Roberts Ridge Revisted

 --USAF Technical Sgt. John Chapman 
(KIA, 2002)

 "It was just a moment of pure panic." 
--Pilot of Razor 4
_________________________

Fourteen years after the first publicized meeting engagement in the Phony War on Terror (PWOT ©) -- the Battle of Roberts Ridge -- USAF Technical Sergeant John Chapman (KIA) is being considered for a posthumous Medal of Honor (MOH) based on "newly accessed" graphic data.

The new data? A grainy and indistinct film recently released in the New York Times. But this fuzzy footage is superfluous because the Sergeant's 2003 Navy Cross award citation already told the story of an action which clearly met the bar for a MOH.

The Blair Witch Project-style footage seems an absurd criteria for reconsideration of Chapman's award. 21st century photo technology could render clearer footage (or what's a DARPA for?).

In a 2010 post on this blog [War and Remembrance], Ranger said that Sgt. Chapman should have received the MOH. Why is the Air Force only now considering the upgrade of his Air Cross?

What was being hidden, and why now?

In an incompetent mission, Airman Chapman was left for dead on the battlefield by SEALS. He continued fighting for an hour, before dying from his injuries. Were the authorities waiting to release this Bad News until all living players had received their retirements?

Certainly the war effort and the concept of a viable Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) would have been harmed if it had been acknowledged that the SEALS had abandoned a member of a sister service. Special Operations have not come far since Desert One, despite the Hoorah and exorbitant funding.

The Special Operations Command ratholed a clear MOH action because it would have shed light on the fact that the vaunted SEALS left a seriously-wounded man to die on the battlefield. While they returned to find injured fellow SEALS, they did  not do so for Air Force member, non-SEAL, Sgt. Chapman.

The SEALS have gained a cachet following the release of Marcus Luttrell's book, Lone Survivor (later a movie). Luttrell was the first of the literary SEALS in the PWOT.

But Ranger questions why the Navy even has an element like the SEALS. They are essentially Naval Infantry which lack the training, experience and institutional knowledge to be infantry. Why does a United States fleet Navy need its own infantry personnel thrown into a fight which is remote from any fleet activity?

Why were the SEALS on a frozen Afghan hillside with nary a whiff of salt in the air?

The Navy has the United States Marine Corps (USMC) for land combat purposes. The Marines have  depth of knowledge and Combat Support (CS) and Combat Support Services (CSS) to support their mission. The SEALS are a redundancy.

This battle lacked the hallmarks of advanced military thought or action. In addition, the players lacked for functional equipment. A quick review of the enemy situation reveals the irrelevance of this mission for which Sgt. Chapman died on a meaningless piece of real estate:

They were a squad or platoon minus, or a reinforced squad, occupying an isolated high-altitude observation post; one could stretch the point and call it a combat outpost. Whatever we call it, it was probably occupied by Chechens who got there by climbing the mountain.

This means that United States forces could have interdicted their support and utilized ambush and blocking positions to kill them as they went up or came down the mountain. This is Infantry 101, of the sort any Army or USMC grunt instinctively understands.

The Battle of Robert Ridge is reminiscent of the Battle of Ia Drang (LZ X-Ray, 1965) in the Republic of Vietnam, the first meeting engagement of the North Vietnamese Army against a heliborne U.S. Army. The Roberts Ridge debacle could also be equated to the Battle of Mogadishu ("Day of the Rangers", Blackhawk Down, 1993) in Somalia.

The truth is simple: if the enemy is assaulted, he will fight back and accept the losses. Our technology means naught when the equation is reduced to rifle against rifle. At that point, you have already lost..

Obviously, the SEALS have no patience for the basics of ground combat, and assaulted an objective without proper visual reconnaissance.

The Operations Orders for this action are still classified -- why?


[cross-posted @milpub.]

