenario of the Jedburgh mode. SF did not recruit, train or accompany the Northern Alliance when overthrowing the Taliban. They simply tagged along, presenting feel-good photo-ops. The Northern Alliance did not need anything in the form of training -- all they needed was beans and bullets. It is doubtful they even needed U.S. intel on the Taliban.

The Special Operations Forces haven't exactly formed "A" Camps, CIDG forces, Mobile Guerrilla Forces [Mike Forces], regional forces or any special projects of significance (if so, they are kept hidden.) In the days of super high-resolution, real-time photo intelligence, strategic recon seems OBE.

This leaves Direct Action [D.A.], the ground of all military combat elements, but the least effective employment of SF assets. SF is devolving into mini Ranger Battalions. What is being lost is the thing that distinguishes them -- the finesse and nuance, which earned them the well-deserved title, "Sneaky Petes".

D.A. is why God made Rangers and Marines. When SF and SEALS are used as assault infantry, then a fine tool is being misutilized. Conventional commanders simply don't know how to synergistically employ SF assets as force multipliers [Note: We are not talking SOF assets; we are talking SF and SEAL.]

Rangers, Force Recon Marines and Marines are classic Infantry assault troops of world-class quality. It is doubtful that any foreign military equals their level of expertise. But the point is, D.A. is not a hearts and minds moment. It is closing with and destroying a hostile force, which is not what COIN is all about, as Boudreaux points out. Killing the indig is not nation building.

The book challenges us to consider what actually makes the SF special. It certainly is not the beret, since everyone wears one these days.