Relative Worth, Revisited

[Re-post: In his 16 December 2011 piece, The Medal of Honor and Messenger, Ranger suggested his associate MSG Benny Adkins receive the Medal of Honor (MOH) for his action in 1966; subsequently Adkins was belatedly awarded the MOH in October 2013.

In his 20 December 2010 piece, Relative Worth, Ranger wrote that Stephen Sanford should also receive the MOH, especially in light of the recent upgrades to medals received by veterans of the Vietnam War. We hope Mr. Sanford does not have to wait that long.] 

 

  Cpl. Stephen Sanford received DSC (2007)

And I believe we need heroes,
I believe we need certain people
who we can measure our own shortcomings by
--Richard Attenborough

The ultimate measure of a man is not
where he stands in moments of comfort and convenience,
but where he stands at times of challenge and controversy
--Martin Luther King, Jr.

Aspire rather to be a hero than merely appear one
--Baltasar Gracian
__________________

In continued consideration of the Medal of Honor, let's compare Staff Sgt Salvatore Guinta's recent MOH (the first living MOH recipient since the Vietnam War) to the Distinguished Service Cross (DSC) awarded to Private First Class Stephen C. Sanford.

[See SSG Guinta's MOH citation HERE; PFC Sanford's DSC HERE. Note, 7, AUG 2014: Two additional MOH's have been awarded, both to 2/503/173 members.] 

The short and sweet question is, why did Guinta receive a MOH when Sanford received only a DSC? What differentiates their actions? Even patriotic site BLACKFIVE posed the following question regarding the dearth of coverage on the actions of PFC Sanford: "Read this and ask why this story hasn't been all over the media. It was released more than 8 weeks ago...only the Army has information on it. I found no media services have picked this up at all..."

Sanford was wounded in the initial burst of fire, yet he elected to continue the assault. He repeatedly assaulted into the face of the enemy though wounded, receiving two "potentially fatal" gunshot wounds in the service of saving and protecting other soldiers. He administered combat life-saving while under direct fire, sustaining two additional solid hit wounds while so doing.

Objectively reading the citations, it is clear that Sanford exceeded the requirements for the MOH, and in fact, his actions exceeded the valorous acts of SSG Guinta.

Of the eight MOH's awarded in the Phony War on Terror (PWOT ©), three have gone to Special Operations Forces - Special Operations Command assets and five to the rest of the entire military. That is a heavily weighted fact. Is the SOCOM more valorous than regular line soldiers?

Some painful questions arise from this comparison. Would Stephen Sanford have received the MOH if he were to have been killed? Would Sanford have received it if he were an SOF asset? If so, why?

This is not a criticism of SSG Guinta, who is a fine soldier and an MOH-worthy recipient. The sole purpose is to question the apparent bias in the conference of this prestigious award. If Guinta deserves the MOH, then so, too, does Pvt. Sanford. That is as clear as a front sight on an M4 carbine.

CPT William Swenson

MOH recipient Capt. William Swenson

________________

Purple Heart magazine featured recent Medal of Honor winner Captain William Swenson in their Jan/Feb (2014) issue ... currently unemployed Capt. Swenson, according to the piece.

And though Mr. Swenson has requested a return to active duty, to-date there has been no action on his personnel request. Capt. Swenson left the Army after nine years Active Duty; he is the only living officer of the Phony War on Terror (PWOT ©).

"In a rare move, Swenson has asked to return to active duty. "We are currently reviewing his request and processing it within established policy," an Army spokesman, George Wright, told Purple Heart magazine."

Correct me if I'm wrong, but MOH recipients should be an exception to policy -- so why is an MOH recipient being treated so shabbily? The Army is a large institution and it's hard to believe they cannot find a place for a man like Swenson. If President Obama were acting as Commander-in-Chief he would directly order the Army Chief of Staff to create a special slot for this man.

MOH winners are akin to demigods in the Army. CPT Swenson was highly regarded by his men, capable and brave; none of this is in question. How could the Army not embrace him with open arms? Answer: he spoke the truth to power. He was correct, but he crossed the thin green line. Ranger knows what happens when you speak the truth (ref. his "Disillusionment" series.)

Swenson has already been shafted once by the Army. In the magazine's list of "Five Key Facts About Captain Swenson is, "#4. His path to the Medal of Honor was marked with Army politics":

"After the September 2009 battle, Swenson criticized senior Army officers in written reports, stating that they refused to send air and artillery support during the firefight, costing lives. The Army launched an investigation into Swenson's allegations. Eventually, the officers were reprimanded and their careers ended. As a result, Swenson's Medal of Honor nomination was "mysteriously deleted form [sic] the Army's awards tracking database. Speculation is that senior officers, perhaps friends of the reprimanded officers, were responsible. ..."

Ranger would like to congratulate Capt. Swenson. Having personally known and served with three MOH recipients, he can say Swenson stands as tall as all of them.

Whatever happens in this case we at RangerAgainstWar wish former Captain Swenson the best life has to offer.

True Colors

 --Capt. William Swenson receiving the Medal of Honor,
October 15, 2013 

Show me a smile then
Don't be unhappy
Can't remember when
I last saw you laughing 
--True Colors, Cyndi Lauper
_______________________

Reportage on the on the most recent Medal of Honor recipient from the Wars on Terror -- Army Captain William Swenson -- carries a misstatement:

"The recognition of Swenson for his gallantry marks only the second time in the last 50 years that two American service members have received the Medal of Honor for actions in the same battle.

"In 2011, Dakota Meyer, a Marine sergeant who also is now a civilian, was awarded the Medal of Honor for his actions in that Sept. 8, 2009, battle in Afghanistan" (Obama: Washington can learn from Medal of Honor recipient.)

Ranger presumes the article's "second time" refers to the to the MOH's posthumously awarded to Randall David "Randy" Shughart and Master Sergeant Gary Gordon for their actions in the Battle of Mogadishu in Oct. 1993. 

In fact, however, the Vietnam War Battle of the Ia Drang Valley (LZ X-Ray) in 1965 produced three Medals of Honor recipients, a battle within that 50 year window. Somehow, we still give that war and its participants the short shrift. 

The MOH recipients from the Battle of LZ X-Ray:

--1st LT Walter J. Marm (15 Feb 67)
--Captain Ed Freeman (16 July 2001)
--Major Bruce Crandall (26 Feb 2007)

It is only appropriate that the MOH be awarded to an Infantry U.S. Army Captain. Capt. Swenson did what one would expect from an officer under dire circumstances; he deserves our praise.

But let us not forget Marm, Freeman or Crandall, or any other recipient from recent wars. 

A Day Late

--Clinton L. Romesha

I’d rather have the Medal of Honor
than be president of the United States
--Harry S. Truman
______________________

[Note: RAW will run further comments on this action.]

Were it not for a story reprinted from MilitaryTimes.com in his Purple Heart Magazine (May/June 2013) reprinted from MilitaryTimes.com, Ranger would not have known of the fourth living Medal of Honor recipient who served in Afghanistan, Clinton L. Romesha. Romesha was presented with his medal at the White House 11 Feb 2013.

Press on Romesha's MOH was scant, typified by this brief NYT piece, possibly because Romesha declined Michelle Obama's invitation to attend her husband's State of the Union speech while in town for the award, denying the President an important photo op. Romesha's action deserves some Ranger commentary.

Staff Sergeant Romesha was the section leader of the 61st Cavalry Regiment, 4th Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division. During the action of 3 October 2009 in Nuristan Province, Afghanistan, this small unit fought for its life in a nasty little defensive fight reminiscent of those at Wanat and Waygul.

In all, U.S. troops were arrayed for combat in a defense position which was indefensible, to no apparent military purpose; the posts were abandoned soon after each fight.

Commander in Chief Obama said at SSG Romesha's MOH presentation that "A later investigation found that Command Outpost Keating was tactically indefensible". That's what these soldiers were asked to do: Defend the indefensible." If this assessment is correct, why was this not ascertained before eight U.S. soldiers were killed and 22 wounded, and why were the soldiers not extracted? The point of combat operations is that something be achieved as a result of the killing and violence; none of these fights met that bar.

Ranger is not questioning the indubitable valor of this engaged unit -- we are asking why COP Keating was hung out in the breeze, a tasty morsel for the Afghan opposition's picking? Hanging pretty medals from a brave soldier's neck does not erase the question.

In terms of U.S. response, the press rolls endless instant replays of the Benghazi Embassy murders and the Boston Marathon bombings, events in which eight U.S. citizens were killed. We are transfixed and mesmerized by these events, and yet hardly a whisper of the eight Americans killed in this 4th Infantry Division fight. No press and no indignation from the C in C down to the section leaders. Where are the congressional committee meetings searching to assign culpability for the failure?

Oddly, the Army reports four officers (0-3 through 06) received reprimands for the action, but the names or the nature of the reprimands are not stated; as the names are not given there is no way to verify the allegation. If there is culpability, the taxpayers have the right to know the names of the accused as we pay their salaries; this is democracy.

Or does democracy die incrementally in small little fights in insignificant valleys of inconsequential countries?

Why do we blithely accept the meaningless and sacrificial deaths of eight soldiers on some far-flung scrap of land which holds no value and gains us nothing? These soldiers did not die defending our country and Constitution. Their actions in Nuristan Province, Afghanistan, were not connected to the safety and security of our Homeland. The U.S. could kill every Taliban fighter in Afghanistan and that country will still never be a democratic member of the fraternity of nations.

So whither the effort, death and destruction?

Relative Worth

Cpl. Stephen Sanford received DSC (2007)

And I believe we need heroes,
I believe we need certain people
who we can measure our own shortcomings by
--Richard Attenborough

The ultimate measure of a man is not
where he stands in moments of comfort and convenience,
but where he stands at times of challenge and controversy
--Martin Luther King, Jr.

Aspire rather to be a hero than merely appear one
--Baltasar Gracian
__________________

In continued consideration of the Medal of Honor, let's compare Staff Sgt Salvatore Guinta's recent MOH (the first living MOH recipient since the Vietnam War) to the Distinguished Service Cross (DSC) awarded to Private First Class Stephen C. Sanford.

[See SSG Guinta's MOH citation HERE; PFC Sanford's DSC HERE.]

The short and sweet question is, why did Guinta receive a MOH when Sanford received only a DSC? What differentiates their actions? Even patriotic site BLACKFIVE posed the following question regarding the dearth of coverage on the actions of PFC Sanford: "Read this and ask why this story hasn't been all over the media. It was released more than 8 weeks ago...only the Army has information on it. I found no media services have picked this up at all..."

Sanford was wounded in the initial burst of fire, yet he elected to continue the assault. He repeatedly assaulted into the face of the enemy though wounded, receiving two "potentially fatal" gunshot wounds in the service of saving and protecting other soldiers. He administered combat life-saving while under direct fire, sustaining two additional solid hit wounds while so doing.

Objectively reading the citations, it is clear that Sanford exceeded the requirements for the MOH, and in fact, his actions exceeded the valorous acts of SSG Guinta.

Of the eight MOH's awarded in the Phony War on Terror (PWOT ©), three have gone to Special Operations Forces - Special Operations Command assets and five to the rest of the entire military. That is a heavily weighted fact. Is the SOCOM more valorous than regular line soldiers?

Some painful questions arise from this comparison. Would Stephen Sanford have received the MOH if he were to have been killed? Would Sanford have received it if he were an SOF asset? If so, why?

This is not a criticism of SSG Guinta, who is a fine soldier and an MOH-worthy recipient. The sole purpose is to question the apparent bias in the conference of this prestigious award. If Guinta deserves the MOH, then so, too, does Pvt. Sanford. That is as clear as a front sight on an M4 carbine.


[Note: Ranger would like to discuss this post with Stephen Sanford. Please contact us.]

War and Remembrance

If I had a child who wanted to be a teacher,
I would bid him Godspeed as if he were going to war.
For indeed the war against prejudice, greed
and ignorance is eternal
-- James Hilton

The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure
conditions favorable to the pursuit of happiness.
They recognized the significance of man's spiritual nature,
of his feelings and of his intellect . . .
They sought to protect Americans in their beliefs,
their thoughts, their emotions, and their sensations.
They conferred as against the government
the right to be left alone -- the most comprehensive of rights
and the right most valued by civilized men
-- Supreme Court Justice Brandeis (Olmstead v. the U.S.)

A nation of warriors and fanatics,
marching forward in perfect unity,
all thinking the same thoughts and shouting the same slogans,
perpetually working, fighting, triumphing, persecuting -
three hundred million people all with the same face
--1984, George Orwell
____________________

The Medals of Honor since 2001 have been about loss and failure, moreso than conspicuous gallantry and devotion to duty which they are meant to recognize. Although the medals recognize gallantry, the gallantry is to no end. The reality is the futility and conspicuous waste of young, vibrant American fighting men, to no discernable purpose.

Of all of the Phony War on Terror (PWOT ©) MOH's, only SFC Paul Smith's is a validation of soldierly skills, leadership, devotion to duty and the subsequent validation of soldierly valor. Of all of the PWOT MOH's to date, only SFC Smith's represented the completion of a mission, albeit at the loss of the soldier's life.

Smith's sacrifice saved a collection point for wounded soldiers, and SFC Smith's loss was for the greater good. All of the subsequent medals represent the failure of arms. The medals have gone to sacrificial lambs throwing themselves on grenades to save their comrades. This valor ignores the validity of their sacrifice.

The MOH's of the Special Operations Command went to Michael Mansoor, a SEAL that self immolized, and Murphy and Miller, who both symbolized exceptional courage dedicated to the completion of their assigned missions.

However, courage has become institutionalized as a symbol of defeat and frustration within a military that has become devoid of success. Our losses have become our victories; our medals symbolize a devotion to combat that has no end point and no military significance.

Historically, the MOH was a representation of hope and duty that led to victory; it has now come to signify self-immolation and meaningless death. It is not that heroic actions are not occurring -- certainly Pararescue Technical Sergeant John Chapman on Roberts Ridge (Operation Anaconda) should have received the MOH, without question. Yet despite these episodes of unmistakable heroism, fully recognized or not, the nagging question remains.

Our medals have become our Cassandras.

Partnering with the Unknown -- SSG Miller MOH, Pt. 2

Bullet in a sand storm
Looking for a place to land
Bullet in a sand storm
Full heart beats an empty one
In the deck they dealt to man
Use me while you can
--Use Me While You Can, Bruce Cockburn

SSG Miller Medal of Honor, Pt. 2:
____________________

When we left Part I, "the entire friendly force still has the freedom of maneuver, has not decisively engaged and maintains initiative, and the main enemy fighting positions had not yet been approached or engaged. At this point it is still a fight to establish and maintain contact."

Their next move contradicts military doctrine.

It is a strange decision to partner with an unknown friendly unit and enter intense combat without knowing the friendlies capabilities and proclivities. This ad hoc approach is NOT the way elite units operate. One cannot plan in-depth with an unknown quantity leading the point.

"During the movement, Staff Sgt. Miller continually reinforced proper patrolling techniques as well as repeatedly adjusted and corrected the ANA rate of speed. Realizing that the engagement area was located in the mouth of a small, extremely steep and narrow valley that created a natural choke point, Staff Sgt. Miller directed the ANA to disperse from a file into a modified wedge."

Why would anyone enter a choke point -- another word for "kill zone" -- when the high ground is obviously well-defended? Why not pull back and request the Quick Reaction Force (QRF) or conventional force to reinforce the effort? Simply put, twelve men do not an assault force make.

"This contact initiated a near-ambush from a company-sized group of insurgents. The insurgent forces fired on Staff Sgt. Miller’s patrol with multiple PKM machine guns, RPGs, and AK-47 assault rifles from distances of less than 25 meters.

"The patrol was completely vulnerable, in the kill zone and without cover in a complex ambush with insurgent fighting positions located to the front (East), the left (North), and the right (South)."

Why did the patrol enter into such a precipitous tactical environment? When does aggressive soldiering become foolhardy activity?

"It soon became evident that numerous insurgents occupied prepared, elevated and hardened fighting positions in the mountain rock with overhead cover along the North and South valley ridgeline. Insurgents on the valley floor to Staff Sgt. Miller’s direct front, left, and right were fighting in defilade and possessed ample cover and concealment necessary for the employment of overwhelming fires on the totally exposed patrol."

This is confusing as the enemy was in defilade. If they are in defilade, then aren't you also in defilade?

"In the face of devastating insurgent fire, the ANA located directly behind Staff Sgt. Miller broke formation and bound away downhill and out of the kill zone, leaving Staff Sgt. Miller alone and with no support in the open terrain."

If the fire was so devastating, why were no ANAs killed while pulling out of the area? Why would anybody occupy open terrain in the face of intense fire? Why not pull bakc and organize a hasty defensive position? Why not bring the SAW back into the main perimeter to provide direct defensive fire? Why not dismount the vehicular 7.62 machine guns and ground-mount them for defensive purposes?

"To the front of Staff Sgt. Miller’s position one PKM machine gun and five AK47s were inflicting devastating hostile fire on the retreating ANA members and the remaining ODA patrol. Understanding the potential for catastrophe, Staff Sgt. Miller boldly charged the enemy and accurately engaged the entire force with his squad automatic weapon, thus eliminating the threat.

"With heavy fire from insurgent forces from all sides of his position engulfing him, Staff Sgt. Miller continued to engage at least four other insurgent positions, killing or wounding at least 10 insurgents."

This is remarkable since previously we saw that the enemy was in defilade.

"The darkness of the night and limited visibility made Staff Sgt. Miller’s weapon, also the most casualty producing, the greatest threat to the insurgent ambush. The highlighted muzzle flash and the distinct sound from his SAW instantly marked Staff Sgt. Miller as an easily identifiable target."

Why was the MK 19 not serviced and returned to action? Why were the vehicle MG's not utilized by the ODA to provide covering fire? Where was the on-call artillery?

"Staff Sgt. Miller’s cover fire was so accurate that it not only provided the necessary cover to save his team, it also suppressed the enemy to the right flank of the patrol, to the point where they could not reposition from that direction against the ODA for the duration of the engagement."

This belies the idea of the enemy being in defilade. Also, since they were in prepared positions they would have avenues of escape safe from direct fire. Artillery would have been most useful at this time. One man cannot keep an enemy company-sized force pinned down, especially when they occupied numerous prepared fighting positions.

"During his final charge forward, Staff Sgt. Miller threw two hand grenades into fighting positions, destroying the positions and killing or wounding an additional four insurgents. Only when Staff Sgt. Miller realized his fellow team members were out of immediate danger, and in positions to support him, did he attempt to move for cover."

Neither the ANA nor ODA elements entered the kill zone. Only Miller was forward and out of supporting fire range prior to his sustaining his mortal wound. This is not prudent soldiering. Where does valor split from ill-advised tactics? The teams were able to move, and Miller's fire was not supernatural.


Pt. III: Things Don't Line Up